From: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
To: Tao Tang <tangtao1634@phytium.com.cn>
Cc: qemu-arm@nongnu.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>,
Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
Chen Baozi <chenbaozi@phytium.com.cn>
Subject: Re: [RFC 06/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Plumb security state through core functions
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 21:28:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aKOa8KwAcm6hhAXq@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250806151134.365755-7-tangtao1634@phytium.com.cn>
On Wed, Aug 06, 2025 at 11:11:29PM +0800, Tao Tang wrote:
> To support parallel processing of secure and non-secure streams, the
> SMMUv3 model needs to differentiate between the two contexts throughout
> its core logic. This commit is the foundational step to make the code
> security-state aware.
>
> An is_secure flag, which will be used in subsequent patches to represent
> the transaction's security state, is now plumbed through the main
> processing paths.
>
> This change is purely preparatory and introduces no functional changes
> for the existing non-secure path. All current call sites are updated
> to pass is_secure = false.
>
> This refactoring paves the way for upcoming patches that will introduce
> separate TLB entries for secure transactions and enable a fully
> parallel secure/non-secure SMMU model.
>
I think it’s easier to review if this patch was split (STE parsing,
page table handling and translation, TLB invalidation)
Also based on my comment on patch 2, stage-2 handling doesn’t seem correct to me.
Thanks,
Mostafa
> Signed-off-by: Tao Tang <tangtao1634@phytium.com.cn>
> ---
> hw/arm/smmu-common.c | 11 ++-
> hw/arm/smmuv3-internal.h | 16 +++-
> hw/arm/smmuv3.c | 160 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> hw/arm/trace-events | 2 +-
> include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h | 1 +
> include/hw/arm/smmuv3.h | 4 +
> 6 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/arm/smmu-common.c b/hw/arm/smmu-common.c
> index 0dcaf2f589..28d6d1bc7f 100644
> --- a/hw/arm/smmu-common.c
> +++ b/hw/arm/smmu-common.c
> @@ -332,13 +332,16 @@ void smmu_iotlb_inv_vmid_s1(SMMUState *s, int vmid)
> * @base_addr[@index]
> */
> static int get_pte(dma_addr_t baseaddr, uint32_t index, uint64_t *pte,
> - SMMUPTWEventInfo *info)
> + SMMUPTWEventInfo *info, bool is_secure)
> {
> int ret;
> dma_addr_t addr = baseaddr + index * sizeof(*pte);
> + MemTxAttrs attrs = is_secure ?
> + (MemTxAttrs) { .secure = 1 } :
> + (MemTxAttrs) { .unspecified = true };
>
> /* TODO: guarantee 64-bit single-copy atomicity */
> - ret = ldq_le_dma(&address_space_memory, addr, pte, MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
> + ret = ldq_le_dma(&address_space_memory, addr, pte, attrs);
>
> if (ret != MEMTX_OK) {
> info->type = SMMU_PTW_ERR_WALK_EABT;
> @@ -485,7 +488,7 @@ static int smmu_ptw_64_s1(SMMUState *bs, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> dma_addr_t pte_addr = baseaddr + offset * sizeof(pte);
