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Herne" , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, cohuck@redhat.com, alifm@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com References: <1556543381-12671-1-git-send-email-jjherne@linux.ibm.com> From: Thomas Huth Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=thuth@redhat.com; keydata= xsFNBFH7eUwBEACzyOXKU+5Pcs6wNpKzrlJwzRl3VGZt95VCdb+FgoU9g11m7FWcOafrVRwU yYkTm9+7zBUc0sW5AuPGR/dp3pSLX/yFWsA/UB4nJsHqgDvDU7BImSeiTrnpMOTXb7Arw2a2 4CflIyFqjCpfDM4MuTmzTjXq4Uov1giGE9X6viNo1pxyEpd7PanlKNnf4PqEQp06X4IgUacW tSGj6Gcns1bCuHV8OPWLkf4hkRnu8hdL6i60Yxz4E6TqlrpxsfYwLXgEeswPHOA6Mn4Cso9O 0lewVYfFfsmokfAVMKWzOl1Sr0KGI5T9CpmRfAiSHpthhHWnECcJFwl72NTi6kUcUzG4se81 O6n9d/kTj7pzTmBdfwuOZ0YUSqcqs0W+l1NcASSYZQaDoD3/SLk+nqVeCBB4OnYOGhgmIHNW 0CwMRO/GK+20alxzk//V9GmIM2ACElbfF8+Uug3pqiHkVnKqM7W9/S1NH2qmxB6zMiJUHlTH gnVeZX0dgH27mzstcF786uPcdEqS0KJuxh2kk5IvUSL3Qn3ZgmgdxBMyCPciD/1cb7/Ahazr 3ThHQXSHXkH/aDXdfLsKVuwDzHLVSkdSnZdt5HHh75/NFHxwaTlydgfHmFFwodK8y/TjyiGZ zg2Kje38xnz8zKn9iesFBCcONXS7txENTzX0z80WKBhK+XSFJwARAQABzRxUaG9tYXMgSHV0 aCA8dGguaHV0aEBnbXguZGU+wsF7BBMBAgAlAhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJCgsEFgIDAQIeAQIX gAUCUfuWKwIZAQAKCRAu2dd0/nAttbe/EACb9hafyOb2FmhUqeAiBORSsUifFacQ7laVjcgR I4um8CSHvxijYftpkM2EdAtmXIKgbNDpQoXcWLXB9lu9mLgTO4DVT00TRR65ikn3FCWcyT74 ENTOzRKyKLsDCjhXKPblTPIQbYAUCOWElcyAPm0ERd62fA/rKNxgIiNo/l4UODOMoOJm2/Ox ZoTckW68Eqv7k9L7m7j+Hn3hoDTjAmcCBJt+j7pOhzWvCbqoNOIH8C8qvPaNlrba+R/K6jkO 6jZkTbYQpGIofEQJ/TNn38IsNGpI1ALTHWFtoMxp3j2Imz0REO6dRE2fHRN8sVlHgkoeGhmY NbDsDE1jFQOEObFnu0euk//7BXU7tGOHckVAZ8T1smiRPHfQU7UEH2a/grndxJ+PNeM5w7n2 l+FN3cf2KgPotCK2s9MjSdZA7C5e3rFYO8lqiqTJKvc62vqp3e7B0Kjyy5/QtzSOejBij2QL xkKSFNtxIz4MtuxN8e3IDQNxsKry3nF7R4MDvouXlMo6wP9KuyNWb+vFJt9GtbgfDMIFVamp ZfhEWzWRJH4VgksENA4K/BzjEHCcbTUb1TFsiB1VRnBPJ0SqlvifnfKk6HcpkDk6Pg8Q5FOJ gbNHrdgXsm+m/9GF2zUUr+rOlhVbK23TUqKqPfwnD7uxjpakVcJnsVCFqJpZi1F/ga9IN87B TQRR+3lMARAAtp831HniPHb9AuKq3wj83ujZK8lH5RLrfVsB4X1wi47bwo56BqhXpR/zxPTR eOFT0gnbw9UkphVc7uk/alnXMDEmgvnuxv89PwIQX6k3qLABeV7ykJQG/WT5HQ6+2DdGtVw3 2vjYAPiWQeETsgWRRQMDR0/hwp8s8tL/UodwYCScH6Vxx9pdy353L1fK4Bb9G73a+9FPjp9l x+WwKTsltVqSBuSjyZQ3c3EE8qbTidXZxB38JwARH8yN3TX+t65cbBqLl/zRUUUTapHQpUEd yoAsHIml32e4q+3xdLtTdlLi7FgPBItSazcqZPjEcYW73UAuLcmQmfJlQ5PkDiuqcitn+KzH /1pqsTU7QFZjbmSMJyXY0TDErOFuMOjf20b6arcpEqse1V3IKrb+nqqA2azboRm3pEANLAJw iVTwK3qwGRgK5ut6N/Znv20VEHkFUsRAZoOusrIRfR5HFDxlXguAdEz8M/hxXFYYXqOoaCYy 6pJxTjy0Y/tIfmS/g9Bnp8qg9wsrsnk0+XRnDVPak++G3Uq9tJPwpJbyO0vcqEI3vAXkAB7X VXLzvFwi66RrsPUoDkuzj+aCNumtOePDOCpXQGPpKl+l1aYRMN/+lNSk3+1sVuc2C07WnYyE gV/cbEVklPmKrNwu6DeUyD0qI/bVzKMWZAiB1r56hsGeyYcAEQEAAcLBXwQYAQIACQUCUft5 TAIbDAAKCRAu2dd0/nAttYTwEACLAS/THRqXRKb17PQmKwZHerUvZm2klo+lwQ3wNQBHUJAT p2R9ULexyXrJPqjUpy7+voz+FcKiuQBTKyieiIxO46oMxsbXGZ70o3gxjxdYdgimUD6U8PPd JH8tfAL4BR5FZNjspcnscN2jgbF4OrpDeOLyBaj6HPmElNPtECHWCaf1xbIFsZxSDGMA6cUh 0uX3Q8VI7JN1AR2cfiIRY7NrIlWYucJxyKjO3ivWm69nCtsHiJ0wcF8KlVo7F2eLaufo0K8A ynL8SHMF3VEyxsXOP2f1UR9T2Ur30MXcTBpjUxml1TX3RWY5uH89Js/jlIugBwuAmacJ7JYh lTg6sF/GNc4nPb4kk2yktNWTade+TzsllYlJPaorD2Qe8qX0iFUhFC6y9+O6mP4ZvWoYapp9 ezYNuebMgEr93ob1+4sFg3812wNP01WqsGtWCJHnPv/JoonFdMzD/bIkXGEJMk6ks2kxQQZq g6Ik/s/vxOfao/xCn8nHt7GwvVy41795hzK6tbSl+BuyCRp0vfPRP34OnK7+jR2nvQpJu/pU rCELuGwT9hsYkUPjVd4lfylN3mzEc6iAv/wwjsc0DRTSQCpXT3v2ymTAsRKrVaEZLibTXaf+ WslxWek3xNYRiqwwWAJuL652eAlxUgQ5ZS+fXBRTiQpJ+F26I/2lccScRd9G5w== Organization: Red Hat Message-ID: <55907be5-61a5-f251-4609-b0336818de17@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 12:16:05 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.6.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.48]); Mon, 06 May 2019 10:16:10 +0000 (UTC) X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: GNU/Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] X-Received-From: 209.132.183.28 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [qemu-s390x] [PATCH] s390-bios: Skip bootmap signature entries X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" On 06/05/2019 12.10, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 06.05.19 12:01, David Hildenbrand wrote: >> On 29.04.19 15:09, Jason J. Herne wrote: >>> Newer versions of zipl have the ability to write signature entries to the boot >>> script for secure boot. We don't yet support secure boot, but we need to skip >>> over signature entries while reading the boot script in order to maintain our >>> ability to boot guest operating systems that have a secure bootloader. