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Tsirkin" , Bernhard Beschow , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Stefan Hajnoczi , Thomas Huth , =?UTF-8?Q?Philippe_Mathieu=2DDaud=C3=A9?= , Jiaxun Yang , Paolo Bonzini , Marcel Apfelbaum , Alistair Francis , Palmer Dabbelt , qemu-riscv@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Huacai Chen , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, Halil Pasic , Christian Borntraeger , Song Gao , Bibo Mao Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::112d; envelope-from=peter.maydell@linaro.org; helo=mail-yw1-x112d.google.com X-Spam_score_int: -20 X-Spam_score: -2.1 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org On Mon, 13 Oct 2025 at 12:47, Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 = wrote: > With a very minimal wording tweak our current defined policy could > avoid being a blocker for enabling KVM in imx8mp-evk. In > > https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/system/security.html > > where it describes the "virtualization use case", we could simply > tweak it to always require a versioned machine type > > Change > > "These use cases rely on hardware virtualization extensions > to execute guest code safely on the physical CPU at close- > to-native speed." > > To say > > "These use cases apply to versioned machine types when used > in combination with hardware virtualization extensions > to execute guest code safely on the physical CPU at close- > to-native speed" With the suggested changes listed elsewhere in this thread, my current manually curated list of machines is: aarch64 ``virt`` i386, x86_64 ``microvm``, ``xenfv``, ``xenpv``, ``xenpvh``, ``pc``, ``q35`` s390x ``s390-ccw-virtio`` loongarch64: ``virt`` ppc64: ``pseries`` riscv32, riscv64: ``virt`` If we say "versioned machine type", that puts these machines outside the "supported" boundary: i386, x86_64 ``microvm``, ``xenfv``, ``xenpv``, ``xenpvh`` loongarch64: ``virt`` riscv32, riscv64: ``virt`` I can certainly see the argument for loongarch64 and maybe even riscv[*] still being "not supported for production security-boundary stuff", but do we really want to say that the Xen machine types and microvm aren't suitable for VM use ? [*] Could somebody from riscv or loongarch maintainers say whether they think these machines should be on the "security supported" list or not yet ? thanks -- PMM