* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability
  2016-06-20 22:04 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability Alex Williamson
@ 2016-06-20 22:23 ` Eric Blake
  2016-06-20 22:31   ` Alex Williamson
  2016-06-21  0:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Eric Blake @ 2016-06-20 22:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Williamson, qemu-devel; +Cc: chen.fan.fnst, lersek, zhoujie2011
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1783 bytes --]
On 06/20/2016 04:04 PM, Alex Williamson wrote:
> The kernel currently exposes the SR-IOV capability as read-only
> through vfio-pci.  This is sufficient to protect the host kernel, but
> has the potential to confuse guests without further virtualization.
> In particular, OVMF tries to size the VF BARs and comes up with absurd
> results, ending with an assert.  There's not much point in adding
> virtualization to a read-only capability, so we simply hide it for
> now.  If the kernel ever enables SR-IOV virtualization, we should
> easily be able to test it through VF BAR sizing or explicit flags.
> 
> Testing whether we should parse extended capabilities is also pulled
> into the function to keep these assumptions in one place.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> ---
> +     * Extended capabilities are chained with each pointing to the next, so we
> +     * can drop anything other than the head of the chain simply by modifying
> +     * the previous next pointer.  For the head of the chain, we can modify the
> +     * capability ID to something that cannot match a valid capability.  ID
> +     * 0 is reserved for this since absence of capabilities is indicated by
> +     * 0 for the ID, version, AND next pointer.  However, pcie_add_capability()
> +     * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
> +     * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
> +     * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
> +     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register
s/abscense/absence/
-- 
Eric Blake   eblake redhat com    +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
[-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 604 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability
  2016-06-20 22:23 ` Eric Blake
@ 2016-06-20 22:31   ` Alex Williamson
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alex Williamson @ 2016-06-20 22:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Blake; +Cc: qemu-devel, chen.fan.fnst, lersek, zhoujie2011
On Mon, 20 Jun 2016 16:23:07 -0600
Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 06/20/2016 04:04 PM, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > The kernel currently exposes the SR-IOV capability as read-only
> > through vfio-pci.  This is sufficient to protect the host kernel, but
> > has the potential to confuse guests without further virtualization.
> > In particular, OVMF tries to size the VF BARs and comes up with absurd
> > results, ending with an assert.  There's not much point in adding
> > virtualization to a read-only capability, so we simply hide it for
> > now.  If the kernel ever enables SR-IOV virtualization, we should
> > easily be able to test it through VF BAR sizing or explicit flags.
> > 
> > Testing whether we should parse extended capabilities is also pulled
> > into the function to keep these assumptions in one place.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> > ---  
> 
> > +     * Extended capabilities are chained with each pointing to the next, so we
> > +     * can drop anything other than the head of the chain simply by modifying
> > +     * the previous next pointer.  For the head of the chain, we can modify the
> > +     * capability ID to something that cannot match a valid capability.  ID
> > +     * 0 is reserved for this since absence of capabilities is indicated by
> > +     * 0 for the ID, version, AND next pointer.  However, pcie_add_capability()
> > +     * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
> > +     * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
> > +     * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
> > +     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register  
> 
> s/abscense/absence/
> 
Thanks, updated:
diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
index 36d5e00..2418b93 100644
--- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
+++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
@@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
      * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
      * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
      * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
-     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register
+     * part for identifying absence of capabilities in a root complex register
      * block.  If the ID still exists after adding capabilities, switch back to
      * zero.  We'll mark this entire first dword as emulated for this purpose.
      */
^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability
  2016-06-20 22:04 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability Alex Williamson
  2016-06-20 22:23 ` Eric Blake
@ 2016-06-21  0:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
  2016-06-21  3:54   ` Alex Williamson
  2016-06-28 13:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
  2016-06-28 20:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Laszlo Ersek @ 2016-06-21  0:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Williamson, qemu-devel; +Cc: chen.fan.fnst, zhoujie2011
On 06/21/16 00:04, Alex Williamson wrote:
> The kernel currently exposes the SR-IOV capability as read-only
> through vfio-pci.  This is sufficient to protect the host kernel, but
> has the potential to confuse guests without further virtualization.
