From: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>
To: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Peter Xu" <peterx@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Revert obsolete & broken workaround for GNUTLS thread safety bug
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 10:40:34 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mrsfkrot.fsf@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261013133622.993935-1-berrange@redhat.com>
Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> writes:
> A year or so ago we introduced a workaround for a troubling GNUTLS
> thread safety problem that hits when a bidirectional TLS channel
> is used and "large" amounts of data are transferred triggering
> re-keying under TLS 1.3.
>
> Unfortunately that workaround turned out to not work, and since it
> was close to final freeze we disabled it, rather than attempt last
> minute changes.
>
> Fast forward a year, and GNUTLS has shipped a fix itself and RHEL
> at least has backported the fix to stable releases. A user who
> is still affected can workaround it by disabling TLS 1.3, or
> forcing use of a different cipher to avoid re-keying entirely.
>
> Getting a viable workaround operating correctly in QEMU is going
> to be challenging and fragile long term, so not worth spending
> more time on.
>
> Revert the broken workaround (which was already hardcoded to be
> disabled at build time).
>
> Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
> Revert "migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround"
> Revert "io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround"
> Revert "crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures"
> Revert "crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety
> problems"
>
> crypto/tlssession.c | 103 ++----------------------------------
> crypto/trace-events | 1 -
> include/crypto/tlssession.h | 14 -----
> include/io/channel.h | 1 -
> io/channel-tls.c | 5 --
> meson.build | 9 ----
> migration/tls.c | 9 ----
> 7 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-15 13:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-13 13:36 [PATCH 0/4] Revert obsolete & broken workaround for GNUTLS thread safety bug Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-13 13:36 ` [PATCH 1/4] Revert "migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround" Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-13 13:36 ` [PATCH 2/4] Revert "io: add support for activating " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-13 13:36 ` [PATCH 3/4] Revert "crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures" Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-13 13:36 ` [PATCH 4/4] Revert "crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems" Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-13 19:29 ` [PATCH 0/4] Revert obsolete & broken workaround for GNUTLS thread safety bug Peter Xu
2026-10-15 13:40 ` Fabiano Rosas [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=87mrsfkrot.fsf@suse.de \
--to=farosas@suse.de \
--cc=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=marcandre.lureau@redhat.com \
--cc=peterx@redhat.com \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox