From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:35:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avwt7XWPt9WNo90r@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFEAcA9otxN=xhb7C8JRQ7HGNZqvzdpDjBaFQ7rCxDviip-rZA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 10:24:26AM +0000, Peter Maydell wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Nov 2026 at 10:10, Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > With the latest pull request of mine that is merged, we now have
> > the mechanism for enforcement of the QEMU security boundary policy
> > with annotations completed across QOM classes for machine types,
> > devices and accelerators.
> >
> > For a bug disclosure affecting a system emulator to be accepted
> > as a security flaw the reproducer scenario must now pass without
> > warnings when adding the '-compat insecure-input' flag.
>
> How does the marking work? I'm confused about what's going
> on with the pl011 UART (which is on the security boundary
> because the arm virt board uses it). Unlike hw/char/serial.c
> and some others, there's no ".secure = true" in hw/char/pl011.c.
> But it isn't being rejected by
> ./build/kvmonly/qemu-system-aarch64 -accel kvm -M virt -display none
> -compat insecure-input=reject -serial stdio
>
> so presumably we have figured out it's secure somehow. What's
> the mechanism here?
Currently we've only marked things which are explicitly user
creatable. ie they appear in '-machine help', '-accel help'
or '-device help' lists.
If a machine type is marked as secure, then implicitly devices
which are built-in for that machine are also considered secure.
Similarly if a device is marked as secure, then implicitly
any QOM parents of that device are also secure.
In the next release cycle, I want to explicitly mark the
built-in devices to make this clear to developers, and also
explicitly mark parent types.
Then code can explicitly validate the built-in devices & parents,
so that we can detect if someone adds something inappropriate
in our security boundary without realizing implications.
> Speaking of pl011, there's also a rust implementation (which
> I am not using in this test). Do we mark both the C and Rust
> implementations as 'secure' ?
We still have Rust disabled by default. Did we ever declare it to
be production ready yet ? If we still consider it experimental then
the rust pl011 would be out of scope.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:09 System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:24 ` Peter Maydell
2026-11-17 10:35 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-11-17 14:55 ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-11-17 14:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:32 ` Mark Cave-Ayland
2026-11-17 16:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=avwt7XWPt9WNo90r@redhat.com \
--to=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=peter.maydell@linaro.org \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox