From: Maxime Guerreiro <maxime.guerreiro@gmail.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: What are the security risks of running QEMU/KVM as root?
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 14:46:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPESWZNaFZB-4hk0GNQAbt=KKf9ZzAMON5oLw6WFBUsi_ApkkQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
Hello,
I'd be interested to learn more about the security 'vision' of qemu/kvm being
two components, one running in-kernel, one running in user land. What are the
security advantages of running guests as non-root?
In case of a qemu or KVM vulnerability, won't malicious guests gain kernel
privilege no matter what user is running qemu?
If a guest is able to execute arbitrary code as the "qemu" user, can
it escalate to
root privileges using /dev/kvm?
I've also asked this on StackExchange [1], for visibility.
Thanks,
Maxime
[1]: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/236681/what-are-the-security-risks-of-running-qemu-kvm-as-root
reply other threads:[~2020-08-25 13:18 UTC|newest]
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