> uint8_t ap;
>
> - if (get_pte(baseaddr, offset, &pte, info)) {
> + if (get_pte(baseaddr, offset, &pte, info, cfg->secure)) {
> goto error;
> }
> trace_smmu_ptw_level(stage, level, iova, subpage_size,
> @@ -621,7 +624,7 @@ static int smmu_ptw_64_s2(SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> dma_addr_t pte_addr = baseaddr + offset * sizeof(pte);
> uint8_t s2ap;
>
> - if (get_pte(baseaddr, offset, &pte, info)) {
> + if (get_pte(baseaddr, offset, &pte, info, cfg->secure)) {
> goto error;
> }
> trace_smmu_ptw_level(stage, level, ipa, subpage_size,
> diff --git a/hw/arm/smmuv3-internal.h b/hw/arm/smmuv3-internal.h
> index 720d21652c..852186cea4 100644
> --- a/hw/arm/smmuv3-internal.h
> +++ b/hw/arm/smmuv3-internal.h
> @@ -243,9 +243,13 @@ REG64(S_EVENTQ_IRQ_CFG0, 0x80b0)
> REG32(S_EVENTQ_IRQ_CFG1, 0x80b8)
> REG32(S_EVENTQ_IRQ_CFG2, 0x80bc)
>
> -static inline int smmu_enabled(SMMUv3State *s)
> +static inline int smmu_enabled(SMMUv3State *s, bool is_secure)
> {
> - return FIELD_EX32(s->cr[0], CR0, SMMU_ENABLE);
> + if (is_secure) {
> + return FIELD_EX32(s->secure_cr[0], S_CR0, SMMUEN);
> + } else {
> + return FIELD_EX32(s->cr[0], CR0, SMMU_ENABLE);
> + }
> }
>
> /* Command Queue Entry */
> @@ -661,6 +665,10 @@ typedef struct CD {
> #define STE_S2S(x) extract32((x)->word[5], 25, 1)
> #define STE_S2R(x) extract32((x)->word[5], 26, 1)
>
> +#define STE_S_S2T0SZ(x) extract32((x)->word[9], 0 , 6)
> +#define STE_S_S2SL0(x) extract32((x)->word[9], 6 , 2)
> +#define STE_S_S2TG(x) extract32((x)->word[9], 14, 2)
> +
> #define STE_CTXPTR(x) \
> ((extract64((x)->word[1], 0, 16) << 32) | \
> ((x)->word[0] & 0xffffffc0))
> @@ -669,6 +677,10 @@ typedef struct CD {
> ((extract64((x)->word[7], 0, 16) << 32) | \
> ((x)->word[6] & 0xfffffff0))
>
> +#define STE_S_S2TTB(x) \
> + ((extract64((x)->word[13], 0, 16) << 32) | \
> + ((x)->word[12] & 0xfffffff0))
> +
> static inline int oas2bits(int oas_field)
> {
> switch (oas_field) {
> diff --git a/hw/arm/smmuv3.c b/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
> index 1f05cc983b..bcf06679e1 100644
> --- a/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
> +++ b/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
> @@ -354,14 +354,14 @@ static void smmuv3_init_regs(SMMUv3State *s)
> }
>
> static int smmu_get_ste(SMMUv3State *s, dma_addr_t addr, STE *buf,
> - SMMUEventInfo *event)
> + SMMUEventInfo *event, MemTxAttrs attrs)
> {
> int ret, i;
>
> trace_smmuv3_get_ste(addr);
> /* TODO: guarantee 64-bit single-copy atomicity */
> ret = dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf),
> - MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
> + attrs);
> if (ret != MEMTX_OK) {
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> "Cannot fetch pte at address=0x%"PRIx64"\n", addr);
> @@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ static int smmu_get_cd(SMMUv3State *s, STE *ste, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> int ret, i;
> SMMUTranslationStatus status;
> SMMUTLBEntry *entry;
> + MemTxAttrs attrs = cfg->secure ?
