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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH <RFC> 00/15] Encode object type security status in code
Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 17:43:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aMmTxNB2eq6hSS9o@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250909165726.3814465-1-berrange@redhat.com>

Ping: anyone have thoughts on this idea of annotating security
status of our code against QOM classes ?

On Tue, Sep 09, 2025 at 05:57:11PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> Our docs/system/security.rst file loosely classifies code into that
> applicable for 'virtualization' vs 'non-virtualization' use cases.
> Only code relevant to the former group is eligible for security
> bug handling. Peter's recent proposal pointed out that we are
> increasingly hitting the limits of such a crude classification:
> 
>   https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2025-09/msg01520.html
> 
> Michael suggested that with the increased complexity, docs are not
> going to be an effective way to convey the information, and we
> need to re-consider embedding this info in code:
> 
>   https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2025-09/msg01566.html
> 
> This also allows users to validate a configuration's security status
> when starting a guest, or modifying a running guest. This series is
> an attempt to start the embedding process.
> 
> It starts with QOM, adding "bool secure" and "bool insecure"
> properties to the TypeInfo struct, which get turned into flags
> on the Type struct. This enables querying any ObjectClass to
> ask whether or not it is declared secure or insecure.
> 
> By default no statement will be made about whether a class is
> secure or insecure, reflecting our historical defaults. Over
> time we should annotate as many classes as possible with an
> explicit statement.
> 
> The "-machine" argument gains two new parameters
> 
>   * prohibit-insecure=yes|no  - a weak security boundary, only
>     excluding stuff that is explicitly declared insecure,
>     permiting stuff that is secure & anything without a stetement
> 
>   * require-secure=yes|no - a strong security boundary, only
>     permitting stuff that is explicitly declared secure,
>     excluding insecure stuff & anything without a statement
> 
> As illustration, I have added explicit annotations for many machine
> types, some accelerators, all NICs (all insecure except xen,
> e1000(e) and virtio), and all PCI virtio devices (all secure).
> 
> Example: TCG is explicitly insecure, KVM is explicitly secure,
>          qtest has no statement:
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,prohibit-insecure=yes -accel tcg
>   qemu-system-x86_64: Type 'tcg-accel' is declared as insecure
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,require-secure=yes -accel tcg
>   qemu-system-x86_64: Type 'tcg-accel' is not declared as secure
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,prohibit-insecure=yes -accel kvm
>   ^Cqemu-system-x86_64: terminating on signal 2
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,require-secure=yes -accel kvm
>   ^Cqemu-system-x86_64: terminating on signal 2
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,prohibit-insecure=yes -accel qtest
>   ^Cqemu-system-x86_64: terminating on signal 2
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,require-secure=yes -accel qtest
>   qemu-system-x86_64: Type 'qtest-accel' is not declared as secure
> 
> Example: isapc machine type is explicitly insecure
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine isapc,require-secure=yes -accel kvm
>   qemu-system-x86_64: Type 'isapc-machine' is not declared as secure
> 
> Example: devices which have no security statement are allowed if
>          merely excluding insecure devices:
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,prohibit-insecure=yes -accel kvm -device i6300esb
>   ^Cqemu-system-x86_64: terminating on signal 2
> 
> Example: devices which have no security statement are rejected if
>          requiring explicit security:
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,require-secure=yes -accel kvm -device i6300esb
>   qemu-system-x86_64: -device i6300esb: Type 'i6300esb' is not declared as secure
> 
> Example: checks also apply in HMP, rtl8139 is explicitly insecure,
>          virtio is explicitly secure
> 
>   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,require-secure=yes -accel kvm -monitor stdio
>   QEMU 10.1.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
>   (qemu) device_add rtl8139
>   Error: Type 'rtl8139' is not declared as secure
>   (qemu) device_add virtio-net
> 
> Example: checks also apply in QMP:
> 
>   $ ./scripts/qmp/qmp-shell-wrap qemu-system-x86_64 -display none -machine pc,require-secure=yes -accel kvm
>   Welcome to the QMP low-level shell!
