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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: "Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	"Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
	"Prasad J Pandit" <pjp@fedoraproject.org>,
	qemu-block@nongnu.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <f4bug@amsat.org>,
	"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	"Markus Armbruster" <armbru@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Eric Blake" <eblake@redhat.com>,
	"Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 02/10] accel: Use qemu_security_policy_taint(), mark KVM and Xen as safe
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2021 11:37:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YTnj2M+lygKzdsgO@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210908232024.2399215-3-philmd@redhat.com>

On Thu, Sep 09, 2021 at 01:20:16AM +0200, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> Add the AccelClass::secure_policy_supported field to classify
> safe (within security boundary) vs unsafe accelerators.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> ---
>  include/qemu/accel.h | 5 +++++
>  accel/kvm/kvm-all.c  | 1 +
>  accel/xen/xen-all.c  | 1 +
>  softmmu/vl.c         | 3 +++
>  4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/qemu/accel.h b/include/qemu/accel.h
> index 4f4c283f6fc..895e30be0de 100644
> --- a/include/qemu/accel.h
> +++ b/include/qemu/accel.h
> @@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ typedef struct AccelClass {
>                         hwaddr start_addr, hwaddr size);
>  #endif
>      bool *allowed;
> +    /*
> +     * Whether the accelerator is withing QEMU security policy boundary.
> +     * See: https://www.qemu.org/contribute/security-process/
> +     */
> +    bool secure_policy_supported;

The security handling policy is a high level concept that is
open to variation over time and also by downstream distro
vendors.

At a code level we should be dealing in a more fundamental
concept. At an accelerator level we should really jsut
declare whether or not the accelerator impl is considered
to be secure against malicious guest code.

eg

    /* Whether this accelerator is secure against execution
     * of malciious guest machine code */
    bool secure;


>      /*
>       * Array of global properties that would be applied when specific
>       * accelerator is chosen. It works like MachineClass.compat_props
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index 0125c17edb8..eb6b9e44df2 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -3623,6 +3623,7 @@ static void kvm_accel_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
>      ac->init_machine = kvm_init;
>      ac->has_memory = kvm_accel_has_memory;
>      ac->allowed = &kvm_allowed;
> +    ac->secure_policy_supported = true;
>  
>      object_class_property_add(oc, "kernel-irqchip", "on|off|split",
>          NULL, kvm_set_kernel_irqchip,
> diff --git a/accel/xen/xen-all.c b/accel/xen/xen-all.c
> index 69aa7d018b2..57867af5faf 100644
> --- a/accel/xen/xen-all.c
> +++ b/accel/xen/xen-all.c
> @@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ static void xen_accel_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
>      ac->setup_post = xen_setup_post;
>      ac->allowed = &xen_allowed;
>      ac->compat_props = g_ptr_array_new();
> +    ac->secure_policy_supported = true;
>  
>      compat_props_add(ac->compat_props, compat, G_N_ELEMENTS(compat));
>  
> diff --git a/softmmu/vl.c b/softmmu/vl.c
> index 92c05ac97ee..e4f94e159c3 100644
> --- a/softmmu/vl.c
> +++ b/softmmu/vl.c
> @@ -2388,6 +2388,9 @@ static int do_configure_accelerator(void *opaque, QemuOpts *opts, Error **errp)
>          return 0;
>      }
>  
> +    qemu_security_policy_taint(!ac->secure_policy_supported,
> +                               "%s accelerator", acc);

We need this information to be introspectable, becuase stuff printed
to stderr is essentially opaque to libvirt and mgmt apps above.

We don't have a convenient "query-accel" command but I think this
could possibly fit into 'query-target'. ie the TargetInfo struct
gain a field:
 

  ##
  # @TargetInfo:
  #
  # Information describing the QEMU target.
  #
  # @arch: the target architecture
  # @secure: Whether the currently active accelerator for this target
  #          is secure against execution of malicous guest code
  #
  # Since: 1.2
  ##
  { 'struct': 'TargetInfo',
    'data': { 'arch': 'SysEmuTarget',
              'secure': 'bool'} }

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
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  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-09 10:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-08 23:20 [RFC PATCH 00/10] security: Introduce qemu_security_policy_taint() API Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 01/10] sysemu: " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-09 10:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-09 18:45   ` Eric Blake
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 02/10] accel: Use qemu_security_policy_taint(), mark KVM and Xen as safe Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-09 10:37   ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2021-10-21 14:47     ` Markus Armbruster
2021-09-09 18:46   ` Eric Blake
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 03/10] block: Use qemu_security_policy_taint() API Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-09  9:53   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-09 10:40   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-09 10:55     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-09 19:05   ` Eric Blake
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 04/10] block/vvfat: Mark the driver as unsafe Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 05/10] block/null: Mark 'read-zeroes=off' option " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 06/10] qdev: Use qemu_security_policy_taint() API Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-09 11:03   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 07/10] hw/display: Mark ATI and Artist devices as unsafe Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 08/10] hw/misc: Mark testdev " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 09/10] hw/net: Mark Tulip device " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-08 23:20 ` [RFC PATCH 10/10] hw/sd: Mark sdhci-pci " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-09-09 10:28 ` [RFC PATCH 00/10] security: Introduce qemu_security_policy_taint() API Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-14 13:30   ` P J P
2021-09-28 11:39     ` P J P
2021-09-30 10:30     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-09 12:03 ` Alexander Bulekov

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