* [PATCH v9 01/16] meson: Add optional dependency on IGVM library
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:00 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM Roy Hopkins
` (17 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
The IGVM library allows Independent Guest Virtual Machine files to be
parsed and processed. IGVM files are used to configure guest memory
layout, initial processor state and other configuration pertaining to
secure virtual machines.
This adds the --enable-igvm configure option, enabled by default, which
attempts to locate and link against the IGVM library via pkgconfig and
sets CONFIG_IGVM if found.
The library is added to the system_ss target in backends/meson.build
where the IGVM parsing will be performed by the ConfidentialGuestSupport
object.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
backends/meson.build | 3 +++
meson.build | 8 ++++++++
meson_options.txt | 2 ++
scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh | 3 +++
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/backends/meson.build b/backends/meson.build
index 9b88d22685..ac0fac7845 100644
--- a/backends/meson.build
+++ b/backends/meson.build
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ if have_vhost_user_crypto
endif
system_ss.add(when: gio, if_true: files('dbus-vmstate.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SGX', if_true: files('hostmem-epc.c'))
+if igvm.found()
+ system_ss.add(igvm)
+endif
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SPDM_SOCKET', if_true: files('spdm-socket.c'))
diff --git a/meson.build b/meson.build
index b5f74aa37a..200352c244 100644
--- a/meson.build
+++ b/meson.build
@@ -1424,6 +1424,12 @@ if host_os == 'linux' and (have_system or have_tools)
method: 'pkg-config',
required: get_option('libudev'))
endif
+igvm = not_found
+if not get_option('igvm').auto() or have_system
+ igvm = dependency('igvm', version: '>= 0.3.0',
+ method: 'pkg-config',
+ required: get_option('igvm'))
+endif
mpathlibs = [libudev]
mpathpersist = not_found
@@ -2601,6 +2607,7 @@ config_host_data.set('CONFIG_CFI', get_option('cfi'))
config_host_data.set('CONFIG_SELINUX', selinux.found())
config_host_data.set('CONFIG_XEN_BACKEND', xen.found())
config_host_data.set('CONFIG_LIBDW', libdw.found())
+config_host_data.set('CONFIG_IGVM', igvm.found())
if xen.found()
# protect from xen.version() having less than three components
xen_version = xen.version().split('.') + ['0', '0']
@@ -4965,6 +4972,7 @@ summary_info += {'seccomp support': seccomp}
summary_info += {'GlusterFS support': glusterfs}
summary_info += {'hv-balloon support': hv_balloon}
summary_info += {'TPM support': have_tpm}
+summary_info += {'IGVM support': igvm}
summary_info += {'libssh support': libssh}
summary_info += {'lzo support': lzo}
summary_info += {'snappy support': snappy}
diff --git a/meson_options.txt b/meson_options.txt
index a442be2995..1e429311a2 100644
--- a/meson_options.txt
+++ b/meson_options.txt
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ option('tpm', type : 'feature', value : 'auto',
description: 'TPM support')
option('valgrind', type : 'feature', value: 'auto',
description: 'valgrind debug support for coroutine stacks')
+option('igvm', type: 'feature', value: 'auto',
+ description: 'Independent Guest Virtual Machine (IGVM) file support')
# Do not enable it by default even for Mingw32, because it doesn't
# work on Wine.
diff --git a/scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh b/scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh
index 73e0770f42..7851540445 100644
--- a/scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh
+++ b/scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ meson_options_help() {
printf "%s\n" ' hv-balloon hv-balloon driver (requires Glib 2.68+ GTree API)'
printf "%s\n" ' hvf HVF acceleration support'
printf "%s\n" ' iconv Font glyph conversion support'
+ printf "%s\n" ' igvm IGVM file support'
printf "%s\n" ' jack JACK sound support'
printf "%s\n" ' keyring Linux keyring support'
printf "%s\n" ' kvm KVM acceleration support'
@@ -346,6 +347,8 @@ _meson_option_parse() {
--iasl=*) quote_sh "-Diasl=$2" ;;
--enable-iconv) printf "%s" -Diconv=enabled ;;
--disable-iconv) printf "%s" -Diconv=disabled ;;
+ --enable-igvm) printf "%s" -Digvm=enabled ;;
+ --disable-igvm) printf "%s" -Digvm=disabled ;;
--includedir=*) quote_sh "-Dincludedir=$2" ;;
--enable-install-blobs) printf "%s" -Dinstall_blobs=true ;;
--disable-install-blobs) printf "%s" -Dinstall_blobs=false ;;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 02/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:00 ` [PATCH v9 01/16] meson: Add optional dependency on IGVM library Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:03 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-08 15:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-07-03 15:10 ` [PATCH v9 03/16] backends/igvm: Add IGVM loader and configuration Roy Hopkins
` (16 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
In preparation for supporting the processing of IGVM files to configure
guests, this adds a set of functions to ConfidentialGuestSupport
allowing configuration of secure virtual machines that can be
implemented for each supported isolation platform type such as Intel TDX
or AMD SEV-SNP. These functions will be called by IGVM processing code
in subsequent patches.
This commit provides a default implementation of the functions that
either perform no action or generate an error when they are called.
Targets that support ConfidentalGuestSupport should override these
implementations.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 31 ++++++++++
include/system/confidential-guest-support.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 98 insertions(+)
diff --git a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
index 8ff7bfa857..c5bef1fbfa 100644
--- a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
+++ b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
@@ -14,15 +14,46 @@
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include "system/confidential-guest-support.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
OBJECT_DEFINE_ABSTRACT_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
confidential_guest_support,
CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT,
OBJECT)
+static bool check_support(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
+ uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
+ uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary)
+{
+ /* Default: no support. */
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int set_guest_state(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
+ ConfidentialGuestPageType memory_type,
+ uint16_t cpu_index, Error **errp)
+{
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "Setting confidential guest state is not supported for this platform");
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int get_mem_map_entry(int index, ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "Obtaining the confidential guest memory map is not supported for this platform");
+ return -1;
+}
+
static void confidential_guest_support_class_init(ObjectClass *oc,
const void *data)
{
+ ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *cgsc = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(oc);
+ cgsc->check_support = check_support;
+ cgsc->set_guest_state = set_guest_state;
+ cgsc->get_mem_map_entry = get_mem_map_entry;
}
static void confidential_guest_support_init(Object *obj)
diff --git a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
index ea46b50c56..79ecd21f42 100644
--- a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
+++ b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H
#include "qom/object.h"
+#include "exec/hwaddr.h"
#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support"
OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
@@ -26,6 +27,36 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
+typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPlatformType {
+ CGS_PLATFORM_SEV,
+ CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_ES,
+ CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_SNP,
+} ConfidentialGuestPlatformType;
+
+typedef enum ConfidentialGuestMemoryType {
+ CGS_MEM_RAM,
+ CGS_MEM_RESERVED,
+ CGS_MEM_ACPI,
+ CGS_MEM_NVS,
+ CGS_MEM_UNUSABLE,
+} ConfidentialGuestMemoryType;
+
+typedef struct ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry {
+ uint64_t gpa;
+ uint64_t size;
+ ConfidentialGuestMemoryType type;
+} ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry;
+
+typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPageType {
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_REQUIRED_MEMORY,
+} ConfidentialGuestPageType;
+
struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
Object parent;
@@ -64,6 +95,42 @@ typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
+
+ /*
+ * Check to see if this confidential guest supports a particular
+ * platform or configuration.
+ *
+ * Return true if supported or false if not supported.
+ */
+ bool (*check_support)(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
+ uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
+ uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary);
+
+ /*
+ * Configure part of the state of a guest for a particular set of data, page
+ * type and gpa. This can be used for example to pre-populate and measure
+ * guest memory contents, define private ranges or set the initial CPU state
+ * for one or more CPUs.
+ *
+ * If memory_type is CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA then ptr points to the initial CPU
+ * context for a virtual CPU. The format of the data depends on the type of
+ * confidential virtual machine. For example, for SEV-ES ptr will point to a
+ * vmcb_save_area structure that should be copied into guest memory at the
+ * address specified in gpa. The cpu_index parameter contains the index of
+ * the CPU the VMSA applies to.
+ */
+ int (*set_guest_state)(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
+ ConfidentialGuestPageType memory_type,
+ uint16_t cpu_index, Error **errp);
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate the system memory map, getting the entry with the given index
+ * that can be populated into guest memory.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for ok, 1 if the index is out of range and -1 on error.
+ */
+ int (*get_mem_map_entry)(int index, ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry,
+ Error **errp);
} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass;
static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v9 02/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM
2025-07-03 15:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-08 15:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-07-11 5:47 ` Ani Sinha
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2025-07-08 15:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roy Hopkins
Cc: qemu-devel, Paolo Bonzini, Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti,
Michael S . Tsirkin, Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum,
Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost, Alistair Francis, Peter Xu,
David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov, Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth,
Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta, Joerg Roedel
On Thu, Jul 03, 2025 at 04:03:10PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote:
> In preparation for supporting the processing of IGVM files to configure
> guests, this adds a set of functions to ConfidentialGuestSupport
> allowing configuration of secure virtual machines that can be
> implemented for each supported isolation platform type such as Intel TDX
> or AMD SEV-SNP. These functions will be called by IGVM processing code
> in subsequent patches.
>
> This commit provides a default implementation of the functions that
> either perform no action or generate an error when they are called.
> Targets that support ConfidentalGuestSupport should override these
> implementations.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
> ---
> backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 31 ++++++++++
> include/system/confidential-guest-support.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
> index 8ff7bfa857..c5bef1fbfa 100644
> --- a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
> +++ b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
> @@ -14,15 +14,46 @@
> #include "qemu/osdep.h"
>
> #include "system/confidential-guest-support.h"
> +#include "qapi/error.h"
>
> OBJECT_DEFINE_ABSTRACT_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
> confidential_guest_support,
> CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT,
> OBJECT)
>
> +static bool check_support(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
> + uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
> + uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary)
Nit-pick - underindented by 1 space.
> diff --git a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
> index ea46b50c56..79ecd21f42 100644
> --- a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
> +++ b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
> @@ -64,6 +95,42 @@ typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
>
> int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> +
> + /*
> + * Check to see if this confidential guest supports a particular
> + * platform or configuration.
> + *
> + * Return true if supported or false if not supported.
> + */
> + bool (*check_support)(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
> + uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
> + uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary);
Nit-pick: underindented 1 space.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v9 02/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM
2025-07-08 15:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2025-07-11 5:47 ` Ani Sinha
0 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Ani Sinha @ 2025-07-11 5:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel P. Berrangé
Cc: Roy Hopkins, qemu-devel, Paolo Bonzini, Stefano Garzarella,
Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin, Cornelia Huck,
Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost, Alistair Francis,
Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov, Tom Lendacky,
Michael Roth, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta, Joerg Roedel
On Tue, Jul 8, 2025 at 8:37 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 03, 2025 at 04:03:10PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote:
> > In preparation for supporting the processing of IGVM files to configure
> > guests, this adds a set of functions to ConfidentialGuestSupport
> > allowing configuration of secure virtual machines that can be
> > implemented for each supported isolation platform type such as Intel TDX
> > or AMD SEV-SNP. These functions will be called by IGVM processing code
> > in subsequent patches.
> >
> > This commit provides a default implementation of the functions that
> > either perform no action or generate an error when they are called.
> > Targets that support ConfidentalGuestSupport should override these
> > implementations.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
> > Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> > Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 31 ++++++++++
> > include/system/confidential-guest-support.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
> > index 8ff7bfa857..c5bef1fbfa 100644
> > --- a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
> > +++ b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
> > @@ -14,15 +14,46 @@
> > #include "qemu/osdep.h"
> >
> > #include "system/confidential-guest-support.h"
> > +#include "qapi/error.h"
> >
> > OBJECT_DEFINE_ABSTRACT_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport,
> > confidential_guest_support,
> > CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT,
> > OBJECT)
> >
> > +static bool check_support(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
> > + uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
> > + uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary)
>
> Nit-pick - underindented by 1 space.
Speaking of which, running checkpatch on this series reminded me that
MAINTAINERS needs updating for this area.
>
>
> > diff --git a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
> > index ea46b50c56..79ecd21f42 100644
> > --- a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
> > +++ b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
>
>
> > @@ -64,6 +95,42 @@ typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
> >
> > int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> > int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Check to see if this confidential guest supports a particular
> > + * platform or configuration.
> > + *
> > + * Return true if supported or false if not supported.
> > + */
> > + bool (*check_support)(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
> > + uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
> > + uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary);
>
> Nit-pick: underindented 1 space.
>
>
> With regards,
> Daniel
> --
> |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
> |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
> |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 03/16] backends/igvm: Add IGVM loader and configuration
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:00 ` [PATCH v9 01/16] meson: Add optional dependency on IGVM library Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:10 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:11 ` [PATCH v9 04/16] hw/i386: Add igvm-cfg object and processing for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (15 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
Adds an IGVM loader to QEMU which processes a given IGVM file and
applies the directives within the file to the current guest
configuration.
The IGVM loader can be used to configure both confidential and
non-confidential guests. For confidential guests, the
ConfidentialGuestSupport object for the system is used to encrypt
memory, apply the initial CPU state and perform other confidential guest
operations.
The loader is configured via a new IgvmCfg QOM object which allows the
user to provide a path to the IGVM file to process.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
---
backends/igvm-cfg.c | 51 +++
backends/igvm.c | 807 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
backends/igvm.h | 22 ++
backends/meson.build | 2 +
include/system/igvm-cfg.h | 46 +++
qapi/qom.json | 17 +
6 files changed, 945 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 backends/igvm-cfg.c
create mode 100644 backends/igvm.c
create mode 100644 backends/igvm.h
create mode 100644 include/system/igvm-cfg.h
diff --git a/backends/igvm-cfg.c b/backends/igvm-cfg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45df63e06c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backends/igvm-cfg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU IGVM interface
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023-2024 SUSE
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+
+#include "system/igvm-cfg.h"
+#include "igvm.h"
+#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
+
+static char *get_igvm(Object *obj, Error **errp)
+{
+ IgvmCfg *igvm = IGVM_CFG(obj);
+ return g_strdup(igvm->filename);
+}
+
+static void set_igvm(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
+{
+ IgvmCfg *igvm = IGVM_CFG(obj);
+ g_free(igvm->filename);
+ igvm->filename = g_strdup(value);
+}
+
+OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE_WITH_INTERFACES(IgvmCfg, igvm_cfg, IGVM_CFG, OBJECT,
+ { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE }, { NULL })
+
+static void igvm_cfg_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
+{
+ IgvmCfgClass *igvmc = IGVM_CFG_CLASS(oc);
+
+ object_class_property_add_str(oc, "file", get_igvm, set_igvm);
+ object_class_property_set_description(oc, "file",
+ "Set the IGVM filename to use");
+
+ igvmc->process = qigvm_process_file;
+}
+
+static void igvm_cfg_init(Object *obj)
+{
+}
+
+static void igvm_cfg_finalize(Object *obj)
+{
+}
diff --git a/backends/igvm.c b/backends/igvm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a31021d44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backends/igvm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,807 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU IGVM configuration backend for guests
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023-2024 SUSE
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+
+#include "igvm.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+#include "system/memory.h"
+#include "system/address-spaces.h"
+#include "hw/core/cpu.h"
+
+#include <igvm/igvm.h>
+#include <igvm/igvm_defs.h>
+
+typedef struct QIgvmParameterData {
+ QTAILQ_ENTRY(QIgvmParameterData) next;
+ uint8_t *data;
+ uint32_t size;
+ uint32_t index;
+} QIgvmParameterData;
+
+/*
+ * QIgvm contains the information required during processing
+ * of a single IGVM file.
+ */
+typedef struct QIgvm {
+ IgvmHandle file;
+ ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs;
+ ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *cgsc;
+ uint32_t compatibility_mask;
+ unsigned current_header_index;
+ QTAILQ_HEAD(, QIgvmParameterData) parameter_data;
+
+ /* These variables keep track of contiguous page regions */
+ IGVM_VHS_PAGE_DATA region_prev_page_data;
+ uint64_t region_start;
+ unsigned region_start_index;
+ unsigned region_last_index;
+ unsigned region_page_count;
+} QIgvm;
+
+static int qigvm_directive_page_data(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_vp_context(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_parameter_area(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_parameter_insert(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_memory_map(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_vp_count(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_environment_info(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_required_memory(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+
+struct QIGVMHandler {
+ uint32_t type;
+ uint32_t section;
+ int (*handler)(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data, Error **errp);
+};
+
+static struct QIGVMHandler handlers[] = {
+ { IGVM_VHT_PAGE_DATA, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_page_data },
+ { IGVM_VHT_VP_CONTEXT, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_vp_context },
+ { IGVM_VHT_PARAMETER_AREA, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_parameter_area },
+ { IGVM_VHT_PARAMETER_INSERT, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_parameter_insert },
+ { IGVM_VHT_MEMORY_MAP, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_memory_map },
+ { IGVM_VHT_VP_COUNT_PARAMETER, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_vp_count },
+ { IGVM_VHT_ENVIRONMENT_INFO_PARAMETER, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_environment_info },
+ { IGVM_VHT_REQUIRED_MEMORY, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_required_memory },
+};
+
+static int qigvm_handler(QIgvm *ctx, uint32_t type, Error **errp)
+{
+ size_t handler;
+ IgvmHandle header_handle;
+ const uint8_t *header_data;
+ int result;
+
+ for (handler = 0; handler < G_N_ELEMENTS(handlers); handler++) {
+ if (handlers[handler].type != type) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ header_handle = igvm_get_header(ctx->file, handlers[handler].section,
+ ctx->current_header_index);
+ if (header_handle < 0) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "IGVM file is invalid: Failed to read directive header (code: %d)",
+ (int)header_handle);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ header_data = igvm_get_buffer(ctx->file, header_handle) +
+ sizeof(IGVM_VHS_VARIABLE_HEADER);
+ result = handlers[handler].handler(ctx, header_data, errp);
+ igvm_free_buffer(ctx->file, header_handle);
+ return result;
+ }
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "IGVM: Unknown header type encountered when processing file: "
+ "(type 0x%X)",
+ type);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void *qigvm_prepare_memory(QIgvm *ctx, uint64_t addr, uint64_t size,
+ int region_identifier, Error **errp)
+{
+ ERRP_GUARD();
+ MemoryRegion *igvm_pages = NULL;
+ Int128 gpa_region_size;
+ MemoryRegionSection mrs =
+ memory_region_find(get_system_memory(), addr, size);
+ if (mrs.mr) {
+ if (!memory_region_is_ram(mrs.mr)) {
+ memory_region_unref(mrs.mr);
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "Processing of IGVM file failed: Could not prepare memory "
+ "at address 0x%lX due to existing non-RAM region",
+ addr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ gpa_region_size = int128_make64(size);
+ if (int128_lt(mrs.size, gpa_region_size)) {
+ memory_region_unref(mrs.mr);
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "Processing of IGVM file failed: Could not prepare memory "
+ "at address 0x%lX: region size exceeded",
+ addr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return qemu_map_ram_ptr(mrs.mr->ram_block, mrs.offset_within_region);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The region_identifier is the is the index of the IGVM directive that
+ * contains the page with the lowest GPA in the region. This will
+ * generate a unique region name.
