From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> To: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 21:11:01 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <ebbf27ef-9ccc-2777-1fd2-dba3da4b822c@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190424160942.13567-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com> On 4/24/19 11:10 AM, Singh, Brijesh wrote: > The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the > SEV guest memory space. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > --- > .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 ++ > 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index acdff2454649..b9c3dc02f344 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -322,6 +322,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va > > For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. > > +14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA > +---------------------------- > + > +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy > +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context > +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START. > + > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ > + __u32 hdr_len; > + > + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */ > + __u32 guest_len; > + > + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */ > + __u32 trans_len; > + }; > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index a7dcf19baefb..c81cac09c5af 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -7269,6 +7269,87 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params; > + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data; > + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; > + struct page **guest_page; > + unsigned long n; > + int ret, offset; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len || > + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len || > + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundry */ > + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); > + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); > + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(hdr); > + goto e_free; > + } > + > + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); > + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; > + > + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); > + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); > + goto e_free; > + } > + > + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans); > + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; > + > + /* Pin guest memory */ > + ret = -EFAULT; > + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, > + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); > + if (!guest_page) > + goto e_free; > + > + data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(guest_page[0]) + offset; Same comment here as in patch 02. No need to use the __sme version if you're going to unconditionally set it below. Thanks, Tom > + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; > + > + /* > + * The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. > + * The __sme_page_pa() takes care of setting the C-bit only when SME > + * is enabled on the host. But we need to set the C-bit regarless of > + * the SME state. > + */ > + data->guest_address |= me_mask; > + > + /* flush the caches to ensure that DRAM has recent contents */ > + sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, n); > + > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); > + > + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); > +e_free: > + kfree(data); > + kfree(hdr); > + kfree(trans); > + return ret; > +} > + > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -7322,6 +7403,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: > r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index fee75bf1fd90..07e058a3ec11 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1550,6 +1550,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > __u32 session_len; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; > + __u32 hdr_len; > + __u64 guest_uaddr; > + __u32 guest_len; > + __u64 trans_uaddr; > + __u32 trans_len; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> To: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, "qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de> Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 21:11:01 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <ebbf27ef-9ccc-2777-1fd2-dba3da4b822c@amd.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20190426211101.03kBuoiMgRJa9xOAXLUOni_J7AgnElr6iNrfiaIrlSE@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190424160942.13567-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com> On 4/24/19 11:10 AM, Singh, Brijesh wrote: > The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the > SEV guest memory space. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > --- > .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 ++ > 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index acdff2454649..b9c3dc02f344 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -322,6 +322,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va > > For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. > > +14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA > +---------------------------- > + > +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy > +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context > +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START. > + > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ > + __u32 hdr_len; > + > + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */ > + __u32 guest_len; > + > + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */ > + __u32 trans_len; > + }; > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index a7dcf19baefb..c81cac09c5af 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -7269,6 +7269,87 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params; > + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data; > + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; > + struct page **guest_page; > + unsigned long n; > + int ret, offset; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len || > + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len || > + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundry */ > + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); > + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); > + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(hdr); > + goto e_free; > + } > + > + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); > + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; > + > + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); > + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); > + goto e_free; > + } > + > + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans); > + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; > + > + /* Pin guest memory */ > + ret = -EFAULT; > + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, > + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); > + if (!guest_page) > + goto e_free; > + > + data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(guest_page[0]) + offset; Same comment here as in patch 02. No need to use the __sme version if you're going to unconditionally set it below. Thanks, Tom > + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; > + > + /* > + * The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. > + * The __sme_page_pa() takes care of setting the C-bit only when SME > + * is enabled on the host. But we need to set the C-bit regarless of > + * the SME state. > + */ > + data->guest_address |= me_mask; > + > + /* flush the caches to ensure that DRAM has recent contents */ > + sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, n); > + > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); > + > + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); > +e_free: > + kfree(data); > + kfree(hdr); > + kfree(trans); > + return ret; > +} > + > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -7322,6 +7403,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: > r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index fee75bf1fd90..07e058a3ec11 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1550,6 +1550,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > __u32 session_len; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; > + __u32 hdr_len; > + __u64 guest_uaddr; > + __u32 guest_len; > + __u64 trans_uaddr; > + __u32 trans_len; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-26 21:11 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-04-24 16:09 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/10] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:09 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:09 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 01/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:09 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 14:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-26 14:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-26 14:29 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 14:29 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 20:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-26 20:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-29 15:01 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 15:01 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 16:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-29 16:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-29 16:43 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 16:43 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 20:31 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 20:31 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-29 16:54 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 16:54 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 03/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 04/10] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:08 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 21:08 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message] 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 06/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 07/10] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/10] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:39 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 21:39 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-05-03 14:25 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-05-03 14:25 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 09/10] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/10] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 19:15 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/10] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Steve Rutherford 2019-04-24 19:15 ` Steve Rutherford via Qemu-devel 2019-04-24 21:32 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 21:32 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-25 0:18 ` Steve Rutherford 2019-04-25 0:18 ` Steve Rutherford via Qemu-devel 2019-04-25 2:15 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-25 2:15 ` Singh, Brijesh
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