From: tobin <tobin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: jejb@linux.ibm.com
Cc: tobin@ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] sev: add sev-inject-launch-secret
Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 14:09:50 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <95c8a00846f4a8469e3bced1e80bc48d@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1590699601.3449.48.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 2020-05-28 17:00, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-05-28 at 16:51 -0400, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum wrote:
>> --- a/qapi/misc-target.json
>> +++ b/qapi/misc-target.json
>> @@ -200,6 +200,26 @@
>> { 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability',
>> 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' }
>>
>> +##
>> +# @sev-inject-launch-secret:
>> +#
>> +# This command injects a secret blob into memory of SEV guest.
>> +#
>> +# @packet-header: the launch secret packet header encoded in base64
>> +#
>> +# @secret: the launch secret data to be injected encoded in base64
>> +#
>> +# @gpa: the guest physical address where secret will be injected.
>> + GPA provided here will be ignored if guest ROM specifies
>> + the a launch secret GPA.
>
> Shouldn't we eliminate the gpa argument to this now the gpa is
> extracted from OVMF? You add it here but don't take it out in the next
> patch.
>
I think having GPA as an optional argument might make the most sense.
Users may or may not know how to use the argument, but it is probably
a good idea to give another option besides sticking the GPA into the
ROM.
>> +# Since: 5.0.0
>> +#
>> +##
>> +{ 'command': 'sev-inject-launch-secret',
>> + 'data': { 'packet_hdr': 'str', 'secret': 'str', 'gpa': 'uint64' },
>
> Java (i.e. Json) people hate underscores and abbreviations. I bet
> they'll want this to be 'packet-header'
>
Happy to change this.
>> + 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' }
>> +
>> ##
>> # @dump-skeys:
>> #
>> diff --git a/target/i386/monitor.c b/target/i386/monitor.c
>> index 27ebfa3ad2..5c2b7d2c17 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/monitor.c
>> +++ b/target/i386/monitor.c
>> @@ -736,3 +736,11 @@ SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error
>> **errp)
>>
>> return data;
>> }
>> +
>> +void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr,
>> + const char *secret, uint64_t gpa,
>> + Error **errp)
>> +{
>> + if (sev_inject_launch_secret(packet_hdr,secret,gpa) != 0)
>> + error_setg(errp, "SEV inject secret failed");
>> +}
>> diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
>> index e5ee13309c..2b8c5f1f53 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c
>> +++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
>> @@ -48,3 +48,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(void)
>> {
>> return NULL;
>> }
>> +int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
>> + uint64_t gpa)
>> +{
>> + return 1;
>> +}
>> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
>> index 846018a12d..774e47d9d1 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
>> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>> #include "sysemu/runstate.h"
>> #include "trace.h"
>> #include "migration/blocker.h"
>> +#include "exec/address-spaces.h"
>>
>> #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
>> #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
>> @@ -743,6 +744,88 @@ sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr,
>> uint64_t len)
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +
>> +static void *
>> +gpa2hva(hwaddr addr, uint64_t size)
>> +{
>> + MemoryRegionSection mrs =
>> memory_region_find(get_system_memory(),
>> + addr, size);
>> +
>> + if (!mrs.mr) {
>> + error_report("No memory is mapped at address 0x%"
>> HWADDR_PRIx, addr);
>> + return NULL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (!memory_region_is_ram(mrs.mr) &&
>> !memory_region_is_romd(mrs.mr)) {
>> + error_report("Memory at address 0x%" HWADDR_PRIx "is not
>> RAM", addr);
>> + memory_region_unref(mrs.mr);
>> + return NULL;
>> + }
>
> We can still check this, but it should be like an assertion failure.
> Since the GPA is selected by the OVMF build there should be no way it
> can't be mapped into the host.
>
> [...]
>> --- a/tests/qtest/qmp-cmd-test.c
>> +++ b/tests/qtest/qmp-cmd-test.c
>> @@ -93,10 +93,10 @@ static bool query_is_blacklisted(const char *cmd)
>> /* Success depends on target-specific build configuration:
>> */
>> "query-pci", /* CONFIG_PCI */
>> /* Success depends on launching SEV guest */
>> - "query-sev-launch-measure",
>> + // "query-sev-launch-measure",
>> /* Success depends on Host or Hypervisor SEV support */
>> - "query-sev",
>> - "query-sev-capabilities",
>> + // "query-sev",
>> + // "query-sev-capabilities",
>
> We're eliminating existing tests ... is that just a stray hunk that you
> forgot to remove?
>
Yes.
> James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-29 18:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-28 20:51 [PATCH 0/2] Add support for SEV Launch Secret Injection Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2020-05-28 20:51 ` [PATCH 1/2] sev: add sev-inject-launch-secret Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2020-05-28 21:00 ` James Bottomley
2020-05-29 18:09 ` tobin [this message]
2020-05-28 21:42 ` Eric Blake
2020-05-29 18:04 ` tobin
2020-05-28 20:51 ` [PATCH 2/2] sev: scan guest ROM for launch secret address Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2020-05-29 19:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-05-29 3:32 ` [PATCH 0/2] Add support for SEV Launch Secret Injection no-reply
2020-05-29 3:35 ` no-reply
2020-05-29 3:36 ` no-reply
2020-05-29 3:39 ` no-reply
2020-06-01 18:51 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
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