> In particular, OVMF tries to size the VF BARs and comes up with absurd
> results, ending with an assert.  There's not much point in adding
> virtualization to a read-only capability, so we simply hide it for
> now.  If the kernel ever enables SR-IOV virtualization, we should
> easily be able to test it through VF BAR sizing or explicit flags.
> 
> Testing whether we should parse extended capabilities is also pulled
> into the function to keep these assumptions in one place.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
> This depends on Chen Fan's patch "vfio: add pcie extended capability
> support", which I'll pull from Zhou Jie's latest series unless there
> are comments to the contrary.  Otherwise based on Stefan's tracing
> pull request so as not to conflict.
> 
>  hw/vfio/pci.c        |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  hw/vfio/trace-events |    1 +
>  2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> index a171056b..36d5e00 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
> +++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> @@ -1772,6 +1772,12 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>      uint8_t cap_ver;
>      uint8_t *config;
>  
> +    /* Only add extended caps if we have them and the guest can see them */
> +    if (!pci_is_express(pdev) || !pci_bus_is_express(pdev->bus) ||
> +        !pci_get_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE)) {
> +        return 0;
> +    }
> +
>      /*
>       * pcie_add_capability always inserts the new capability at the tail
>       * of the chain.  Therefore to end up with a chain that matches the
> @@ -1780,6 +1786,25 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>       */
>      config = g_memdup(pdev->config, vdev->config_size);
>  
> +    /*
> +     * Extended capabilities are chained with each pointing to the next, so we
> +     * can drop anything other than the head of the chain simply by modifying
> +     * the previous next pointer.  For the head of the chain, we can modify the
> +     * capability ID to something that cannot match a valid capability.  ID
> +     * 0 is reserved for this since absence of capabilities is indicated by
> +     * 0 for the ID, version, AND next pointer.  However, pcie_add_capability()
> +     * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
> +     * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
> +     * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
> +     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register
> +     * block.  If the ID still exists after adding capabilities, switch back to
> +     * zero.  We'll mark this entire first dword as emulated for this purpose.
> +     */
> +    pci_set_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE,
> +                 PCI_EXT_CAP(0xFFFF, 0, 0));
> +    pci_set_long(pdev->wmask + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, 0);
> +    pci_set_long(vdev->emulated_config_bits + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, ~0);
> +
>      for (next = PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE; next;
>           next = PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT(pci_get_long(config + next))) {
>          header = pci_get_long(config + next);
> @@ -1794,12 +1819,23 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>           */
>          size = vfio_ext_cap_max_size(config, next);
>  
> -        pcie_add_capability(pdev, cap_id, cap_ver, next, size);
> -        pci_set_long(pdev->config + next, PCI_EXT_CAP(cap_id, cap_ver, 0));
> -
>          /* Use emulated next pointer to allow dropping extended caps */
>          pci_long_test_and_set_mask(vdev->emulated_config_bits + next,
>                                     PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT_MASK);
> +
> +        switch (cap_id) {
> +        case PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV: /* Read-only VF BARs confuses OVMF */
I think s/confuses/confuse/.
Other than that, this is mostly black magic to me, so I can't even ACK
it with a straight face :)
I would like to test it, and report back, but then again, I don't have a
NIC with virtual functions. :/
Thank you!
