From: Corey Bryant <coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: pmoore@redhat.com, lmr@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
anthony@codemonkey.ws
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] seccomp: "-sandbox on" won't kill Qemu when option not built in
Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 22:20:07 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52A68867.4080309@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <52A60328.6020102@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On 12/09/2013 12:51 PM, Eduardo Otubo wrote:
>
>
> On 12/09/2013 03:33 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 09, 2013 at 03:20:52PM -0200, Eduardo Otubo wrote:
>>> This option was requested by virt-test team so they can run tests with
>>> Qemu and "-sandbox on" set without breaking whole test if host doesn't
>>> have support for seccomp in kernel. It covers two possibilities:
>>>
>>> 1) Host kernel support does not support seccomp, but user installed
>>> Qemu
>>> package with sandbox support: Libseccomp will fail -> qemu will
>>> fail
>>> nicely and won't stop execution.
>>>
>>> 2) Host kernel has support but Qemu package wasn't built with sandbox
>>> feature. Qemu will fail nicely and won't stop execution.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>> ---
>>> vl.c | 10 +++-------
>>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/vl.c b/vl.c
>>> index b0399de..a0806dc 100644
>>> --- a/vl.c
>>> +++ b/vl.c
>>> @@ -967,13 +967,11 @@ static int parse_sandbox(QemuOpts *opts, void
>>> *opaque)
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>>> if (seccomp_start() < 0) {
>>> qerror_report(ERROR_CLASS_GENERIC_ERROR,
>>> - "failed to install seccomp syscall filter
>>> in the kernel");
>>> - return -1;
>>> + "failed to install seccomp syscall filter
>>> in the kernel, disabling it");
>>> }
>>> #else
>>> qerror_report(ERROR_CLASS_GENERIC_ERROR,
>>> - "sandboxing request but seccomp is not
>>> compiled into this build");
>>> - return -1;
>>> + "sandboxing request but seccomp is not
>>> compiled into this build, disabling it");
>>> #endif
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -3808,9 +3806,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
>>> exit(1);
>>> }
>>>
>>> - if (qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("sandbox"), parse_sandbox,
>>> NULL, 0)) {
>>> - exit(1);
>>> - }
>>> + qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("sandbox"), parse_sandbox,
>>> NULL, 0);
>>>
>>> #ifndef _WIN32
>>> if (qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("add-fd"), parse_add_fd,
>>> NULL, 1)) {
>>
>> This change is really dubious from a security POV. If the admin requested
>> sandboxing and the host or QEMU build cannot support it, then QEMU really
>> *must* exit.
>
> I think an admin must know what he's doing. If he requested sandbox but
> without kernel support he need to step back a little and understand what
> he's doing. This patch won't decrease the security level, IMHO.
>
Preventing qemu from exiting is definitely not the right approach.
Please feel free to run code by me ahead of time in the future.
>>
>> IMHO the test suite should probe to see if sandbox is working or not, and
>> just not use the "-sandbox on" arg if the host doesn't support it.
>
> But I think this could be done on virt-test as well :)
>
This would make sense.
Although it sounds like Lucas was looking for an error message when
seccomp kills qemu. Maybe virt-test could grep the audit log for the
existence of a "type=SECCOMP" record within the test's time of
execution, and issue a message based on that.
--
Regards,
Corey Bryant
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-12-10 3:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-12-09 17:20 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] seccomp: "-sandbox on" won't kill Qemu when option not built in Eduardo Otubo
2013-12-09 17:33 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2013-12-09 17:51 ` Eduardo Otubo
2013-12-09 18:16 ` Paul Moore
2013-12-10 3:20 ` Corey Bryant [this message]
2013-12-10 18:48 ` Lucas Meneghel Rodrigues
2013-12-10 19:31 ` Paul Moore
2013-12-10 20:13 ` Lucas Meneghel Rodrigues
2013-12-10 19:35 ` Eduardo Otubo
2013-12-09 19:11 ` Lucas Meneghel Rodrigues
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