From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@suse.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Stefano Garzarella" <sgarzare@redhat.com>,
"Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
"Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
"Sergio Lopez" <slp@redhat.com>,
"Eduardo Habkost" <eduardo@habkost.net>,
"Alistair Francis" <alistair@alistair23.me>,
"Peter Xu" <peterx@redhat.com>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
"Igor Mammedov" <imammedo@redhat.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
"Ani Sinha" <anisinha@redhat.com>,
"Jörg Roedel" <jroedel@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 02/17] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2024 17:47:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZqEwKsGFyHQZNFUn@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c07dcfe9496a8682bf262bfa6caa180e0eefcce4.1720004383.git.roy.hopkins@suse.com>
On Wed, Jul 03, 2024 at 12:05:40PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote:
> In preparation for supporting the processing of IGVM files to configure
> guests, this adds a set of functions to ConfidentialGuestSupport
> allowing configuration of secure virtual machines that can be
> implemented for each supported isolation platform type such as Intel TDX
> or AMD SEV-SNP. These functions will be called by IGVM processing code
> in subsequent patches.
>
> This commit provides a default implementation of the functions that
> either perform no action or generate an error when they are called.
> Targets that support ConfidentalGuestSupport should override these
> implementations.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@suse.com>
> ---
> include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 31 ++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> index 02dc4e518f..4834efbe38 100644
> --- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> +++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
> #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
>
> #include "qom/object.h"
> +#include "exec/hwaddr.h"
>
> #define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support"
> OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
> @@ -28,6 +29,36 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
> CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
>
>
> +typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPlatformType {
> + CGS_PLATFORM_SEV,
> + CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_ES,
> + CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_SNP,
> +} ConfidentialGuestPlatformType;
> +
> +typedef enum ConfidentialGuestMemoryType {
> + CGS_MEM_RAM,
> + CGS_MEM_RESERVED,
> + CGS_MEM_ACPI,
> + CGS_MEM_NVS,
> + CGS_MEM_UNUSABLE,
> +} ConfidentialGuestMemoryType;
> +
> +typedef struct ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry {
> + uint64_t gpa;
> + uint64_t size;
> + ConfidentialGuestMemoryType type;
> +} ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry;
> +
> +typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPageType {
> + CGS_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL,
> + CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA,
> + CGS_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO,
> + CGS_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED,
> + CGS_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS,
> + CGS_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID,
> + CGS_PAGE_TYPE_REQUIRED_MEMORY,
> +} ConfidentialGuestPageType;
> +
> struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
> Object parent;
>
> @@ -66,6 +97,40 @@ typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
>
> int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> +
> + /*
> + * Check for to see if this confidential guest supports a particular
> + * platform or configuration
> + */
> + int (*check_support)(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
> + uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
> + uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary);
> +
> + /*
> + * Configure part of the state of a guest for a particular set of data, page
> + * type and gpa. This can be used for example to pre-populate and measure
> + * guest memory contents, define private ranges or set the initial CPU state
> + * for one or more CPUs.
> + *
> + * If memory_type is CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA then ptr points to the initial CPU
> + * context for a virtual CPU. The format of the data depends on the type of
> + * confidential virtual machine. For example, for SEV-ES ptr will point to a
> + * vmcb_save_area structure that should be copied into guest memory at the
> + * address specified in gpa. The cpu_index parameter contains the index of
> + * the CPU the VMSA applies to.
> + */
> + int (*set_guest_state)(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
> + ConfidentialGuestPageType memory_type,
> + uint16_t cpu_index, Error **errp);
> +
> + /*
> + * Iterate the system memory map, getting the entry with the given index
> + * that can be populated into guest memory.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 for ok, 1 if the index is out of range and -1 on error.
> + */
> + int (*get_mem_map_entry)(int index, ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry,
> + Error **errp);
> } ConfidentialGuestSupportClass;
>
> static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
> @@ -94,6 +159,16 @@ static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(klass) \
> + OBJECT_CLASS_CHECK(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, (klass), \
> + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
> +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT(obj) \
> + OBJECT_CHECK(ConfidentialGuestSupport, (obj), \
> + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
> +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(obj) \
> + OBJECT_GET_CLASS(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, (obj), \
> + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
Are you sure these are needed ? Earlier in this header have
OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass,
CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
which calls DECLARE_INSTANCE_CHECKER and
DECLARE_CLASS_CHECKERS, which should define these
very same macros.
With regards,
Daniel
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-24 16:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-03 11:05 [PATCH v4 00/17] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 01/17] meson: Add optional dependency on IGVM library Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 16:26 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 02/17] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 16:47 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 03/17] backends/igvm: Add IGVM loader and configuration Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 16:59 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-29 13:35 ` Stefano Garzarella
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 04/17] hw/i386: Add igvm-cfg object and processing for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 17:08 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 05/17] i386/pc_sysfw: Ensure sysfw flash configuration does not conflict with IGVM Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 17:13 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 10:42 ` Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 06/17] sev: Fix error handling in sev_encrypt_flash() Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 17:19 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 07/17] sev: Update launch_update_data functions to use Error handling Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 17:21 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 08/17] target/i386: Allow setting of R_LDTR and R_TR with cpu_x86_load_seg_cache() Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 09/17] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 10/17] i386/sev: Implement ConfidentialGuestSupport functions for SEV Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 11/17] docs/system: Add documentation on support for IGVM Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 17:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-29 13:41 ` Stefano Garzarella
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 12/17] docs/interop/firmware.json: Add igvm to FirmwareDevice Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 17:27 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 13/17] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add set_guest_policy() function Roy Hopkins
2024-07-24 17:30 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 14/17] backends/igvm: Process initialization sections in IGVM file Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 15/17] backends/igvm: Handle policy for SEV guests Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 16/17] i386/sev: Add implementation of CGS set_guest_policy() Roy Hopkins
2024-07-03 11:05 ` [PATCH v4 17/17] sev: Provide sev_features flags from IGVM VMSA to KVM_SEV_INIT2 Roy Hopkins
2024-07-20 18:26 ` [PATCH v4 00/17] Introduce support for IGVM files Michael S. Tsirkin
2024-08-13 9:53 ` Roy Hopkins
2024-08-13 10:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2024-07-24 16:29 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-02 15:57 ` Roy Hopkins
2024-08-02 16:03 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
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