+ */
+ g_autofree char *region_name =
+ g_strdup_printf("igvm.%X", region_identifier);
+ igvm_pages = g_new0(MemoryRegion, 1);
+ if (ctx->cgs && ctx->cgs->require_guest_memfd) {
+ if (!memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd(igvm_pages, NULL,
+ region_name, size, errp)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!memory_region_init_ram(igvm_pages, NULL, region_name, size,
+ errp)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ memory_region_add_subregion(get_system_memory(), addr, igvm_pages);
+ return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(igvm_pages);
+ }
+}
+
+static int qigvm_type_to_cgs_type(IgvmPageDataType memory_type, bool unmeasured,
+ bool zero)
+{
+ switch (memory_type) {
+ case IGVM_PAGE_DATA_TYPE_NORMAL: {
+ if (unmeasured) {
+ return CGS_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED;
+ } else {
+ return zero ? CGS_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO : CGS_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL;
+ }
+ }
+ case IGVM_PAGE_DATA_TYPE_SECRETS:
+ return CGS_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS;
+ case IGVM_PAGE_DATA_TYPE_CPUID_DATA:
+ return CGS_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID;
+ case IGVM_PAGE_DATA_TYPE_CPUID_XF:
+ return CGS_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool qigvm_page_attrs_equal(IgvmHandle igvm, unsigned header_index,
+ const IGVM_VHS_PAGE_DATA *page_1,
+ const IGVM_VHS_PAGE_DATA *page_2)
+{
+ IgvmHandle data_handle1, data_handle2;
+
+ /*
+ * If one page has data and the other doesn't then this results in different
+ * page types: NORMAL vs ZERO.
+ */
+ data_handle1 = igvm_get_header_data(igvm, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ header_index - 1);
+ data_handle2 =
+ igvm_get_header_data(igvm, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE, header_index);
+ if ((data_handle1 == IGVMAPI_NO_DATA ||
+ data_handle2 == IGVMAPI_NO_DATA) &&
+ data_handle1 != data_handle2) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return ((*(const uint32_t *)&page_1->flags ==
+ *(const uint32_t *)&page_2->flags) &&
+ (page_1->data_type == page_2->data_type) &&
+ (page_1->compatibility_mask == page_2->compatibility_mask));
+}
+
+static int qigvm_process_mem_region(QIgvm *ctx, unsigned start_index,
+ uint64_t gpa_start, unsigned page_count,
+ const IgvmPageDataFlags *flags,
+ const IgvmPageDataType page_type,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ uint8_t *region;
+ IgvmHandle data_handle;
+ const void *data;
+ uint32_t data_size;
+ unsigned page_index;
+ bool zero = true;
+ const uint64_t page_size = flags->is_2mb_page ? 0x200000 : 0x1000;
+ int result;
+ int cgs_page_type;
+
+ region = qigvm_prepare_memory(ctx, gpa_start, page_count * page_size,
+ start_index, errp);
+ if (!region) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (page_index = 0; page_index < page_count; page_index++) {
+ data_handle = igvm_get_header_data(
+ ctx->file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE, page_index + start_index);
+ if (data_handle == IGVMAPI_NO_DATA) {
+ /* No data indicates a zero page */
+ memset(®ion[page_index * page_size], 0, page_size);
+ } else if (data_handle < 0) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "IGVM file contains invalid page data for directive with "
+ "index %d",
+ page_index + start_index);
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ zero = false;
+ data_size = igvm_get_buffer_size(ctx->file, data_handle);
+ if (data_size < page_size) {
+ memset(®ion[page_index * page_size], 0, page_size);
+ } else if (data_size > page_size) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "IGVM file contains page data with invalid size for "
+ "directive with index %d",
+ page_index + start_index);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ data = igvm_get_buffer(ctx->file, data_handle);
+ memcpy(®ion[page_index * page_size], data, data_size);
+ igvm_free_buffer(ctx->file, data_handle);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If a confidential guest support object is provided then use it to set the
+ * guest state.
+ */
+ if (ctx->cgs) {
+ cgs_page_type =
+ qigvm_type_to_cgs_type(page_type, flags->unmeasured, zero);
+ if (cgs_page_type < 0) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "Invalid page type in IGVM file. Directives: %d to %d, "
+ "page type: %d",
+ start_index, start_index + page_count, page_type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ result = ctx->cgsc->set_guest_state(
+ gpa_start, region, page_size * page_count, cgs_page_type, 0, errp);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_process_mem_page(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const IGVM_VHS_PAGE_DATA *page_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ if (page_data) {
+ if (ctx->region_page_count == 0) {
+ ctx->region_start = page_data->gpa;
+ ctx->region_start_index = ctx->current_header_index;
+ } else {
+ if (!qigvm_page_attrs_equal(ctx->file, ctx->current_header_index,
+ page_data,
+ &ctx->region_prev_page_data) ||
+ ((ctx->region_prev_page_data.gpa +
+ (ctx->region_prev_page_data.flags.is_2mb_page ? 0x200000 :
+ 0x1000)) !=
+ page_data->gpa) ||
+ (ctx->region_last_index != (ctx->current_header_index - 1))) {
+ /* End of current region */
+ if (qigvm_process_mem_region(
+ ctx, ctx->region_start_index, ctx->region_start,
+ ctx->region_page_count,
+ &ctx->region_prev_page_data.flags,
+ ctx->region_prev_page_data.data_type, errp) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ctx->region_page_count = 0;
+ ctx->region_start = page_data->gpa;
+ ctx->region_start_index = ctx->current_header_index;
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(&ctx->region_prev_page_data, page_data,
+ sizeof(ctx->region_prev_page_data));
+ ctx->region_last_index = ctx->current_header_index;
+ ctx->region_page_count++;
+ } else {
+ if (ctx->region_page_count > 0) {
+ if (qigvm_process_mem_region(
+ ctx, ctx->region_start_index, ctx->region_start,
+ ctx->region_page_count, &ctx->region_prev_page_data.flags,
+ ctx->region_prev_page_data.data_type, errp) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ctx->region_page_count = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_page_data(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_PAGE_DATA *page_data =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_PAGE_DATA *)header_data;
+ if (page_data->compatibility_mask & ctx->compatibility_mask) {
+ return qigvm_process_mem_page(ctx, page_data, errp);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_vp_context(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_VP_CONTEXT *vp_context =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_VP_CONTEXT *)header_data;
+ IgvmHandle data_handle;
+ uint8_t *data;
+ int result;
+
+ if (!(vp_context->compatibility_mask & ctx->compatibility_mask)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A confidential guest support object must be provided for setting
+ * a VP context.
+ */
+ if (!ctx->cgs) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "A VP context is present in the IGVM file but is not supported "
+ "by the current system.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ data_handle = igvm_get_header_data(ctx->file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ ctx->current_header_index);
+ if (data_handle < 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid VP context in IGVM file. Error code: %X",
+ data_handle);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ data = (uint8_t *)igvm_get_buffer(ctx->file, data_handle);
+ result = ctx->cgsc->set_guest_state(
+ vp_context->gpa, data, igvm_get_buffer_size(ctx->file, data_handle),
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA, vp_context->vp_index, errp);
+ igvm_free_buffer(ctx->file, data_handle);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_parameter_area(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER_AREA *param_area =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER_AREA *)header_data;
+ QIgvmParameterData *param_entry;
+
+ param_entry = g_new0(QIgvmParameterData, 1);
+ param_entry->size = param_area->number_of_bytes;
+ param_entry->index = param_area->parameter_area_index;
+ param_entry->data = g_malloc0(param_entry->size);
+
+ QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ctx->parameter_data, param_entry, next);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_parameter_insert(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER_INSERT *param =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER_INSERT *)header_data;
+ QIgvmParameterData *param_entry;
+ int result;
+ void *region;
+
+ if (!(param->compatibility_mask & ctx->compatibility_mask)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(param_entry, &ctx->parameter_data, next)
+ {
+ if (param_entry->index == param->parameter_area_index) {
+ region = qigvm_prepare_memory(ctx, param->gpa, param_entry->size,
+ ctx->current_header_index, errp);
+ if (!region) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(region, param_entry->data, param_entry->size);
+ g_free(param_entry->data);
+ param_entry->data = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If a confidential guest support object is provided then use it to
+ * set the guest state.
+ */
+ if (ctx->cgs) {
+ result = ctx->cgsc->set_guest_state(param->gpa, region,
+ param_entry->size,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED, 0,
+ errp);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_cmp_mm_entry(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY *entry_a =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY *)a;
+ const IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY *entry_b =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY *)b;
+ if (entry_a->starting_gpa_page_number < entry_b->starting_gpa_page_number) {
+ return -1;
+ } else if (entry_a->starting_gpa_page_number >
+ entry_b->starting_gpa_page_number) {
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_memory_map(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER *param = (const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER *)header_data;
+ QIgvmParameterData *param_entry;
+ int max_entry_count;
+ int entry = 0;
+ IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY *mm_entry;
+ ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry cgmm_entry;
+ int retval = 0;
+
+ if (!ctx->cgs) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "IGVM file contains a memory map but this is not supported "
+ "by the current system.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the parameter area that should hold the memory map */
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(param_entry, &ctx->parameter_data, next)
+ {
+ if (param_entry->index == param->parameter_area_index) {
+ max_entry_count =
+ param_entry->size / sizeof(IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY);
+ mm_entry = (IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY *)param_entry->data;
+
+ retval = ctx->cgsc->get_mem_map_entry(entry, &cgmm_entry, errp);
+ while (retval == 0) {
+ if (entry > max_entry_count) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "IGVM: guest memory map size exceeds parameter area defined in IGVM file");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ mm_entry[entry].starting_gpa_page_number = cgmm_entry.gpa >> 12;
+ mm_entry[entry].number_of_pages = cgmm_entry.size >> 12;
+
+ switch (cgmm_entry.type) {
+ case CGS_MEM_RAM:
+ mm_entry[entry].entry_type =
+ IGVM_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY_TYPE_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ case CGS_MEM_RESERVED:
+ mm_entry[entry].entry_type =
+ IGVM_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY_TYPE_PLATFORM_RESERVED;
+ break;
+ case CGS_MEM_ACPI:
+ mm_entry[entry].entry_type =
+ IGVM_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY_TYPE_PLATFORM_RESERVED;
+ break;
+ case CGS_MEM_NVS:
+ mm_entry[entry].entry_type =
+ IGVM_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
+ break;
+ case CGS_MEM_UNUSABLE:
+ mm_entry[entry].entry_type =
+ IGVM_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY_TYPE_PLATFORM_RESERVED;
+ break;
+ }
+ retval =
+ ctx->cgsc->get_mem_map_entry(++entry, &cgmm_entry, errp);
+ }
+ if (retval < 0) {
+ return retval;
+ }
+ /* The entries need to be sorted */
+ qsort(mm_entry, entry, sizeof(IGVM_VHS_MEMORY_MAP_ENTRY),
+ qigvm_cmp_mm_entry);
+
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_vp_count(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER *param = (const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER *)header_data;
+ QIgvmParameterData *param_entry;
+ uint32_t *vp_count;
+ CPUState *cpu;
+
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(param_entry, &ctx->parameter_data, next)
+ {
+ if (param_entry->index == param->parameter_area_index) {
+ vp_count = (uint32_t *)(param_entry->data + param->byte_offset);
+ *vp_count = 0;
+ CPU_FOREACH(cpu)
+ {
+ (*vp_count)++;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_environment_info(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER *param = (const IGVM_VHS_PARAMETER *)header_data;
+ QIgvmParameterData *param_entry;
+ IgvmEnvironmentInfo *environmental_state;
+
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(param_entry, &ctx->parameter_data, next)
+ {
+ if (param_entry->index == param->parameter_area_index) {
+ environmental_state =
+ (IgvmEnvironmentInfo *)(param_entry->data + param->byte_offset);
+ environmental_state->memory_is_shared = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_directive_required_memory(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_REQUIRED_MEMORY *mem =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_REQUIRED_MEMORY *)header_data;
+ uint8_t *region;
+ int result;
+
+ if (!(mem->compatibility_mask & ctx->compatibility_mask)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ region = qigvm_prepare_memory(ctx, mem->gpa, mem->number_of_bytes,
+ ctx->current_header_index, errp);
+ if (!region) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ctx->cgs) {
+ result =
+ ctx->cgsc->set_guest_state(mem->gpa, region, mem->number_of_bytes,
+ CGS_PAGE_TYPE_REQUIRED_MEMORY, 0, errp);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_supported_platform_compat_mask(QIgvm *ctx, Error **errp)
+{
+ int32_t header_count;
+ unsigned header_index;
+ IgvmHandle header_handle;
+ IGVM_VHS_SUPPORTED_PLATFORM *platform;
+ uint32_t compatibility_mask_sev = 0;
+ uint32_t compatibility_mask_sev_es = 0;
+ uint32_t compatibility_mask_sev_snp = 0;
+ uint32_t compatibility_mask = 0;
+
+ header_count = igvm_header_count(ctx->file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_PLATFORM);
+ if (header_count < 0) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "Invalid platform header count in IGVM file. Error code: %X",
+ header_count);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (header_index = 0; header_index < (unsigned)header_count;
+ header_index++) {
+ IgvmVariableHeaderType typ = igvm_get_header_type(
+ ctx->file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_PLATFORM, header_index);
+ if (typ == IGVM_VHT_SUPPORTED_PLATFORM) {
+ header_handle = igvm_get_header(
+ ctx->file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_PLATFORM, header_index);
+ if (header_handle < 0) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "Invalid platform header in IGVM file. "
+ "Index: %d, Error code: %X",
+ header_index, header_handle);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ platform =
+ (IGVM_VHS_SUPPORTED_PLATFORM *)(igvm_get_buffer(ctx->file,
+ header_handle) +
+ sizeof(
+ IGVM_VHS_VARIABLE_HEADER));
+ if ((platform->platform_type == IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_SEV_ES) &&
+ ctx->cgs) {
+ if (ctx->cgsc->check_support(
+ CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_ES, platform->platform_version,
+ platform->highest_vtl, platform->shared_gpa_boundary)) {
+ compatibility_mask_sev_es = platform->compatibility_mask;
+ }
+ } else if ((platform->platform_type == IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_SEV) &&
+ ctx->cgs) {
+ if (ctx->cgsc->check_support(
+ CGS_PLATFORM_SEV, platform->platform_version,
+ platform->highest_vtl, platform->shared_gpa_boundary)) {
+ compatibility_mask_sev = platform->compatibility_mask;
+ }
+ } else if ((platform->platform_type ==
+ IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_SEV_SNP) &&
+ ctx->cgs) {
+ if (ctx->cgsc->check_support(
+ CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_SNP, platform->platform_version,
+ platform->highest_vtl, platform->shared_gpa_boundary)) {
+ compatibility_mask_sev_snp = platform->compatibility_mask;
+ }
+ } else if (platform->platform_type == IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_NATIVE) {
+ compatibility_mask = platform->compatibility_mask;
+ }
+ igvm_free_buffer(ctx->file, header_handle);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Choose the strongest supported isolation technology */
+ if (compatibility_mask_sev_snp != 0) {
+ ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask_sev_snp;
+ } else if (compatibility_mask_sev_es != 0) {
+ ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask_sev_es;
+ } else if (compatibility_mask_sev != 0) {
+ ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask_sev;
+ } else if (compatibility_mask != 0) {
+ ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask;
+ } else {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "IGVM file does not describe a compatible supported platform");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static IgvmHandle qigvm_file_init(char *filename, Error **errp)
+{
+ IgvmHandle igvm;
+ g_autofree uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned long len;
+ g_autoptr(GError) gerr = NULL;
+
+ if (!g_file_get_contents(filename, (gchar **)&buf, &len, &gerr)) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Unable to load %s: %s", filename, gerr->message);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ igvm = igvm_new_from_binary(buf, len);
+ if (igvm < 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Unable to parse IGVM file %s: %d", filename, igvm);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return igvm;
+}
+
+int qigvm_process_file(IgvmCfg *cfg, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ int32_t header_count;
+ QIgvmParameterData *parameter;
+ int retval = -1;
+ QIgvm ctx;
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+ ctx.file = qigvm_file_init(cfg->filename, errp);
+ if (ctx.file < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ConfidentialGuestSupport object is optional and allows a confidential
+ * guest platform to perform extra processing, such as page measurement, on
+ * IGVM directives.
+ */
+ ctx.cgs = cgs;
+ ctx.cgsc = cgs ? CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs) : NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the IGVM file provides configuration for the current
+ * platform
+ */
+ if (qigvm_supported_platform_compat_mask(&ctx, errp) < 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ header_count = igvm_header_count(ctx.file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE);
+ if (header_count <= 0) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp, "Invalid directive header count in IGVM file. Error code: %X",
+ header_count);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ QTAILQ_INIT(&ctx.parameter_data);
+
+ for (ctx.current_header_index = 0;
+ ctx.current_header_index < (unsigned)header_count;
+ ctx.current_header_index++) {
+ IgvmVariableHeaderType type = igvm_get_header_type(
+ ctx.file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE, ctx.current_header_index);
+ if (qigvm_handler(&ctx, type, errp) < 0) {
+ goto cleanup_parameters;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Contiguous pages of data with compatible flags are grouped together in
+ * order to reduce the number of memory regions we create. Make sure the
+ * last group is processed with this call.
