From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:42676) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1Vq501-0006ES-MM for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 09 Dec 2013 12:52:14 -0500 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1Vq4zs-0008Rz-PS for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 09 Dec 2013 12:52:05 -0500 Received: from e24smtp03.br.ibm.com ([32.104.18.24]:49778) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1Vq4zs-0008Rq-Da for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 09 Dec 2013 12:51:56 -0500 Received: from /spool/local by e24smtp03.br.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 15:51:49 -0200 Received: from d24relay03.br.ibm.com (d24relay03.br.ibm.com [9.13.184.25]) by d24dlp01.br.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9AD1E3520078 for ; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 12:51:37 -0500 (EST) Received: from d24av04.br.ibm.com (d24av04.br.ibm.com [9.8.31.97]) by d24relay03.br.ibm.com (8.13.8/8.13.8/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id rB9HpKwc35258478 for ; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 15:51:20 -0200 Received: from d24av04.br.ibm.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by d24av04.br.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.14.4/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id rB9HpbUe005282 for ; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 15:51:37 -0200 Message-ID: <52A60328.6020102@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 15:51:36 -0200 From: Eduardo Otubo MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1386609652-7876-1-git-send-email-otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20131209173330.GG22114@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20131209173330.GG22114@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] seccomp: "-sandbox on" won't kill Qemu when option not built in List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: "Daniel P. Berrange" Cc: pmoore@redhat.com, lmr@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, anthony@codemonkey.ws On 12/09/2013 03:33 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > On Mon, Dec 09, 2013 at 03:20:52PM -0200, Eduardo Otubo wrote: >> This option was requested by virt-test team so they can run tests with >> Qemu and "-sandbox on" set without breaking whole test if host doesn't >> have support for seccomp in kernel. It covers two possibilities: >> >> 1) Host kernel support does not support seccomp, but user installed Qemu >> package with sandbox support: Libseccomp will fail -> qemu will fail >> nicely and won't stop execution. >> >> 2) Host kernel has support but Qemu package wasn't built with sandbox >> feature. Qemu will fail nicely and won't stop execution. >> >> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo >> --- >> vl.c | 10 +++------- >> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/vl.c b/vl.c >> index b0399de..a0806dc 100644 >> --- a/vl.c >> +++ b/vl.c >> @@ -967,13 +967,11 @@ static int parse_sandbox(QemuOpts *opts, void *opaque) >> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP >> if (seccomp_start() < 0) { >> qerror_report(ERROR_CLASS_GENERIC_ERROR, >> - "failed to install seccomp syscall filter in the kernel"); >> - return -1; >> + "failed to install seccomp syscall filter in the kernel, disabling it"); >> } >> #else >> qerror_report(ERROR_CLASS_GENERIC_ERROR, >> - "sandboxing request but seccomp is not compiled into this build"); >> - return -1; >> + "sandboxing request but seccomp is not compiled into this build, disabling it"); >> #endif >> } >> >> @@ -3808,9 +3806,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp) >> exit(1); >> } >> >> - if (qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("sandbox"), parse_sandbox, NULL, 0)) { >> - exit(1); >> - } >> + qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("sandbox"), parse_sandbox, NULL, 0); >> >> #ifndef _WIN32 >> if (qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("add-fd"), parse_add_fd, NULL, 1)) { > > This change is really dubious from a security POV. If the admin requested > sandboxing and the host or QEMU build cannot support it, then QEMU really > *must* exit. I think an admin must know what he's doing. If he requested sandbox but without kernel support he need to step back a little and understand what he's doing. This patch won't decrease the security level, IMHO. > > IMHO the test suite should probe to see if sandbox is working or not, and > just not use the "-sandbox on" arg if the host doesn't support it. But I think this could be done on virt-test as well :) -- Eduardo Otubo IBM Linux Technology Center