Laszlo
> +            trace_vfio_add_ext_cap_dropped(vdev->vbasedev.name, cap_id, next);
> +            break;
> +        default:
> +            pcie_add_capability(pdev, cap_id, cap_ver, next, size);
> +        }
> +
> +    }
> +
> +    /* Cleanup chain head ID if necessary */
> +    if (pci_get_word(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE) == 0xFFFF) {
> +        pci_set_word(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, 0);
>      }
>  
>      g_free(config);
> @@ -1821,13 +1857,6 @@ static int vfio_add_capabilities(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>          return ret;
>      }
>  
> -    /* on PCI bus, it doesn't make sense to expose extended capabilities. */
> -    if (!pci_is_express(pdev) ||
> -        !pci_bus_is_express(pdev->bus) ||
> -        !pci_get_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE)) {
> -        return 0;
> -    }
> -
>      return vfio_add_ext_cap(vdev);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/trace-events b/hw/vfio/trace-events
> index 9da0ff9..a768fb5 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/trace-events
> +++ b/hw/vfio/trace-events
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ vfio_pci_hot_reset_result(const char *name, const char *result) "%s hot reset: %
>  vfio_populate_device_config(const char *name, unsigned long size, unsigned long offset, unsigned long flags) "Device %s config:\n  size: 0x%lx, offset: 0x%lx, flags: 0x%lx"
>  vfio_populate_device_get_irq_info_failure(void) "VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO failure: %m"
>  vfio_initfn(const char *name, int group_id) " (%s) group %d"
> +vfio_add_ext_cap_dropped(const char *name, uint16_t cap, uint16_t offset) "%s %x@%x"
>  vfio_pci_reset(const char *name) " (%s)"
>  vfio_pci_reset_flr(const char *name) "%s FLR/VFIO_DEVICE_RESET"
>  vfio_pci_reset_pm(const char *name) "%s PCI PM Reset"
> 
^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability
  2016-06-21  0:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
@ 2016-06-21  3:54   ` Alex Williamson
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alex Williamson @ 2016-06-21  3:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Laszlo Ersek; +Cc: qemu-devel, chen.fan.fnst, zhoujie2011
On Tue, 21 Jun 2016 02:15:23 +0200
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 06/21/16 00:04, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > The kernel currently exposes the SR-IOV capability as read-only
> > through vfio-pci.  This is sufficient to protect the host kernel, but
> > has the potential to confuse guests without further virtualization.
> > In particular, OVMF tries to size the VF BARs and comes up with absurd
> > results, ending with an assert.  There's not much point in adding
> > virtualization to a read-only capability, so we simply hide it for
> > now.  If the kernel ever enables SR-IOV virtualization, we should
> > easily be able to test it through VF BAR sizing or explicit flags.
> > 
> > Testing whether we should parse extended capabilities is also pulled
> > into the function to keep these assumptions in one place.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > 
> > This depends on Chen Fan's patch "vfio: add pcie extended capability
> > support", which I'll pull from Zhou Jie's latest series unless there
> > are comments to the contrary.  Otherwise based on Stefan's tracing
> > pull request so as not to conflict.
> > 
> >  hw/vfio/pci.c        |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
> >  hw/vfio/trace-events |    1 +
> >  2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> > index a171056b..36d5e00 100644
> > --- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
> > +++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> > @@ -1772,6 +1772,12 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
> >      uint8_t cap_ver;
> >      uint8_t *config;
> >  
> > +    /* Only add extended caps if we have them and the guest can see them */
> > +    if (!pci_is_express(pdev) || !pci_bus_is_express(pdev->bus) ||
> > +        !pci_get_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE)) {
> > +        return 0;
> > +    }
> > +
> >      /*
> >       * pcie_add_capability always inserts the new capability at the tail
> >       * of the chain.  Therefore to end up with a chain that matches the
> > @@ -1780,6 +1786,25 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
> >       */
> >      config = g_memdup(pdev->config, vdev->config_size);
> >  
> > +    /*
> > +     * Extended capabilities are chained with each pointing to the next, so we
> > +     * can drop anything other than the head of the chain simply by modifying
> > +     * the previous next pointer.  For the head of the chain, we can modify the
> > +     * capability ID to something that cannot match a valid capability.  ID
> > +     * 0 is reserved for this since absence of capabilities is indicated by
> > +     * 0 for the ID, version, AND next pointer.  However, pcie_add_capability()
> > +     * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
> > +     * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
> > +     * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
> > +     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register
> > +     * block.  If the ID still exists after adding capabilities, switch back to
> > +     * zero.  We'll mark this entire first dword as emulated for this purpose.
