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[82.29.237.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b10sm228285wrn.9.2021.08.18.08.43.30 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 18 Aug 2021 08:43:31 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 16:43:29 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" To: James Bottomley Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM. Message-ID: References: <20210816144413.GA29881@ashkalra_ubuntu_server> <20210816151349.GA29903@ashkalra_ubuntu_server> <20210818103147.GB31834@ashkalra_ubuntu_server> <8ae11fca26e8d7f96ffc7ec6353c87353cadc63a.camel@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <8ae11fca26e8d7f96ffc7ec6353c87353cadc63a.camel@linux.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/2.0.7 (2021-05-04) Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dgilbert@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Received-SPF: pass client-ip=216.205.24.124; envelope-from=dgilbert@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -34 X-Spam_score: -3.5 X-Spam_bar: --- X-Spam_report: (-3.5 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.7, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Ashish Kalra , brijesh.singh@amd.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, tobin@ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankeh@us.ibm.com, dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Paolo Bonzini Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" * James Bottomley (jejb@linux.ibm.com) wrote: > On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:31 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > > * James Bottomley (jejb@linux.ibm.com) wrote: > > > On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 10:31 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > > > Hello Paolo, > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 05:38:55PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > > > > > On 16/08/21 17:13, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > > > > > > > I think that once the mirror VM starts booting and > > > > > > > > running the UEFI code, it might be only during the PEI or > > > > > > > > DXE phase where it will start actually running the MH > > > > > > > > code, so mirror VM probably still need to handles > > > > > > > > KVM_EXIT_IO when SEC phase does I/O, I can see PIC > > > > > > > > accesses and Debug Agent initialization stuff in SEC > > > > > > > > startup code. > > > > > > > That may be a design of the migration helper code that you > > > > > > > were working with, but it's not necessary. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Actually my comments are about a more generic MH code. > > > > > > > > > > I don't think that would be a good idea; designing QEMU's > > > > > migration helper interface to be as constrained as possible is > > > > > a good thing. The migration helper is extremely security > > > > > sensitive code, so it should not expose itself to the attack > > > > > surface of the whole of QEMU. > > > > > > The attack surface of the MH in the guest is simply the API. The > > > API needs to do two things: > > > > > > 1. validate a correct endpoint and negotiate a wrapping key > > > 2. When requested by QEMU, wrap a section of guest encrypted > > > memory > > > with the wrapping key and return it. > > > > > > The big security risk is in 1. if the MH can be tricked into > > > communicating with the wrong endpoint it will leak the entire > > > guest. If we can lock that down, I don't see any particular > > > security problem with 2. So, provided we get the security > > > properties of the API correct, I think we won't have to worry over > > > much about exposure of the API. > > > > Well, we'd have to make sure it only does stuff on behalf of qemu; if > > the guest can ever write to MH's memory it could do something that > > the guest shouldn't be able to. > > Given the lack of SMI, we can't guarantee that with plain SEV and -ES. > Once we move to -SNP, we can use VMPLs to achieve this. Doesn't the MH have access to different slots and running on separate vCPUs; so it's still got some separation? > But realistically, given the above API, even if the guest is malicious, > what can it do? I think it's simply return bogus pages that cause a > crash on start after migration, which doesn't look like a huge risk to > the cloud to me (it's more a self destructive act on behalf of the > guest). I'm a bit worried about the data structures that are shared between the migration code in qemu and the MH; the code in qemu is going to have to be paranoid about not trusting anything coming from the MH. Dave > James > > -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK