From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
yoshihiro.yunomae.ez@hitachi.com, mtosatti@redhat.com,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, peterx@redhat.com,
Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>,
linux-trace-users@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] host and guest kernel trace merging
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 09:10:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56DDA7E2.3050506@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160307104924.1871dbdb@gandalf.local.home>
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On 03/07/2016 08:49 AM, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Mar 2016 15:17:05 +0000
> Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>
>> qemu-guest-agent runs inside the guest and replies to RPC commands from
>> the host. It is used for backups, shutdown, network configuration, etc.
>> From time to time people have wanted the ability to execute an arbitrary
>> command inside the guest and return the output. This functionality has
>> never been merged, probably for the security reason.
>
> How's the connection set up. That is, how does it know the commands are
> coming from the host? And how does it know that the commands from the
> host is from a trusted source? If the host is compromised, is there
> anything keeping an intruder from controlling the guest?
qemu-guest-agent uses a virtio channel, so only the host can be driving
that channel. But how can a guest know that it trusts the host? It
can't. A compromised host implicitly compromises all guests, and that's
always been the case. At least qemu-guest-agent doesn't make the window
any larger.
--
Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-07 16:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-03 19:35 [Qemu-devel] [RFC] host and guest kernel trace merging Luiz Capitulino
2016-03-04 11:19 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-04 13:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 15:17 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-07 15:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 16:10 ` Eric Blake [this message]
2016-03-07 16:26 ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 17:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-24 5:16 ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24 13:02 ` Luiz Capitulino
2016-03-25 1:53 ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24 8:42 ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24 10:13 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-25 2:22 ` Peter Xu
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