From: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
To: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Daniel P . Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>,
Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>,
Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
QEMU Developers <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 10:42:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFEAcA9QWLmi1fGuPW93GXFKV2KCwNs6Xp3U9MU2r4wtendzhg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200714083631.888605-2-ppandit@redhat.com>
On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 at 09:40, P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
>
> QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases.
> It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
>
> All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant.
> Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still
> be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not
> used or maintained actively.
>
> For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein
> QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables
> guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
>
> The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this
> sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
>
> It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security
> one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
How does this interact with the way we already document our
level of security support in docs/system/security.rst ?
> + C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient
> + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted
> + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with
> + due care and be considered as a CVE issue.
> + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental
> + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well
> + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed
> + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE.
The difficulty with this is that MAINTAINERS is not set up
with a split between "security issues" and "non-security
issues". For instance this stanza:
> @@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ ARM TCG CPUs
> M: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
> L: qemu-arm@nongnu.org
> S: Maintained
> +C: Low
> F: target/arm/
> F: tests/tcg/arm/
> F: tests/tcg/aarch64/
you have marked "Low", but the files it covers include
both ones used by TCG (not security-critical) and ones
used by KVM (security-critical).
Also, MAINTAINERS is not user-facing. If we want to say
that vvfat or 9pfs are not suitable for use on a security
boundary and that we do not consider bugs in them to
be security issues, we should do that in the user-facing
documentation.
Broadly speaking, it feels like you're trying to come up
with an automatic way to say "does this patch touch a
security-relevant part of the code", and I'm not sure
that that's possible.
> GIT Data Mining Config
> M: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Something in your patch workflow is mangling UTF-8 characters,
incidentally.
thanks
-- PMM
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-14 9:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-14 8:36 [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add security quotient field P J P
2020-07-14 8:36 ` [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or " P J P
2020-07-14 9:42 ` Peter Maydell [this message]
2020-07-14 9:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:12 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 10:22 ` Peter Maydell
2020-07-14 11:02 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 13:10 ` P J P
2020-07-16 6:55 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16 8:36 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 9:21 ` P J P
2020-07-16 9:39 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 9:45 ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-16 10:01 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 12:22 ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-16 12:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:30 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:48 ` Kevin Wolf
2020-07-14 13:56 ` Thomas Huth
2020-07-14 15:04 ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-14 14:02 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:18 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-07-14 11:51 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16 8:56 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-16 9:44 ` P J P
2020-07-16 10:09 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 10:43 ` Markus Armbruster
2020-07-14 9:46 ` [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add " Michael S. Tsirkin
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