> + (MemTxAttrs) { .secure = 1 } :
> + (MemTxAttrs) { .unspecified = true };
>
> trace_smmuv3_get_cd(addr);
>
> @@ -407,7 +410,7 @@ static int smmu_get_cd(SMMUv3State *s, STE *ste, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
>
> /* TODO: guarantee 64-bit single-copy atomicity */
> ret = dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf),
> - MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
> + attrs);
> if (ret != MEMTX_OK) {
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> "Cannot fetch pte at address=0x%"PRIx64"\n", addr);
> @@ -472,7 +475,8 @@ static int decode_ste_s2_cfg(SMMUv3State *s, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> g_assert_not_reached();
> }
>
> - switch (STE_S2TG(ste)) {
> + uint32_t s2tg = cfg->secure ? STE_S_S2TG(ste) : STE_S2TG(ste);
> + switch (s2tg) {
> case 0x0: /* 4KB */
> cfg->s2cfg.granule_sz = 12;
> break;
> @@ -484,13 +488,13 @@ static int decode_ste_s2_cfg(SMMUv3State *s, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> break;
> default:
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> - "SMMUv3 bad STE S2TG: %x\n", STE_S2TG(ste));
> + "SMMUv3 bad STE S2TG: %x\n", s2tg);
> goto bad_ste;
> }
>
> - cfg->s2cfg.vttb = STE_S2TTB(ste);
> + cfg->s2cfg.vttb = cfg->secure ? STE_S_S2TTB(ste) : STE_S2TTB(ste);
>
> - cfg->s2cfg.sl0 = STE_S2SL0(ste);
> + cfg->s2cfg.sl0 = cfg->secure ? STE_S_S2SL0(ste) : STE_S2SL0(ste);
> /* FEAT_TTST not supported. */
> if (cfg->s2cfg.sl0 == 0x3) {
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "SMMUv3 S2SL0 = 0x3 has no meaning!\n");
> @@ -519,7 +523,7 @@ static int decode_ste_s2_cfg(SMMUv3State *s, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> goto bad_ste;
> }
>
> - cfg->s2cfg.tsz = STE_S2T0SZ(ste);
> + cfg->s2cfg.tsz = cfg->secure ? STE_S_S2T0SZ(ste) : STE_S2T0SZ(ste);
>
> if (!s2t0sz_valid(cfg)) {
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "SMMUv3 bad STE S2T0SZ = %d\n",
> @@ -599,21 +603,52 @@ static int decode_ste(SMMUv3State *s, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> if (cfg->aborted || cfg->bypassed) {
> return 0;
> }
> + bool is_secure = cfg->secure;
>
> /*
> * If a stage is enabled in SW while not advertised, throw bad ste
> * according to user manual(IHI0070E) "5.2 Stream Table Entry".
> */
> - if (!STAGE1_SUPPORTED(s) && STE_CFG_S1_ENABLED(config)) {
> - qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "SMMUv3 S1 used but not supported.\n");
> - goto bad_ste;
> - }
> - if (!STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s) && STE_CFG_S2_ENABLED(config)) {
> - qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "SMMUv3 S2 used but not supported.\n");
> - goto bad_ste;
> + if (!is_secure) {
> + if (!STAGE1_SUPPORTED(s) && STE_CFG_S1_ENABLED(config)) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "SMMUv3 S1 used but not supported.\n");
> + goto bad_ste;
> + }
> + if (!STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s) && STE_CFG_S2_ENABLED(config)) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "SMMUv3 S2 used but not supported.\n");
> + goto bad_ste;
> + }
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * As described in user manual(IHI0070G.b) "3.10.2 Support for Secure
> + * state" , the SMMU supports stage 1 translation and might support
> + * stage 2 translation.
> + */
> + if (!SECURE_IMPLEMENTED(s) && STE_CFG_S1_ENABLED(config)) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "SMMUv3 S1 used but not supported in secure state.\n");
> + goto bad_ste;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * IHI0070G.b "6.3.53 SMMU_S_IDR1": SEL2 == 0 if SMMU_IDR0.S1P == 0 or
> + * if SMMU_IDR0.S2P == 0.