+ */
+ retval = qigvm_process_mem_page(&ctx, NULL, errp);
+
+cleanup_parameters:
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(parameter, &ctx.parameter_data, next)
+ {
+ g_free(parameter->data);
+ parameter->data = NULL;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ igvm_free(ctx.file);
+
+ return retval;
+}
diff --git a/backends/igvm.h b/backends/igvm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..db02ea9165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backends/igvm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU IGVM configuration backend for Confidential Guests
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023-2024 SUSE
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef BACKENDS_IGVM_H
+#define BACKENDS_IGVM_H
+
+#include "system/confidential-guest-support.h"
+#include "system/igvm-cfg.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+
+int qigvm_process_file(IgvmCfg *igvm, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
+ Error **errp);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/backends/meson.build b/backends/meson.build
index ac0fac7845..60021f45d1 100644
--- a/backends/meson.build
+++ b/backends/meson.build
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ system_ss.add(when: gio, if_true: files('dbus-vmstate.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SGX', if_true: files('hostmem-epc.c'))
if igvm.found()
system_ss.add(igvm)
+ system_ss.add(files('igvm-cfg.c'), igvm)
+ system_ss.add(files('igvm.c'), igvm)
endif
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SPDM_SOCKET', if_true: files('spdm-socket.c'))
diff --git a/include/system/igvm-cfg.h b/include/system/igvm-cfg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..321b3196f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/system/igvm-cfg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU IGVM interface
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef QEMU_IGVM_CFG_H
+#define QEMU_IGVM_CFG_H
+
+#include "qom/object.h"
+
+typedef struct IgvmCfg {
+ ObjectClass parent_class;
+
+ /*
+ * filename: Filename that specifies a file that contains the configuration
+ * of the guest in Independent Guest Virtual Machine (IGVM)
+ * format.
+ */
+ char *filename;
+} IgvmCfg;
+
+typedef struct IgvmCfgClass {
+ ObjectClass parent_class;
+
+ /*
+ * If an IGVM filename has been specified then process the IGVM file.
+ * Performs a no-op if no filename has been specified.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for ok and -1 on error.
+ */
+ int (*process)(IgvmCfg *cfg, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
+ Error **errp);
+
+} IgvmCfgClass;
+
+#define TYPE_IGVM_CFG "igvm-cfg"
+
+OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(IgvmCfg, IgvmCfgClass, IGVM_CFG)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/qapi/qom.json b/qapi/qom.json
index b133b06447..bbdb56dced 100644
--- a/qapi/qom.json
+++ b/qapi/qom.json
@@ -932,6 +932,19 @@
'data': { '*filename': 'str' },
'if': 'CONFIG_POSIX' }
+##
+# @IgvmCfgProperties:
+#
+# Properties common to objects that handle IGVM files.
+#
+# @file: IGVM file to use to configure guest
+#
+# Since: 10.1
+##
+{ 'struct': 'IgvmCfgProperties',
+ 'if': 'CONFIG_IGVM',
+ 'data': { 'file': 'str' } }
+
##
# @SevCommonProperties:
#
@@ -1142,6 +1155,8 @@
'filter-redirector',
'filter-replay',
'filter-rewriter',
+ { 'name': 'igvm-cfg',
+ 'if': 'CONFIG_IGVM' },
'input-barrier',
{ 'name': 'input-linux',
'if': 'CONFIG_LINUX' },
@@ -1218,6 +1233,8 @@
'filter-redirector': 'FilterRedirectorProperties',
'filter-replay': 'NetfilterProperties',
'filter-rewriter': 'FilterRewriterProperties',
+ 'igvm-cfg': { 'type': 'IgvmCfgProperties',
+ 'if': 'CONFIG_IGVM' },
'input-barrier': 'InputBarrierProperties',
'input-linux': { 'type': 'InputLinuxProperties',
'if': 'CONFIG_LINUX' },
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 04/16] hw/i386: Add igvm-cfg object and processing for IGVM files
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:10 ` [PATCH v9 03/16] backends/igvm: Add IGVM loader and configuration Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:11 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:15 ` [PATCH v9 05/16] i386/pc_sysfw: Ensure sysfw flash configuration does not conflict with IGVM Roy Hopkins
` (14 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
An IGVM file contains configuration of guest state that should be
applied during configuration of the guest, before the guest is started.
This patch allows the user to add an igvm-cfg object to an X86 machine
configuration that allows an IGVM file to be configured that will be
applied to the guest before it is started.
If an IGVM configuration is provided then the IGVM file is processed at
the end of the board initialization, before the state transition to
PHASE_MACHINE_INITIALIZED.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
hw/i386/pc.c | 12 ++++++++++++
hw/i386/pc_piix.c | 10 ++++++++++
hw/i386/pc_q35.c | 10 ++++++++++
include/hw/i386/x86.h | 3 +++
qemu-options.hx | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc.c b/hw/i386/pc.c
index b211633575..432ab288a8 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc.c
@@ -1833,6 +1833,18 @@ static void pc_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "fd-bootchk",
pc_machine_get_fd_bootchk,
pc_machine_set_fd_bootchk);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IGVM)
+ object_class_property_add_link(oc, "igvm-cfg",
+ TYPE_IGVM_CFG,
+ offsetof(X86MachineState, igvm),
+ object_property_allow_set_link,
+ OBJ_PROP_LINK_STRONG);
+ object_class_property_set_description(oc, "igvm-cfg",
+ "Set IGVM configuration");
+#endif
+
+
}
static const TypeInfo pc_machine_info = {
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_piix.c b/hw/i386/pc_piix.c
index ea7572e783..3184ea1b37 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_piix.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_piix.c
@@ -366,6 +366,16 @@ static void pc_init1(MachineState *machine, const char *pci_type)
x86_nvdimm_acpi_dsmio,
x86ms->fw_cfg, OBJECT(pcms));
}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IGVM)
+ /* Apply guest state from IGVM if supplied */
+ if (x86ms->igvm) {
+ if (IGVM_CFG_GET_CLASS(x86ms->igvm)
+ ->process(x86ms->igvm, machine->cgs, &error_fatal) < 0) {
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
}
typedef enum PCSouthBridgeOption {
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_q35.c b/hw/i386/pc_q35.c
index 33211b1876..6990e1c669 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_q35.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_q35.c
@@ -325,6 +325,16 @@ static void pc_q35_init(MachineState *machine)
x86_nvdimm_acpi_dsmio,
x86ms->fw_cfg, OBJECT(pcms));
}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IGVM)
+ /* Apply guest state from IGVM if supplied */
+ if (x86ms->igvm) {
+ if (IGVM_CFG_GET_CLASS(x86ms->igvm)
+ ->process(x86ms->igvm, machine->cgs, &error_fatal) < 0) {
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
}
#define DEFINE_Q35_MACHINE(major, minor) \
diff --git a/include/hw/i386/x86.h b/include/hw/i386/x86.h
index fc460b82f8..8755cad50a 100644
--- a/include/hw/i386/x86.h
+++ b/include/hw/i386/x86.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "hw/intc/ioapic.h"
#include "hw/isa/isa.h"
#include "qom/object.h"
+#include "system/igvm-cfg.h"
struct X86MachineClass {
MachineClass parent;
@@ -92,6 +93,8 @@ struct X86MachineState {
* which means no limitation on the guest's bus locks.
*/
uint64_t bus_lock_ratelimit;
+
+ IgvmCfg *igvm;
};
#define X86_MACHINE_SMM "smm"
diff --git a/qemu-options.hx b/qemu-options.hx
index 1f862b19a6..f4c05b388b 100644
--- a/qemu-options.hx
+++ b/qemu-options.hx
@@ -5992,6 +5992,34 @@ SRST
-machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0 \\
.....
+ ``-object igvm-cfg,file=file``
+ Create an IGVM configuration object that defines the initial state
+ of the guest using a file in that conforms to the Independent Guest
+ Virtual Machine (IGVM) file format.
+
+ This is currently only supported by ``-machine q35`` and
+ ``-machine pc``.
+
+ The ``file`` parameter is used to specify the IGVM file to load.
+ When provided, the IGVM file is used to populate the initial
+ memory of the virtual machine and, depending on the platform, can
+ define the initial processor state, memory map and parameters.
+
+ The IGVM file is expected to contain the firmware for the virtual
+ machine, therefore an ``igvm-cfg`` object cannot be provided along
+ with other ways of specifying firmware, such as the ``-bios``
+ parameter on x86 machines.
+
+ e.g to launch a machine providing the firmware in an IGVM file
+
+ .. parsed-literal::
+
+ # |qemu_system_x86| \\
+ ...... \\
+ -object igvm-cfg,id=igvm0,file=bios.igvm \\
+ -machine ...,igvm-cfg=igvm0 \\
+ .....
+
``-object authz-simple,id=id,identity=string``
Create an authorization object that will control access to
network services.
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 05/16] i386/pc_sysfw: Ensure sysfw flash configuration does not conflict with IGVM
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:11 ` [PATCH v9 04/16] hw/i386: Add igvm-cfg object and processing for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:15 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:21 ` [PATCH v9 06/16] sev: Update launch_update_data functions to use Error handling Roy Hopkins
` (13 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
When using an IGVM file the configuration of the system firmware is
defined by IGVM directives contained in the file. In this case the user
should not configure any pflash devices.
This commit skips initialization of the ROM mode when pflash0 is not set
then checks to ensure no pflash devices have been configured when using
IGVM, exiting with an error message if this is not the case.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
index 821396c16e..1a12b635ad 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
@@ -220,7 +220,13 @@ void pc_system_firmware_init(PCMachineState *pcms,
BlockBackend *pflash_blk[ARRAY_SIZE(pcms->flash)];
if (!pcmc->pci_enabled) {
- x86_bios_rom_init(X86_MACHINE(pcms), "bios.bin", rom_memory, true);
+ /*
+ * If an IGVM file is specified then the firmware must be provided
+ * in the IGVM file.
+ */
+ if (!X86_MACHINE(pcms)->igvm) {
+ x86_bios_rom_init(X86_MACHINE(pcms), "bios.bin", rom_memory, true);
+ }
return;
}
@@ -240,8 +246,13 @@ void pc_system_firmware_init(PCMachineState *pcms,
}
if (!pflash_blk[0]) {
- /* Machine property pflash0 not set, use ROM mode */
- x86_bios_rom_init(X86_MACHINE(pcms), "bios.bin", rom_memory, false);
+ /*
+ * Machine property pflash0 not set, use ROM mode unless using IGVM,
+ * in which case the firmware must be provided by the IGVM file.
+ */
+ if (!X86_MACHINE(pcms)->igvm) {
+ x86_bios_rom_init(X86_MACHINE(pcms), "bios.bin", rom_memory, false);
+ }
} else {
if (kvm_enabled() && !kvm_readonly_mem_enabled()) {
/*
@@ -257,6 +268,20 @@ void pc_system_firmware_init(PCMachineState *pcms,
}
pc_system_flash_cleanup_unused(pcms);
+
+ /*
+ * The user should not have specified any pflash devices when using IGVM
+ * to configure the guest.
+ */
+ if (X86_MACHINE(pcms)->igvm) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pcms->flash); i++) {
+ if (pcms->flash[i]) {
+ error_report("pflash devices cannot be configured when "
+ "using IGVM");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
void x86_firmware_configure(hwaddr gpa, void *ptr, int size)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 06/16] sev: Update launch_update_data functions to use Error handling
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:15 ` [PATCH v9 05/16] i386/pc_sysfw: Ensure sysfw flash configuration does not conflict with IGVM Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:21 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:31 ` [PATCH v9 07/16] target/i386: Allow setting of R_LDTR and R_TR with cpu_x86_load_seg_cache() Roy Hopkins
` (12 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
The class function and implementations for updating launch data return
a code in case of error. In some cases an error message is generated and
in other cases, just the error return value is used.
This small refactor adds an 'Error **errp' parameter to all functions
which consistently set an error condition if a non-zero value is
returned.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/sev.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 1a12f0671c..a84f5f5d28 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ struct SevCommonStateClass {
Error **errp);
int (*launch_start)(SevCommonState *sev_common);
void (*launch_finish)(SevCommonState *sev_common);
- int (*launch_update_data)(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, size_t len);
+ int (*launch_update_data)(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
+ uint8_t *ptr, size_t len, Error **errp);
int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
};
@@ -970,9 +971,8 @@ sev_snp_adjust_cpuid_features(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg, uint32_t feature, uint32
return value;
}
-static int
-sev_launch_update_data(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
- uint8_t *addr, size_t len)
+static int sev_launch_update_data(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
+ uint8_t *addr, size_t len, Error **errp)
{
int ret, fw_error;
struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data update;
@@ -987,8 +987,8 @@ sev_launch_update_data(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
&update, &fw_error);
if (ret) {
- error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
- __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", __func__,
+ ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
}
return ret;
@@ -1116,8 +1116,8 @@ sev_launch_finish(SevCommonState *sev_common)
migrate_add_blocker(&sev_mig_blocker, &error_fatal);
}
-static int
-snp_launch_update_data(uint64_t gpa, void *hva, size_t len, int type)
+static int snp_launch_update_data(uint64_t gpa, void *hva, size_t len,
+ int type, Error **errp)
{
SevLaunchUpdateData *data;
@@ -1132,23 +1132,21 @@ snp_launch_update_data(uint64_t gpa, void *hva, size_t len, int type)
return 0;
}
-static int
-sev_snp_launch_update_data(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
- uint8_t *ptr, size_t len)
+static int sev_snp_launch_update_data(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
+ uint8_t *ptr, size_t len, Error **errp)
{
- int ret = snp_launch_update_data(gpa, ptr, len,
- KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
- return ret;
+ return snp_launch_update_data(gpa, ptr, len,
+ KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL, errp);
}
static int
sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(SnpCpuidInfo *snp_cpuid_info,
- const KvmCpuidInfo *kvm_cpuid_info)
+ const KvmCpuidInfo *kvm_cpuid_info, Error **errp)
{
size_t i;
if (kvm_cpuid_info->cpuid.nent > SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT) {
- error_report("SEV-SNP: CPUID entry count (%d) exceeds max (%d)",
+ error_setg(errp, "SEV-SNP: CPUID entry count (%d) exceeds max (%d)",
kvm_cpuid_info->cpuid.nent, SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT);
return -1;
}
@@ -1190,8 +1188,8 @@ sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(SnpCpuidInfo *snp_cpuid_info,
return 0;
}
-static int
-snp_launch_update_cpuid(uint32_t cpuid_addr, void *hva, size_t cpuid_len)
+static int snp_launch_update_cpuid(uint32_t cpuid_addr, void *hva,
+ size_t cpuid_len, Error **errp)
{
KvmCpuidInfo kvm_cpuid_info = {0};
SnpCpuidInfo snp_cpuid_info;
@@ -1208,26 +1206,25 @@ snp_launch_update_cpuid(uint32_t cpuid_addr, void *hva, size_t cpuid_len)
} while (ret == -E2BIG);
if (ret) {
- error_report("SEV-SNP: unable to query CPUID values for CPU: '%s'",
- strerror(-ret));
- return 1;
+ error_setg(errp, "SEV-SNP: unable to query CPUID values for CPU: '%s'",
+ strerror(-ret));
+ return -1;
}
- ret = sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(&snp_cpuid_info, &kvm_cpuid_info);
- if (ret) {
- error_report("SEV-SNP: failed to generate CPUID table information");
- return 1;
+ ret = sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(&snp_cpuid_info, &kvm_cpuid_info, errp);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return -1;
}
memcpy(hva, &snp_cpuid_info, sizeof(snp_cpuid_info));
return snp_launch_update_data(cpuid_addr, hva, cpuid_len,
- KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID);
+ KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID, errp);
}
-static int
-snp_launch_update_kernel_hashes(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp, uint32_t addr,
- void *hva, uint32_t len)
+static int snp_launch_update_kernel_hashes(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp,
+ uint32_t addr, void *hva,
+ uint32_t len, Error **errp)
{
int type = KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO;
if (sev_snp->parent_obj.kernel_hashes) {
@@ -1239,7 +1236,7 @@ snp_launch_update_kernel_hashes(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp, uint32_t addr,
sizeof(*sev_snp->kernel_hashes_data));
type = KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL;
}
- return snp_launch_update_data(addr, hva, len, type);
+ return snp_launch_update_data(addr, hva, len, type, errp);
}
static int
@@ -1277,12 +1274,14 @@ snp_populate_metadata_pages(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp,
}
if (type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID) {
- ret = snp_launch_update_cpuid(desc->base, hva, desc->len);
+ ret = snp_launch_update_cpuid(desc->base, hva, desc->len,
+ &error_fatal);
} else if (desc->type == SEV_DESC_TYPE_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES) {
ret = snp_launch_update_kernel_hashes(sev_snp, desc->base, hva,
- desc->len);
+ desc->len, &error_fatal);
} else {
- ret = snp_launch_update_data(desc->base, hva, desc->len, type);
+ ret = snp_launch_update_data(desc->base, hva, desc->len, type,
+ &error_fatal);
}
if (ret) {
@@ -1615,9 +1614,8 @@ sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
if (sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) {
int ret;
- ret = klass->launch_update_data(sev_common, gpa, ptr, len);
+ ret = klass->launch_update_data(sev_common, gpa, ptr, len, errp);
if (ret < 0) {
- error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to encrypt pflash rom");
return ret;
}
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 07/16] target/i386: Allow setting of R_LDTR and R_TR with cpu_x86_load_seg_cache()
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:21 ` [PATCH v9 06/16] sev: Update launch_update_data functions to use Error handling Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:31 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:31 ` [PATCH v9 08/16] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state Roy Hopkins
` (11 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
The x86 segment registers are identified by the X86Seg enumeration which
includes LDTR and TR as well as the normal segment registers. The
function 'cpu_x86_load_seg_cache()' uses the enum to determine which
segment to set. However, specifying R_LDTR or R_TR results in an
out-of-bounds access of the segment array.
Possibly by coincidence, the function does correctly set LDTR or TR in
this case as the structures for these registers immediately follow the
array which is accessed out of bounds.
