From: "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
To: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>,
Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>,
"open list:X86 Xen CPUs" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] Do not access /dev/mem in MSI-X PCI passthrough on Xen
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 04:34:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3WruE/VOBZFfHfi@mail-itl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y3VYs/sS4VddrBCK@mail-itl>
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On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 10:40:02PM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 02:15:22PM -0500, Jason Andryuk wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 2:21 PM Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
> > <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > The /dev/mem is used for two purposes:
> > > - reading PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT
> > > - reading Pending Bit Array (PBA)
> > >
> > > The first one was originally done because when Xen did not send all
> > > vector ctrl writes to the device model, so QEMU might have outdated old
> > > register value. This has been changed in Xen, so QEMU can now use its
> > > cached value of the register instead.
> > >
> > > The Pending Bit Array (PBA) handling is for the case where it lives on
> > > the same page as the MSI-X table itself. Xen has been extended to handle
> > > this case too (as well as other registers that may live on those pages),
> > > so QEMU handling is not necessary anymore.
> > >
> > > Removing /dev/mem access is useful to work within stubdomain, and
> > > necessary when dom0 kernel runs in lockdown mode.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
> >
> > I put the Xen, QEMU, and xen-pciback patches into OpenXT and gave a
> > little test. When pci_permissive=0, iwlwifi fails to load its
> > firmware. With pci_permissive=1, it looks like MSI-X is enabled. (I
> > previously included your libxl allow_interrupt_control patch - that
> > seemed to get regular MSIs working prior to the MSI-X patches.) I
> > also removed the OpenXT equivalent of 0005-Disable-MSI-X-caps.patch.
> > I am testing with Linux 5.4.y, so that could be another factor.
>
> Can you confirm the allow_interrupt_control is set by libxl? Also,
> vanilla 5.4 doesn't have the allow_interrupt_control patch at all, and you
> may have an earlier version that had "allow_msi_enable" as the sysfs
> file name.
Ok, I found what is wrong. Enabling MSI-X is refused, because INTx isn't
disabled at this point yet. And apparently I was testing this with
permissive=1...
Linux does this:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/drivers/pci/msi/msi.c#L611
In short:
1. Enable MSI-X with MASKALL=1
2. Setup MSI-X table
3. Disable INTx
4. Set MASKALL=0
This patch on top should fix this:
----8<----
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c
index 097316a74126..f4c4381de76e 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static int msi_msix_flags_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 new_value,
(new_value ^ old_value) & ~field_config->allowed_bits)
return PCIBIOS_SET_FAILED;
- if (new_value & field_config->enable_bit) {
+ if ((new_value & field_config->allowed_bits) == field_config->enable_bit) {
/* don't allow enabling together with other interrupt types */
int int_type = xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type(dev);
----8<----
Jan, is the above safe? It should prevent clearing MASKALL if INTx isn't
disabled, unless I missed something? But also, it will allow enabling
MSI-X with MASKALL=1 together with MSI, which I'm not sure if should be
allowed.
Alternatively to the above patch, I could allow specifically setting
MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE + MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL while INTx isn't disabled as a
single exception, but at this point I'm not sure if some other driver or
OS wouldn't approach this in yet another way.
--
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-17 3:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-14 19:20 [PATCH 1/2] hw/xen/xen_pt: Call default handler only if no custom one is set Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-14 19:20 ` [PATCH 2/2] Do not access /dev/mem in MSI-X PCI passthrough on Xen Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-14 19:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-11-14 22:44 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-15 8:14 ` Jan Beulich
2022-11-15 11:38 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-15 14:05 ` Jan Beulich
2022-11-16 19:15 ` Jason Andryuk
2022-11-16 21:40 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-17 3:34 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki [this message]
2022-11-17 8:04 ` Jan Beulich
2022-11-17 11:15 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-17 17:29 ` Jason Andryuk
2022-11-22 17:12 ` [PATCH 1/2] hw/xen/xen_pt: Call default handler only if no custom one is set Anthony PERARD via
2023-09-26 23:25 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
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