From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, armbru@redhat.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
xiaoyao.li@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, anisinha@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/31] i386/sev: Introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 13:02:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zl2w6KktLnFxq83Y@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240530111643.1091816-8-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:16:19AM -0500, Pankaj Gupta wrote:
> +# @policy: the 'POLICY' parameter to the SNP_LAUNCH_START command, as
> +# defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: 0x30000)
> +#
> +# @guest-visible-workarounds: 16-byte, base64-encoded blob to report
> +# hypervisor-defined workarounds, corresponding to the 'GOSVW'
> +# parameter of the SNP_LAUNCH_START command defined in the SEV-SNP
> +# firmware ABI (default: all-zero)
> +#
> +# @id-block: 96-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Block'
> +# structure for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined in the
> +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero)
> +#
> +# @id-auth: 4096-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID
> +# Authentication Information Structure' for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH
> +# command defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero)
> +#
> +# @auth-key-enabled: true if 'id-auth' blob contains the 'AUTHOR_KEY'
> +# field defined SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: false)
In 'id-auth', 'auth' is short for 'authentication'
In 'auth-key-enabled', 'auth' is short for 'author'.
Shortening 'authentication' is a compelling win. Shorting 'author'
is not much of a win.
So to make it less ambiguous, how about '@author-key-enabled' for
the field ?
> +#
> +# @host-data: 32-byte, base64-encoded, user-defined blob to provide to
> +# the guest, as documented for the 'HOST_DATA' parameter of the
> +# SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default:
> +# all-zero)
> +#
> +# @vcek-disabled: Guests are by default allowed to choose between VLEK
> +# (Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key) or VCEK (Versioned Chip
> +# Endorsement Key) when requesting attestation reports from
> +# firmware. Set this to true to disable the use of VCEK.
> +# (default: false) (since: 9.1)
> +#
> +# Since: 9.1
> +##
> +{ 'struct': 'SevSnpGuestProperties',
> + 'base': 'SevCommonProperties',
> + 'data': {
> + '*policy': 'uint64',
> + '*guest-visible-workarounds': 'str',
> + '*id-block': 'str',
> + '*id-auth': 'str',
> + '*auth-key-enabled': 'bool',
> + '*host-data': 'str',
> + '*vcek-disabled': 'bool' } }
>
> ##
> # @ThreadContextProperties:
> @@ -1007,6 +1062,7 @@
> { 'name': 'secret_keyring',
> 'if': 'CONFIG_SECRET_KEYRING' },
> 'sev-guest',
> + 'sev-snp-guest',
> 'thread-context',
> 's390-pv-guest',
> 'throttle-group',
> @@ -1077,6 +1133,7 @@
> 'secret_keyring': { 'type': 'SecretKeyringProperties',
> 'if': 'CONFIG_SECRET_KEYRING' },
> 'sev-guest': 'SevGuestProperties',
> + 'sev-snp-guest': 'SevSnpGuestProperties',
> 'thread-context': 'ThreadContextProperties',
> 'throttle-group': 'ThrottleGroupProperties',
> 'tls-creds-anon': 'TlsCredsAnonProperties',
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index c141f4fed4..841b45f59b 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
>
> OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevCommonState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_COMMON)
> OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SevGuestStateClass, SEV_GUEST)
> +OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevSnpGuestState, SevSnpGuestStateClass, SEV_SNP_GUEST)
>
> struct SevCommonState {
> X86ConfidentialGuest parent_obj;
> @@ -100,8 +101,26 @@ struct SevGuestStateClass {
> SevCommonStateClass parent_class;
> };
>
> +struct SevSnpGuestState {
> + SevCommonState parent_obj;
> +
> + /* configuration parameters */
> + char *guest_visible_workarounds;
> + char *id_block;
> + char *id_auth;
> + char *host_data;
> +
> + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start kvm_start_conf;
> + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish kvm_finish_conf;
> +};
> +
> +struct SevSnpGuestStateClass {
> + SevCommonStateClass parent_class;
> +};
> +
> #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
> #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
> +#define DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY 0x30000
>
> #define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e"
> typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {
> @@ -1505,11 +1524,249 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = {
> .class_init = sev_guest_class_init,
> };
>
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_get_policy(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
> + void *opaque, Error **errp)
> +{
> + visit_type_uint64(v, name,
> + (uint64_t *)&SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->kvm_start_conf.policy,
> + errp);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_set_policy(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
> + void *opaque, Error **errp)
> +{
> + visit_type_uint64(v, name,
> + (uint64_t *)&SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->kvm_start_conf.policy,
> + errp);
> +}
> +
> +static char *
> +sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> +{
> + return g_strdup(SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->guest_visible_workarounds);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, const char *value,
> + Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf;
> + g_autofree guchar *blob;
> + gsize len;
> +
> + g_free(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds);
> +
> + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
> + sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds = g_strdup(value);
> +
> + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds,
> + -1, &len, errp);
> + if (!blob) {
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (len != sizeof(start->gosvw)) {
> + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu",
> + len, sizeof(start->gosvw));
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(start->gosvw, blob, len);
> +}
> +
> +static char *
> +sev_snp_guest_get_id_block(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_block);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_set_id_block(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf;
> + gsize len;
> +
> + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_block);
> + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_block_uaddr);
> +
> + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
> + sev_snp_guest->id_block = g_strdup(value);
> +
> + finish->id_block_uaddr =
> + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_block, -1, &len, errp);
> +
> + if (!finish->id_block_uaddr) {
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (len != KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE) {
> + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu not equal to %u",
> + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + finish->id_block_en = (len) ? 1 : 0;
> +}
> +
> +static char *
> +sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_auth);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf;
> + gsize len;
> +
> + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_auth);
> + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_auth_uaddr);
> +
> + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
> + sev_snp_guest->id_auth = g_strdup(value);
> +
> + finish->id_auth_uaddr =
> + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_auth, -1, &len, errp);
> +
> + if (!finish->id_auth_uaddr) {
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE) {
> + error_setg(errp, "parameter length:ID_AUTH %lu exceeds max of %u",
> + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE);
> + return;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static bool
> +sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + return !!sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en;
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en = value;
> +}
> +
> +static bool
> +sev_snp_guest_get_vcek_disabled(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + return !!sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.vcek_disabled;
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_set_vcek_disabled(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.vcek_disabled = value;
> +}
> +
> +static char *
> +sev_snp_guest_get_host_data(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->host_data);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_set_host_data(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf;
> + g_autofree guchar *blob;
> + gsize len;
> +
> + g_free(sev_snp_guest->host_data);
> +
> + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
> + sev_snp_guest->host_data = g_strdup(value);
> +
> + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->host_data, -1, &len, errp);
> +
> + if (!blob) {
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (len != sizeof(finish->host_data)) {
> + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu not equal to %lu",
> + len, sizeof(finish->host_data));
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(finish->host_data, blob, len);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
> +{
> + object_class_property_add(oc, "policy", "uint64",
> + sev_snp_guest_get_policy,
> + sev_snp_guest_set_policy, NULL, NULL);
> + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "guest-visible-workarounds",
> + sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds,
> + sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds);
> + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-block",
> + sev_snp_guest_get_id_block,
> + sev_snp_guest_set_id_block);
> + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-auth",
> + sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth,
> + sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth);
> + object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "auth-key-enabled",
> + sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en,
> + sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en);
> + object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "vcek-required",
> + sev_snp_guest_get_vcek_disabled,
> + sev_snp_guest_set_vcek_disabled);
> + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "host-data",
> + sev_snp_guest_get_host_data,
> + sev_snp_guest_set_host_data);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_snp_guest_instance_init(Object *obj)
> +{
> + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
> +
> + /* default init/start/finish params for kvm */
> + sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf.policy = DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY;
> +}
> +
> +/* guest info specific to sev-snp */
> +static const TypeInfo sev_snp_guest_info = {
> + .parent = TYPE_SEV_COMMON,
> + .name = TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST,
> + .instance_size = sizeof(SevSnpGuestState),
> + .class_init = sev_snp_guest_class_init,
> + .instance_init = sev_snp_guest_instance_init,
> +};
> +
> static void
> sev_register_types(void)
> {
> type_register_static(&sev_common_info);
> type_register_static(&sev_guest_info);
> + type_register_static(&sev_snp_guest_info);
> }
>
> type_init(sev_register_types);
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h
> index 668374eef3..bedc667eeb 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.h
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.h
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>