> + */
> + if (STE_CFG_S2_ENABLED(config)) {
> + if (!SECURE_S2_SUPPORTED(s) ||
> + (SECURE_S2_SUPPORTED(s) &&
> + (!STAGE1_SUPPORTED(s) || !STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s)))) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "SMMUv3 S2 used but not supported in secure state.\n");
> + goto bad_ste;
> + }
> + }
> }
>
> - if (STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s)) {
> + if ((!is_secure && STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s)) ||
> + (is_secure && SECURE_S2_SUPPORTED(s))) {
> /* VMID is considered even if s2 is disabled. */
> cfg->s2cfg.vmid = STE_S2VMID(ste);
> } else {
> @@ -659,20 +694,29 @@ bad_ste:
> * @sid: stream ID
> * @ste: returned stream table entry
> * @event: handle to an event info
> + * @is_secure: true if the translation is for a secure domain
> *
> * Supports linear and 2-level stream table
> * Return 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
> */
> static int smmu_find_ste(SMMUv3State *s, uint32_t sid, STE *ste,
> - SMMUEventInfo *event)
> + SMMUEventInfo *event, bool is_secure)
> {
> - dma_addr_t addr, strtab_base;
> + dma_addr_t addr;
> uint32_t log2size;
> int strtab_size_shift;
> int ret;
> + uint32_t features = is_secure ? s->secure_features : s->features;
> + dma_addr_t strtab_base = is_secure ? s->secure_strtab_base : s->strtab_base;
> + uint8_t sid_split = is_secure ? s->secure_sid_split : s->sid_split;
> + MemTxAttrs attrs = is_secure ?
> + (MemTxAttrs) { .secure = 1 } :
> + (MemTxAttrs) { .unspecified = true };
>
> - trace_smmuv3_find_ste(sid, s->features, s->sid_split);
> - log2size = FIELD_EX32(s->strtab_base_cfg, STRTAB_BASE_CFG, LOG2SIZE);
> + trace_smmuv3_find_ste(sid, features, sid_split, is_secure);
> + log2size = is_secure
> + ? FIELD_EX32(s->secure_strtab_base_cfg, S_STRTAB_BASE_CFG, LOG2SIZE)
> + : FIELD_EX32(s->strtab_base_cfg, STRTAB_BASE_CFG, LOG2SIZE);
> /*
> * Check SID range against both guest-configured and implementation limits
> */
> @@ -680,7 +724,7 @@ static int smmu_find_ste(SMMUv3State *s, uint32_t sid, STE *ste,
> event->type = SMMU_EVT_C_BAD_STREAMID;
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> - if (s->features & SMMU_FEATURE_2LVL_STE) {
> + if (features & SMMU_FEATURE_2LVL_STE) {
> int l1_ste_offset, l2_ste_offset, max_l2_ste, span, i;
> dma_addr_t l1ptr, l2ptr;
> STEDesc l1std;
> @@ -689,15 +733,15 @@ static int smmu_find_ste(SMMUv3State *s, uint32_t sid, STE *ste,
> * Align strtab base address to table size. For this purpose, assume it
> * is not bounded by SMMU_IDR1_SIDSIZE.
> */
> - strtab_size_shift = MAX(5, (int)log2size - s->sid_split - 1 + 3);
> - strtab_base = s->strtab_base & SMMU_BASE_ADDR_MASK &
> + strtab_size_shift = MAX(5, (int)log2size - sid_split - 1 + 3);
> + strtab_base = strtab_base & SMMU_BASE_ADDR_MASK &
> ~MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, strtab_size_shift);
> - l1_ste_offset = sid >> s->sid_split;
> - l2_ste_offset = sid & ((1 << s->sid_split) - 1);
> + l1_ste_offset = sid >> sid_split;
> + l2_ste_offset = sid & ((1 << sid_split) - 1);
> l1ptr = (dma_addr_t)(strtab_base + l1_ste_offset * sizeof(l1std));
> /* TODO: guarantee 64-bit single-copy atomicity */
> ret = dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, l1ptr, &l1std,
> - sizeof(l1std), MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
> + sizeof(l1std), attrs);
> if (ret != MEMTX_OK) {
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> "Could not read L1PTR at 0X%"PRIx64"\n", l1ptr);