> > +     */
> > +    pci_set_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE,
> > +                 PCI_EXT_CAP(0xFFFF, 0, 0));
> > +    pci_set_long(pdev->wmask + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, 0);
> > +    pci_set_long(vdev->emulated_config_bits + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, ~0);
> > +
> >      for (next = PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE; next;
> >           next = PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT(pci_get_long(config + next))) {
> >          header = pci_get_long(config + next);
> > @@ -1794,12 +1819,23 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
> >           */
> >          size = vfio_ext_cap_max_size(config, next);
> >  
> > -        pcie_add_capability(pdev, cap_id, cap_ver, next, size);
> > -        pci_set_long(pdev->config + next, PCI_EXT_CAP(cap_id, cap_ver, 0));
> > -
> >          /* Use emulated next pointer to allow dropping extended caps */
> >          pci_long_test_and_set_mask(vdev->emulated_config_bits + next,
> >                                     PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT_MASK);
> > +
> > +        switch (cap_id) {
> > +        case PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV: /* Read-only VF BARs confuses OVMF */  
> 
> I think s/confuses/confuse/.
Thanks, fixed.
> Other than that, this is mostly black magic to me, so I can't even ACK
> it with a straight face :)
> 
> I would like to test it, and report back, but then again, I don't have a
> NIC with virtual functions. :/
Time to justify one for OVMF testing? ;)  Thanks,
Alex
^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability
  2016-06-20 22:04 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability Alex Williamson
  2016-06-20 22:23 ` Eric Blake
  2016-06-21  0:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
@ 2016-06-28 13:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
  2016-06-28 20:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Laszlo Ersek @ 2016-06-28 13:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Williamson, qemu-devel; +Cc: chen.fan.fnst, zhoujie2011
On 06/21/16 00:04, Alex Williamson wrote:
> The kernel currently exposes the SR-IOV capability as read-only
> through vfio-pci.  This is sufficient to protect the host kernel, but
> has the potential to confuse guests without further virtualization.
> In particular, OVMF tries to size the VF BARs and comes up with absurd
> results, ending with an assert.  There's not much point in adding
> virtualization to a read-only capability, so we simply hide it for
> now.  If the kernel ever enables SR-IOV virtualization, we should
> easily be able to test it through VF BAR sizing or explicit flags.
> 
> Testing whether we should parse extended capabilities is also pulled
> into the function to keep these assumptions in one place.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
> This depends on Chen Fan's patch "vfio: add pcie extended capability
> support", which I'll pull from Zhou Jie's latest series unless there
> are comments to the contrary.  Otherwise based on Stefan's tracing
> pull request so as not to conflict.
> 
>  hw/vfio/pci.c        |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  hw/vfio/trace-events |    1 +
>  2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> index a171056b..36d5e00 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
> +++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> @@ -1772,6 +1772,12 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>      uint8_t cap_ver;
>      uint8_t *config;
>  
> +    /* Only add extended caps if we have them and the guest can see them */
> +    if (!pci_is_express(pdev) || !pci_bus_is_express(pdev->bus) ||
> +        !pci_get_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE)) {
> +        return 0;
> +    }
> +
>      /*
>       * pcie_add_capability always inserts the new capability at the tail
>       * of the chain.  Therefore to end up with a chain that matches the
> @@ -1780,6 +1786,25 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>       */
>      config = g_memdup(pdev->config, vdev->config_size);
>  
> +    /*
> +     * Extended capabilities are chained with each pointing to the next, so we
> +     * can drop anything other than the head of the chain simply by modifying
> +     * the previous next pointer.  For the head of the chain, we can modify the
> +     * capability ID to something that cannot match a valid capability.  ID
> +     * 0 is reserved for this since absence of capabilities is indicated by
> +     * 0 for the ID, version, AND next pointer.  However, pcie_add_capability()
> +     * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
> +     * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
> +     * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
> +     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register
> +     * block.  If the ID still exists after adding capabilities, switch back to
> +     * zero.  We'll mark this entire first dword as emulated for this purpose.