This patch adds correct handling for R_LDTR and R_TR in the function.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/cpu.h | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
index 51e10139df..399b830893 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.h
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
@@ -2417,7 +2417,14 @@ static inline void cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(CPUX86State *env,
SegmentCache *sc;
unsigned int new_hflags;
- sc = &env->segs[seg_reg];
+ if (seg_reg == R_LDTR) {
+ sc = &env->ldt;
+ } else if (seg_reg == R_TR) {
+ sc = &env->tr;
+ } else {
+ sc = &env->segs[seg_reg];
+ }
+
sc->selector = selector;
sc->base = base;
sc->limit = limit;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 08/16] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:31 ` [PATCH v9 07/16] target/i386: Allow setting of R_LDTR and R_TR with cpu_x86_load_seg_cache() Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:31 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-08 15:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-07-03 15:34 ` [PATCH v9 09/16] i386/sev: Implement ConfidentialGuestSupport functions for SEV Roy Hopkins
` (10 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
When an SEV guest is started, the reset vector and state are
extracted from metadata that is contained in the firmware volume.
In preparation for using IGVM to setup the initial CPU state,
the code has been refactored to populate vmcb_save_area for each
CPU which is then applied during guest startup and CPU reset.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
---
target/i386/sev.c | 322 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
target/i386/sev.h | 110 ++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index a84f5f5d28..a13f91e615 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevSnpGuestState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_SNP_GUEST)
/* hard code sha256 digest size */
#define HASH_SIZE 32
+/* Convert between SEV-ES VMSA and SegmentCache flags/attributes */
+#define FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(flags) \
+ ((((flags) & 0xff00) << 12) | (((flags) & 0xff) << 8))
+#define FLAGS_SEGCACHE_TO_VMSA(flags) \
+ ((((flags) & 0xff00) >> 8) | (((flags) & 0xf00000) >> 12))
+
typedef struct QEMU_PACKED SevHashTableEntry {
QemuUUID guid;
uint16_t len;
@@ -89,6 +95,14 @@ typedef struct QEMU_PACKED SevHashTableDescriptor {
uint32_t size;
} SevHashTableDescriptor;
+typedef struct SevLaunchVmsa {
+ QTAILQ_ENTRY(SevLaunchVmsa) next;
+
+ uint16_t cpu_index;
+ uint64_t gpa;
+ struct sev_es_save_area vmsa;
+} SevLaunchVmsa;
+
struct SevCommonState {
X86ConfidentialGuest parent_obj;
@@ -107,9 +121,7 @@ struct SevCommonState {
int sev_fd;
SevState state;
- uint32_t reset_cs;
- uint32_t reset_ip;
- bool reset_data_valid;
+ QTAILQ_HEAD(, SevLaunchVmsa) launch_vmsa;
};
struct SevCommonStateClass {
@@ -364,6 +376,172 @@ static struct RAMBlockNotifier sev_ram_notifier = {
.ram_block_removed = sev_ram_block_removed,
};
+static void sev_apply_cpu_context(CPUState *cpu)
+{
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ X86CPU *x86;
+ CPUX86State *env;
+ struct SevLaunchVmsa *launch_vmsa;
+
+ /* See if an initial VMSA has been provided for this CPU */
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(launch_vmsa, &sev_common->launch_vmsa, next)
+ {
+ if (cpu->cpu_index == launch_vmsa->cpu_index) {
+ x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
+ env = &x86->env;
+
+ /*
+ * Ideally we would provide the VMSA directly to kvm which would
+ * ensure that the resulting initial VMSA measurement which is
+ * calculated during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is calculated from
+ * exactly what we provide here. Currently this is not possible so
+ * we need to copy the parts of the VMSA structure that we currently
+ * support into the CPU state.
+ */
+ cpu_load_efer(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.efer);
+ cpu_x86_update_cr4(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr4);
+ cpu_x86_update_cr0(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr0);
+ cpu_x86_update_cr3(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr3);
+ env->xcr0 = launch_vmsa->vmsa.xcr0;
+ env->pat = launch_vmsa->vmsa.g_pat;
+
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_CS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.attrib));
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_DS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.attrib));
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_ES, launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.attrib));
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_FS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.attrib));
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_GS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.attrib));
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_SS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.attrib));
+
+ env->gdt.base = launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.base;
+ env->gdt.limit = launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.limit;
+ env->gdt.flags =
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.attrib);
+ env->idt.base = launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.base;
+ env->idt.limit = launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.limit;
+ env->idt.flags =
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.attrib);
+
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_LDTR, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.attrib));
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
+ env, R_TR, launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.selector,
+ launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.limit,
+ FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.attrib));
+
+ env->dr[6] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.dr6;
+ env->dr[7] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.dr7;
+
+ env->regs[R_EAX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rax;
+ env->regs[R_ECX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rcx;
+ env->regs[R_EDX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rdx;
+ env->regs[R_EBX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rbx;
+ env->regs[R_ESP] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rsp;
+ env->regs[R_EBP] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rbp;
+ env->regs[R_ESI] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rsi;
+ env->regs[R_EDI] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rdi;
+#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
+ env->regs[R_R8] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r8;
+ env->regs[R_R9] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r9;
+ env->regs[R_R10] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r10;
+ env->regs[R_R11] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r11;
+ env->regs[R_R12] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r12;
+ env->regs[R_R13] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r13;
+ env->regs[R_R14] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r14;
+ env->regs[R_R15] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r15;
+#endif
+ env->eip = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rip;
+ env->eflags = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rflags;
+
+ cpu_set_fpuc(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.x87_fcw);
+ env->mxcsr = launch_vmsa->vmsa.mxcsr;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int sev_set_cpu_context(uint16_t cpu_index, const void *ctx,
+ uint32_t ctx_len, hwaddr gpa, Error **errp)
+{
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ SevLaunchVmsa *launch_vmsa;
+ CPUState *cpu;
+ bool exists = false;
+
+ /*
+ * Setting the CPU context is only supported for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP. The
+ * context buffer will contain a sev_es_save_area from the Linux kernel
+ * which is defined by "Table B-4. VMSA Layout, State Save Area for SEV-ES"
+ * in the AMD64 APM, Volume 2.
+ */
+
+ if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
+ error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context: Not supported");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx_len < sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area)) {
+ error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context: "
+ "Invalid context provided");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cpu = qemu_get_cpu(cpu_index);
+ if (!cpu) {
+ error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context for out of bounds "
+ "CPU index %d", cpu_index);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the context of this VP has already been set then replace it with the
+ * new context.
+ */
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(launch_vmsa, &sev_common->launch_vmsa, next)
+ {
+ if (cpu_index == launch_vmsa->cpu_index) {
+ launch_vmsa->gpa = gpa;
+ memcpy(&launch_vmsa->vmsa, ctx, sizeof(launch_vmsa->vmsa));
+ exists = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!exists) {
+ /* New VP context */
+ launch_vmsa = g_new0(SevLaunchVmsa, 1);
+ memcpy(&launch_vmsa->vmsa, ctx, sizeof(launch_vmsa->vmsa));
+ launch_vmsa->cpu_index = cpu_index;
+ launch_vmsa->gpa = gpa;
+ QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&sev_common->launch_vmsa, launch_vmsa, next);
+ }
+
+ /* Synchronise the VMSA with the current CPU state */
+ sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
bool
sev_enabled(void)
{
@@ -998,6 +1176,16 @@ static int
sev_launch_update_vmsa(SevGuestState *sev_guest)
{
int ret, fw_error;
+ CPUState *cpu;
+
+ /*
+ * The initial CPU state is measured as part of KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA.
+ * Synchronise the CPU state to any provided launch VMSA structures.
+ */
+ CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
+ sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu);
+ }
+
ret = sev_ioctl(SEV_COMMON(sev_guest)->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA,
NULL, &fw_error);
@@ -1780,40 +1968,109 @@ sev_es_find_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size,
return sev_es_parse_reset_block(info, addr);
}
-void sev_es_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
+
+static void seg_to_vmsa(const SegmentCache *cpu_seg, struct vmcb_seg *vmsa_seg)
{
- X86CPU *x86;
- CPUX86State *env;
- ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs;
- SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(
- object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_COMMON));
+ vmsa_seg->selector = cpu_seg->selector;
+ vmsa_seg->base = cpu_seg->base;
+ vmsa_seg->limit = cpu_seg->limit;
+ vmsa_seg->attrib = FLAGS_SEGCACHE_TO_VMSA(cpu_seg->flags);
+}
- /* Only update if we have valid reset information */
- if (!sev_common || !sev_common->reset_data_valid) {
- return;
- }
+static void initialize_vmsa(const CPUState *cpu, struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa)
+{
+ const X86CPU *x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
+ const CPUX86State *env = &x86->env;
- /* Do not update the BSP reset state */
- if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) {
- return;
+ /*
+ * Initialize the SEV-ES save area from the current state of
+ * the CPU. The entire state does not need to be copied, only the state
+ * that is copied back to the CPUState in sev_apply_cpu_context.
+ */
+ memset(vmsa, 0, sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area));
+ vmsa->efer = env->efer;
+ vmsa->cr0 = env->cr[0];
+ vmsa->cr3 = env->cr[3];
+ vmsa->cr4 = env->cr[4];
+ vmsa->xcr0 = env->xcr0;
+ vmsa->g_pat = env->pat;
+
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_CS], &vmsa->cs);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_DS], &vmsa->ds);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_ES], &vmsa->es);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_FS], &vmsa->fs);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_GS], &vmsa->gs);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_SS], &vmsa->ss);
+
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->gdt, &vmsa->gdtr);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->idt, &vmsa->idtr);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->ldt, &vmsa->ldtr);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&env->tr, &vmsa->tr);
+
+ vmsa->dr6 = env->dr[6];
+ vmsa->dr7 = env->dr[7];
+
+ vmsa->rax = env->regs[R_EAX];
+ vmsa->rcx = env->regs[R_ECX];
+ vmsa->rdx = env->regs[R_EDX];
+ vmsa->rbx = env->regs[R_EBX];
+ vmsa->rsp = env->regs[R_ESP];
+ vmsa->rbp = env->regs[R_EBP];
+ vmsa->rsi = env->regs[R_ESI];
+ vmsa->rdi = env->regs[R_EDI];
+
+#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
+ vmsa->r8 = env->regs[R_R8];
+ vmsa->r9 = env->regs[R_R9];
+ vmsa->r10 = env->regs[R_R10];
+ vmsa->r11 = env->regs[R_R11];
+ vmsa->r12 = env->regs[R_R12];
+ vmsa->r13 = env->regs[R_R13];
+ vmsa->r14 = env->regs[R_R14];
+ vmsa->r15 = env->regs[R_R15];
+#endif
+
+ vmsa->rip = env->eip;
+ vmsa->rflags = env->eflags;
+}
+
+static void sev_es_set_ap_context(uint32_t reset_addr)
+{
+ CPUState *cpu;
+ struct sev_es_save_area vmsa;
+ SegmentCache cs;
+
+ cs.selector = 0xf000;
+ cs.base = reset_addr & 0xffff0000;
+ cs.limit = 0xffff;
+ cs.flags = DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK | DESC_R_MASK |
+ DESC_A_MASK;
+
+ CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
+ if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) {
+ /* Do not update the BSP reset state */
+ continue;
+ }
+ initialize_vmsa(cpu, &vmsa);
+ seg_to_vmsa(&cs, &vmsa.cs);
+ vmsa.rip = reset_addr & 0x0000ffff;
+ sev_set_cpu_context(cpu->cpu_index, &vmsa,
+ sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area),
+ 0, &error_fatal);
}
+}
- x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
- env = &x86->env;
-
- cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(env, R_CS, 0xf000, sev_common->reset_cs, 0xffff,
- DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK |
- DESC_R_MASK | DESC_A_MASK);
-
- env->eip = sev_common->reset_ip;
+void sev_es_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
+{
+ if (sev_enabled()) {
+ sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu);
+ }
}
int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
{
- CPUState *cpu;
uint32_t addr;
int ret;
- SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
return 0;
@@ -1826,14 +2083,12 @@ int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
return ret;
}
+ /*
+ * The reset vector is saved into a CPU context for each AP but not for
+ * the BSP. This is applied during guest startup or when the CPU is reset.
+ */
if (addr) {
- sev_common->reset_cs = addr & 0xffff0000;
- sev_common->reset_ip = addr & 0x0000ffff;
- sev_common->reset_data_valid = true;
-
- CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
- sev_es_set_reset_vector(cpu);
- }
+ sev_es_set_ap_context(addr);
}
return 0;
@@ -2068,6 +2323,7 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "reduced-phys-bits",
&sev_common->reduced_phys_bits,
OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE);
+ QTAILQ_INIT(&sev_common->launch_vmsa);
}
/* sev guest info common to sev/sev-es/sev-snp */
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h
index 373669eaac..38caa849f5 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.h
+++ b/target/i386/sev.h
@@ -55,6 +55,116 @@ typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext {
size_t cmdline_size;
} SevKernelLoaderContext;
+/* Save area definition for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests */
+struct QEMU_PACKED sev_es_save_area {
+ struct vmcb_seg es;
+ struct vmcb_seg cs;
+ struct vmcb_seg ss;
+ struct vmcb_seg ds;
+ struct vmcb_seg fs;
+ struct vmcb_seg gs;
+ struct vmcb_seg gdtr;
+ struct vmcb_seg ldtr;
+ struct vmcb_seg idtr;
+ struct vmcb_seg tr;
+ uint64_t vmpl0_ssp;
+ uint64_t vmpl1_ssp;
+ uint64_t vmpl2_ssp;
+ uint64_t vmpl3_ssp;
+ uint64_t u_cet;
+ uint8_t reserved_0xc8[2];
+ uint8_t vmpl;
+ uint8_t cpl;
+ uint8_t reserved_0xcc[4];
+ uint64_t efer;
+ uint8_t reserved_0xd8[104];
+ uint64_t xss;
+ uint64_t cr4;
+ uint64_t cr3;
+ uint64_t cr0;
+ uint64_t dr7;
+ uint64_t dr6;
+ uint64_t rflags;
+ uint64_t rip;
+ uint64_t dr0;
+ uint64_t dr1;
+ uint64_t dr2;
+ uint64_t dr3;
+ uint64_t dr0_addr_mask;
+ uint64_t dr1_addr_mask;
+ uint64_t dr2_addr_mask;
+ uint64_t dr3_addr_mask;
+ uint8_t reserved_0x1c0[24];
+ uint64_t rsp;
+ uint64_t s_cet;
+ uint64_t ssp;
+ uint64_t isst_addr;
+ uint64_t rax;
+ uint64_t star;
+ uint64_t lstar;
+ uint64_t cstar;
+ uint64_t sfmask;
+ uint64_t kernel_gs_base;
+ uint64_t sysenter_cs;
+ uint64_t sysenter_esp;
+ uint64_t sysenter_eip;
+ uint64_t cr2;
+ uint8_t reserved_0x248[32];
+ uint64_t g_pat;
+ uint64_t dbgctl;
+ uint64_t br_from;
+ uint64_t br_to;
+ uint64_t last_excp_from;
+ uint64_t last_excp_to;
+ uint8_t reserved_0x298[80];
+ uint32_t pkru;
+ uint32_t tsc_aux;
+ uint8_t reserved_0x2f0[24];
+ uint64_t rcx;
+ uint64_t rdx;
+ uint64_t rbx;
+ uint64_t reserved_0x320; /* rsp already available at 0x01d8 */
+ uint64_t rbp;
+ uint64_t rsi;
+ uint64_t rdi;
+ uint64_t r8;
+ uint64_t r9;
+ uint64_t r10;
+ uint64_t r11;
+ uint64_t r12;
+ uint64_t r13;
+ uint64_t r14;
+ uint64_t r15;
+ uint8_t reserved_0x380[16];
+ uint64_t guest_exit_info_1;
+ uint64_t guest_exit_info_2;
+ uint64_t guest_exit_int_info;
+ uint64_t guest_nrip;
+ uint64_t sev_features;
+ uint64_t vintr_ctrl;
+ uint64_t guest_exit_code;
+ uint64_t virtual_tom;
+ uint64_t tlb_id;
+ uint64_t pcpu_id;
+ uint64_t event_inj;
+ uint64_t xcr0;
+ uint8_t reserved_0x3f0[16];
+
+ /* Floating point area */
+ uint64_t x87_dp;
+ uint32_t mxcsr;
+ uint16_t x87_ftw;
+ uint16_t x87_fsw;
+ uint16_t x87_fcw;
+ uint16_t x87_fop;
+ uint16_t x87_ds;
+ uint16_t x87_cs;
+ uint64_t x87_rip;
+ uint8_t fpreg_x87[80];
+ uint8_t fpreg_xmm[256];
+ uint8_t fpreg_ymm[256];
+};
+
bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp);
int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v9 08/16] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state
2025-07-03 15:31 ` [PATCH v9 08/16] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-08 15:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-07-08 15:28 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2025-07-08 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roy Hopkins
Cc: qemu-devel, Paolo Bonzini, Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti,
Michael S . Tsirkin, Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum,
Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost, Alistair Francis, Peter Xu,
David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov, Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth,
Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta, Joerg Roedel
On Thu, Jul 03, 2025 at 04:31:59PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote:
> When an SEV guest is started, the reset vector and state are
> extracted from metadata that is contained in the firmware volume.
>
> In preparation for using IGVM to setup the initial CPU state,
> the code has been refactored to populate vmcb_save_area for each
> CPU which is then applied during guest startup and CPU reset.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
> ---
> target/i386/sev.c | 322 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> target/i386/sev.h | 110 ++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index a84f5f5d28..a13f91e615 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> +static void sev_apply_cpu_context(CPUState *cpu)
> +{
> + SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
> + X86CPU *x86;
> + CPUX86State *env;
> + struct SevLaunchVmsa *launch_vmsa;
> +
> + /* See if an initial VMSA has been provided for this CPU */
> + QTAILQ_FOREACH(launch_vmsa, &sev_common->launch_vmsa, next)
> + {
> + if (cpu->cpu_index == launch_vmsa->cpu_index) {
> + x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
> + env = &x86->env;
> +
> + /*
> + * Ideally we would provide the VMSA directly to kvm which would
> + * ensure that the resulting initial VMSA measurement which is
> + * calculated during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is calculated from
> + * exactly what we provide here. Currently this is not possible so
> + * we need to copy the parts of the VMSA structure that we currently
> + * support into the CPU state.