> @@ -722,7 +766,7 @@ static int smmu_find_ste(SMMUv3State *s, uint32_t sid, STE *ste,
> }
> max_l2_ste = (1 << span) - 1;
> l2ptr = l1std_l2ptr(&l1std);
> - trace_smmuv3_find_ste_2lvl(s->strtab_base, l1ptr, l1_ste_offset,
> + trace_smmuv3_find_ste_2lvl(strtab_base, l1ptr, l1_ste_offset,
> l2ptr, l2_ste_offset, max_l2_ste);
> if (l2_ste_offset > max_l2_ste) {
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> @@ -734,12 +778,12 @@ static int smmu_find_ste(SMMUv3State *s, uint32_t sid, STE *ste,
> addr = l2ptr + l2_ste_offset * sizeof(*ste);
> } else {
> strtab_size_shift = log2size + 5;
> - strtab_base = s->strtab_base & SMMU_BASE_ADDR_MASK &
> + strtab_base = strtab_base & SMMU_BASE_ADDR_MASK &
> ~MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, strtab_size_shift);
> addr = strtab_base + sid * sizeof(*ste);
> }
>
> - if (smmu_get_ste(s, addr, ste, event)) {
> + if (smmu_get_ste(s, addr, ste, event, attrs)) {
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> @@ -868,7 +912,7 @@ static int smmuv3_decode_config(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> /* ASID defaults to -1 (if s1 is not supported). */
> cfg->asid = -1;
>
> - ret = smmu_find_ste(s, sid, &ste, event);
> + ret = smmu_find_ste(s, sid, &ste, event, cfg->secure);
> if (ret) {
> return ret;
> }
> @@ -897,12 +941,14 @@ static int smmuv3_decode_config(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
> *
> * @sdev: SMMUDevice handle
> * @event: output event info
> + * @is_secure: true if the translation is for a secure domain
> *
> * The configuration cache contains data resulting from both STE and CD
> * decoding under the form of an SMMUTransCfg struct. The hash table is indexed
> * by the SMMUDevice handle.
> */
> -static SMMUTransCfg *smmuv3_get_config(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUEventInfo *event)
> +static SMMUTransCfg *smmuv3_get_config(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUEventInfo *event,
> + bool is_secure)
> {
> SMMUv3State *s = sdev->smmu;
> SMMUState *bc = &s->smmu_state;
> @@ -922,6 +968,7 @@ static SMMUTransCfg *smmuv3_get_config(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUEventInfo *event)
> 100 * sdev->cfg_cache_hits /
> (sdev->cfg_cache_hits + sdev->cfg_cache_misses));
> cfg = g_new0(SMMUTransCfg, 1);
> + cfg->secure = is_secure;
>
> if (!smmuv3_decode_config(&sdev->iommu, cfg, event)) {
> g_hash_table_insert(bc->configs, sdev, cfg);
> @@ -1103,19 +1150,25 @@ static IOMMUTLBEntry smmuv3_translate(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr, hwaddr addr,
> .perm = IOMMU_NONE,
> };
> SMMUTLBEntry *cached_entry = NULL;
> + /* We don't support secure translation for now */
> + bool is_secure = false;
>
> qemu_mutex_lock(&s->mutex);
>
> - if (!smmu_enabled(s)) {
> - if (FIELD_EX32(s->gbpa, GBPA, ABORT)) {
> - status = SMMU_TRANS_ABORT;
> + if (!smmu_enabled(s, is_secure)) {
> + bool abort_flag;
> +
> + if (is_secure) {
> + abort_flag = FIELD_EX32(s->secure_gbpa, S_GBPA, ABORT);
> } else {
> - status = SMMU_TRANS_DISABLE;
> + abort_flag = FIELD_EX32(s->gbpa, GBPA, ABORT);
> }
> +
> + status = abort_flag ? SMMU_TRANS_ABORT : SMMU_TRANS_DISABLE;
> goto epilogue;
> }
>
> - cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &event);
> + cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &event, is_secure);
> if (!cfg) {
> status = SMMU_TRANS_ERROR;
> goto epilogue;
> @@ -1167,7 +1220,7 @@ epilogue:
> qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> "%s translation failed for iova=0x%"PRIx64" (%s)\n",
