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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, mszeredi@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/9] virtiofsd, fuse_lowlevel.c: Add capability to parse security context
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 19:41:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yfwv5wDFb3OcTEtH@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220202193935.268777-6-vgoyal@redhat.com>

* Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote:
> Add capability to enable and parse security context as sent by client
> and put into fuse_req. Filesystems now can get security context from
> request and set it on files during creation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> ---
>  tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h   |  5 ++
>  tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h        |  7 +++
>  tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h
> index 6f8a988202..bf46954dab 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h
> @@ -377,6 +377,11 @@ struct fuse_file_info {
>   */
>  #define FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT (1 << 29)
>  
> +/**
> + * Indicates that file server supports creating file security context
> + */
> +#define FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX (1ULL << 32)
> +
>  /**
>   * Ioctl flags
>   *
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h
> index 492e002181..a5572fa4ae 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
>  struct fv_VuDev;
>  struct fv_QueueInfo;
>  
> +struct fuse_security_context {
> +        const char *name;
> +        uint32_t ctxlen;
> +        const void *ctx;
> +};
> +
>  struct fuse_req {
>      struct fuse_session *se;
>      uint64_t unique;
> @@ -35,6 +41,7 @@ struct fuse_req {
>      } u;
>      struct fuse_req *next;
>      struct fuse_req *prev;
> +    struct fuse_security_context secctx;
>  };
>  
>  struct fuse_notify_req {
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
> index 83d29762a4..cd9ef97b3c 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
> @@ -886,11 +886,59 @@ static void do_readlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>      }
>  }
>  
> +static int parse_secctx_fill_req(fuse_req_t req, struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter)
> +{
> +    struct fuse_secctx_header *fsecctx_header;
> +    struct fuse_secctx *fsecctx;
> +    const void *secctx;
> +    const char *name;
> +
> +    fsecctx_header = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx_header));
> +    if (!fsecctx_header) {
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +    }
> +
> +    /*
> +     * As of now maximum of one security context is supported. It can
> +     * change in future though.
> +     */
> +    if (fsecctx_header->nr_secctx > 1) {
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +    }
> +
> +    /* No security context sent. Maybe no LSM supports it */
> +    if (!fsecctx_header->nr_secctx) {
> +        return 0;
> +    }
> +
> +    fsecctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx));
> +    if (!fsecctx) {
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +    }

Are there any sanity checks to be done on fsecctx->size?

> +    name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter);
> +    if (!name) {
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +    }
> +
> +    secctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, fsecctx->size);
> +    if (!secctx) {
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +    }
> +
> +    req->secctx.name = name;
> +    req->secctx.ctx = secctx;
> +    req->secctx.ctxlen = fsecctx->size;

It's OK to use the pointers into the iter here rather than take copies?

> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>                       struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter)
>  {
>      struct fuse_mknod_in *arg;
>      const char *name;
> +    bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX;
> +    int err;
>  
>      arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg));
>      name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter);
> @@ -901,6 +949,13 @@ static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>  
>      req->ctx.umask = arg->umask;
>  
> +    if (secctx_enabled) {
> +        err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter);
> +        if (err) {
> +            fuse_reply_err(req, -err);

return ?

> +        }
> +    }
> +
>      if (req->se->op.mknod) {
>          req->se->op.mknod(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode, arg->rdev);
>      } else {
> @@ -913,6 +968,8 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>  {
>      struct fuse_mkdir_in *arg;
>      const char *name;
> +    bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX;
> +    int err;
>  
>      arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg));
>      name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter);
> @@ -923,6 +980,13 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>  
>      req->ctx.umask = arg->umask;
>  
> +    if (secctx_enabled) {
> +        err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter);
> +        if (err) {
> +            fuse_reply_err(req, err);
return ?
> +        }
> +    }
> +
>      if (req->se->op.mkdir) {
>          req->se->op.mkdir(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode);
>      } else {
> @@ -969,12 +1033,21 @@ static void do_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>  {
>      const char *name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter);
>      const char *linkname = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter);
> +    bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX;
> +    int err;
>  
>      if (!name || !linkname) {
>          fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL);
>          return;
>      }
>  
> +    if (secctx_enabled) {
> +        err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter);
> +        if (err) {
> +            fuse_reply_err(req, err);
return ?
> +        }
> +    }
> +
>      if (req->se->op.symlink) {
>          req->se->op.symlink(req, linkname, nodeid, name);
>      } else {
> @@ -1048,6 +1121,8 @@ static void do_link(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>  static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>                        struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter)
>  {
> +    bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX;
> +
>      if (req->se->op.create) {
>          struct fuse_create_in *arg;
>          struct fuse_file_info fi;
> @@ -1060,6 +1135,15 @@ static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>              return;
>          }
>  
> +        if (secctx_enabled) {
> +            int err;
> +            err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter);
> +            if (err) {
> +                fuse_reply_err(req, err);
> +                return;
> +            }
> +        }
> +
>          memset(&fi, 0, sizeof(fi));
>          fi.flags = arg->flags;
>          fi.kill_priv = arg->open_flags & FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID;
> @@ -2016,6 +2100,9 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>      if (flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT) {
>          se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT;
>      }
> +    if (flags & FUSE_SECURITY_CTX) {
> +        se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX;
> +    }
>  #ifdef HAVE_SPLICE
>  #ifdef HAVE_VMSPLICE
>      se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_MOVE;
> @@ -2155,8 +2242,14 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
>          outarg.flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT;
>      }
>  
> +    if (se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX) {
> +        /* bits 32..63 get shifted down 32 bits into the flags2 field */
> +        outarg.flags2 |= FUSE_SECURITY_CTX >> 32;
> +    }
> +
>      fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   INIT: %u.%u\n", outarg.major, outarg.minor);
> -    fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags);
> +    fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   flags2=0x%08x flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags2,
> +             outarg.flags);
>      fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   max_readahead=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_readahead);
>      fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   max_write=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_write);
>      fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   max_background=%i\n", outarg.max_background);
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK



  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-03 21:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-02 19:39 [PATCH v5 0/9] virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 1/9] virtiofsd: Fix breakage due to fuse_init_in size change Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 2/9] linux-headers: Update headers to v5.17-rc1 Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 3/9] virtiofsd: Parse extended "struct fuse_init_in" Vivek Goyal
2022-02-03 18:56   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 13:31     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 4/9] virtiofsd: Extend size of fuse_conn_info->capable and ->want fields Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 5/9] virtiofsd, fuse_lowlevel.c: Add capability to parse security context Vivek Goyal
2022-02-03 19:41   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2022-02-07 13:47     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 6/9] virtiofsd: Move core file creation code in separate function Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 7/9] virtiofsd: Create new file with fscreate set Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 11:38   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 14:07     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 8/9] virtiofsd: Create new file using O_TMPFILE and set security context Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 12:23   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 9/9] virtiofsd: Add an option to enable/disable security label Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 12:40   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 14:13     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 12:49 ` [PATCH v5 0/9] virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 14:30   ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 16:06     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 13:05 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-07 13:24   ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 13:30     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-07 14:50       ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 21:19   ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 21:34     ` Daniel Walsh
2022-02-08  8:59     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-09 10:24       ` [Virtio-fs] " German Maglione
2022-02-09 15:08         ` Vivek Goyal

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