From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, graf@amazon.com, agraf@csgraf.de,
stefanha@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, slp@redhat.com,
richard.henderson@linaro.org, eduardo@habkost.net,
mst@redhat.com, marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com, philmd@linaro.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 13:57:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zr9M0BqDEdF5D5xJ@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFfO_h48q9Lkt1BmtoPxtZ1a8HJsoQCTTdBMTFkB568+v6B0Sw@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 06:50:34PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> Hi Daniel,
>
> On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 8:07 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:45:01PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> > > AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> > > is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> > > adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
> > >
> > > In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> > > 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> > > contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> > > VM for validation.
> > >
> > > A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> > > be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> > > Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> > > ---
> > > hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> > > hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> > > hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> > > hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> > > include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> > > 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
> > > index 5558879a96..d2c65668ef 100644
> > > --- a/hw/core/eif.c
> > > +++ b/hw/core/eif.c
> > > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> > > #include "qemu/bswap.h"
> > > #include "qapi/error.h"
> > > #include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
> > > +#include <cbor.h>
> > > +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
> > > +#include <gnutls/x509.h>
> > >
> > > #include "hw/core/eif.h"
> > >
> >
> > > @@ -269,6 +284,125 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> > > return false;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static bool get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
> > > + uint8_t *sha384, Error **errp)
> > > +{
> > > + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
> > > + size_t hash_size = 48;
> > > + gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
> > > +
> > > + gnutls_global_init();
> > > + gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
> > > +
> > > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) != 0) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(crt, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384, sha384,
> > > + &hash_size) != 0) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to compute SHA384 fingerprint");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return true;
> > > +
> > > + cleanup:
> > > + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
> > > + gnutls_global_deinit();
> > > + return false;
> > > +}
> >
> > I'd suggest this go into qcrypto/x509-utils.c & include/qcrypto/x509-utils.h,
> > as:
> >
> > int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert,
> > size_t size,
> > QCryptoHashAlgorith hash,
> > Error **errp);
> >
> > there's no need to be calling gnutls_global_init() / deinit() either.
> >
> >
> > > @@ -299,7 +433,9 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
> > > */
> > > bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > > char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
> > > - Error **errp)
> > > + uint8_t *image_sha384, uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384,
> > > + uint8_t *app_sha384, uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384,
> > > + bool *signature_found, Error **errp)
> > > {
> > > FILE *f = NULL;
> > > FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
> > > @@ -308,9 +444,33 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > > uint32_t crc = 0;
> > > EifHeader eif_header;
> > > bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
> > > -
> > > + /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > > + GChecksum *image_hasher = NULL;
> > > + /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > > + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher = NULL;
> > > + /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
> > > + GChecksum *app_hasher = NULL;
> > > + size_t digest_len;
> > > +
> > > + *signature_found = false;
> > > *kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
> > >
> > > + image_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > + if (image_hasher == NULL) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for image");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > + bootstrap_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > + if (bootstrap_hasher == NULL) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for bootstrap");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > + app_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > + if (app_hasher == NULL) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for app");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> >
> > Don't use GChecksum APIs please, use the qcrypto hash APIs instead,
> > as we need all code to be using the designated QEMU crypto backend.
> >
>
> Thanks for the reviews. I was looking into replacing the GChecksum
> uses with qcrypto apis and was able to do it in the extendPCR function
> but I need some help with how I can do this in the eif.c file. For
> example, the "image_hash" needs to be a SHA384 hash of the kernel,
> cmdline, ramdisks sections' data as they appear in the order that is
> in the EIF file. Using GChecksum it was easy as I was able to just
> pass the hashers to the "read_eif_kernel", "read_eif_ramdisk" etc
> functions and call "update" on them. But the qcrypto apis are
> stateless i.e., I would need to pass all the buffers in a single api
> call so it wouldn't work right now out of the box. Do you have any
> suggestions how I should modify/create qcrypto apis so that I can
> easily do this (considering that I would need to implement for
> different qcrypto backends)? Thanks!
Looking at the read_eif_* methods:
@ -213,6 +218,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, kernel, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, kernel, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, kernel, size);
g_free(kernel);
fclose(tmp_file);
@@ -230,6 +237,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
}
static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
+ GChecksum *image_hasher,
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher,
uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
{
size_t got = fread(cmdline, 1, size, f);
@@ -239,10 +248,14 @@ static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
return true;
}
static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
+ GChecksum *image_hasher,
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_or_app_hasher,
uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
{
size_t got;
@@ -261,6 +274,8 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, ramdisk, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, ramdisk, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_or_app_hasher, ramdisk, size);
g_free(ramdisk);
return true;
For the kernel + ramdisk, these methods are freeing the buffer.
For the cmdline, the pointer is held by the caller.
I'd suggest that read_eif_kernel+ramddisk are changed to return
the data pointer instead of free'ing it.
The caller can then stash the kernl+cmdline+ramdisk into an iovec
and calc the hash in a single stateless operation.
If you really don't want to do that, then you'll have to wait for
this series to be finalized & merged next dev cycle:
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2024-08/msg01173.html
It is getting close to ready, so might not be too long, but I can't
guarantee a timeframe.
With regards,
Daniel
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-16 12:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:56 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 14:24 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 18:02 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-14 8:17 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 12:54 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:51 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-12 14:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-12 13:55 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-12 14:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-16 12:50 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-16 12:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2024-08-16 13:34 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-13 12:57 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] docs/nitro-enclave: Documentation for nitro-enclave machine type Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-18 11:51 ` [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
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