> mr->parent_obj.name, addr, smmu_event_string(event.type));
> - smmuv3_record_event(s, &event, false);
> + smmuv3_record_event(s, &event, cfg->secure);
> break;
> }
>
> @@ -1186,16 +1239,18 @@ epilogue:
> * @tg: translation granule (if communicated through range invalidation)
> * @num_pages: number of @granule sized pages (if tg != 0), otherwise 1
> * @stage: Which stage(1 or 2) is used
> + * @is_secure: true if the translation is for a secure domain
> */
> static void smmuv3_notify_iova(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr,
> IOMMUNotifier *n,
> int asid, int vmid,
> dma_addr_t iova, uint8_t tg,
> - uint64_t num_pages, int stage)
> + uint64_t num_pages, int stage,
> + bool is_secure)
> {
> SMMUDevice *sdev = container_of(mr, SMMUDevice, iommu);
> SMMUEventInfo eventinfo = {.inval_ste_allowed = true};
> - SMMUTransCfg *cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &eventinfo);
> + SMMUTransCfg *cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &eventinfo, is_secure);
> IOMMUTLBEvent event;
> uint8_t granule;
>
> @@ -1251,7 +1306,8 @@ static void smmuv3_notify_iova(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr,
> /* invalidate an asid/vmid/iova range tuple in all mr's */
> static void smmuv3_inv_notifiers_iova(SMMUState *s, int asid, int vmid,
> dma_addr_t iova, uint8_t tg,
> - uint64_t num_pages, int stage)
> + uint64_t num_pages, int stage,
> + bool is_secure)
> {
> SMMUDevice *sdev;
>
> @@ -1263,12 +1319,14 @@ static void smmuv3_inv_notifiers_iova(SMMUState *s, int asid, int vmid,
> iova, tg, num_pages, stage);
>
> IOMMU_NOTIFIER_FOREACH(n, mr) {
> - smmuv3_notify_iova(mr, n, asid, vmid, iova, tg, num_pages, stage);
> + smmuv3_notify_iova(mr, n, asid, vmid, iova, tg,
> + num_pages, stage, is_secure);
> }
> }
> }
>
> -static void smmuv3_range_inval(SMMUState *s, Cmd *cmd, SMMUStage stage)
> +static void smmuv3_range_inval(SMMUState *s, Cmd *cmd, SMMUStage stage,
> + bool is_secure)
> {
> dma_addr_t end, addr = CMD_ADDR(cmd);
> uint8_t type = CMD_TYPE(cmd);
> @@ -1284,7 +1342,8 @@ static void smmuv3_range_inval(SMMUState *s, Cmd *cmd, SMMUStage stage)
> SMMUv3State *smmuv3 = ARM_SMMUV3(s);
>
> /* Only consider VMID if stage-2 is supported. */
> - if (STAGE2_SUPPORTED(smmuv3)) {
> + if (STAGE2_SUPPORTED(smmuv3) ||
> + (SECURE_IMPLEMENTED(smmuv3) && SECURE_S2_SUPPORTED(smmuv3))) {
> vmid = CMD_VMID(cmd);
> }
>
> @@ -1294,7 +1353,7 @@ static void smmuv3_range_inval(SMMUState *s, Cmd *cmd, SMMUStage stage)
>
> if (!tg) {
> trace_smmuv3_range_inval(vmid, asid, addr, tg, 1, ttl, leaf, stage);
> - smmuv3_inv_notifiers_iova(s, asid, vmid, addr, tg, 1, stage);
> + smmuv3_inv_notifiers_iova(s, asid, vmid, addr, tg, 1, stage, is_secure);
> if (stage == SMMU_STAGE_1) {
> smmu_iotlb_inv_iova(s, asid, vmid, addr, tg, 1, ttl);
> } else {
> @@ -1317,7 +1376,8 @@ static void smmuv3_range_inval(SMMUState *s, Cmd *cmd, SMMUStage stage)
> num_pages = (mask + 1) >> granule;
> trace_smmuv3_range_inval(vmid, asid, addr, tg, num_pages,
> ttl, leaf, stage);
> - smmuv3_inv_notifiers_iova(s, asid, vmid, addr, tg, num_pages, stage);
> + smmuv3_inv_notifiers_iova(s, asid, vmid, addr, tg,
> + num_pages, stage, is_secure);
> if (stage == SMMU_STAGE_1) {
> smmu_iotlb_inv_iova(s, asid, vmid, addr, tg, num_pages, ttl);
> } else {
> @@ -1461,7 +1521,8 @@ static int smmuv3_cmdq_consume(SMMUv3State *s, bool is_secure)
> * VMID is only matched when stage 2 is supported, otherwise set it
> * to -1 as the value used for stage-1 only VMIDs.
