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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, mszeredi@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 8/9] virtiofsd: Create new file using O_TMPFILE and set security context
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 12:23:56 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YgEPXBy6bPfCPjc1@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220202193935.268777-9-vgoyal@redhat.com>

* Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote:
> If guest and host policies can't work with each other, then guest security
> context (selinux label) needs to be set into an xattr. Say remap guest
> security.selinux xattr to trusted.virtiofs.security.selinux.
> 
> That means setting "fscreate" is not going to help as that's ony useful
> for security.selinux xattr on host.
> 
> So we need another method which is atomic. Use O_TMPFILE to create new
> file, set xattr and then linkat() to proper place.
> 
> But this works only for regular files. So dir, symlinks will continue
> to be non-atomic.
> 
> Also if host filesystem does not support O_TMPFILE, we fallback to
> non-atomic behavior.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>

> ---
>  tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> index acb99aa2fc..43c9b6dbe5 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> @@ -2153,14 +2153,29 @@ static int lo_do_open(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode,
>  
>  static int do_create_nosecctx(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
>                                 const char *name, mode_t mode,
> -                               struct fuse_file_info *fi, int *open_fd)
> +                               struct fuse_file_info *fi, int *open_fd,
> +                              bool tmpfile)
>  {
>      int err, fd;
>      struct lo_cred old = {};
>      struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
>      int flags;
>  
> -    flags = fi->flags | O_CREAT | O_EXCL;
> +    if (tmpfile) {
> +        flags = fi->flags | O_TMPFILE;
> +        /*
> +         * Don't use O_EXCL as we want to link file later. Also reset O_CREAT
> +         * otherwise openat() returns -EINVAL.
> +         */
> +        flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL);
> +
> +        /* O_TMPFILE needs either O_RDWR or O_WRONLY */
> +        if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
> +            flags |= O_RDWR;
> +        }
> +    } else {
> +        flags = fi->flags | O_CREAT | O_EXCL;
> +    }
>  
>      err = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask);
>      if (err) {
> @@ -2191,7 +2206,7 @@ static int do_create_secctx_fscreate(fuse_req_t req,
>          return err;
>      }
>  
> -    err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, &fd);
> +    err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, &fd, false);
>  
>      close_reset_proc_fscreate(fscreate_fd);
>      if (!err) {
> @@ -2200,6 +2215,44 @@ static int do_create_secctx_fscreate(fuse_req_t req,
>      return err;
>  }
>  
> +static int do_create_secctx_tmpfile(fuse_req_t req,
> +                                    struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
> +                                    const char *name, mode_t mode,
> +                                    struct fuse_file_info *fi,
> +                                    const char *secctx_name, int *open_fd)
> +{
> +    int err, fd = -1;
> +    struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
> +    char procname[64];
> +
> +    err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, ".", mode, fi, &fd, true);
> +    if (err) {
> +        return err;
> +    }
> +
> +    err = fsetxattr(fd, secctx_name, req->secctx.ctx, req->secctx.ctxlen, 0);
> +    if (err) {
> +        err = errno;
> +        goto out;
> +    }
> +
> +    /* Security context set on file. Link it in place */
> +    sprintf(procname, "%d", fd);
> +    FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
> +    err = linkat(AT_FDCWD, procname, parent_inode->fd, name,
> +                 AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
> +    err = err == -1 ? errno : 0;
> +    FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
> +
> +out:
> +    if (!err) {
> +        *open_fd = fd;
> +    } else if (fd != -1) {
> +        close(fd);
> +    }
> +    return err;
> +}
> +
>  static int do_create_secctx_noatomic(fuse_req_t req,
>                                       struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
>                                       const char *name, mode_t mode,
> @@ -2208,7 +2261,7 @@ static int do_create_secctx_noatomic(fuse_req_t req,
>  {
>      int err = 0, fd = -1;
>  
> -    err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, &fd);
> +    err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, &fd, false);
>      if (err) {
>          goto out;
>      }
> @@ -2250,20 +2303,31 @@ static int do_lo_create(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_inode *parent_inode,
>      if (secctx_enabled) {
>          /*
>           * If security.selinux has not been remapped and selinux is enabled,
> -         * use fscreate to set context before file creation.
> -         * Otherwise fallback to non-atomic method of file creation
> -         * and xattr settting.
> +         * use fscreate to set context before file creation. If not, use
> +         * tmpfile method for regular files. Otherwise fallback to
> +         * non-atomic method of file creation and xattr settting.
>           */
>          if (!mapped_name && lo->use_fscreate) {
>              err = do_create_secctx_fscreate(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi,
>                                              open_fd);
>              goto out;
> +        } else if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
> +            err = do_create_secctx_tmpfile(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi,
> +                                           ctxname, open_fd);
> +            /*
> +             * If filesystem does not support O_TMPFILE, fallback to non-atomic
> +             * method.
> +             */
> +            if (!err || err != EOPNOTSUPP) {
> +                goto out;
> +            }
>          }
>  
>          err = do_create_secctx_noatomic(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi,
>                                          ctxname, open_fd);
>      } else {
> -        err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, open_fd);
> +        err = do_create_nosecctx(req, parent_inode, name, mode, fi, open_fd,
> +                                 false);
>      }
>  
>  out:
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK



  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-07 12:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-02 19:39 [PATCH v5 0/9] virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 1/9] virtiofsd: Fix breakage due to fuse_init_in size change Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 2/9] linux-headers: Update headers to v5.17-rc1 Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 3/9] virtiofsd: Parse extended "struct fuse_init_in" Vivek Goyal
2022-02-03 18:56   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 13:31     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 4/9] virtiofsd: Extend size of fuse_conn_info->capable and ->want fields Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 5/9] virtiofsd, fuse_lowlevel.c: Add capability to parse security context Vivek Goyal
2022-02-03 19:41   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 13:47     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 6/9] virtiofsd: Move core file creation code in separate function Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 7/9] virtiofsd: Create new file with fscreate set Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 11:38   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 14:07     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 8/9] virtiofsd: Create new file using O_TMPFILE and set security context Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 12:23   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2022-02-02 19:39 ` [PATCH v5 9/9] virtiofsd: Add an option to enable/disable security label Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 12:40   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 14:13     ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 12:49 ` [PATCH v5 0/9] virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 14:30   ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 16:06     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-07 13:05 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-07 13:24   ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 13:30     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-07 14:50       ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 21:19   ` Vivek Goyal
2022-02-07 21:34     ` Daniel Walsh
2022-02-08  8:59     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-09 10:24       ` [Virtio-fs] " German Maglione
2022-02-09 15:08         ` Vivek Goyal

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