>   Connected
>   (QEMU) device_add driver=rtl8139
>   {"error": {"class": "GenericError", "desc": "Type 'rtl8139' is not declared as secure"}}
>   (QEMU) device_add driver=virtio-net
>   {"return": {}}
> 
> Some questions....
> 
>   * Is using '-machine' the right place to express the policy ?
> 
>   * Can we change '-accel help' to report 'secure' / 'insecure'
>     as we did for '-machine help' and '-device help'.
> 
>   * Should we have 'query-devices' for QMP to allow the 'secure'
>     or 'insecure' status to be queried for every device.
> 
>   * Should we have 'query-accel' for QMP to allow the 'secure'
>     or 'insecure' status to be queried for every accelerator.
> 
>   * Should we enforce checks for -object & object_add too ?
>     Easy to add code for this, but do we need the ability to
>     exclude some object backends of dubious code quality ?
> 
>   * Likewise for -chardev / -netdev / etc which are
>     conceptual specializations of -object
> 
>   * BlockDriver structs don't use QOM, so we can't mark
>     'vvfat' block backend as insecure
> 
> The first one about '-machine' is probably the main blocker
> from a design POV. Other things are just potential future
> incremental work.
> 
> This series has had only 1/2 a day's work / thought put into
> it, hence RFC status. It has been compiled and minimally tested
> with the examples shown above. I have not pushed this through
> CI nor considered tests yet. Still it gives a good illustration
> of what's involved in recording security info in code.
> 
> Daniel P. Berrangé (15):
>   qom: replace 'abstract' with 'flags'
>   qom: add tracking of security state of object types
>   machine: add 'require-secure' and 'prohibit-insecure' properties
>   machine: check security for machine and accelerator types
>   system: report machine security status in help output
>   system: check security of device types
>   system: report device security status in help output
>   hw/core: report secure/insecure status in query-machines
>   accel: mark 'kvm' as secure and 'tcg' as insecure
>   hw/virtio: mark all virtio PCI devices as secure
>   hw: mark x86, s390, ppc, arm versioned machine types as secure
>   hw: declare Xen & microvm machines as secure, isapc as insecure
>   hw/core: declare 'none' machine to be insecure
>   hw/net: mark all NICs as insecure except e1000, e1000e & xen
>   docs: expand security docs with info about secure/insecure markers
> 
>  accel/kvm/kvm-all.c            |  1 +
>  accel/tcg/tcg-all.c            |  1 +
>  docs/system/security.rst       | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  hw/arm/virt.c                  |  1 +
>  hw/arm/xen-pvh.c               |  1 +
>  hw/core/machine-qmp-cmds.c     |  2 ++
>  hw/core/machine.c              | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  hw/core/null-machine.c         |  2 +-
>  hw/i386/isapc.c                |  2 +-
>  hw/i386/microvm.c              |  1 +
>  hw/i386/pc_piix.c              |  4 +--
>  hw/i386/xen/xen-pvh.c          |  1 +
>  hw/i386/xen/xen_pvdevice.c     |  1 +
>  hw/net/allwinner-sun8i-emac.c  |  1 +
>  hw/net/allwinner_emac.c        |  3 +-
>  hw/net/cadence_gem.c           |  1 +
>  hw/net/can/can_kvaser_pci.c    |  1 +
>  hw/net/can/can_mioe3680_pci.c  |  1 +
>  hw/net/can/can_pcm3680_pci.c   |  1 +
>  hw/net/can/ctucan_pci.c        |  1 +
>  hw/net/can/xlnx-versal-canfd.c |  1 +
>  hw/net/can/xlnx-zynqmp-can.c   |  1 +
>  hw/net/dp8393x.c               |  1 +
>  hw/net/e1000.c                 |  1 +
>  hw/net/e1000e.c                |  1 +
>  hw/net/eepro100.c              |  1 +
>  hw/net/fsl_etsec/etsec.c       |  1 +
>  hw/net/ftgmac100.c             |  1 +
>  hw/net/igb.c                   |  1 +
>  hw/net/igbvf.c                 |  1 +
>  hw/net/imx_fec.c               |  2 ++
>  hw/net/lan9118.c               |  1 +
>  hw/net/lan9118_phy.c           |  1 +
>  hw/net/lance.c                 |  1 +
>  hw/net/lasi_i82596.c           |  1 +
>  hw/net/mcf_fec.c               |  1 +
>  hw/net/msf2-emac.c             |  1 +
