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From: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
	Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2020 11:01:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a3c05575-6fb2-8d1b-f6d9-2eabf3f4082d@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <892533f8-cd3c-e282-58c2-4212eb3a84b8@redhat.com>


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On 6/26/20 8:53 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>>> Does this have any implications when probing with the 'none' machine?
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure.  In your case, I guess the cpu bit would still show up
>>>> as before, so it would tell you base feature availability, but not
>>>> whether you can use the new configuration option.
>>>>
>>>> Since the HTL option is generic, you could still set it on the "none"
>>>> machine, though it wouldn't really have any effect.  That is, if you
>>>> could create a suitable object to point it at, which would depend on
>>>> ... details.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The important point is that we never want the (expanded) host cpu model
>>> look different when either specifying or not specifying the HTL
>>> property.
>>
>> Ah, yes, I see your point.  So my current suggestion will satisfy
>> that, basically it is:
>>
>> cpu has unpack (inc. by default) && htl specified
>> 	=> works (allowing secure), as expected
> 
> ack
> 
>>
>> !cpu has unpack && htl specified
>> 	=> bails out with an error
> 
> ack
> 
>>
>> !cpu has unpack && !htl specified
>> 	=> works for a non-secure guest, as expected
>> 	=> guest will fail if it attempts to go secure
> 
> ack, behavior just like running on older hw without unpack
> 
>>
>> cpu has unpack && !htl specified
>> 	=> works as expected for a non-secure guest (unpack feature is
>> 	   present, but unused)
>> 	=> secure guest may work "by accident", but only if all virtio
>> 	   properties have the right values, which is the user's
>> 	   problem
>>
>> That last case is kinda ugly, but I think it's tolerable.
> 
> Right, we must not affect non-secure guests, and existing secure setups
> (e.g., older qemu machines). Will have to think about this some more,
> but does not sound too crazy.

I severely dislike having to specify things to make PV work.
The IOMMU is already a thorn in our side and we're working on making the
whole ordeal completely transparent so the only requirement to make this
work is the right machine, kernel, qemu and kernel cmd line option
"prot_virt=1". That's why we do the reboot into PV mode in the first place.

I.e. the goal is that if customers convert compatible guests into
protected ones and start them up on a z15 on a distro with PV support
they can just use the guest without having to change XML or command line
parameters.

Internal customers have already created bugs because they did not follow
the documentation and the more cmd options we bring the more bugzillas
we'll get.

PV is already in the field/GA and can be ordered, as is our documentation.

@Christian: Please chime in here

> 
> Thanks!
> 



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  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-26  9:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-19  2:05 [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-06-26 11:01   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-14 19:26   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-07-14 19:36   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:05 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-06-26 10:33   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-05  7:38     ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:06 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:12   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:46     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 11:47       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-19 12:16         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 20:04           ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-24  7:55           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-25  4:57             ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:02       ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 14:45     ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 15:05       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-20  8:24         ` David Gibson
2020-06-22  9:09           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-25  5:06             ` David Gibson
2020-06-19  2:42 ` [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models no-reply
2020-06-19  8:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19  9:45   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19  9:56     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-19 10:05       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19 10:10         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-22 12:02           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25  5:25             ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  7:06               ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26  4:42                 ` David Gibson
2020-06-26  6:53                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-26  9:01                     ` Janosch Frank [this message]
2020-06-26  9:32                       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26  9:49                         ` Janosch Frank
2020-06-26 10:29                           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 10:58                             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-26 12:49                               ` Janosch Frank
2020-07-01 11:59                                 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-19  9:48   ` David Gibson
2020-06-19 10:04     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  5:42       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  6:59         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-06-25  9:49           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-22 14:27 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-06-24  7:06   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-25  5:47     ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:48       ` David Gibson
2020-06-25  5:44   ` David Gibson

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