> #define TYPE_SEV_COMMON "sev-common"
> #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"
> +#define TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST "sev-snp-guest"
>
> #define SEV_POLICY_NODBG 0x1
> #define SEV_POLICY_NOKS 0x2
> --
> 2.34.1
>
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-03 12:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-30 11:16 [PATCH v4 00/31] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 01/31] i386/sev: Replace error_report with error_setg Pankaj Gupta
2024-06-03 11:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 02/31] linux-headers: Update to current kvm/next Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 14:38 ` Liam Merwick via
2024-05-31 15:37 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 03/31] memory: Introduce memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd() Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 04/31] i386/sev: Introduce "sev-common" type to encapsulate common SEV state Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 05/31] i386/sev: Move sev_launch_update to separate class method Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 06/31] i386/sev: Move sev_launch_finish " Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 07/31] i386/sev: Introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-03 12:02 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2024-06-03 17:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 08/31] i386/sev: Add a sev_snp_enabled() helper Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 09/31] i386/sev: Add sev_kvm_init() override for SEV class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 10/31] i386/sev: Add snp_kvm_init() override for SNP class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 11/31] i386/cpu: Set SEV-SNP CPUID bit when SNP enabled Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 12/31] i386/sev: Don't return launch measurements for SEV-SNP guests Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 13/31] i386/sev: Add a class method to determine KVM VM type for SNP guests Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 14/31] i386/sev: Update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 15/31] i386/sev: Add the SNP launch start context Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 16/31] i386/sev: Add handling to encrypt/finalize guest launch data Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 17/31] i386/sev: Set CPU state to protected once SNP guest payload is finalized Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 18/31] hw/i386/sev: Add function to get SEV metadata from OVMF header Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 15:19 ` Liam Merwick via
2024-05-31 15:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-31 16:41 ` Liam Merwick via
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 19/31] i386/sev: Add support for populating OVMF metadata pages Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 20/31] i386/sev: Add support for SNP CPUID validation Pankaj Gupta
2024-07-02 3:07 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-04 0:34 ` Michael Roth
2024-07-04 4:09 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-04 5:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 21/31] i386/sev: Extract build_kernel_loader_hashes Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 22/31] i386/sev: Reorder struct declarations Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 23/31] i386/sev: Allow measured direct kernel boot on SNP Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 24/31] hw/i386/sev: Add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 25/31] i386/sev: Invoke launch_updata_data() for SEV class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:10 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 26/31] i386/sev: Invoke launch_updata_data() for SNP class Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 27/31] hw/i386/sev: Use guest_memfd for legacy ROMs Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:27 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-14 8:58 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-06-14 10:02 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 28/31] hw/i386: Add support for loading BIOS using guest_memfd Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-14 8:34 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-06-14 8:48 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-06-14 9:03 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 29/31] hw/i386/sev: Allow use of pflash in conjunction with -bios Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 12:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-03 11:55 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-06-03 13:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 9:03 ` Hoffmann, Gerd
2024-06-03 14:27 ` Michael Roth via
2024-06-03 14:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-03 16:31 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 30/31] i386/kvm: Add KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL handling for KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE Pankaj Gupta
2024-07-04 8:53 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-30 11:16 ` [PATCH v4 31/31] i386/sev: Enable KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hcall for SNP guests Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-31 11:20 ` [PATCH v4 00/31] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-31 17:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-31 17:40 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-05-31 17:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-01 4:57 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-06-03 14:15 ` Michael Roth
2024-06-03 14:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
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