> */
> - if (STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s)) {
> + if (STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s) ||
> + (SECURE_IMPLEMENTED(s) && SECURE_S2_SUPPORTED(s))) {
> vmid = CMD_VMID(&cmd);
> }
>
> @@ -1483,7 +1544,8 @@ static int smmuv3_cmdq_consume(SMMUv3State *s, bool is_secure)
> * If stage-2 is supported, invalidate for this VMID only, otherwise
> * invalidate the whole thing.
> */
> - if (STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s)) {
> + if (STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s) ||
> + (SECURE_IMPLEMENTED(s) && SECURE_S2_SUPPORTED(s))) {
> vmid = CMD_VMID(&cmd);
> trace_smmuv3_cmdq_tlbi_nh(vmid);
> smmu_iotlb_inv_vmid_s1(bs, vmid);
> @@ -1502,7 +1564,7 @@ static int smmuv3_cmdq_consume(SMMUv3State *s, bool is_secure)
> cmd_error = SMMU_CERROR_ILL;
> break;
> }
> - smmuv3_range_inval(bs, &cmd, SMMU_STAGE_1);
> + smmuv3_range_inval(bs, &cmd, SMMU_STAGE_1, false);
> break;
> case SMMU_CMD_TLBI_S12_VMALL:
> {
> @@ -1527,7 +1589,7 @@ static int smmuv3_cmdq_consume(SMMUv3State *s, bool is_secure)
> * As currently only either s1 or s2 are supported
> * we can reuse same function for s2.
> */
> - smmuv3_range_inval(bs, &cmd, SMMU_STAGE_2);
> + smmuv3_range_inval(bs, &cmd, SMMU_STAGE_2, false);
> break;
> case SMMU_CMD_TLBI_EL3_ALL:
> case SMMU_CMD_TLBI_EL3_VA:
> diff --git a/hw/arm/trace-events b/hw/arm/trace-events
> index 7bb0bd0cc5..92c87f0b9e 100644
> --- a/hw/arm/trace-events
> +++ b/hw/arm/trace-events
> @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ smmuv3_cmdq_consume_out(uint32_t prod, uint32_t cons, uint8_t prod_wrap, uint8_t
> smmuv3_cmdq_consume_error(const char *cmd_name, uint8_t cmd_error) "Error on %s command execution: %d"
> smmuv3_write_mmio(uint64_t addr, uint64_t val, unsigned size, uint32_t r) "addr: 0x%"PRIx64" val:0x%"PRIx64" size: 0x%x(%d)"
> smmuv3_record_event(const char *type, uint32_t sid, bool is_secure) "%s sid=0x%x is_secure=%d"
> -smmuv3_find_ste(uint16_t sid, uint32_t features, uint16_t sid_split) "sid=0x%x features:0x%x, sid_split:0x%x"
> +smmuv3_find_ste(uint16_t sid, uint32_t features, uint16_t sid_split, bool is_secure) "sid=0x%x features:0x%x, sid_split:0x%x is_secure=%d"
> smmuv3_find_ste_2lvl(uint64_t strtab_base, uint64_t l1ptr, int l1_ste_offset, uint64_t l2ptr, int l2_ste_offset, int max_l2_ste) "strtab_base:0x%"PRIx64" l1ptr:0x%"PRIx64" l1_off:0x%x, l2ptr:0x%"PRIx64" l2_off:0x%x max_l2_ste:%d"
> smmuv3_get_ste(uint64_t addr) "STE addr: 0x%"PRIx64
> smmuv3_translate_disable(const char *n, uint16_t sid, uint64_t addr, bool is_write) "%s sid=0x%x bypass (smmu disabled) iova:0x%"PRIx64" is_write=%d"
> diff --git a/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h b/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h
> index e5e2d09294..5d15a1212b 100644
> --- a/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h
> +++ b/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h
> @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ typedef struct SMMUTransCfg {
> SMMUTransTableInfo tt[2];
> /* Used by stage-2 only. */
> struct SMMUS2Cfg s2cfg;
> + bool secure;
> } SMMUTransCfg;
>
> typedef struct SMMUDevice {
> diff --git a/include/hw/arm/smmuv3.h b/include/hw/arm/smmuv3.h
> index 72ad042514..43c7289a43 100644
> --- a/include/hw/arm/smmuv3.h
> +++ b/include/hw/arm/smmuv3.h
> @@ -110,4 +110,8 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SMMUv3State, SMMUv3Class, ARM_SMMUV3)
> #define STAGE1_SUPPORTED(s) FIELD_EX32(s->idr[0], IDR0, S1P)
> #define STAGE2_SUPPORTED(s) FIELD_EX32(s->idr[0], IDR0, S2P)
>
> +#define SECURE_IMPLEMENTED(s) \
> + FIELD_DP32(s->secure_idr[1], S_IDR1, SECURE_IMPL, 1)
> +#define SECURE_S2_SUPPORTED(s) \
> + FIELD_DP32(s->secure_idr[1], S_IDR1, SEL2, 1)
> #endif
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-18 21:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-06 15:11 [RFC 00/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add initial support for Secure State Tao Tang
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 01/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Introduce secure registers and commands Tao Tang
2025-08-11 10:22 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2025-08-11 10:43 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2025-08-18 21:21 ` Mostafa Saleh
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 02/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Implement read/write logic for secure registers Tao Tang
2025-08-06 21:53 ` Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-10 16:54 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-12 17:12 ` Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-18 21:24 ` Mostafa Saleh
2025-08-20 15:21 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-23 10:41 ` Mostafa Saleh
2025-09-11 15:27 ` Tao Tang
2025-09-15 9:14 ` Mostafa Saleh
2025-09-15 9:34 ` Eric Auger
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 03/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Implement S_INIT for secure initialization Tao Tang
2025-08-18 21:26 ` Mostafa Saleh
2025-08-20 16:01 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 04/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Enable command processing for the Secure state Tao Tang
2025-08-06 21:55 ` Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-10 16:59 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-11 10:34 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2025-08-12 17:27 ` Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-12 17:39 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2025-08-12 18:42 ` Peter Maydell
2025-08-15 6:02 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-15 14:53 ` Peter Maydell
2025-08-17 3:46 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 05/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Support secure event queue and error handling Tao Tang
2025-08-11 10:41 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 06/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Plumb security state through core functions Tao Tang
2025-08-18 21:28 ` Mostafa Saleh [this message]
2025-08-20 16:25 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-23 10:43 ` Mostafa Saleh
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 07/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add separate address space for secure SMMU accesses Tao Tang
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 08/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Enable secure-side stage 2 TLB invalidations Tao Tang
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 09/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Make the configuration cache security-state aware Tao Tang
2025-08-06 15:11 ` [RFC 10/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Differentiate secure TLB entries via keying Tao Tang
2025-08-06 21:11 ` [RFC 00/11] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add initial support for Secure State Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-06 21:28 ` Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-10 16:11 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-11 10:26 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2025-08-12 17:50 ` Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-12 18:04 ` Pierrick Bouvier
2025-08-15 5:49 ` Tao Tang
2025-09-30 4:04 ` Tao Tang
2025-08-18 21:52 ` Mostafa Saleh
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