[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 0/4] ivshmem security fixes

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 0/4] ivshmem security fixes

[Andreas Färber]

Hello,

This series tightens security on incoming data for ivshmem, originally sparked
by SUSE's security team (Sebastian Krahmer). I've combined them and tackled
remaining review feedback.

Regards,
Andreas

Changes from Sebastian's #2:
* Rebased onto Stefan's patches
* Dropped g_realloc() check (Stefan)
* Fixed fd leak and appended a patch fixing another one (Stefan)
* Simplified comment (Stefan)

Changes from Stefan's series:
* Modified to handle partial reads (Peter/Gerd)
* Changed check from > to >= (Peter)

Cc: Cam Macdonell <cam@cs.ualberta.ca>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Marchand <david.marchand@6wind.com>

Andreas Färber (1):
  ivshmem: Fix fd leak on error

Sebastian Krahmer (1):
  ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access

Stefan Hajnoczi (2):
  ivshmem: Check ivshmem_read() size argument
  ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server

 hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

-- 
1.8.4.5

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/4] ivshmem: Check ivshmem_read() size argument

[Andreas Färber]

From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

The third argument to the fd_read() callback implemented by
ivshmem_read() is the number of bytes, not a flags field.  Fix this and
check we received enough bytes before accessing the buffer pointer.

Cc: Cam Macdonell <cam@cs.ualberta.ca>
Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
[AF: Handle partial reads via FIFO]
Reported-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
---
 hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
index bd9d718..caeee1e 100644
--- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
+++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include "migration/migration.h"
 #include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h"
 #include "qemu/event_notifier.h"
+#include "qemu/fifo8.h"
 #include "sysemu/char.h"
 
 #include <sys/mman.h>
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ typedef struct IVShmemState {
 
     CharDriverState **eventfd_chr;
     CharDriverState *server_chr;
+    Fifo8 incoming_fifo;
     MemoryRegion ivshmem_mmio;
 
     /* We might need to register the BAR before we actually have the memory.
@@ -424,14 +426,35 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) {
     }
 }
 
-static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t * buf, int flags)
+static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
 {
     IVShmemState *s = opaque;
     int incoming_fd, tmp_fd;
     int guest_max_eventfd;
     long incoming_posn;
 
-    memcpy(&incoming_posn, buf, sizeof(long));
+    if (fifo8_is_empty(&s->incoming_fifo) && size == sizeof(incoming_posn)) {
+        memcpy(&incoming_posn, buf, size);
+    } else {
+        const uint8_t *p;
+        uint32_t num;
+
+        IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("short read of %d bytes\n", size);
+        num = MAX(size, sizeof(long) - fifo8_num_used(&s->incoming_fifo));
+        fifo8_push_all(&s->incoming_fifo, buf, num);
+        if (fifo8_num_used(&s->incoming_fifo) < sizeof(incoming_posn)) {
+            return;
+        }
+        size -= num;
+        buf += num;
+        p = fifo8_pop_buf(&s->incoming_fifo, sizeof(incoming_posn), &num);
+        g_assert(num == sizeof(incoming_posn));
+        memcpy(&incoming_posn, p, sizeof(incoming_posn));
+        if (size > 0) {
+            fifo8_push_all(&s->incoming_fifo, buf, size);
+        }
+    }
+
     /* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */
     tmp_fd = qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd(s->server_chr);
     IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n", incoming_posn, tmp_fd);
@@ -663,6 +686,8 @@ static int pci_ivshmem_init(PCIDevice *dev)
         s->ivshmem_size = ivshmem_get_size(s);
     }
 
+    fifo8_create(&s->incoming_fifo, sizeof(long));
+
     register_savevm(DEVICE(dev), "ivshmem", 0, 0, ivshmem_save, ivshmem_load,
                                                                         dev);
 
@@ -796,6 +821,7 @@ static void pci_ivshmem_uninit(PCIDevice *dev)
     memory_region_del_subregion(&s->bar, &s->ivshmem);
     vmstate_unregister_ram(&s->ivshmem, DEVICE(dev));
     unregister_savevm(DEVICE(dev), "ivshmem", s);
+    fifo8_destroy(&s->incoming_fifo);
 }
 
 static Property ivshmem_properties[] = {
-- 
1.8.4.5

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 2/4] ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server

[Andreas Färber]

From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

Check incoming_posn to avoid out-of-bounds array accesses if the ivshmem
server on the host sends invalid values.