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Jason J. Herne >>> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali >>> --- >>> pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- >>> pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 10 ++++++---- >>> 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c >>> index 7aef65a..d13b7cb 100644 >>> --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c >>> +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c >>> @@ -254,7 +254,14 @@ static void run_eckd_boot_script(block_number_t bmt_block_nr, >>> memset(sec, FREE_SPACE_FILLER, sizeof(sec)); >>> read_block(block_nr, sec, "Cannot read Boot Map Script"); >>> >>> - for (i = 0; bms->entry[i].type == BOOT_SCRIPT_LOAD; i++) { >>> + for (i = 0; bms->entry[i].type == BOOT_SCRIPT_LOAD || >>> + bms->entry[i].type == BOOT_SCRIPT_SIGNATURE; i++) { >>> + >>> + /* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */ >>> + if (bms->entry[i].type == BOOT_SCRIPT_SIGNATURE) { >>> + continue; >>> + } >>> + >>> address = bms->entry[i].address.load_address; >>> block_nr = eckd_block_num(&bms->entry[i].blkptr.xeckd.bptr.chs); >>> >>> @@ -489,7 +496,15 @@ static void zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) >>> >>> /* Load image(s) into RAM */ >>> entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1]); >>> - while (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD) { >>> + while (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || >>> + entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE) { >>> + >>> + /* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */ >>> + if (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE) { >>> + entry++; >>> + continue; >>> + } >>> + >>> zipl_load_segment(entry); >>> >>> entry++; >>> diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h >>> index a085212..94f53a5 100644 >>> --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h >>> +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h >>> @@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ typedef struct ScsiMbr { >>> #define ZIPL_COMP_HEADER_IPL 0x00 >>> #define ZIPL_COMP_HEADER_DUMP 0x01 >>> >>> -#define ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD 0x02 >>> -#define ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC 0x01 >>> +#define ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC 0x01 >>> +#define ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD 0x02 >>> +#define ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE 0x03 >>> >>> typedef struct XEckdMbr { >>> uint8_t magic[4]; /* == "xIPL" */ >>> @@ -117,8 +118,9 @@ typedef struct BootMapScriptEntry { >>> BootMapPointer blkptr; >>> uint8_t pad[7]; >>> uint8_t type; /* == BOOT_SCRIPT_* */ >>> -#define BOOT_SCRIPT_EXEC 0x01 >>> -#define BOOT_SCRIPT_LOAD 0x02 >>> +#define BOOT_SCRIPT_EXEC 0x01 >>> +#define BOOT_SCRIPT_LOAD 0x02 >>> +#define BOOT_SCRIPT_SIGNATURE 0x03 >>> union { >>> uint64_t load_address; >>> uint64_t load_psw; >>> >> >> Naive question from me: >> >> Can't we place the signatures somewhere else, and instead associate them >> with entries? This avoids breaking backwards compatibility for the sake >> of signatures we want unmodified zipl loaders to ignore. >> > > > ... but I guess this is already documented somewhere internally and > other components have been adjusted. IOW, cannot be changed anymore. > > Guess our implementation should have tolerated other entries than > "BOOT_SCRIPT_LOAD" right from the beginning. Hmm, now we only tolerate the _LOAD and _SIGNATURE entries, but still nothing else... would it make sense to rewrite the code a little bit to tolerate all other kind of entries, but just act on the well-known _LOAD entries, so that we do not step into this trap in the future anymore? Thomas