From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Ashish Kalra" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Connor Kuehl" <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
"Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
"Hubertus Franke" <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
"Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum" <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
"Jim Cadden" <jcadden@ibm.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 10:03:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABgObfb3VOSav+pdwC5_xrCeM5S32B2XV02L7H7DWx+9Gi8u_g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210930054915.13252-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Queued, thanks. However, it would be nice to have a documentation of
all our SEV firmware interfaces somewhere in docs/specs/.
Paolo
On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 7:49 AM Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Currently booting with -kernel/-initrd/-append is not supported in SEV
> confidential guests, because the content of these blobs is not measured
> and therefore not trusted by the SEV guest.
>
> However, in some cases the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are not secret
> but should not be modified by the host. In such a case, we want to
> verify inside the trusted VM that the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are
> indeed the ones expected by the Guest Owner, and only if that is the
> case go on and boot them up (removing the need for grub inside OVMF in
> that mode).
>
> To support that, OVMF adds a special area for hashes of
> kernel/initrd/cmdline; that area is expected to be filled by QEMU and
> encrypted as part of the initial SEV guest launch. This in turn makes
> the hashes part of the AMD PSP measured content, and OVMF can trust
> these inputs if they match the hashes.
>
> This series adds an SEV function to generate the table of hashes for
> OVMF and encrypt it (patch 1/2), and calls this function if SEV is
> enabled when the kernel/initrd/cmdline are prepared (patch 2/2).
>
> Corresponding OVMF support [1] is already available in edk2 (patch series
> "Measured SEV boot with kernel/initrd/cmdline").
>
> [1] https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/78250
>
> ---
>
> v4 changes:
> - struct and variable renames (KernelLoaderContext -> SevKernelLoaderContext,
> kernel_loader_context -> sev_load_ctx).
>
> v3 resend: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210825073538.959525-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210624102040.2015280-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v3 changes:
> - initrd hash is now mandatory; if no -initrd is passed, calculate the
> hash of the empty buffer. This is now aligned with the OVMF
> behaviour which verifies the empty initrd (correctly).
> - make SevHashTable entries fixed: 3 entries for cmdline, initrd, and kernel.
> - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: first calculate all the hashes, only then
> fill-in the hashes table in the guest's memory.
> - Use g_assert_not_reached in sev-stub.c.
> - Use QEMU_PACKED attribute for structs.
> - Use QemuUUID type for guids.
> - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: use ARRAY_SIZE(iov) instead of literal 2.
>
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210621190553.1763020-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v2 changes:
> - Extract main functionality to sev.c (with empty stub in sev-stub.c)
> - Use sev_enabled() instead of machine->cgs->ready to detect SEV guest
> - Coding style changes
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210525065931.1628554-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
>
>
> Dov Murik (2):
> sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux
> boot
> x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux
>
> target/i386/sev_i386.h | 12 ++++
> hw/i386/x86.c | 25 +++++++-
> target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++
> target/i386/sev.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> --
> 2.25.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-04 8:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-30 5:49 [PATCH v4 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline Dov Murik
2021-09-30 5:49 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux boot Dov Murik
2021-09-30 8:32 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-30 10:13 ` Dov Murik
2021-10-18 18:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-19 6:18 ` Dov Murik
2021-10-20 15:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-27 19:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-28 8:41 ` Dov Murik
2021-11-01 10:28 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-30 5:49 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux Dov Murik
2021-10-04 8:03 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2021-10-04 17:23 ` [PATCH v4 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline Dov Murik
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