> + */
Are there any parts of the VMSA described in the IGVM that we are
unable to handle here ?
If so, what happens if those parts are set in the IGVM and their
value doesn't match KVM's default ? Presumably that would become
a measurement failure ?
> + cpu_load_efer(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.efer);
> + cpu_x86_update_cr4(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr4);
> + cpu_x86_update_cr0(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr0);
> + cpu_x86_update_cr3(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cr3);
> + env->xcr0 = launch_vmsa->vmsa.xcr0;
> + env->pat = launch_vmsa->vmsa.g_pat;
> +
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_CS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.cs.attrib));
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_DS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ds.attrib));
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_ES, launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.es.attrib));
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_FS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.fs.attrib));
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_GS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.gs.attrib));
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_SS, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ss.attrib));
> +
> + env->gdt.base = launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.base;
> + env->gdt.limit = launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.limit;
> + env->gdt.flags =
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.gdtr.attrib);
> + env->idt.base = launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.base;
> + env->idt.limit = launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.limit;
> + env->idt.flags =
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.idtr.attrib);
> +
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_LDTR, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.attrib));
> + cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(
> + env, R_TR, launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.selector,
> + launch_vmsa->vmsa.ldtr.base, launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.limit,
> + FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(launch_vmsa->vmsa.tr.attrib));
> +
> + env->dr[6] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.dr6;
> + env->dr[7] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.dr7;
> +
> + env->regs[R_EAX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rax;
> + env->regs[R_ECX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rcx;
> + env->regs[R_EDX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rdx;
> + env->regs[R_EBX] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rbx;
> + env->regs[R_ESP] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rsp;
> + env->regs[R_EBP] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rbp;
> + env->regs[R_ESI] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rsi;
> + env->regs[R_EDI] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rdi;
> +#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
> + env->regs[R_R8] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r8;
> + env->regs[R_R9] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r9;
> + env->regs[R_R10] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r10;
> + env->regs[R_R11] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r11;
> + env->regs[R_R12] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r12;
> + env->regs[R_R13] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r13;
> + env->regs[R_R14] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r14;
> + env->regs[R_R15] = launch_vmsa->vmsa.r15;
> +#endif
> + env->eip = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rip;
> + env->eflags = launch_vmsa->vmsa.rflags;
> +
> + cpu_set_fpuc(env, launch_vmsa->vmsa.x87_fcw);
> + env->mxcsr = launch_vmsa->vmsa.mxcsr;
> +
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_set_cpu_context(uint16_t cpu_index, const void *ctx,
> + uint32_t ctx_len, hwaddr gpa, Error **errp)
> +{
> + SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
> + SevLaunchVmsa *launch_vmsa;
> + CPUState *cpu;
> + bool exists = false;
> +
> + /*
> + * Setting the CPU context is only supported for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP. The
> + * context buffer will contain a sev_es_save_area from the Linux kernel
> + * which is defined by "Table B-4. VMSA Layout, State Save Area for SEV-ES"
> + * in the AMD64 APM, Volume 2.
> + */
> +
> + if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
> + error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context: Not supported");
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx_len < sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area)) {
> + error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context: "
> + "Invalid context provided");
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + cpu = qemu_get_cpu(cpu_index);
> + if (!cpu) {
> + error_setg(errp, "SEV: unable to set CPU context for out of bounds "
> + "CPU index %d", cpu_index);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * If the context of this VP has already been set then replace it with the
> + * new context.
> + */
> + QTAILQ_FOREACH(launch_vmsa, &sev_common->launch_vmsa, next)
> + {
> + if (cpu_index == launch_vmsa->cpu_index) {
> + launch_vmsa->gpa = gpa;
> + memcpy(&launch_vmsa->vmsa, ctx, sizeof(launch_vmsa->vmsa));
> + exists = true;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (!exists) {
> + /* New VP context */
> + launch_vmsa = g_new0(SevLaunchVmsa, 1);
> + memcpy(&launch_vmsa->vmsa, ctx, sizeof(launch_vmsa->vmsa));
> + launch_vmsa->cpu_index = cpu_index;
> + launch_vmsa->gpa = gpa;
> + QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&sev_common->launch_vmsa, launch_vmsa, next);
> + }
> +
> + /* Synchronise the VMSA with the current CPU state */
> + sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> bool
> sev_enabled(void)
> {
> @@ -998,6 +1176,16 @@ static int
> sev_launch_update_vmsa(SevGuestState *sev_guest)
> {
> int ret, fw_error;
> + CPUState *cpu;
> +
> + /*
> + * The initial CPU state is measured as part of KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA.
> + * Synchronise the CPU state to any provided launch VMSA structures.
> + */
> + CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
> + sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu);
> + }
> +
>
> ret = sev_ioctl(SEV_COMMON(sev_guest)->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA,
> NULL, &fw_error);
> @@ -1780,40 +1968,109 @@ sev_es_find_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size,
> return sev_es_parse_reset_block(info, addr);
> }
>
> -void sev_es_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
> +
> +static void seg_to_vmsa(const SegmentCache *cpu_seg, struct vmcb_seg *vmsa_seg)
> {
> - X86CPU *x86;
> - CPUX86State *env;
> - ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs;
> - SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(
> - object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_COMMON));
> + vmsa_seg->selector = cpu_seg->selector;
> + vmsa_seg->base = cpu_seg->base;
> + vmsa_seg->limit = cpu_seg->limit;
> + vmsa_seg->attrib = FLAGS_SEGCACHE_TO_VMSA(cpu_seg->flags);
> +}
>
> - /* Only update if we have valid reset information */
> - if (!sev_common || !sev_common->reset_data_valid) {
> - return;
> - }
> +static void initialize_vmsa(const CPUState *cpu, struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa)
> +{
> + const X86CPU *x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
> + const CPUX86State *env = &x86->env;
>
> - /* Do not update the BSP reset state */
> - if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) {
> - return;
> + /*
> + * Initialize the SEV-ES save area from the current state of
> + * the CPU. The entire state does not need to be copied, only the state
> + * that is copied back to the CPUState in sev_apply_cpu_context.
> + */
> + memset(vmsa, 0, sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area));
> + vmsa->efer = env->efer;
> + vmsa->cr0 = env->cr[0];
> + vmsa->cr3 = env->cr[3];
> + vmsa->cr4 = env->cr[4];
> + vmsa->xcr0 = env->xcr0;
> + vmsa->g_pat = env->pat;
> +
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_CS], &vmsa->cs);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_DS], &vmsa->ds);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_ES], &vmsa->es);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_FS], &vmsa->fs);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_GS], &vmsa->gs);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->segs[R_SS], &vmsa->ss);
> +
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->gdt, &vmsa->gdtr);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->idt, &vmsa->idtr);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->ldt, &vmsa->ldtr);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&env->tr, &vmsa->tr);
> +
> + vmsa->dr6 = env->dr[6];
> + vmsa->dr7 = env->dr[7];
> +
> + vmsa->rax = env->regs[R_EAX];
> + vmsa->rcx = env->regs[R_ECX];
> + vmsa->rdx = env->regs[R_EDX];
> + vmsa->rbx = env->regs[R_EBX];
> + vmsa->rsp = env->regs[R_ESP];
> + vmsa->rbp = env->regs[R_EBP];
> + vmsa->rsi = env->regs[R_ESI];
> + vmsa->rdi = env->regs[R_EDI];
> +
> +#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
> + vmsa->r8 = env->regs[R_R8];
> + vmsa->r9 = env->regs[R_R9];
> + vmsa->r10 = env->regs[R_R10];
> + vmsa->r11 = env->regs[R_R11];
> + vmsa->r12 = env->regs[R_R12];
> + vmsa->r13 = env->regs[R_R13];
> + vmsa->r14 = env->regs[R_R14];
> + vmsa->r15 = env->regs[R_R15];
> +#endif
> +
> + vmsa->rip = env->eip;
> + vmsa->rflags = env->eflags;
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_es_set_ap_context(uint32_t reset_addr)
> +{
> + CPUState *cpu;
> + struct sev_es_save_area vmsa;
> + SegmentCache cs;
> +
> + cs.selector = 0xf000;
> + cs.base = reset_addr & 0xffff0000;
> + cs.limit = 0xffff;
> + cs.flags = DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK | DESC_R_MASK |
> + DESC_A_MASK;
> +
> + CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
> + if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) {
> + /* Do not update the BSP reset state */
> + continue;
> + }
> + initialize_vmsa(cpu, &vmsa);
> + seg_to_vmsa(&cs, &vmsa.cs);
> + vmsa.rip = reset_addr & 0x0000ffff;
> + sev_set_cpu_context(cpu->cpu_index, &vmsa,
> + sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area),
> + 0, &error_fatal);
> }
> +}
>
> - x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
> - env = &x86->env;
> -
> - cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(env, R_CS, 0xf000, sev_common->reset_cs, 0xffff,
> - DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK |
> - DESC_R_MASK | DESC_A_MASK);
> -
> - env->eip = sev_common->reset_ip;
> +void sev_es_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
> +{
> + if (sev_enabled()) {
> + sev_apply_cpu_context(cpu);
> + }
> }
>
> int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
> {
> - CPUState *cpu;
> uint32_t addr;
> int ret;
> - SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
>
> if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
> return 0;
> @@ -1826,14 +2083,12 @@ int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
> return ret;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * The reset vector is saved into a CPU context for each AP but not for
> + * the BSP. This is applied during guest startup or when the CPU is reset.
> + */
> if (addr) {
> - sev_common->reset_cs = addr & 0xffff0000;
> - sev_common->reset_ip = addr & 0x0000ffff;
> - sev_common->reset_data_valid = true;
> -
> - CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
> - sev_es_set_reset_vector(cpu);
> - }
> + sev_es_set_ap_context(addr);
> }
>
> return 0;
> @@ -2068,6 +2323,7 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
> object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "reduced-phys-bits",
> &sev_common->reduced_phys_bits,
> OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE);
> + QTAILQ_INIT(&sev_common->launch_vmsa);
> }
>
> /* sev guest info common to sev/sev-es/sev-snp */
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h
> index 373669eaac..38caa849f5 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.h
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.h
> @@ -55,6 +55,116 @@ typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext {
> size_t cmdline_size;
> } SevKernelLoaderContext;
>
> +/* Save area definition for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests */
> +struct QEMU_PACKED sev_es_save_area {
> + struct vmcb_seg es;
> + struct vmcb_seg cs;
> + struct vmcb_seg ss;
> + struct vmcb_seg ds;
> + struct vmcb_seg fs;
> + struct vmcb_seg gs;
> + struct vmcb_seg gdtr;
> + struct vmcb_seg ldtr;
> + struct vmcb_seg idtr;
> + struct vmcb_seg tr;
> + uint64_t vmpl0_ssp;
> + uint64_t vmpl1_ssp;
> + uint64_t vmpl2_ssp;
> + uint64_t vmpl3_ssp;
> + uint64_t u_cet;
> + uint8_t reserved_0xc8[2];
> + uint8_t vmpl;
> + uint8_t cpl;
> + uint8_t reserved_0xcc[4];
> + uint64_t efer;
> + uint8_t reserved_0xd8[104];
> + uint64_t xss;
> + uint64_t cr4;
> + uint64_t cr3;
> + uint64_t cr0;
> + uint64_t dr7;
> + uint64_t dr6;
> + uint64_t rflags;
> + uint64_t rip;
> + uint64_t dr0;
> + uint64_t dr1;
> + uint64_t dr2;
> + uint64_t dr3;
> + uint64_t dr0_addr_mask;
> + uint64_t dr1_addr_mask;
> + uint64_t dr2_addr_mask;
> + uint64_t dr3_addr_mask;
> + uint8_t reserved_0x1c0[24];
> + uint64_t rsp;
> + uint64_t s_cet;
> + uint64_t ssp;
> + uint64_t isst_addr;
> + uint64_t rax;
> + uint64_t star;
> + uint64_t lstar;
> + uint64_t cstar;
> + uint64_t sfmask;
> + uint64_t kernel_gs_base;
> + uint64_t sysenter_cs;
> + uint64_t sysenter_esp;
> + uint64_t sysenter_eip;
> + uint64_t cr2;
> + uint8_t reserved_0x248[32];
> + uint64_t g_pat;
> + uint64_t dbgctl;
> + uint64_t br_from;
> + uint64_t br_to;
> + uint64_t last_excp_from;
> + uint64_t last_excp_to;
> + uint8_t reserved_0x298[80];
> + uint32_t pkru;
> + uint32_t tsc_aux;
> + uint8_t reserved_0x2f0[24];
> + uint64_t rcx;
> + uint64_t rdx;
> + uint64_t rbx;
> + uint64_t reserved_0x320; /* rsp already available at 0x01d8 */
> + uint64_t rbp;
> + uint64_t rsi;
> + uint64_t rdi;
> + uint64_t r8;
> + uint64_t r9;
> + uint64_t r10;
> + uint64_t r11;
> + uint64_t r12;
> + uint64_t r13;
> + uint64_t r14;
> + uint64_t r15;
> + uint8_t reserved_0x380[16];
> + uint64_t guest_exit_info_1;
> + uint64_t guest_exit_info_2;
> + uint64_t guest_exit_int_info;
> + uint64_t guest_nrip;
> + uint64_t sev_features;
> + uint64_t vintr_ctrl;
> + uint64_t guest_exit_code;
> + uint64_t virtual_tom;
> + uint64_t tlb_id;
> + uint64_t pcpu_id;
> + uint64_t event_inj;
> + uint64_t xcr0;
> + uint8_t reserved_0x3f0[16];
> +
> + /* Floating point area */
> + uint64_t x87_dp;
> + uint32_t mxcsr;
> + uint16_t x87_ftw;
> + uint16_t x87_fsw;
> + uint16_t x87_fcw;
> + uint16_t x87_fop;
> + uint16_t x87_ds;
> + uint16_t x87_cs;
> + uint64_t x87_rip;
> + uint8_t fpreg_x87[80];
> + uint8_t fpreg_xmm[256];
> + uint8_t fpreg_ymm[256];
> +};
> +
> bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp);
>
> int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
> --
> 2.43.0
>
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v9 08/16] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state
2025-07-08 15:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2025-07-08 15:28 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
0 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2025-07-08 15:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roy Hopkins, qemu-devel, Paolo Bonzini, Stefano Garzarella,
Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin, Cornelia Huck,
Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost, Alistair Francis,
Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov, Tom Lendacky,
Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta, Joerg Roedel
On Tue, Jul 08, 2025 at 04:25:25PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 03, 2025 at 04:31:59PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote:
> > When an SEV guest is started, the reset vector and state are
> > extracted from metadata that is contained in the firmware volume.
> >
> > In preparation for using IGVM to setup the initial CPU state,
> > the code has been refactored to populate vmcb_save_area for each
> > CPU which is then applied during guest startup and CPU reset.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
> > Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> > Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
> > Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
> > ---
> > target/i386/sev.c | 322 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> > target/i386/sev.h | 110 ++++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> > index a84f5f5d28..a13f91e615 100644
> > --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
>
>
> > +static void sev_apply_cpu_context(CPUState *cpu)
> > +{
> > + SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
> > + X86CPU *x86;
> > + CPUX86State *env;
> > + struct SevLaunchVmsa *launch_vmsa;
> > +
> > + /* See if an initial VMSA has been provided for this CPU */
> > + QTAILQ_FOREACH(launch_vmsa, &sev_common->launch_vmsa, next)
> > + {
> > + if (cpu->cpu_index == launch_vmsa->cpu_index) {
> > + x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
> > + env = &x86->env;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Ideally we would provide the VMSA directly to kvm which would
> > + * ensure that the resulting initial VMSA measurement which is
> > + * calculated during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is calculated from
> > + * exactly what we provide here. Currently this is not possible so
> > + * we need to copy the parts of the VMSA structure that we currently
> > + * support into the CPU state.
> > + */
>
> Are there any parts of the VMSA described in the IGVM that we are
> unable to handle here ?
>
> If so, what happens if those parts are set in the IGVM and their
> value doesn't match KVM's default ? Presumably that would become
> a measurement failure ?
Never mind, this is answered by the following patch.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 09/16] i386/sev: Implement ConfidentialGuestSupport functions for SEV
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:31 ` [PATCH v9 08/16] i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:34 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 15:41 ` [PATCH v9 10/16] docs/system: Add documentation on support for IGVM Roy Hopkins
` (9 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
The ConfidentialGuestSupport object defines a number of virtual
functions that are called during processing of IGVM directives to query
or configure initial guest state. In order to support processing of IGVM
files, these functions need to be implemented by relevant isolation
hardware support code such as SEV.
This commit implements the required functions for SEV-ES and adds
support for processing IGVM files for configuring the guest.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/sev.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
target/i386/sev.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 246 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index a13f91e615..1296f4feb6 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@
#include "confidential-guest.h"
#include "hw/i386/pc.h"
#include "system/address-spaces.h"
+#include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h"
#include "qemu/queue.h"
+#include "qemu/cutils.h"
OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevCommonState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_COMMON)
OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_GUEST)
@@ -50,6 +52,9 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevSnpGuestState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_SNP_GUEST)
/* hard code sha256 digest size */
#define HASH_SIZE 32
+/* Hard coded GPA that KVM uses for the VMSA */
+#define KVM_VMSA_GPA 0xFFFFFFFFF000
+
/* Convert between SEV-ES VMSA and SegmentCache flags/attributes */
#define FLAGS_VMSA_TO_SEGCACHE(flags) \
((((flags) & 0xff00) << 12) | (((flags) & 0xff) << 8))
@@ -480,6 +485,103 @@ static void sev_apply_cpu_context(CPUState *cpu)
}
}
+static int check_vmsa_supported(hwaddr gpa, const struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ struct sev_es_save_area vmsa_check;
+
+ /*
+ * KVM always populates the VMSA at a fixed GPA which cannot be modified
+ * from userspace. Specifying a different GPA will not prevent the guest
+ * from starting but will cause the launch measurement to be different
+ * from expected. Therefore check that the provided GPA matches the KVM
+ * hardcoded value.
+ */
+ if (gpa != KVM_VMSA_GPA) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: The VMSA GPA must be %lX but is specified as %lX",
+ __func__, KVM_VMSA_GPA, gpa);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Clear all supported fields so we can then check the entire structure
+ * is zero.