>  hw/net/mv88w8618_eth.c         |  1 +
>  hw/net/ne2000-isa.c            |  1 +
>  hw/net/ne2000-pci.c            |  1 +
>  hw/net/npcm7xx_emc.c           |  1 +
>  hw/net/npcm_gmac.c             |  1 +
>  hw/net/npcm_pcs.c              |  1 +
>  hw/net/opencores_eth.c         |  1 +
>  hw/net/pcnet-pci.c             |  1 +
>  hw/net/rocker/rocker.c         |  1 +
>  hw/net/rtl8139.c               |  1 +
>  hw/net/smc91c111.c             |  1 +
>  hw/net/spapr_llan.c            |  1 +
>  hw/net/stellaris_enet.c        |  1 +
>  hw/net/sungem.c                |  1 +
>  hw/net/sunhme.c                |  1 +
>  hw/net/tulip.c                 |  1 +
>  hw/net/virtio-net.c            |  1 +
>  hw/net/vmxnet3.c               |  1 +
>  hw/net/xen_nic.c               |  1 +
>  hw/net/xgmac.c                 |  1 +
>  hw/net/xilinx_axienet.c        |  1 +
>  hw/net/xilinx_ethlite.c        |  1 +
>  hw/ppc/spapr.c                 |  1 +
>  hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c     |  1 +
>  hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c         |  3 ++
>  hw/xen/xen-pvh-common.c        |  1 +
>  hw/xenpv/xen_machine_pv.c      |  2 +-
>  include/hw/boards.h            | 18 +++++++++-
>  include/hw/i386/pc.h           |  5 ++-
>  include/qom/object.h           | 24 +++++++++++++
>  qapi/machine.json              |  9 ++++-
>  qom/object.c                   | 40 +++++++++++++++++----
>  system/qdev-monitor.c          | 10 ++++++
>  system/vl.c                    |  6 ++--
>  71 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 2.50.1
> 

With regards,
Daniel
-- 
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-16 16:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-09 16:57 [PATCH <RFC> 00/15] Encode object type security status in code Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 01/15] qom: replace 'abstract' with 'flags' Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 02/15] qom: add tracking of security state of object types Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-22 21:33   ` Eric Blake
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 03/15] machine: add 'require-secure' and 'prohibit-insecure' properties Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 04/15] machine: check security for machine and accelerator types Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 05/15] system: report machine security status in help output Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 06/15] system: check security of device types Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 07/15] system: report device security status in help output Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 08/15] hw/core: report secure/insecure status in query-machines Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 09/15] accel: mark 'kvm' as secure and 'tcg' as insecure Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 10/15] hw/virtio: mark all virtio PCI devices as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 11/15] hw: mark x86, s390, ppc, arm versioned machine types " Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 12/15] hw: declare Xen & microvm machines as secure, isapc as insecure Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 13/15] hw/core: declare 'none' machine to be insecure Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 14/15] hw/net: mark all NICs as insecure except e1000, e1000e & xen Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-09 16:57 ` [PATCH 15/15] docs: expand security docs with info about secure/insecure markers Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-16 16:43 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2025-09-16 16:51   ` [PATCH <RFC> 00/15] Encode object type security status in code Peter Maydell
2025-09-18 11:35 ` Markus Armbruster
2025-09-18 12:29   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2025-09-18 14:44     ` Markus Armbruster
2025-09-18 14:51       ` Daniel P. Berrangé

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