> +     */
> +    pci_set_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE,
> +                 PCI_EXT_CAP(0xFFFF, 0, 0));
> +    pci_set_long(pdev->wmask + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, 0);
> +    pci_set_long(vdev->emulated_config_bits + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, ~0);
> +
>      for (next = PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE; next;
>           next = PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT(pci_get_long(config + next))) {
>          header = pci_get_long(config + next);
> @@ -1794,12 +1819,23 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>           */
>          size = vfio_ext_cap_max_size(config, next);
>  
> -        pcie_add_capability(pdev, cap_id, cap_ver, next, size);
> -        pci_set_long(pdev->config + next, PCI_EXT_CAP(cap_id, cap_ver, 0));
> -
>          /* Use emulated next pointer to allow dropping extended caps */
>          pci_long_test_and_set_mask(vdev->emulated_config_bits + next,
>                                     PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT_MASK);
> +
> +        switch (cap_id) {
> +        case PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV: /* Read-only VF BARs confuses OVMF */
> +            trace_vfio_add_ext_cap_dropped(vdev->vbasedev.name, cap_id, next);
> +            break;
> +        default:
> +            pcie_add_capability(pdev, cap_id, cap_ver, next, size);
> +        }
> +
> +    }
> +
> +    /* Cleanup chain head ID if necessary */
> +    if (pci_get_word(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE) == 0xFFFF) {
> +        pci_set_word(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, 0);
>      }
>  
>      g_free(config);
> @@ -1821,13 +1857,6 @@ static int vfio_add_capabilities(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>          return ret;
>      }
>  
> -    /* on PCI bus, it doesn't make sense to expose extended capabilities. */
> -    if (!pci_is_express(pdev) ||
> -        !pci_bus_is_express(pdev->bus) ||
> -        !pci_get_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE)) {
> -        return 0;
> -    }
> -
>      return vfio_add_ext_cap(vdev);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/trace-events b/hw/vfio/trace-events
> index 9da0ff9..a768fb5 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/trace-events
> +++ b/hw/vfio/trace-events
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ vfio_pci_hot_reset_result(const char *name, const char *result) "%s hot reset: %
>  vfio_populate_device_config(const char *name, unsigned long size, unsigned long offset, unsigned long flags) "Device %s config:\n  size: 0x%lx, offset: 0x%lx, flags: 0x%lx"
>  vfio_populate_device_get_irq_info_failure(void) "VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO failure: %m"
>  vfio_initfn(const char *name, int group_id) " (%s) group %d"
> +vfio_add_ext_cap_dropped(const char *name, uint16_t cap, uint16_t offset) "%s %x@%x"
>  vfio_pci_reset(const char *name) " (%s)"
>  vfio_pci_reset_flr(const char *name) "%s FLR/VFIO_DEVICE_RESET"
>  vfio_pci_reset_pm(const char *name) "%s PCI PM Reset"
> 
> 
Please hold off sending a PULL for this patch for a little longer, I'll
do my best to follow up with test results today.
Thanks!
Laszlo
^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability
  2016-06-20 22:04 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vfio/pci: Hide SR-IOV capability Alex Williamson
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2016-06-28 13:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
@ 2016-06-28 20:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Laszlo Ersek @ 2016-06-28 20:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Williamson, qemu-devel; +Cc: chen.fan.fnst, zhoujie2011
On 06/21/16 00:04, Alex Williamson wrote:
> The kernel currently exposes the SR-IOV capability as read-only
> through vfio-pci.  This is sufficient to protect the host kernel, but
> has the potential to confuse guests without further virtualization.
> In particular, OVMF tries to size the VF BARs and comes up with absurd
> results, ending with an assert.  There's not much point in adding
> virtualization to a read-only capability, so we simply hide it for
> now.  If the kernel ever enables SR-IOV virtualization, we should
> easily be able to test it through VF BAR sizing or explicit flags.
> 
> Testing whether we should parse extended capabilities is also pulled
> into the function to keep these assumptions in one place.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
> This depends on Chen Fan's patch "vfio: add pcie extended capability
> support", which I'll pull from Zhou Jie's latest series unless there
> are comments to the contrary.  Otherwise based on Stefan's tracing
> pull request so as not to conflict.
> 
>  hw/vfio/pci.c        |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  hw/vfio/trace-events |    1 +
>  2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> index a171056b..36d5e00 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
> +++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> @@ -1772,6 +1772,12 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>      uint8_t cap_ver;
>      uint8_t *config;
>  
> +    /* Only add extended caps if we have them and the guest can see them */
> +    if (!pci_is_express(pdev) || !pci_bus_is_express(pdev->bus) ||
> +        !pci_get_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE)) {
> +        return 0;
> +    }
> +
>      /*
>       * pcie_add_capability always inserts the new capability at the tail
>       * of the chain.  Therefore to end up with a chain that matches the
> @@ -1780,6 +1786,25 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>       */
>      config = g_memdup(pdev->config, vdev->config_size);
>  
> +    /*
> +     * Extended capabilities are chained with each pointing to the next, so we
> +     * can drop anything other than the head of the chain simply by modifying
> +     * the previous next pointer.  For the head of the chain, we can modify the
> +     * capability ID to something that cannot match a valid capability.  ID
> +     * 0 is reserved for this since absence of capabilities is indicated by
> +     * 0 for the ID, version, AND next pointer.  However, pcie_add_capability()
> +     * uses ID 0 as reserved for list management and will incorrectly match and
> +     * assert if we attempt to pre-load the head of the chain with with this
> +     * ID.  Use ID 0xFFFF temporarily since it is also seems to be reserved in
> +     * part for identifying abscense of capabilities in a root complex register
> +     * block.  If the ID still exists after adding capabilities, switch back to
> +     * zero.  We'll mark this entire first dword as emulated for this purpose.
> +     */
> +    pci_set_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE,
> +                 PCI_EXT_CAP(0xFFFF, 0, 0));
> +    pci_set_long(pdev->wmask + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, 0);
> +    pci_set_long(vdev->emulated_config_bits + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, ~0);
> +
>      for (next = PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE; next;
>           next = PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT(pci_get_long(config + next))) {
>          header = pci_get_long(config + next);
> @@ -1794,12 +1819,23 @@ static int vfio_add_ext_cap(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>           */
>          size = vfio_ext_cap_max_size(config, next);
>  
> -        pcie_add_capability(pdev, cap_id, cap_ver, next, size);
> -        pci_set_long(pdev->config + next, PCI_EXT_CAP(cap_id, cap_ver, 0));
> -
>          /* Use emulated next pointer to allow dropping extended caps */
>          pci_long_test_and_set_mask(vdev->emulated_config_bits + next,
>                                     PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT_MASK);
> +
> +        switch (cap_id) {
> +        case PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV: /* Read-only VF BARs confuses OVMF */
> +            trace_vfio_add_ext_cap_dropped(vdev->vbasedev.name, cap_id, next);
> +            break;
> +        default:
> +            pcie_add_capability(pdev, cap_id, cap_ver, next, size);
> +        }
> +
> +    }
> +
> +    /* Cleanup chain head ID if necessary */
> +    if (pci_get_word(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE) == 0xFFFF) {
> +        pci_set_word(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE, 0);
>      }
>  
>      g_free(config);
> @@ -1821,13 +1857,6 @@ static int vfio_add_capabilities(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev)
>          return ret;
>      }
>  
> -    /* on PCI bus, it doesn't make sense to expose extended capabilities. */
> -    if (!pci_is_express(pdev) ||
> -        !pci_bus_is_express(pdev->bus) ||
> -        !pci_get_long(pdev->config + PCI_CONFIG_SPACE_SIZE)) {
> -        return 0;
> -    }
> -
>      return vfio_add_ext_cap(vdev);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/trace-events b/hw/vfio/trace-events
> index 9da0ff9..a768fb5 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/trace-events
> +++ b/hw/vfio/trace-events
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ vfio_pci_hot_reset_result(const char *name, const char *result) "%s hot reset: %
>  vfio_populate_device_config(const char *name, unsigned long size, unsigned long offset, unsigned long flags) "Device %s config:\n  size: 0x%lx, offset: 0x%lx, flags: 0x%lx"
>  vfio_populate_device_get_irq_info_failure(void) "VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO failure: %m"
>  vfio_initfn(const char *name, int group_id) " (%s) group %d"
> +vfio_add_ext_cap_dropped(const char *name, uint16_t cap, uint16_t offset) "%s %x@%x"
>  vfio_pci_reset(const char *name) " (%s)"
>  vfio_pci_reset_flr(const char *name) "%s FLR/VFIO_DEVICE_RESET"
>  vfio_pci_reset_pm(const char *name) "%s PCI PM Reset"
> 
> 
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
(with
<http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.emulators.qemu/412174/focus=412178>
applied first)
^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread