From: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kevin Wolf" <kwolf@redhat.com>,
"Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
"Christian Schoenebeck" <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>,
"Michael Roth" <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"QEMU Developers" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
"Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>,
"Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 18:40:11 +0530 (IST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <nycvar.YSQ.7.78.906.2007141723140.6870@xnncv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200714064921-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Hello all,
Thank you so much for the comments and inptus, I appreciate it.
+-- On Tue, 14 Jul 2020, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote --+
| On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 11:22:28AM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
| > On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 at 11:12, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
| > > And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like
| > > Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition.
| > > We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue
| > > if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue
| > > if it reproduces with -security=low".
| >
| > I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it
| > easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I
| > didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful
| > for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security
| > researchers' lives a bit easier".
* General consensus seems to be that MAINTAINERS file is not best suited for
such security related annotation.
* We generally ask researchers if the issue is reproducible with
'-enable-kvm', so it excludes TCG use cases.
| -security level
| Set minimal required security level of QEMU.
|
| high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against
| malicious guests.
secure -> insecure, I think?
| low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security
| against malicious guests.
|
| Default would be -security low.
|
| Does this look reasonable?
|
| Just a correction to what I wrote: I no longer think it's reasonable to
| classify the severity of a security issue automatically. E.g. a qemu
| crash in virtio code is a high severity security issue if it triggers
| with platform_iommu=on since it is then driver from guest userspace, and
| low severity one without since then it's driven from a guest driver.
|
| So I think we can add something like this to security.rst and to
| the wiki:
|
| only a security issue if it
| reproduces with -security high, a regular bug if it only reproduces with
| -security low
|
| Prasad?
IIUC:
* QEMU would abort(3), if a user attempts to start QEMU with insecure options
like say -virtfs OR -fda fat:floopy OR -netdev user OR -device tulip ?
* One way could be to abort(3) at options parsing stage, if 'security' flag
is set to high(1) and continue further if it is low(0).
* ie. for each option we'd need do define if it is safe or not?
Does that seem right? OR do we maintain a run time list of features/options
deemed to be safe? Either way, we need to define some place, which QEMU
functions/devices/backends etc. are safe.
Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
8685 545E B54C 486B C6EB 271E E285 8B5A F050 DE8D
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-14 13:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-14 8:36 [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add security quotient field P J P
2020-07-14 8:36 ` [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or " P J P
2020-07-14 9:42 ` Peter Maydell
2020-07-14 9:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:12 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 10:22 ` Peter Maydell
2020-07-14 11:02 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 13:10 ` P J P [this message]
2020-07-16 6:55 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16 8:36 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 9:21 ` P J P
2020-07-16 9:39 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 9:45 ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-16 10:01 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 12:22 ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-16 12:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:30 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:48 ` Kevin Wolf
2020-07-14 13:56 ` Thomas Huth
2020-07-14 15:04 ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-14 14:02 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:18 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-07-14 11:51 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16 8:56 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-16 9:44 ` P J P
2020-07-16 10:09 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 10:43 ` Markus Armbruster
2020-07-14 9:46 ` [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add " Michael S. Tsirkin
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