Cc: Cam Macdonell <cam@cs.ualberta.ca>
Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
[AF: Tighten upper bound check for posn in close_guest_eventfds()]
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
---
 hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
index caeee1e..24f74f6 100644
--- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
+++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)
     if (!ivshmem_has_feature(s, IVSHMEM_IOEVENTFD)) {
         return;
     }
+    if (posn < 0 || posn >= s->nb_peers) {
+        return;
+    }
 
     guest_curr_max = s->peers[posn].nb_eventfds;
 
@@ -455,6 +458,11 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
         }
     }
 
+    if (incoming_posn < -1) {
+        IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("invalid incoming_posn %ld\n", incoming_posn);
+        return;
+    }
+
     /* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */
     tmp_fd = qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd(s->server_chr);
     IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n", incoming_posn, tmp_fd);
-- 
1.8.4.5

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/4] ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access

[Andreas Färber]

From: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>

Fix OOB access via malformed incoming_posn parameters
and check that requested memory is actually alloc'ed.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
[AF: Rebased, cleanups, avoid fd leak]
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
---
 hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
index 24f74f6..ecef82a 100644
--- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
+++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_IVSHMEM   PCI_VENDOR_ID_REDHAT_QUMRANET
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_IVSHMEM   0x1110
@@ -410,14 +411,24 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)
 
 /* this function increase the dynamic storage need to store data about other
  * guests */
-static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) {
+static int increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size)
+{
 
     int j, old_nb_alloc;
 
+    /* check for integer overflow */
+    if (new_min_size >= INT_MAX / sizeof(Peer) - 1 || new_min_size <= 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     old_nb_alloc = s->nb_peers;
 
-    while (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers)
-        s->nb_peers = s->nb_peers * 2;
+    if (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers) {
+        /* +1 because #new_min_size is used as last array index */
+        s->nb_peers = new_min_size + 1;
+    } else {
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("bumping storage to %d guests\n", s->nb_peers);
     s->peers = g_realloc(s->peers, s->nb_peers * sizeof(Peer));
@@ -427,6 +438,8 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) {
         s->peers[j].eventfds = NULL;
         s->peers[j].nb_eventfds = 0;
     }
+
+    return 0;
 }
 
 static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
@@ -469,7 +482,13 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
 
     /* make sure we have enough space for this guest */
     if (incoming_posn >= s->nb_peers) {
-        increase_dynamic_storage(s, incoming_posn);
+        if (increase_dynamic_storage(s, incoming_posn) < 0) {
+            error_report("increase_dynamic_storage() failed");
+            if (tmp_fd != -1) {
+                close(tmp_fd);
+            }
+            return;
+        }
     }
 
     if (tmp_fd == -1) {
-- 
1.8.4.5

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 4/4] ivshmem: Fix fd leak on error

[Andreas Färber]

Reported-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
---
 hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
index ecef82a..bf585b7 100644
--- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
+++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
@@ -512,6 +512,7 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
     if (incoming_fd == -1) {
         fprintf(stderr, "could not allocate file descriptor %s\n",
                                                             strerror(errno));
+        close(tmp_fd);
         return;
     }
 
-- 
1.8.4.5

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/4] ivshmem: Check ivshmem_read() size argument

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 06:40:05PM +0200, Andreas Färber wrote:
> From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> 
> The third argument to the fd_read() callback implemented by
> ivshmem_read() is the number of bytes, not a flags field.  Fix this and
> check we received enough bytes before accessing the buffer pointer.
> 
> Cc: Cam Macdonell <cam@cs.ualberta.ca>
> Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> [AF: Handle partial reads via FIFO]
> Reported-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
> Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>

Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

> ---
>  hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> index bd9d718..caeee1e 100644
> --- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> +++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>  #include "migration/migration.h"
>  #include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h"
>  #include "qemu/event_notifier.h"
> +#include "qemu/fifo8.h"
>  #include "sysemu/char.h"
>  
>  #include <sys/mman.h>
> @@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ typedef struct IVShmemState {
>  
>      CharDriverState **eventfd_chr;
>      CharDriverState *server_chr;
> +    Fifo8 incoming_fifo;
>      MemoryRegion ivshmem_mmio;
>  
>      /* We might need to register the BAR before we actually have the memory.
> @@ -424,14 +426,35 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) {
>      }
>  }
>  
> -static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t * buf, int flags)
> +static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
>  {
>      IVShmemState *s = opaque;
>      int incoming_fd, tmp_fd;
>      int guest_max_eventfd;
>      long incoming_posn;
>  
> -    memcpy(&incoming_posn, buf, sizeof(long));
> +    if (fifo8_is_empty(&s->incoming_fifo) && size == sizeof(incoming_posn)) {
> +        memcpy(&incoming_posn, buf, size);
> +    } else {
> +        const uint8_t *p;
> +        uint32_t num;
> +
> +        IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("short read of %d bytes\n", size);
> +        num = MAX(size, sizeof(long) - fifo8_num_used(&s->incoming_fifo));
> +        fifo8_push_all(&s->incoming_fifo, buf, num);
> +        if (fifo8_num_used(&s->incoming_fifo) < sizeof(incoming_posn)) {
> +            return;
> +        }
> +        size -= num;
> +        buf += num;
> +        p = fifo8_pop_buf(&s->incoming_fifo, sizeof(incoming_posn), &num);
> +        g_assert(num == sizeof(incoming_posn));
> +        memcpy(&incoming_posn, p, sizeof(incoming_posn));
> +        if (size > 0) {
> +            fifo8_push_all(&s->incoming_fifo, buf, size);
> +        }
> +    }
> +
>      /* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */
>      tmp_fd = qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd(s->server_chr);
>      IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n", incoming_posn, tmp_fd);
> @@ -663,6 +686,8 @@ static int pci_ivshmem_init(PCIDevice *dev)
>          s->ivshmem_size = ivshmem_get_size(s);
>      }
>  
> +    fifo8_create(&s->incoming_fifo, sizeof(long));
> +
>      register_savevm(DEVICE(dev), "ivshmem", 0, 0, ivshmem_save, ivshmem_load,
>                                                                          dev);
>  
> @@ -796,6 +821,7 @@ static void pci_ivshmem_uninit(PCIDevice *dev)
>      memory_region_del_subregion(&s->bar, &s->ivshmem);
>      vmstate_unregister_ram(&s->ivshmem, DEVICE(dev));
>      unregister_savevm(DEVICE(dev), "ivshmem", s);
> +    fifo8_destroy(&s->incoming_fifo);
>  }
>  
>  static Property ivshmem_properties[] = {
> -- 
> 1.8.4.5

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 2/4] ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 06:40:06PM +0200, Andreas Färber wrote:
> From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> 
> Check incoming_posn to avoid out-of-bounds array accesses if the ivshmem
> server on the host sends invalid values.
> 
> Cc: Cam Macdonell <cam@cs.ualberta.ca>
> Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> [AF: Tighten upper bound check for posn in close_guest_eventfds()]
> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
> Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>

Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

> ---
>  hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> index caeee1e..24f74f6 100644
> --- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> +++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> @@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)
>      if (!ivshmem_has_feature(s, IVSHMEM_IOEVENTFD)) {
>          return;
>      }
> +    if (posn < 0 || posn >= s->nb_peers) {
> +        return;
> +    }
>  
>      guest_curr_max = s->peers[posn].nb_eventfds;
>  
> @@ -455,6 +458,11 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
>          }
>      }
>  
> +    if (incoming_posn < -1) {
> +        IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("invalid incoming_posn %ld\n", incoming_posn);
> +        return;
> +    }
> +
>      /* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */
>      tmp_fd = qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd(s->server_chr);
>      IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n", incoming_posn, tmp_fd);
> -- 
> 1.8.4.5

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/4] ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 06:40:07PM +0200, Andreas Färber wrote:
> From: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
> 
> Fix OOB access via malformed incoming_posn parameters
> and check that requested memory is actually alloc'ed.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
> [AF: Rebased, cleanups, avoid fd leak]
> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
> Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>

Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

> ---
>  hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> index 24f74f6..ecef82a 100644
> --- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> +++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>  
>  #include <sys/mman.h>
>  #include <sys/types.h>
> +#include <limits.h>
>  
>  #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_IVSHMEM   PCI_VENDOR_ID_REDHAT_QUMRANET
>  #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_IVSHMEM   0x1110
> @@ -410,14 +411,24 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)
>  
>  /* this function increase the dynamic storage need to store data about other
>   * guests */
> -static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) {
> +static int increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size)
> +{
>  
>      int j, old_nb_alloc;
>  
> +    /* check for integer overflow */
> +    if (new_min_size >= INT_MAX / sizeof(Peer) - 1 || new_min_size <= 0) {
> +        return -1;
> +    }
> +
>      old_nb_alloc = s->nb_peers;
>  
> -    while (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers)
> -        s->nb_peers = s->nb_peers * 2;
> +    if (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers) {
> +        /* +1 because #new_min_size is used as last array index */
> +        s->nb_peers = new_min_size + 1;
> +    } else {
> +        return 0;
> +    }
>  
>      IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("bumping storage to %d guests\n", s->nb_peers);
>      s->peers = g_realloc(s->peers, s->nb_peers * sizeof(Peer));
> @@ -427,6 +438,8 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) {
>          s->peers[j].eventfds = NULL;
>          s->peers[j].nb_eventfds = 0;
>      }
> +
> +    return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
> @@ -469,7 +482,13 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
>  
>      /* make sure we have enough space for this guest */
>      if (incoming_posn >= s->nb_peers) {
> -        increase_dynamic_storage(s, incoming_posn);
> +        if (increase_dynamic_storage(s, incoming_posn) < 0) {
> +            error_report("increase_dynamic_storage() failed");
> +            if (tmp_fd != -1) {
> +                close(tmp_fd);
> +            }
> +            return;
> +        }
>      }
>  
>      if (tmp_fd == -1) {
> -- 
> 1.8.4.5

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 4/4] ivshmem: Fix fd leak on error

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 06:40:08PM +0200, Andreas Färber wrote:
> Reported-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
> Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>

Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

> ---
>  hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> index ecef82a..bf585b7 100644
> --- a/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> +++ b/hw/misc/ivshmem.c
> @@ -512,6 +512,7 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
>      if (incoming_fd == -1) {
>          fprintf(stderr, "could not allocate file descriptor %s\n",
>                                                              strerror(errno));
> +        close(tmp_fd);
>          return;
>      }
>  
> -- 
> 1.8.4.5

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 0/4] ivshmem security fixes

[Paolo Bonzini]

On 15/09/2014 18:40, Andreas Färber wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This series tightens security on incoming data for ivshmem, originally sparked
> by SUSE's security team (Sebastian Krahmer). I've combined them and tackled
> remaining review feedback.
> 
> Regards,
> Andreas
> 
> Changes from Sebastian's #2:
> * Rebased onto Stefan's patches
> * Dropped g_realloc() check (Stefan)
> * Fixed fd leak and appended a patch fixing another one (Stefan)
> * Simplified comment (Stefan)
> 
> Changes from Stefan's series:
> * Modified to handle partial reads (Peter/Gerd)
> * Changed check from > to >= (Peter)
> 
> Cc: Cam Macdonell <cam@cs.ualberta.ca>
> Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> Cc: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
> Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
> Cc: David Marchand <david.marchand@6wind.com>
> 
> Andreas Färber (1):
>   ivshmem: Fix fd leak on error
> 
> Sebastian Krahmer (1):
>   ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access
> 
> Stefan Hajnoczi (2):
>   ivshmem: Check ivshmem_read() size argument
>   ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server
> 
>  hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 

These seem to have falled on the floor, and they're a dependency for
Andrew's error_report cleanup, so I picked them up.

Paolo