From: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>
To: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Leonardo Bras Soares Passos <lsoaresp@redhat.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] util/userfaultfd: Support /dev/userfaultfd
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 00:08:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <be81c4e3-960e-05a4-cdb1-192a9e7f33a4@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230125224016.212529-4-peterx@redhat.com>
On 25/1/23 23:40, Peter Xu wrote:
> Teach QEMU to use /dev/userfaultfd when it existed and fallback to the
> system call if either it's not there or doesn't have enough permission.
>
> Firstly, as long as the app has permission to access /dev/userfaultfd, it
> always have the ability to trap kernel faults which QEMU mostly wants.
> Meanwhile, in some context (e.g. containers) the userfaultfd syscall can be
> forbidden, so it can be the major way to use postcopy in a restricted
> environment with strict seccomp setup.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
> ---
> util/trace-events | 1 +
> util/userfaultfd.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/util/trace-events b/util/trace-events
> index c8f53d7d9f..16f78d8fe5 100644
> --- a/util/trace-events
> +++ b/util/trace-events
> @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ qemu_vfio_region_info(const char *desc, uint64_t region_ofs, uint64_t region_siz
> qemu_vfio_pci_map_bar(int index, uint64_t region_ofs, uint64_t region_size, int ofs, void *host) "map region bar#%d addr 0x%"PRIx64" size 0x%"PRIx64" ofs 0x%x host %p"
>
> #userfaultfd.c
> +uffd_detect_open_mode(int mode) "%d"
> uffd_query_features_nosys(int err) "errno: %i"
> uffd_query_features_api_failed(int err) "errno: %i"
> uffd_create_fd_nosys(int err) "errno: %i"
> diff --git a/util/userfaultfd.c b/util/userfaultfd.c
> index 9845a2ec81..360ecf8084 100644
> --- a/util/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/util/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -18,10 +18,46 @@
> #include <poll.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> #include <sys/ioctl.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +
> +typedef enum {
> + UFFD_UNINITIALIZED = 0,
> + UFFD_USE_DEV_PATH,
> + UFFD_USE_SYSCALL,
> +} uffd_open_mode;
> +
> +static uffd_open_mode open_mode;
'open_mode' could be reduced to uffd_detect_open_mode()'s
scope.
> +static int uffd_dev;
> +
> +static uffd_open_mode uffd_detect_open_mode(void)
> +{
> + if (open_mode == UFFD_UNINITIALIZED) {
> + /*
> + * Make /dev/userfaultfd the default approach because it has better
> + * permission controls, meanwhile allows kernel faults without any
> + * privilege requirement (e.g. SYS_CAP_PTRACE).
> + */
> + uffd_dev = open("/dev/userfaultfd", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
> + if (uffd_dev >= 0) {
> + open_mode = UFFD_USE_DEV_PATH;
> + } else {
> + /* Fallback to the system call */
> + open_mode = UFFD_USE_SYSCALL;
> + }
> + trace_uffd_detect_open_mode(open_mode);
> + }
> +
> + return open_mode;
If 'open_mode' isn't relevant, this function could return uffd_dev/-1
instead. Not really an improvement :)
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
> +}
>
> int uffd_open(int flags)
> {
> #if defined(__linux__) && defined(__NR_userfaultfd)
> + if (uffd_detect_open_mode() == UFFD_USE_DEV_PATH) {
> + assert(uffd_dev >= 0);
> + return ioctl(uffd_dev, USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW, flags);
> + }
> +
> return syscall(__NR_userfaultfd, flags);
> #else
> return -EINVAL;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-25 23:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-25 22:40 [PATCH 0/3] util/userfaultfd: Support /dev/userfaultfd Peter Xu
2023-01-25 22:40 ` [PATCH 1/3] linux-headers: Update to v6.1 Peter Xu
2023-01-25 22:40 ` [PATCH 2/3] util/userfaultfd: Add uffd_open() Peter Xu
2023-01-25 23:04 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-01-26 15:58 ` Peter Xu
2023-01-25 22:40 ` [PATCH 3/3] util/userfaultfd: Support /dev/userfaultfd Peter Xu
2023-01-25 23:08 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé [this message]
2023-01-26 17:33 ` Peter Xu
2023-01-26 9:02 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-26 9:05 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-26 20:03 ` Peter Xu
2023-01-26 14:13 ` [PATCH 0/3] " Michal Prívozník
2023-01-26 14:15 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 15:25 ` Peter Xu
2023-01-26 15:29 ` Michal Prívozník
2023-01-26 15:49 ` Peter Xu
2023-01-26 15:59 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-26 17:26 ` Peter Xu
2023-01-31 19:48 ` Peter Xu
2023-01-31 20:06 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-31 21:01 ` Peter Xu
2023-02-01 7:55 ` Michal Prívozník
2023-02-01 14:58 ` Peter Xu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=be81c4e3-960e-05a4-cdb1-192a9e7f33a4@linaro.org \
--to=philmd@linaro.org \
--cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \
--cc=lsoaresp@redhat.com \
--cc=peterx@redhat.com \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
--cc=quintela@redhat.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).