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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: "Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@gmail.com>,
	Peter Crosthwaite <peter.crosthwaite@xilinx.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	QEMU Developers <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH 0/3] pflash_cfi01: allow reading/writing it only in secure mode
Date: Thu, 09 Apr 2015 15:06:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5526795F.1020802@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFEAcA9WZ5Vx3tRVrykP33+JSq-A=a+-fMRMPR-PJnGaHazmtg@mail.gmail.com>



On 09/04/2015 14:47, Peter Maydell wrote:
> On 9 April 2015 at 13:20, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
>> This is an example of usage of attributes in a device model.  It lets
>> you block flash writes unless the CPU is in secure mode.  Enabling it
>> currently requires a -readconfig file:
>>
>>         [global]
>>         driver = "cfi.pflash01"
>>         property = "secure"
>>         value = "on"
>>
>> because the driver includes a "."; however, I plan to enable this through
>> the command line for the final version of the patches.
> 
> Are real flash devices ever wired up like this?

On x86 machines it is almost exactly like this.  I'm implementing x86
system management mode, and I'm reusing MEMTXATTRS_SECURE for it.

Recent x86 chipsets make this a run-time setting, rather than a static
setting, but the idea is the same.  It is a run-time setting (chipset
register) so that the firmware can do some initial detection of the
flash outside system management mode.  Then it writes a 1 to the
register, and finally it writes a 1 to a "lock" register so that the
first register becomes read-only.

The above scheme was actually more complicated, and allowed a race that
let you bypass the protection.  So, even more recent machines have some
additional complication, whereby flash accesses are only allowed if
_all_ processors are in system management mode.  Again, it is a run-time
setting.

QEMU emulates a slightly older chipset, which is why I'm making it a
static property.  The static property is also much harder to get wrong
and insecure by mistake.

Paolo

> I would expect boards which want to provide secure-mode
> only flash to do so by not giving any access at all to
> the device from the non-secure address space.
> 
> (Supporting multiple AddressSpaces for ARM CPUs is the
> next thing on my todo list; as well as partitioning the
> flash this would allow secure-mode-only RAM and UARTs,
> for instance.)
> 
> -- PMM
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2015-04-09 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-04-09 12:20 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH 0/3] pflash_cfi01: allow reading/writing it only in secure mode Paolo Bonzini
2015-04-09 12:20 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/3] pflash_cfi01: change big-endian property to BIT type Paolo Bonzini
2015-04-09 12:20 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 2/3] pflash_cfi01: change to new-style MMIO accessors Paolo Bonzini
2015-04-09 12:20 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/3] pflash_cfi01: add secure property Paolo Bonzini
2015-04-09 12:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH 0/3] pflash_cfi01: allow reading/writing it only in secure mode Peter Maydell
2015-04-09 13:06   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2015-04-09 13:12     ` Peter Maydell
2015-04-09 13:58     ` Edgar E. Iglesias
2015-04-09 14:43       ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-04-09 16:10         ` Laszlo Ersek
2015-04-09 16:27           ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-04-09 23:30             ` Edgar E. Iglesias
2015-04-10  9:54             ` Peter Maydell

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