From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Daniel P . Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/22] target/i386/monitor: Return QMP error when SEV is disabled in build
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 13:25:28 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YV7nOJolgSSIX5Wf@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8f12bc3e-53aa-c946-bb06-f7d08721b243@redhat.com>
* Philippe Mathieu-Daudé (philmd@redhat.com) wrote:
> On 10/4/21 10:11, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > On 02/10/21 14:53, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> >> If the management layer tries to inject a secret, it gets an empty
> >> response in case the binary built without SEV:
> >>
> >> { "execute": "sev-inject-launch-secret",
> >> "arguments": { "packet-header": "mypkt", "secret": "mypass",
> >> "gpa": 4294959104 }
> >> }
> >> {
> >> "return": {
> >> }
> >> }
> >>
> >> Make it clearer by returning an error, mentioning the feature is
> >> disabled:
> >>
> >> { "execute": "sev-inject-launch-secret",
> >> "arguments": { "packet-header": "mypkt", "secret": "mypass",
> >> "gpa": 4294959104 }
> >> }
> >> {
> >> "error": {
> >> "class": "GenericError",
> >> "desc": "this feature or command is not currently supported"
> >> }
> >> }
> >>
> >> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> >> Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> >> ---
> >> target/i386/monitor.c | 5 +++++
> >> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/target/i386/monitor.c b/target/i386/monitor.c
> >> index 196c1c9e77f..a9f85acd473 100644
> >> --- a/target/i386/monitor.c
> >> +++ b/target/i386/monitor.c
> >> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> >> #include "monitor/hmp-target.h"
> >> #include "monitor/hmp.h"
> >> #include "qapi/qmp/qdict.h"
> >> +#include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h"
> >> #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
> >> #include "sysemu/sev.h"
> >> #include "qapi/error.h"
> >> @@ -743,6 +744,10 @@ void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret(const char
> >> *packet_hdr,
> >> bool has_gpa, uint64_t gpa,
> >> Error **errp)
> >> {
> >> + if (!sev_enabled()) {
> >> + error_setg(errp, QERR_UNSUPPORTED);
> >> + return;
> >> + }
> >> if (!has_gpa) {
> >> uint8_t *data;
> >> struct sev_secret_area *area;
> >>
> >
> > This should be done in the sev_inject_launch_secret stub instead, I
> > think. Or if you do it here, you can remove the "if (!sev_guest)"
> > conditional in the non-stub version.
>
> This part is not related to SEV builtin; what we want to avoid here
> is management layer to try to inject secret while the guest hasn't
> been started with SEV (IOW 'no memory encryption requested for KVM).
>
> Maybe this error message is more explicit?
>
> error_setg(errp, "Guest is not using memory encryption");
>
> Or:
>
> error_setg(errp, "Guest is not using SEV");
This is better; there's a separate feature called memory encryption, so
we don't want to confuse things.
Dave
>
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-07 12:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-02 12:52 [PATCH v3 00/22] target/i386/sev: Housekeeping SEV + measured Linux SEV guest Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-02 12:52 ` [PATCH v3 01/22] qapi/misc-target: Wrap long 'SEV Attestation Report' long lines Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:52 ` [PATCH v3 02/22] qapi/misc-target: Group SEV QAPI definitions Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:52 ` [PATCH v3 03/22] target/i386/kvm: Introduce i386_softmmu_kvm Meson source set Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:52 ` [PATCH v3 04/22] target/i386/kvm: Restrict SEV stubs to x86 architecture Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 05/22] target/i386/monitor: Return QMP error when SEV is disabled in build Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-07 11:29 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-07 12:25 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 06/22] target/i386/cpu: Add missing 'qapi/error.h' header Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 07/22] target/i386/sev_i386.h: Remove unused headers Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 08/22] target/i386/sev: Remove sev_get_me_mask() Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-04 8:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 09/22] target/i386/sev: Mark unreachable code with g_assert_not_reached() Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 10/22] target/i386/sev: sev_get_attestation_report use g_autofree Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 11/22] target/i386/sev: Restrict SEV to system emulation Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 12/22] target/i386/sev: Declare system-specific functions in 'sev_i386.h' Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 13/22] target/i386/sev: Remove stubs by using code elision Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-06 18:55 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-08 15:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 14/22] target/i386/sev: Move qmp_query_sev_attestation_report() to sev.c Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-06 20:45 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 9:57 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-10-07 9:48 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 15/22] target/i386/sev: Move qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret() " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 16/22] target/i386/sev: Move qmp_query_sev_capabilities() " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 17/22] target/i386/sev: Move qmp_query_sev_launch_measure() " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 18/22] target/i386/sev: Move qmp_query_sev() & hmp_info_sev() " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 19/22] monitor: Restrict 'info sev' to x86 targets Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:26 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-07 15:18 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 20/22] sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux boot Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 21/22] x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-02 12:53 ` [PATCH v3 22/22] MAINTAINERS: Cover AMD SEV files Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:27 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-06 20:35 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-10-04 8:27 ` [PATCH v3 00/22] target/i386/sev: Housekeeping SEV + measured Linux SEV guest Paolo Bonzini
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