From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:36030) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1ZuiHR-0003oU-Ea for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 06 Nov 2015 09:46:18 -0500 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1ZuiHQ-0003NG-0F for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 06 Nov 2015 09:46:17 -0500 Received: from mail-vk0-x231.google.com ([2607:f8b0:400c:c05::231]:36678) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1ZuiHP-0003MW-N8 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 06 Nov 2015 09:46:15 -0500 Received: by vkex70 with SMTP id x70so15308844vke.3 for ; Fri, 06 Nov 2015 06:46:13 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: From: Peter Maydell Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2015 14:45:53 +0000 Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.5 v3 1/3] arm: boot: Add secure_board_setup flag List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Peter Crosthwaite Cc: Rob Herring , qemu-arm@nongnu.org, QEMU Developers , Guenter Roeck , Peter Crosthwaite On 3 November 2015 at 04:30, Peter Crosthwaite wrote: > Add a flag that when set, will cause the primary CPU to start in secure > mode, even if the overall boot is non-secure. This is useful for when > there is a board-setup blob that needs to run from secure mode, but > device and secondary CPU init should still be done as-normal for a non- > secure boot. > > Signed-off-by: Peter Crosthwaite > --- > changed since v2: > Assert if running KVM and board_setup_secure is set > > hw/arm/boot.c | 8 +++++++- > include/hw/arm/arm.h | 6 ++++++ > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/hw/arm/boot.c b/hw/arm/boot.c > index b0879a5..f671454 100644 > --- a/hw/arm/boot.c > +++ b/hw/arm/boot.c > @@ -495,7 +495,8 @@ static void do_cpu_reset(void *opaque) > } > > /* Set to non-secure if not a secure boot */ > - if (!info->secure_boot) { > + if (!info->secure_boot && > + (cs != first_cpu || !info->secure_board_setup)) { > /* Linux expects non-secure state */ > env->cp15.scr_el3 |= SCR_NS; > } > @@ -598,6 +599,11 @@ static void arm_load_kernel_notify(Notifier *notifier, void *data) > struct arm_boot_info *info = > container_of(n, struct arm_boot_info, load_kernel_notifier); > > + /* It is the boards job to make sure secure_board_setup is actually > + * possible > + */ I think we could improve this comment a bit: /* The board code is not supposed to set secure_board_setup unless * running its code in secure mode is actually possible, and KVM * doesn't support secure. */ > + assert(!info->secure_board_setup || tcg_enabled()); This assertion causes us to fail "make check", because there's a test target which starts every board with the "qtest" accelerator, which is not TCG. You need !kvm_enabled() instead (and to include sysemu/kvm.h). > + > /* Load the kernel. */ > if (!info->kernel_filename || info->firmware_loaded) { > > diff --git a/include/hw/arm/arm.h b/include/hw/arm/arm.h > index 9217b70..60dc919 100644 > --- a/include/hw/arm/arm.h > +++ b/include/hw/arm/arm.h > @@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ struct arm_boot_info { > hwaddr board_setup_addr; > void (*write_board_setup)(ARMCPU *cpu, > const struct arm_boot_info *info); > + > + /* If set, the board specific loader/setup blob will be run from secure > + * mode, regardless of secure_boot. The blob becomes responsible for > + * changing to non-secure state if implementing a non-secure boot > + */ > + bool secure_board_setup; > }; thanks -- PMM