+ */
+ memcpy(&vmsa_check, vmsa, sizeof(struct sev_es_save_area));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.es, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.es));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.cs, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.cs));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.ss, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.ss));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.ds, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.ds));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.fs, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.fs));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.gs, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.gs));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.gdtr, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.gdtr));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.idtr, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.idtr));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.ldtr, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.ldtr));
+ memset(&vmsa_check.tr, 0, sizeof(vmsa_check.tr));
+ vmsa_check.efer = 0;
+ vmsa_check.cr0 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.cr3 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.cr4 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.xcr0 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.dr6 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.dr7 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rax = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rcx = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rdx = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rbx = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rsp = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rbp = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rsi = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rdi = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r8 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r9 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r10 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r11 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r12 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r13 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r14 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.r15 = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rip = 0;
+ vmsa_check.rflags = 0;
+
+ vmsa_check.g_pat = 0;
+ vmsa_check.xcr0 = 0;
+
+ vmsa_check.x87_fcw = 0;
+ vmsa_check.mxcsr = 0;
+
+ if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ if (vmsa_check.sev_features != SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: sev_features in the VMSA contains an unsupported "
+ "value. For SEV-SNP, sev_features must be set to %x.",
+ __func__, SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ vmsa_check.sev_features = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (vmsa_check.sev_features != 0) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: sev_features in the VMSA contains an unsupported "
+ "value. For SEV-ES and SEV, sev_features must be "
+ "set to 0.", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!buffer_is_zero(&vmsa_check, sizeof(vmsa_check))) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: The VMSA contains fields that are not "
+ "synchronized with KVM. Continuing would result in "
+ "either unpredictable guest behavior, or a "
+ "mismatched launch measurement.",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int sev_set_cpu_context(uint16_t cpu_index, const void *ctx,
uint32_t ctx_len, hwaddr gpa, Error **errp)
{
@@ -1491,18 +1593,26 @@ sev_snp_launch_finish(SevCommonState *sev_common)
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp->kvm_finish_conf;
/*
- * To boot the SNP guest, the hypervisor is required to populate the CPUID
- * and Secrets page before finalizing the launch flow. The location of
- * the secrets and CPUID page is available through the OVMF metadata GUID.
+ * Populate all the metadata pages if not using an IGVM file. In the case
+ * where an IGVM file is provided it will be used to configure the metadata
+ * pages directly.
*/
- metadata = pc_system_get_ovmf_sev_metadata_ptr();
- if (metadata == NULL) {
- error_report("%s: Failed to locate SEV metadata header", __func__);
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (!X86_MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->igvm) {
+ /*
+ * To boot the SNP guest, the hypervisor is required to populate the
+ * CPUID and Secrets page before finalizing the launch flow. The
+ * location of the secrets and CPUID page is available through the
+ * OVMF metadata GUID.
+ */
+ metadata = pc_system_get_ovmf_sev_metadata_ptr();
+ if (metadata == NULL) {
+ error_report("%s: Failed to locate SEV metadata header", __func__);
+ exit(1);
+ }
- /* Populate all the metadata pages */
- snp_populate_metadata_pages(sev_snp, metadata);
+ /* Populate all the metadata pages */
+ snp_populate_metadata_pages(sev_snp, metadata);
+ }
QTAILQ_FOREACH(data, &launch_update, next) {
ret = sev_snp_launch_update(sev_snp, data);
@@ -2290,6 +2400,124 @@ static void sev_common_set_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
SEV_COMMON(obj)->kernel_hashes = value;
}
+static bool cgs_check_support(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform,
+ uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl,
+ uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary)
+{
+ return (((platform == CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_SNP) && sev_snp_enabled()) ||
+ ((platform == CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_ES) && sev_es_enabled()) ||
+ ((platform == CGS_PLATFORM_SEV) && sev_enabled()));
+}
+
+static int cgs_set_guest_state(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
+ ConfidentialGuestPageType memory_type,
+ uint16_t cpu_index, Error **errp)
+{
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(sev_common);
+
+ if (!sev_enabled()) {
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: attempt to configure guest memory, but SEV "
+ "is not enabled", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ switch (memory_type) {
+ case CGS_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL:
+ case CGS_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO:
+ return klass->launch_update_data(sev_common, gpa, ptr, len, errp);
+
+ case CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA:
+ if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: attempt to configure initial VMSA, but SEV-ES "
+ "is not supported",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (check_vmsa_supported(gpa, (const struct sev_es_save_area *)ptr,
+ errp) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return sev_set_cpu_context(cpu_index, ptr, len, gpa, errp);
+
+ case CGS_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED:
+ if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ return snp_launch_update_data(
+ gpa, ptr, len, KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED, errp);
+ }
+ /* No action required if not SEV-SNP */
+ return 0;
+
+ case CGS_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS:
+ if (!sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: attempt to configure secrets page, but SEV-SNP "
+ "is not supported",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return snp_launch_update_data(gpa, ptr, len,
+ KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS, errp);
+
+ case CGS_PAGE_TYPE_REQUIRED_MEMORY:
+ if (kvm_convert_memory(gpa, len, true) < 0) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "%s: failed to configure required memory. gpa: %lX, type: %d",
+ __func__, gpa, memory_type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case CGS_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID:
+ if (!sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: attempt to configure CPUID page, but SEV-SNP "
+ "is not supported",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return snp_launch_update_cpuid(gpa, ptr, len, errp);
+ }
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: failed to update guest. gpa: %lX, type: %d", __func__,
+ gpa, memory_type);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int cgs_get_mem_map_entry(int index,
+ ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ struct e820_entry *table;
+ int num_entries;
+
+ num_entries = e820_get_table(&table);
+ if ((index < 0) || (index >= num_entries)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ entry->gpa = table[index].address;
+ entry->size = table[index].length;
+ switch (table[index].type) {
+ case E820_RAM:
+ entry->type = CGS_MEM_RAM;
+ break;
+ case E820_RESERVED:
+ entry->type = CGS_MEM_RESERVED;
+ break;
+ case E820_ACPI:
+ entry->type = CGS_MEM_ACPI;
+ break;
+ case E820_NVS:
+ entry->type = CGS_MEM_NVS;
+ break;
+ case E820_UNUSABLE:
+ entry->type = CGS_MEM_UNUSABLE;
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void
sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
{
@@ -2313,6 +2541,8 @@ static void
sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
{
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(obj);
+ ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *cgs =
+ CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(obj);
sev_common->kvm_type = -1;
@@ -2323,6 +2553,10 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "reduced-phys-bits",
&sev_common->reduced_phys_bits,
OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE);
+ cgs->check_support = cgs_check_support;
+ cgs->set_guest_state = cgs_set_guest_state;
+ cgs->get_mem_map_entry = cgs_get_mem_map_entry;
+
QTAILQ_INIT(&sev_common->launch_vmsa);
}
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h
index 38caa849f5..d2eb06db32 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.h
+++ b/target/i386/sev.h
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ bool sev_snp_enabled(void);
#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_SMT 0x10000
#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_DBG 0x80000
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE 1
+
typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext {
char *setup_data;
size_t setup_size;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 10/16] docs/system: Add documentation on support for IGVM
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:34 ` [PATCH v9 09/16] i386/sev: Implement ConfidentialGuestSupport functions for SEV Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 15:41 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 16:02 ` [PATCH v9 11/16] docs/interop/firmware.json: Add igvm to FirmwareDevice Roy Hopkins
` (8 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 15:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
IGVM support has been implemented for Confidential Guests that support
AMD SEV and AMD SEV-ES. Add some documentation that gives some
background on the IGVM format and how to use it to configure a
confidential guest.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 2 +
docs/system/igvm.rst | 173 +++++++++++++++++++++
docs/system/index.rst | 1 +
3 files changed, 176 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 docs/system/igvm.rst
diff --git a/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 748f5094ba..6c23f3535f 100644
--- a/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+.. _amd-sev:
+
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
=========================================
diff --git a/docs/system/igvm.rst b/docs/system/igvm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79508d9588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/system/igvm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+Independent Guest Virtual Machine (IGVM) support
+================================================
+
+IGVM files are designed to encapsulate all the information required to launch a
+virtual machine on any given virtualization stack in a deterministic way. This
+allows the cryptographic measurement of initial guest state for Confidential
+Guests to be calculated when the IGVM file is built, allowing a relying party to
+verify the initial state of a guest via a remote attestation.
+
+Although IGVM files are designed with Confidential Computing in mind, they can
+also be used to configure non-confidential guests. Multiple platforms can be
+defined by a single IGVM file, allowing a single IGVM file to configure a
+virtual machine that can run on, for example, TDX, SEV and non-confidential
+hosts.
+
+QEMU supports IGVM files through the user-creatable ``igvm-cfg`` object. This
+object is used to define the filename of the IGVM file to process. A reference
+to the object is added to the ``-machine`` to configure the virtual machine
+to use the IGVM file for configuration.
+
+Confidential platform support is provided through the use of
+the ``ConfidentialGuestSupport`` object. If the virtual machine provides an
+instance of this object then this is used by the IGVM loader to configure the
+isolation properties of the directives within the file.
+
+Further Information on IGVM
+---------------------------
+
+Information about the IGVM format, including links to the format specification
+and documentation for the Rust and C libraries can be found at the project
+repository:
+
+https://github.com/microsoft/igvm
+
+
+Supported Platforms
+-------------------
+
+Currently, IGVM files can be provided for Confidential Guests on host systems
+that support AMD SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP with KVM. IGVM files can also be
+provided for non-confidential guests.
+
+
+Limitations when using IGVM with AMD SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP
+------------------------------------------------------------
+
+IGVM files configure the initial state of the guest using a set of directives.
+Not every directive is supported by every Confidential Guest type. For example,
+AMD SEV does not support encrypted save state regions, therefore setting the
+initial CPU state using IGVM for SEV is not possible. When an IGVM file contains
+directives that are not supported for the active platform, an error is generated
+and the guest launch is aborted.
+
+The table below describes the list of directives that are supported for SEV,
+SEV-ES, SEV-SNP and non-confidential platforms.
+
+.. list-table:: SEV, SEV-ES, SEV-SNP & non-confidential Supported Directives
+ :widths: 35 65
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - IGVM directive
+ - Notes
+ * - IGVM_VHT_PAGE_DATA
+ - ``NORMAL`` zero, measured and unmeasured page types are supported. Other
+ page types result in an error.
+ * - IGVM_VHT_PARAMETER_AREA
+ -
+ * - IGVM_VHT_PARAMETER_INSERT
+ -
+ * - IGVM_VHT_VP_COUNT_PARAMETER
+ - The guest parameter page is populated with the CPU count.
+ * - IGVM_VHT_ENVIRONMENT_INFO_PARAMETER
+ - The ``memory_is_shared`` parameter is set to 1 in the guest parameter
+ page.
+
+.. list-table:: Additional SEV, SEV-ES & SEV_SNP Supported Directives
+ :widths: 25 75
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - IGVM directive
+ - Notes
+ * - IGVM_VHT_MEMORY_MAP
+ - The memory map page is populated using entries from the E820 table.
+ * - IGVM_VHT_REQUIRED_MEMORY
+ - Ensures memory is available in the guest at the specified range.
+
+.. list-table:: Additional SEV-ES & SEV-SNP Supported Directives
+ :widths: 25 75
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - IGVM directive
+ - Notes
+ * - IGVM_VHT_VP_CONTEXT
+ - Setting of the initial CPU state for the boot CPU and additional CPUs is
+ supported with limitations on the fields that can be provided in the
+ VMSA. See below for details on which fields are supported.
+
+Initial CPU state with VMSA
+---------------------------
+
+The initial state of guest CPUs can be defined in the IGVM file for AMD SEV-ES
+and SEV-SNP. The state data is provided as a VMSA structure as defined in Table
+B-4 in the AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2 [1].
+
+The IGVM VMSA is translated to CPU state in QEMU which is then synchronized
+by KVM to the guest VMSA during the launch process where it contributes to the
+launch measurement. See :ref:`amd-sev` for details on the launch process and
+guest launch measurement.
+
+It is important that no information is lost or changed when translating the
+VMSA provided by the IGVM file into the VSMA that is used to launch the guest.
+Therefore, QEMU restricts the VMSA fields that can be provided in the IGVM
+VMSA structure to the following registers:
+
+RAX, RCX, RDX, RBX, RBP, RSI, RDI, R8-R15, RSP, RIP, CS, DS, ES, FS, GS, SS,
+CR0, CR3, CR4, XCR0, EFER, PAT, GDT, IDT, LDTR, TR, DR6, DR7, RFLAGS, X87_FCW,
+MXCSR.
+
+When processing the IGVM file, QEMU will check if any fields other than the
+above are non-zero and generate an error if this is the case.
+
+KVM uses a hardcoded GPA of 0xFFFFFFFFF000 for the VMSA. When an IGVM file
+defines initial CPU state, the GPA for each VMSA must match this hardcoded
+value.
+
+Firmware Images with IGVM
+-------------------------
+
+When an IGVM filename is specified for a Confidential Guest Support object it
+overrides the default handling of system firmware: the firmware image, such as
+an OVMF binary should be contained as a payload of the IGVM file and not
+provided as a flash drive or via the ``-bios`` parameter. The default QEMU
+firmware is not automatically populated into the guest memory space.
+
+If an IGVM file is provided along with either the ``-bios`` parameter or pflash
+devices then an error is displayed and the guest startup is aborted.
+
+Running a guest configured using IGVM
+-------------------------------------
+
+To run a guest configured with IGVM you firstly need to generate an IGVM file
+that contains a guest configuration compatible with the platform you are
+targeting.
+
+The ``buildigvm`` tool [2] is an example of a tool that can be used to generate
+IGVM files for non-confidential X86 platforms as well as for SEV, SEV-ES and
+SEV-SNP confidential platforms.
+
+Example using this tool to generate an IGVM file for AMD SEV-SNP::
+
+ buildigvm --firmware /path/to/OVMF.fd --output sev-snp.igvm \
+ --cpucount 4 sev-snp
+
+To run a guest configured with the generated IGVM you need to add an
+``igvm-cfg`` object and refer to it from the ``-machine`` parameter:
+
+Example (for AMD SEV)::
+
+ qemu-system-x86_64 \
+ <other parameters> \
+ -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0,igvm-cfg=igvm0 \
+ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 \
+ -object igvm-cfg,id=igvm0,file=/path/to/sev-snp.igvm
+
+References
+----------
+
+[1] AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming
+ Rev 3.41
+ https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24593.pdf
+
+[2] ``buildigvm`` - A tool to build example IGVM files containing OVMF firmware
+ https://github.com/roy-hopkins/buildigvm
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/system/index.rst b/docs/system/index.rst
index 718e9d3c56..427b020483 100644
--- a/docs/system/index.rst
+++ b/docs/system/index.rst
@@ -38,5 +38,6 @@ or Hypervisor.Framework.
security
multi-process
confidential-guest-support
+ igvm
vm-templating
sriov
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 11/16] docs/interop/firmware.json: Add igvm to FirmwareDevice
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 15:41 ` [PATCH v9 10/16] docs/system: Add documentation on support for IGVM Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 16:02 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 16:02 ` [PATCH v9 12/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add set_guest_policy() function Roy Hopkins
` (7 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 16:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
Create an enum entry within FirmwareDevice for 'igvm' to describe that
an IGVM file can be used to map firmware into memory as an alternative
to pre-existing firmware devices.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
docs/interop/firmware.json | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/interop/firmware.json b/docs/interop/firmware.json
index 745d21d822..0711b6f323 100644
--- a/docs/interop/firmware.json
+++ b/docs/interop/firmware.json
@@ -57,10 +57,17 @@
#
# @memory: The firmware is to be mapped into memory.
#
+# @igvm: The firmware is defined by a file conforming to the IGVM
+# specification and mapped into memory according to directives
+# defined in the file. This is similar to @memory but may
+# include additional processing defined by the IGVM file
+# including initial CPU state or population of metadata into
+# the guest address space. Since: 10.1
+#
# Since: 3.0
##
{ 'enum' : 'FirmwareDevice',
- 'data' : [ 'flash', 'kernel', 'memory' ] }
+ 'data' : [ 'flash', 'kernel', 'memory', 'igvm' ] }
##
# @FirmwareArchitecture:
@@ -377,6 +384,24 @@
{ 'struct' : 'FirmwareMappingMemory',
'data' : { 'filename' : 'str' } }
+##
+# @FirmwareMappingIgvm:
+#
+# Describes loading and mapping properties for the firmware executable,
+# when @FirmwareDevice is @igvm.
+#
+# @filename: Identifies the IGVM file containing the firmware executable
+# along with other information used to configure the initial
+# state of the guest. The IGVM file may be shared by multiple
+# virtual machine definitions. This corresponds to creating
+# an object on the command line with "-object igvm-cfg,
+# file=@filename".
+#
+# Since: 10.1
+##
+{ 'struct' : 'FirmwareMappingIgvm',
+ 'data' : { 'filename' : 'str' } }
+
##
# @FirmwareMapping:
#
@@ -393,7 +418,8 @@
'discriminator' : 'device',
'data' : { 'flash' : 'FirmwareMappingFlash',
'kernel' : 'FirmwareMappingKernel',
- 'memory' : 'FirmwareMappingMemory' } }
+ 'memory' : 'FirmwareMappingMemory',
+ 'igvm' : 'FirmwareMappingIgvm' } }
##
# @Firmware:
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 12/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add set_guest_policy() function
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 16:02 ` [PATCH v9 11/16] docs/interop/firmware.json: Add igvm to FirmwareDevice Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 16:02 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 16:18 ` [PATCH v9 13/16] backends/igvm: Process initialization sections in IGVM file Roy Hopkins
` (6 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 16:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
For confidential guests a policy can be provided that defines the
security level, debug status, expected launch measurement and other
parameters that define the configuration of the confidential platform.
This commit adds a new function named set_guest_policy() that can be
implemented by each confidential platform, such as AMD SEV to set the
policy. This will allow configuration of the policy from a
multi-platform resource such as an IGVM file without the IGVM processor
requiring specific implementation details for each platform.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 12 ++++++++++++
include/system/confidential-guest-support.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
diff --git a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
index c5bef1fbfa..156dd15e66 100644
--- a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
+++ b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c
@@ -38,6 +38,17 @@ static int set_guest_state(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
return -1;
}
+static int set_guest_policy(ConfidentialGuestPolicyType policy_type,
+ uint64_t policy,
+ void *policy_data1, uint32_t policy_data1_size,
+ void *policy_data2, uint32_t policy_data2_size,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "Setting confidential guest policy is not supported for this platform");
+ return -1;
+}
+
static int get_mem_map_entry(int index, ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry,
Error **errp)
{
@@ -53,6 +64,7 @@ static void confidential_guest_support_class_init(ObjectClass *oc,
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *cgsc = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(oc);
cgsc->check_support = check_support;
cgsc->set_guest_state = set_guest_state;
+ cgsc->set_guest_policy = set_guest_policy;
cgsc->get_mem_map_entry = get_mem_map_entry;
}
diff --git a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
index 79ecd21f42..0cc8b26e64 100644
--- a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
+++ b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPageType {
CGS_PAGE_TYPE_REQUIRED_MEMORY,
} ConfidentialGuestPageType;
+typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPolicyType {
+ GUEST_POLICY_SEV,
+} ConfidentialGuestPolicyType;
+
struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
Object parent;
@@ -123,6 +127,23 @@ typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
ConfidentialGuestPageType memory_type,
uint16_t cpu_index, Error **errp);
+ /*
+ * Set the guest policy. The policy can be used to configure the
+ * confidential platform, such as if debug is enabled or not and can contain
+ * information about expected launch measurements, signed verification of
+ * guest configuration and other platform data.
+ *
+ * The format of the policy data is specific to each platform. For example,
+ * SEV-SNP uses a policy bitfield in the 'policy' argument and provides an
+ * ID block and ID authentication in the 'policy_data' parameters. The type
+ * of policy data is identified by the 'policy_type' argument.
+ */
+ int (*set_guest_policy)(ConfidentialGuestPolicyType policy_type,
+ uint64_t policy,
+ void *policy_data1, uint32_t policy_data1_size,
+ void *policy_data2, uint32_t policy_data2_size,
+ Error **errp);
+
/*
* Iterate the system memory map, getting the entry with the given index
* that can be populated into guest memory.
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 13/16] backends/igvm: Process initialization sections in IGVM file
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 16:02 ` [PATCH v9 12/16] backends/confidential-guest-support: Add set_guest_policy() function Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 16:18 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v9 14/16] backends/igvm: Handle policy for SEV guests Roy Hopkins
` (5 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
The initialization sections in IGVM files contain configuration that
should be applied to the guest platform before it is started. This
includes guest policy and other information that can affect the security
level and the startup measurement of a guest.
This commit introduces handling of the initialization sections during
processing of the IGVM file.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
---
backends/igvm.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/backends/igvm.c b/backends/igvm.c
index 2a31021d44..ebdb4594d1 100644
--- a/backends/igvm.c
+++ b/backends/igvm.c
@@ -786,6 +786,27 @@ int qigvm_process_file(IgvmCfg *cfg, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
}
}
+ header_count =
+ igvm_header_count(ctx.file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_INITIALIZATION);
+ if (header_count < 0) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "Invalid initialization header count in IGVM file. Error code: %X",
+ header_count);
+ goto cleanup_parameters;
+ }
+
+ for (ctx.current_header_index = 0;
+ ctx.current_header_index < (unsigned)header_count;
+ ctx.current_header_index++) {
+ IgvmVariableHeaderType type =
+ igvm_get_header_type(ctx.file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_INITIALIZATION,
+ ctx.current_header_index);
+ if (qigvm_handler(&ctx, type, errp) < 0) {
+ goto cleanup_parameters;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Contiguous pages of data with compatible flags are grouped together in
* order to reduce the number of memory regions we create. Make sure the
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 14/16] backends/igvm: Handle policy for SEV guests
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 16:18 ` [PATCH v9 13/16] backends/igvm: Process initialization sections in IGVM file Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 16:21 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v9 15/16] i386/sev: Add implementation of CGS set_guest_policy() Roy Hopkins
` (4 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
Adds a handler for the guest policy initialization IGVM section and
builds an SEV policy based on this information and the ID block
directive if present. The policy is applied using by calling
'set_guest_policy()' on the ConfidentialGuestSupport object.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
backends/igvm.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 149 insertions(+)
diff --git a/backends/igvm.c b/backends/igvm.c
index ebdb4594d1..b568f06c76 100644
--- a/backends/igvm.c
+++ b/backends/igvm.c
@@ -27,6 +27,40 @@ typedef struct QIgvmParameterData {
uint32_t index;
} QIgvmParameterData;
+/*
+ * Some directives are specific to particular confidential computing platforms.
+ * Define required types for each of those platforms here.
+ */
+
+/* SEV/SEV-ES/SEV-SNP */
+
+/*
+ * These structures are defined in "SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI
+ * Specification" Rev 1.58, section 8.18.
+ */
+struct QEMU_PACKED sev_id_block {
+ uint8_t ld[48];
+ uint8_t family_id[16];
+ uint8_t image_id[16];
+ uint32_t version;
+ uint32_t guest_svn;
+ uint64_t policy;
+};
+
+struct QEMU_PACKED sev_id_authentication {
+ uint32_t id_key_alg;
+ uint32_t auth_key_algo;
+ uint8_t reserved[56];
+ uint8_t id_block_sig[512];
+ uint8_t id_key[1028];
+ uint8_t reserved2[60];
+ uint8_t id_key_sig[512];
+ uint8_t author_key[1028];
+ uint8_t reserved3[892];
+};
+
+#define IGVM_SEV_ID_BLOCK_VERSION 1
+
/*
* QIgvm contains the information required during processing
* of a single IGVM file.
@@ -38,6 +72,17 @@ typedef struct QIgvm {
uint32_t compatibility_mask;
unsigned current_header_index;
QTAILQ_HEAD(, QIgvmParameterData) parameter_data;
+ IgvmPlatformType platform_type;
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-SNP platforms can contain an ID block and authentication
+ * that should be verified by the guest.
+ */
+ struct sev_id_block *id_block;
+ struct sev_id_authentication *id_auth;
+
+ /* Define the guest policy for SEV guests */
+ uint64_t sev_policy;
/* These variables keep track of contiguous page regions */
IGVM_VHS_PAGE_DATA region_prev_page_data;
@@ -67,6 +112,11 @@ static int qigvm_directive_environment_info(QIgvm *ctx,
static int qigvm_directive_required_memory(QIgvm *ctx,
const uint8_t *header_data,
Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_directive_snp_id_block(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
+static int qigvm_initialization_guest_policy(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp);
struct QIGVMHandler {
uint32_t type;
@@ -91,6 +141,10 @@ static struct QIGVMHandler handlers[] = {
qigvm_directive_environment_info },
{ IGVM_VHT_REQUIRED_MEMORY, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
qigvm_directive_required_memory },
+ { IGVM_VHT_SNP_ID_BLOCK, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE,
+ qigvm_directive_snp_id_block },
+ { IGVM_VHT_GUEST_POLICY, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_INITIALIZATION,
+ qigvm_initialization_guest_policy },
};
static int qigvm_handler(QIgvm *ctx, uint32_t type, Error **errp)
@@ -632,6 +686,74 @@ static int qigvm_directive_required_memory(QIgvm *ctx,
return 0;
}
+static int qigvm_directive_snp_id_block(QIgvm *ctx, const uint8_t *header_data,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_SNP_ID_BLOCK *igvm_id =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_SNP_ID_BLOCK *)header_data;
+
+ if (!(igvm_id->compatibility_mask & ctx->compatibility_mask)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->id_block) {
+ error_setg(errp, "IGVM: Multiple ID blocks encountered "
+ "in IGVM file.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ctx->id_block = g_new0(struct sev_id_block, 1);
+ ctx->id_auth = g_new0(struct sev_id_authentication, 1);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->id_block->family_id, igvm_id->family_id,
+ sizeof(ctx->id_block->family_id));
+ memcpy(ctx->id_block->image_id, igvm_id->image_id,
+ sizeof(ctx->id_block->image_id));
+ ctx->id_block->guest_svn = igvm_id->guest_svn;
+ ctx->id_block->version = IGVM_SEV_ID_BLOCK_VERSION;
+ memcpy(ctx->id_block->ld, igvm_id->ld, sizeof(ctx->id_block->ld));
+
+ ctx->id_auth->id_key_alg = igvm_id->id_key_algorithm;
+ assert(sizeof(igvm_id->id_key_signature) <=
+ sizeof(ctx->id_auth->id_block_sig));
+ memcpy(ctx->id_auth->id_block_sig, &igvm_id->id_key_signature,
+ sizeof(igvm_id->id_key_signature));
+
+ ctx->id_auth->auth_key_algo = igvm_id->author_key_algorithm;
+ assert(sizeof(igvm_id->author_key_signature) <=
+ sizeof(ctx->id_auth->id_key_sig));
+ memcpy(ctx->id_auth->id_key_sig, &igvm_id->author_key_signature,
+ sizeof(igvm_id->author_key_signature));
+
+ /*
+ * SEV and IGVM public key structure population are slightly different.
+ * See SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification, Chapter 10.
+ */
+ *((uint32_t *)ctx->id_auth->id_key) = igvm_id->id_public_key.curve;
+ memcpy(&ctx->id_auth->id_key[4], &igvm_id->id_public_key.qx, 72);
+ memcpy(&ctx->id_auth->id_key[76], &igvm_id->id_public_key.qy, 72);
+
+ *((uint32_t *)ctx->id_auth->author_key) =
+ igvm_id->author_public_key.curve;
+ memcpy(&ctx->id_auth->author_key[4], &igvm_id->author_public_key.qx,
+ 72);
+ memcpy(&ctx->id_auth->author_key[76], &igvm_id->author_public_key.qy,
+ 72);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int qigvm_initialization_guest_policy(QIgvm *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *header_data, Error **errp)
+{
+ const IGVM_VHS_GUEST_POLICY *guest =
+ (const IGVM_VHS_GUEST_POLICY *)header_data;
+
+ if (guest->compatibility_mask & ctx->compatibility_mask) {
+ ctx->sev_policy = guest->policy;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int qigvm_supported_platform_compat_mask(QIgvm *ctx, Error **errp)
{
int32_t header_count;
@@ -701,12 +823,16 @@ static int qigvm_supported_platform_compat_mask(QIgvm *ctx, Error **errp)
/* Choose the strongest supported isolation technology */
if (compatibility_mask_sev_snp != 0) {
ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask_sev_snp;
+ ctx->platform_type = IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_SEV_SNP;
} else if (compatibility_mask_sev_es != 0) {
ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask_sev_es;
+ ctx->platform_type = IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_SEV_ES;
} else if (compatibility_mask_sev != 0) {
ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask_sev;
+ ctx->platform_type = IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_SEV;
} else if (compatibility_mask != 0) {
ctx->compatibility_mask = compatibility_mask;
+ ctx->platform_type = IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_NATIVE;
} else {
error_setg(
errp,
@@ -716,6 +842,23 @@ static int qigvm_supported_platform_compat_mask(QIgvm *ctx, Error **errp)
return 0;
}
+static int qigvm_handle_policy(QIgvm *ctx, Error **errp)
+{
+ if (ctx->platform_type == IGVM_PLATFORM_TYPE_SEV_SNP) {
+ int id_block_len = 0;
+ int id_auth_len = 0;
+ if (ctx->id_block) {
+ ctx->id_block->policy = ctx->sev_policy;
+ id_block_len = sizeof(struct sev_id_block);
+ id_auth_len = sizeof(struct sev_id_authentication);
+ }
+ return ctx->cgsc->set_guest_policy(GUEST_POLICY_SEV, ctx->sev_policy,
+ ctx->id_block, id_block_len,
+ ctx->id_auth, id_auth_len, errp);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static IgvmHandle qigvm_file_init(char *filename, Error **errp)
{
IgvmHandle igvm;
@@ -814,12 +957,18 @@ int qigvm_process_file(IgvmCfg *cfg, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
*/
retval = qigvm_process_mem_page(&ctx, NULL, errp);
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ retval = qigvm_handle_policy(&ctx, errp);
+ }
+
cleanup_parameters:
QTAILQ_FOREACH(parameter, &ctx.parameter_data, next)
{
g_free(parameter->data);
parameter->data = NULL;
}
+ g_free(ctx.id_block);
+ g_free(ctx.id_auth);
cleanup:
igvm_free(ctx.file);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 15/16] i386/sev: Add implementation of CGS set_guest_policy()
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v9 14/16] backends/igvm: Handle policy for SEV guests Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 16:21 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v9 16/16] sev: Provide sev_features flags from IGVM VMSA to KVM_SEV_INIT2 Roy Hopkins
` (3 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel
The new cgs_set_guest_policy() function is provided to receive the guest
policy flags, SNP ID block and SNP ID authentication from guest
configuration such as an IGVM file and apply it to the platform prior to
launching the guest.
The policy is used to populate values for the existing 'policy',
'id_block' and 'id_auth' parameters. When provided, the guest policy is
applied and the ID block configuration is used to verify the launch
measurement and signatures. The guest is only successfully started if
the expected launch measurements match the actual measurements and the
signatures are valid.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/sev.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
target/i386/sev.h | 12 +++++++
2 files changed, 95 insertions(+)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 1296f4feb6..3e5722ba65 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -2518,6 +2518,88 @@ static int cgs_get_mem_map_entry(int index,
return 0;
}
+static int cgs_set_guest_policy(ConfidentialGuestPolicyType policy_type,
+ uint64_t policy, void *policy_data1,
+ uint32_t policy_data1_size, void *policy_data2,
+ uint32_t policy_data2_size, Error **errp)
+{
+ if (policy_type != GUEST_POLICY_SEV) {
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: Invalid guest policy type provided for SEV: %d",
+ __func__, policy_type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * SEV-SNP handles policy differently. The policy flags are defined in
+ * kvm_start_conf.policy and an ID block and ID auth can be provided.
+ */
+ if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest =
+ SEV_SNP_GUEST(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish =
+ &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf;
+
+ /*
+ * The policy consists of flags in 'policy' and optionally an ID block
+ * and ID auth in policy_data1 and policy_data2 respectively. The ID
+ * block and auth are optional so clear any previous ID block and auth
+ * and set them if provided, but always set the policy flags.
+ */
+ g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_block);
+ g_free((guchar *)finish->id_block_uaddr);
+ g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_auth);
+ g_free((guchar *)finish->id_auth_uaddr);
+ sev_snp_guest->id_block = NULL;
+ finish->id_block_uaddr = 0;
+ sev_snp_guest->id_auth = NULL;
+ finish->id_auth_uaddr = 0;
+
+ if (policy_data1_size > 0) {
+ struct sev_snp_id_authentication *id_auth =
+ (struct sev_snp_id_authentication *)policy_data2;
+
+ if (policy_data1_size != KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: Invalid SEV-SNP ID block: incorrect size",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (policy_data2_size != KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: Invalid SEV-SNP ID auth block: incorrect size",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ assert(policy_data1 != NULL);
+ assert(policy_data2 != NULL);
+
+ finish->id_block_uaddr =
+ (__u64)g_memdup2(policy_data1, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ finish->id_auth_uaddr =
+ (__u64)g_memdup2(policy_data2, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if an author key has been provided and use that to flag
+ * whether the author key is enabled. The first of the author key
+ * must be non-zero to indicate the key type, which will currently
+ * always be 2.
+ */
+ sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en =
+ id_auth->author_key[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ finish->id_block_en = 1;
+ }
+ sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf.policy = policy;
+ } else {
+ SevGuestState *sev_guest = SEV_GUEST(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ /* Only the policy flags are supported for SEV and SEV-ES */
+ if ((policy_data1_size > 0) || (policy_data2_size > 0) || !sev_guest) {
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: An ID block/ID auth block has been provided "
+ "but SEV-SNP is not enabled", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ sev_guest->policy = policy;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void
sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
{
@@ -2556,6 +2638,7 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
cgs->check_support = cgs_check_support;
cgs->set_guest_state = cgs_set_guest_state;
cgs->get_mem_map_entry = cgs_get_mem_map_entry;
+ cgs->set_guest_policy = cgs_set_guest_policy;
QTAILQ_INIT(&sev_common->launch_vmsa);
}
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h
index d2eb06db32..9db1a802f6 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.h
+++ b/target/i386/sev.h
@@ -167,6 +167,18 @@ struct QEMU_PACKED sev_es_save_area {
uint8_t fpreg_ymm[256];
};
+struct QEMU_PACKED sev_snp_id_authentication {
+ uint32_t id_key_alg;
+ uint32_t auth_key_algo;
+ uint8_t reserved[56];
+ uint8_t id_block_sig[512];
+ uint8_t id_key[1028];
+ uint8_t reserved2[60];
+ uint8_t id_key_sig[512];
+ uint8_t author_key[1028];
+ uint8_t reserved3[892];
+};
+
bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp);
int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 16/16] sev: Provide sev_features flags from IGVM VMSA to KVM_SEV_INIT2
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v9 15/16] i386/sev: Add implementation of CGS set_guest_policy() Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-03 16:21 ` Roy Hopkins
2025-07-08 13:28 ` [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Stefano Garzarella
` (2 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Roy Hopkins @ 2025-07-03 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: Roy Hopkins, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange,
Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin,
Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost,
Alistair Francis, Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov,
Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta,
Joerg Roedel, Liam Merwick
IGVM files can contain an initial VMSA that should be applied to each
vcpu as part of the initial guest state. The sev_features flags are
provided as part of the VMSA structure. However, KVM only allows
sev_features to be set during initialization and not as the guest is
being prepared for launch.
This patch queries KVM for the supported set of sev_features flags and
processes the VP context entries in the IGVM file during kvm_init to
determine any sev_features flags set in the IGVM file. These are then
provided in the call to KVM_SEV_INIT2 to ensure the guest state
matches that specified in the IGVM file.
