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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] i386: Add notify VM exit support
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 09:17:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YinCH/GbShwG1fRF@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310090205.10645-3-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>

On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 05:02:05PM +0800, Chenyi Qiang wrote:
> There are cases that malicious virtual machine can cause CPU stuck (due
> to event windows don't open up), e.g., infinite loop in microcode when
> nested #AC (CVE-2015-5307). No event window means no event (NMI, SMI and
> IRQ) can be delivered. It leads the CPU to be unavailable to host or
> other VMs. Notify VM exit is introduced to mitigate such kind of
> attacks, which will generate a VM exit if no event window occurs in VM
> non-root mode for a specified amount of time (notify window).
> 
> A new KVM capability KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT is exposed to user space
> so that the user can query the capability and set the expected notify
> window when creating VMs.
> 
> If notify VM exit happens with VM_INVALID_CONTEXT, hypervisor should
> exit to user space with the exit reason KVM_EXIT_NOTIFY to inform the
> fatal case. Then user space can inject a SHUTDOWN event to the target
> vcpu. This is implemented by defining a new bit in flags field of
> kvm_vcpu_event in KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS ioctl.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
> ---
>  hw/i386/x86.c         | 24 ++++++++++++++++++
>  include/hw/i386/x86.h |  3 +++
>  target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/i386/x86.c b/hw/i386/x86.c
> index b84840a1bb..25e6c50b1e 100644
> --- a/hw/i386/x86.c
> +++ b/hw/i386/x86.c
> @@ -1309,6 +1309,23 @@ static void machine_set_sgx_epc(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
>      qapi_free_SgxEPCList(list);
>  }
>  
> +static void x86_machine_get_notify_window(Object *obj, Visitor *v,
> +                                const char *name, void *opaque, Error **errp)
> +{
> +    X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(obj);
> +    int32_t notify_window = x86ms->notify_window;
> +
> +    visit_type_int32(v, name, &notify_window, errp);
> +}
> +
> +static void x86_machine_set_notify_window(Object *obj, Visitor *v,
> +                               const char *name, void *opaque, Error **errp)
> +{
> +    X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(obj);
> +
> +    visit_type_int32(v, name, &x86ms->notify_window, errp);
> +}
> +
>  static void x86_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
>  {
>      X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(obj);
> @@ -1319,6 +1336,7 @@ static void x86_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
>      x86ms->oem_id = g_strndup(ACPI_BUILD_APPNAME6, 6);
>      x86ms->oem_table_id = g_strndup(ACPI_BUILD_APPNAME8, 8);
>      x86ms->bus_lock_ratelimit = 0;
> +    x86ms->notify_window = -1;
>  }

IIUC from the kernel patch, this negative value leaves the protection
disabled, and thus the host remains vulnerable to the CVE. I would
expect this ought to set a suitable default value to fix the flaw.

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
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  reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10  9:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-10  9:02 [PATCH 0/2] Enable notify VM exit Chenyi Qiang
2022-03-10  9:02 ` [PATCH 1/2] linux-headers: Sync the linux headers Chenyi Qiang
2022-03-10  9:02 ` [PATCH 2/2] i386: Add notify VM exit support Chenyi Qiang
2022-03-10  9:17   ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2022-03-10  9:53     ` Chenyi Qiang
2022-03-10 10:03       ` Daniel P. Berrangé

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