From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
To: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Describe flaws in qcow/qcow2 encryption in the docs
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 06:21:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52DFC5D4.5060109@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1390390561-14901-1-git-send-email-berrange@redhat.com>
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On 01/22/2014 04:36 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> The qemu-img.texi / qemu-doc.texi files currently describe the
> qcow2/qcow2 encryption thus
>
> "Encryption uses the AES format which is very secure (128 bit
> keys). Use a long password (16 characters) to get maximum
> protection."
>
> While AES is indeed a strong encryption system, the way that
> QCow/QCow2 use it results in a poor/weak encryption system.
> Due to the use of predictable IVs it is vulnerable to chosen
> plaintext attacks which can reveal the existance of encrypted
s/existance/existence/
> data.
>
> The direct use of the user passphrase as the encryption key
> also leads to an inability to change the passphrase of an
> image. If passphrase is ever compromised the image data will
> all be vulnerable, since it cannot be re-encrypted. The admin
> has to clone the image files with a new passphrase and then
> use a program like shred to secure erase all the old files.
>
> Recommend against any use of QCow/QCow2 encryption, directing
> users to dm-crypt / LUKS which can meet modern cryptography
> best practices.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
> ---
> qemu-doc.texi | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
> qemu-img.texi | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> +
> +The use of encryption in QCow and QCow2 images is considered to flawed by modern
> +cryptography standards, suffering from a number of design problems
s/$/:/
> +
> +@itemize @minus
> +@item The AES-CBC cipher is used with predictable initialization vectors based
> +on the sector number. This makes it vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks
> +which can reveal the existence of encrypted data.
> +@item The user passphrase is directly used as the encryption key. A poorly
> +choosen / short passphrase will compromise the security of the encryption.
s/choosen/chosen/
> +In the event of the passphrase being compromised there is no way to change
Maybe s/^/@item / ? After all, the need to clone/shred after compromise
is there whether the passphrase was poorly chosen or maximally chosen,
it's just that poorly chosen is more likely to be easily compromised.
> +++ b/qemu-img.texi
> +@item The user passphrase is directly used as the encryption key. A poorly
> +choosen / short passphrase will compromise the security of the encryption.
Copy and paste the fixes above here, too.
--
Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-01-22 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-01-22 11:36 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Describe flaws in qcow/qcow2 encryption in the docs Daniel P. Berrange
2014-01-22 11:49 ` Peter Maydell
2014-01-22 12:28 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2014-01-22 13:21 ` Eric Blake [this message]
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