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From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
To: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: chen.fan.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com, lersek@redhat.com,
	zhoujie2011@cn.fujitsu.com
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 16:23:07 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <57686CCB.6080101@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160620215824.13390.52262.stgit@gimli.home>

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On 06/20/2016 04:04 PM, Alex Williamson wrote:
> The kernel currently exposes the SR-IOV capability as read-only
> through vfio-pci.  This is sufficient to protect the host kernel, but
> has the potential to confuse guests without further virtualization.
> In particular, OVMF tries to size the VF BARs and comes up with absurd
> results, ending with an assert.  There's not much point in adding
> virtualization to a read-only capability, so we simply hide it for
> now.  If the kernel ever enables SR-IOV virtualization, we should
> easily be able to test it through VF BAR sizing or explicit flags.
> 
> Testing whether we should parse extended capabilities is also pulled
> into the function to keep these assumptions in one place.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> ---

> +     * Extended capabilities are chained with each pointing to the next, so we
> +     * can drop anything other than the head of the chain simply by modifying
> +     * the previous next pointer.  For the head of the chain, we can modify the
> +     * capability ID to something that cannot match a valid capability.  ID
> +     * 0 is reserved for this since absence of capabilities is indicated by
> +     * 0 for the ID, version, AND next pointer.  However, pcie_add_capability()
> +     * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
> +     * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
> +     * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
> +     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register

s/abscense/absence/

-- 
Eric Blake   eblake redhat com    +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org


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  reply	other threads:[~2016-06-20 22:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-20 22:04 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability Alex Williamson
2016-06-20 22:23 ` Eric Blake [this message]
2016-06-20 22:31   ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-21  0:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
2016-06-21  3:54   ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-28 13:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
2016-06-28 20:05 ` Laszlo Ersek

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