The igvm process() function is modified to allow a partial processing
of the file during initialization, with only the IGVM_VHT_VP_CONTEXT
fields being processed. This means the function is called twice,
firstly to extract the sev_features then secondly to actually
configure the guest.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
backends/igvm.c | 17 +++-
backends/igvm.h | 2 +-
hw/i386/pc_piix.c | 2 +-
hw/i386/pc_q35.c | 2 +-
include/system/igvm-cfg.h | 5 +-
target/i386/sev.c | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
6 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/backends/igvm.c b/backends/igvm.c
index b568f06c76..9ad41582ee 100644
--- a/backends/igvm.c
+++ b/backends/igvm.c
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static IgvmHandle qigvm_file_init(char *filename, Error **errp)
}
int qigvm_process_file(IgvmCfg *cfg, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
- Error **errp)
+ bool onlyVpContext, Error **errp)
{
int32_t header_count;
QIgvmParameterData *parameter;
@@ -924,11 +924,22 @@ int qigvm_process_file(IgvmCfg *cfg, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
ctx.current_header_index++) {
IgvmVariableHeaderType type = igvm_get_header_type(
ctx.file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_DIRECTIVE, ctx.current_header_index);
- if (qigvm_handler(&ctx, type, errp) < 0) {
- goto cleanup_parameters;
+ if (!onlyVpContext || (type == IGVM_VHT_VP_CONTEXT)) {
+ if (qigvm_handler(&ctx, type, errp) < 0) {
+ goto cleanup_parameters;
+ }
}
}
+ /*
+ * If only processing the VP context then we don't need to process
+ * any more of the file.
+ */
+ if (onlyVpContext) {
+ retval = 0;
+ goto cleanup_parameters;
+ }
+
header_count =
igvm_header_count(ctx.file, IGVM_HEADER_SECTION_INITIALIZATION);
if (header_count < 0) {
diff --git a/backends/igvm.h b/backends/igvm.h
index db02ea9165..a4abab043a 100644
--- a/backends/igvm.h
+++ b/backends/igvm.h
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@
#include "qapi/error.h"
int qigvm_process_file(IgvmCfg *igvm, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
- Error **errp);
+ bool onlyVpContext, Error **errp);
#endif
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_piix.c b/hw/i386/pc_piix.c
index 3184ea1b37..a3285fbc64 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_piix.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_piix.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void pc_init1(MachineState *machine, const char *pci_type)
/* Apply guest state from IGVM if supplied */
if (x86ms->igvm) {
if (IGVM_CFG_GET_CLASS(x86ms->igvm)
- ->process(x86ms->igvm, machine->cgs, &error_fatal) < 0) {
+ ->process(x86ms->igvm, machine->cgs, false, &error_fatal) < 0) {
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_q35.c b/hw/i386/pc_q35.c
index 6990e1c669..cf871cfdad 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_q35.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_q35.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static void pc_q35_init(MachineState *machine)
/* Apply guest state from IGVM if supplied */
if (x86ms->igvm) {
if (IGVM_CFG_GET_CLASS(x86ms->igvm)
- ->process(x86ms->igvm, machine->cgs, &error_fatal) < 0) {
+ ->process(x86ms->igvm, machine->cgs, false, &error_fatal) < 0) {
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
diff --git a/include/system/igvm-cfg.h b/include/system/igvm-cfg.h
index 321b3196f0..944f23a814 100644
--- a/include/system/igvm-cfg.h
+++ b/include/system/igvm-cfg.h
@@ -31,11 +31,14 @@ typedef struct IgvmCfgClass {
/*
* If an IGVM filename has been specified then process the IGVM file.
* Performs a no-op if no filename has been specified.
+ * If onlyVpContext is true then only the IGVM_VHT_VP_CONTEXT entries
+ * in the IGVM file will be processed, allowing information about the
+ * CPU state to be determined before processing the entire file.
*
* Returns 0 for ok and -1 on error.
*/
int (*process)(IgvmCfg *cfg, ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
- Error **errp);
+ bool onlyVpContext, Error **errp);
} IgvmCfgClass;
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 3e5722ba65..1057b8ab2c 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ struct SevCommonState {
uint32_t cbitpos;
uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;
bool kernel_hashes;
+ uint64_t sev_features;
+ uint64_t supported_sev_features;
/* runtime state */
uint8_t api_major;
@@ -485,7 +487,40 @@ static void sev_apply_cpu_context(CPUState *cpu)
}
}
-static int check_vmsa_supported(hwaddr gpa, const struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa,
+static int check_sev_features(SevCommonState *sev_common, uint64_t sev_features,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ /*
+ * Ensure SEV_FEATURES is configured for correct SEV hardware and that
+ * the requested features are supported. If SEV-SNP is enabled then
+ * that feature must be enabled, otherwise it must be cleared.
+ */
+ if (sev_snp_enabled() && !(sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE)) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "%s: SEV_SNP is enabled but is not enabled in VMSA sev_features",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (!sev_snp_enabled() &&
+ (sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE)) {
+ error_setg(
+ errp,
+ "%s: SEV_SNP is not enabled but is enabled in VMSA sev_features",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (sev_features & ~sev_common->supported_sev_features) {
+ error_setg(errp,
+ "%s: VMSA contains unsupported sev_features: %lX, "
+ "supported features: %lX",
+ __func__, sev_features, sev_common->supported_sev_features);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_vmsa_supported(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
+ const struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa,
Error **errp)
{
struct sev_es_save_area vmsa_check;
@@ -551,24 +586,10 @@ static int check_vmsa_supported(hwaddr gpa, const struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa,
vmsa_check.x87_fcw = 0;
vmsa_check.mxcsr = 0;
- if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
- if (vmsa_check.sev_features != SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) {
- error_setg(errp,
- "%s: sev_features in the VMSA contains an unsupported "
- "value. For SEV-SNP, sev_features must be set to %x.",
- __func__, SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE);
- return -1;
- }
- vmsa_check.sev_features = 0;
- } else {
- if (vmsa_check.sev_features != 0) {
- error_setg(errp,
- "%s: sev_features in the VMSA contains an unsupported "
- "value. For SEV-ES and SEV, sev_features must be "
- "set to 0.", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (check_sev_features(sev_common, vmsa_check.sev_features, errp) < 0) {
+ return -1;
}
+ vmsa_check.sev_features = 0;
if (!buffer_is_zero(&vmsa_check, sizeof(vmsa_check))) {
error_setg(errp,
@@ -1722,6 +1743,39 @@ static int sev_snp_kvm_type(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg)
return KVM_X86_SNP_VM;
}
+static int sev_init_supported_features(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
+ SevCommonState *sev_common, Error **errp)
+{
+ X86ConfidentialGuestClass *x86_klass =
+ X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_GET_CLASS(cgs);
+ /*
+ * Older kernels do not support query or setting of sev_features. In this
+ * case the set of supported features must be zero to match the settings
+ * in the kernel.
+ */
+ if (x86_klass->kvm_type(X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST(sev_common)) ==
+ KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
+ sev_common->supported_sev_features = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Query KVM for the supported set of sev_features */
+ struct kvm_device_attr attr = {
+ .group = KVM_X86_GRP_SEV,
+ .attr = KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES,
+ .addr = (unsigned long)&sev_common->supported_sev_features,
+ };
+ if (kvm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR, &attr) < 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: failed to query supported sev_features",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ sev_common->supported_sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
{
char *devname;
@@ -1802,6 +1856,10 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
}
}
+ if (sev_init_supported_features(cgs, sev_common, errp) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
trace_kvm_sev_init();
switch (x86_klass->kvm_type(X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST(sev_common))) {
case KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM:
@@ -1813,6 +1871,40 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
case KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM:
case KVM_X86_SNP_VM: {
struct kvm_sev_init args = { 0 };
+ MachineState *machine = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine());
+ X86MachineState *x86machine = X86_MACHINE(qdev_get_machine());
+
+ /*
+ * If configuration is provided via an IGVM file then the IGVM file
+ * might contain configuration of the initial vcpu context. For SEV
+ * the vcpu context includes the sev_features which should be applied
+ * to the vcpu.
+ *
+ * KVM does not synchronize sev_features from CPU state. Instead it
+ * requires sev_features to be provided as part of this initialization
+ * call which is subsequently automatically applied to the VMSA of
+ * each vcpu.
+ *
+ * The IGVM file is normally processed after initialization. Therefore
+ * we need to pre-process it here to extract sev_features in order to
+ * provide it to KVM_SEV_INIT2. Each cgs_* function that is called by
+ * the IGVM processor detects this pre-process by observing the state
+ * as SEV_STATE_UNINIT.
+ */
+ if (x86machine->igvm) {
+ if (IGVM_CFG_GET_CLASS(x86machine->igvm)
+ ->process(x86machine->igvm, machine->cgs, true, errp) ==
+ -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * KVM maintains a bitmask of allowed sev_features. This does not
+ * include SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE which is set accordingly by KVM
+ * itself. Therefore we need to clear this flag.
+ */
+ args.vmsa_features = sev_common->sev_features &
+ ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
+ }
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &args, &fw_error);
break;
@@ -2416,6 +2508,24 @@ static int cgs_set_guest_state(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(sev_common);
+ if (sev_common->state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+ /* Pre-processing of IGVM file called from sev_common_kvm_init() */
+ if ((cpu_index == 0) && (memory_type == CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA)) {
+ const struct sev_es_save_area *sa =
+ (const struct sev_es_save_area *)ptr;
+ if (len < sizeof(*sa)) {
+ error_setg(errp, "%s: invalid VMSA length encountered",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (check_sev_features(sev_common, sa->sev_features, errp) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ sev_common->sev_features = sa->sev_features;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!sev_enabled()) {
error_setg(errp, "%s: attempt to configure guest memory, but SEV "
"is not enabled", __func__);
@@ -2435,7 +2545,8 @@ static int cgs_set_guest_state(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
__func__);
return -1;
}
- if (check_vmsa_supported(gpa, (const struct sev_es_save_area *)ptr,
+ if (check_vmsa_supported(sev_common, gpa,
+ (const struct sev_es_save_area *)ptr,
errp) < 0) {
return -1;
}
@@ -2492,6 +2603,12 @@ static int cgs_get_mem_map_entry(int index,
struct e820_entry *table;
int num_entries;
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ if (sev_common->state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+ /* Pre-processing of IGVM file called from sev_common_kvm_init() */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
num_entries = e820_get_table(&table);
if ((index < 0) || (index >= num_entries)) {
return 1;
@@ -2523,6 +2640,12 @@ static int cgs_set_guest_policy(ConfidentialGuestPolicyType policy_type,
uint32_t policy_data1_size, void *policy_data2,
uint32_t policy_data2_size, Error **errp)
{
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ if (sev_common->state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+ /* Pre-processing of IGVM file called from sev_common_kvm_init() */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (policy_type != GUEST_POLICY_SEV) {
error_setg(errp, "%s: Invalid guest policy type provided for SEV: %d",
__func__, policy_type);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v9 16/16] sev: Provide sev_features flags from IGVM VMSA to KVM_SEV_INIT2 Roy Hopkins
@ 2025-07-08 13:28 ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-07-08 15:32 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-07-08 17:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Stefano Garzarella @ 2025-07-08 13:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roy Hopkins
Cc: qemu-devel, Paolo Bonzini, Daniel P . Berrange, Marcelo Tosatti,
Michael S . Tsirkin, Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum,
Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost, Alistair Francis, Peter Xu,
David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov, Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth,
Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta, Joerg Roedel
On Thu, Jul 03, 2025 at 03:59:33PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote:
>Here is v9 of the set of patches to add support for IGVM files to QEMU. This is
>based on commit c77283dd5d79149f4e7e9edd00f65416c648ee59 of qemu.
I successfully tested this series with the IGVM file generated by
COCONUT SVSM [1] in this way:
$ cd svsm
$ FW_FILE=/path/to/edk2/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/FV/OVMF.fd make
$ ./scripts/launch_guest.sh \
--qemu /path/to/qemu/build/qemu-system-x86_64 \
--image /path/to/fedora.qcow2 -- -vga none
Host kernel: https://github.com/coconut-svsm/linux/tree/svsm
QEMU: master (commit df6fe2abf2e990f767ce755d426bc439c7bba336) + this
series
SVSM: commit 00b24f830a318a40b56b492b917466e28fde12e2
EDK2: https://github.com/coconut-svsm/edk2/tree/svsm
Guest kernel: Linux 6.16-rc5
[1] https://github.com/coconut-svsm/svsm
Tested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Thanks!
>
>Once again, this is mostly a rebase of the previous patch series. However,
>thanks to those reviewers who have provided feedback on v8 which has now been
>addressed in this new version.
>
>This v9 patch series is also available on github: [2]
>
>For testing IGVM support in QEMU you need to generate an IGVM file that is
>configured for the platform you want to launch. You can use the `buildigvm`
>test tool [3] to allow generation of IGVM files for all currently supported
>platforms. Patch 11/17 contains information on how to generate an IGVM file
>using this tool.
>
>Changes in v9:
>
>* Address review comments from v8
>* Add metadata to relevant commits.
>
>Patch summary:
>
>1-11: Add support and documentation for processing IGVM files for SEV, SEV-ES,
>SEV-SNP and native platforms.
>
>12-15: Processing of policy and SEV-SNP ID_BLOCK from IGVM file.
>
>16: Add pre-processing of IGVM file to support synchronization of 'SEV_FEATURES'
>from IGVM VMSA to KVM.
>
>[1] Link to v8:
>https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2025-06/msg02324.html
>
>[2] v8 patches also available here:
>https://github.com/roy-hopkins/qemu/tree/igvm_master_v9
>
>[3] `buildigvm` tool v0.2.0
>https://github.com/roy-hopkins/buildigvm/releases/tag/v0.2.0
>
>Roy Hopkins (16):
> meson: Add optional dependency on IGVM library
> backends/confidential-guest-support: Add functions to support IGVM
> backends/igvm: Add IGVM loader and configuration
> hw/i386: Add igvm-cfg object and processing for IGVM files
> i386/pc_sysfw: Ensure sysfw flash configuration does not conflict with
> IGVM
> sev: Update launch_update_data functions to use Error handling
> target/i386: Allow setting of R_LDTR and R_TR with
> cpu_x86_load_seg_cache()
> i386/sev: Refactor setting of reset vector and initial CPU state
> i386/sev: Implement ConfidentialGuestSupport functions for SEV
> docs/system: Add documentation on support for IGVM
> docs/interop/firmware.json: Add igvm to FirmwareDevice
> backends/confidential-guest-support: Add set_guest_policy() function
> backends/igvm: Process initialization sections in IGVM file
> backends/igvm: Handle policy for SEV guests
> i386/sev: Add implementation of CGS set_guest_policy()
> sev: Provide sev_features flags from IGVM VMSA to KVM_SEV_INIT2
>
> backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 43 +
> backends/igvm-cfg.c | 51 +
> backends/igvm.c | 988 ++++++++++++++++++++
> backends/igvm.h | 22 +
> backends/meson.build | 5 +
> docs/interop/firmware.json | 30 +-
> docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 2 +
> docs/system/igvm.rst | 173 ++++
> docs/system/index.rst | 1 +
> hw/i386/pc.c | 12 +
> hw/i386/pc_piix.c | 10 +
> hw/i386/pc_q35.c | 10 +
> hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 31 +-
> include/hw/i386/x86.h | 3 +
> include/system/confidential-guest-support.h | 88 ++
> include/system/igvm-cfg.h | 49 +
> meson.build | 8 +
> meson_options.txt | 2 +
> qapi/qom.json | 17 +
> qemu-options.hx | 28 +
> scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh | 3 +
> target/i386/cpu.h | 9 +-
> target/i386/sev.c | 850 +++++++++++++++--
> target/i386/sev.h | 124 +++
> 24 files changed, 2475 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 backends/igvm-cfg.c
> create mode 100644 backends/igvm.c
> create mode 100644 backends/igvm.h
> create mode 100644 docs/system/igvm.rst
> create mode 100644 include/system/igvm-cfg.h
>
>--
>2.43.0
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-08 13:28 ` [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Stefano Garzarella
@ 2025-07-08 15:32 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-07-08 17:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2025-07-08 15:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roy Hopkins
Cc: qemu-devel, Paolo Bonzini, Stefano Garzarella, Marcelo Tosatti,
Michael S . Tsirkin, Cornelia Huck, Marcel Apfelbaum,
Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost, Alistair Francis, Peter Xu,
David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov, Tom Lendacky, Michael Roth,
Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta, Joerg Roedel
On Thu, Jul 03, 2025 at 03:59:33PM +0100, Roy Hopkins wrote:
> Here is v9 of the set of patches to add support for IGVM files to QEMU. This is
> based on commit c77283dd5d79149f4e7e9edd00f65416c648ee59 of qemu.
>
> Once again, this is mostly a rebase of the previous patch series. However,
> thanks to those reviewers who have provided feedback on v8 which has now been
> addressed in this new version.
>
> This v9 patch series is also available on github: [2]
>
> For testing IGVM support in QEMU you need to generate an IGVM file that is
> configured for the platform you want to launch. You can use the `buildigvm`
> test tool [3] to allow generation of IGVM files for all currently supported
> platforms. Patch 11/17 contains information on how to generate an IGVM file
> using this tool.
>
> Changes in v9:
>
> * Address review comments from v8
> * Add metadata to relevant commits.
>
> Patch summary:
>
> 1-11: Add support and documentation for processing IGVM files for SEV, SEV-ES,
> SEV-SNP and native platforms.
>
> 12-15: Processing of policy and SEV-SNP ID_BLOCK from IGVM file.
>
> 16: Add pre-processing of IGVM file to support synchronization of 'SEV_FEATURES'
> from IGVM VMSA to KVM.
IIRC, way back in the early draft of this you have included some pieces
related to TDX which we then dropped since TDX wasn't ready in QEMU
upstream.
Now that TDX merged in QEMU a few weeks back, I'm wondering what gaps there
are in this series wrt TDX support ?
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files
2025-07-03 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/16] Introduce support for IGVM files Roy Hopkins
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2025-07-08 15:32 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2025-07-08 17:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
18 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2025-07-08 17:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roy Hopkins
Cc: qemu-devel, Daniel P . Berrange, Stefano Garzarella,
Marcelo Tosatti, Michael S . Tsirkin, Cornelia Huck,
Marcel Apfelbaum, Sergio Lopez, Eduardo Habkost, Alistair Francis,
Peter Xu, David Hildenbrand, Igor Mammedov, Tom Lendacky,
Michael Roth, Ani Sinha, Gerd Hoffman, Pankaj Gupta, Joerg Roedel
Queued, thanks.
Paolo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread