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From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
To: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
	"Paul Walmsley" <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Palmer Dabbelt" <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	"Albert Ou" <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	"Conor Dooley" <conor@kernel.org>,
	"Rob Herring" <robh@kernel.org>,
	"Krzysztof Kozlowski" <krzk+dt@kernel.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Conor Dooley" <conor+dt@kernel.org>,
	"Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	"Alex Gaynor" <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>,
	"Boqun Feng" <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	"Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
	"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
	"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@kernel.org>,
	"Alice Ryhl" <aliceryhl@google.com>,
	"Trevor Gross" <tmgross@umich.edu>,
	"Benno Lossin" <lossin@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	 devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	 alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
	jim.shu@sifive.com,  andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com,
	charlie@rivosinc.com,  atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com,
	cleger@rivosinc.com,  alexghiti@rivosinc.com,
	samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org,
	 rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,
	 Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>, Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Subject: [PATCH v18 12/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2025 12:46:17 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250711-v5_user_cfi_series-v18-12-a8ee62f9f38e@rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250711-v5_user_cfi_series-v18-0-a8ee62f9f38e@rivosinc.com>

Implement architecture agnostic prctls() interface for setting and getting
shadow stack status.

prctls implemented are PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS,
PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS and PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS.

As part of PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS/PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, only
PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE is implemented because RISCV allows each mode to
write to their own shadow stack using `sspush` or `ssamoswap`.

PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS locks current configuration of shadow stack
enabling.

Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
---
 arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h |  16 ++++++
 arch/riscv/kernel/process.c      |   8 +++
 arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c      | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 134 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h
index 0c81cc9a2b6d..f747ad469c7c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
 
 struct task_struct;
 struct kernel_clone_args;
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ struct kernel_clone_args;
 #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI
 struct cfi_state {
 	unsigned long ubcfi_en : 1; /* Enable for backward cfi. */
+	unsigned long ubcfi_locked : 1;
 	unsigned long user_shdw_stk; /* Current user shadow stack pointer */
 	unsigned long shdw_stk_base; /* Base address of shadow stack */
 	unsigned long shdw_stk_size; /* size of shadow stack */
@@ -26,6 +28,12 @@ void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr, unsigned
 unsigned long get_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *size);
 void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr);
 bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task);
+bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task);
+bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task);
+void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task);
+void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable);
+
+#define PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK (PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE)
 
 #else
 
@@ -41,6 +49,14 @@ bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task);
 
 #define is_shstk_enabled(task) false
 
+#define is_shstk_locked(task) false
+
+#define is_shstk_allocated(task) false
+
+#define set_shstk_lock(task) do {} while (0)
+
+#define set_shstk_status(task, enable) do {} while (0)
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
index 2d009cfc09e8..a449218f174f 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
@@ -156,6 +156,14 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
 	regs->epc = pc;
 	regs->sp = sp;
 
+	/*
+	 * clear shadow stack state on exec.
+	 * libc will set it later via prctl.
+	 */
+	set_shstk_status(current, false);
+	set_shstk_base(current, 0, 0);
+	set_active_shstk(current, 0);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
 	regs->status &= ~SR_UXL;
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
index ec3d78efd6f3..08620bdae696 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
 	return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en;
 }
 
+bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base;
+}
+
+bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked;
+}
+
 void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr, unsigned long size)
 {
 	task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base = shstk_addr;
@@ -42,6 +52,26 @@ void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr)
 	task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk = shstk_addr;
 }
 
+void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable)
+{
+	if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack())
+		return;
+
+	task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en = enable ? 1 : 0;
+
+	if (enable)
+		task->thread.envcfg |= ENVCFG_SSE;
+	else
+		task->thread.envcfg &= ~ENVCFG_SSE;
+
+	csr_write(CSR_ENVCFG, task->thread.envcfg);
+}
+
+void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked = 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * If size is 0, then to be compatible with regular stack we want it to be as big as
  * regular stack. Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back
@@ -261,3 +291,83 @@ void shstk_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	vm_munmap(base, size);
 	set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0);
 }
+
+int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *status)
+{
+	unsigned long bcfi_status = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack())
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* this means shadow stack is enabled on the task */
+	bcfi_status |= (is_shstk_enabled(t) ? PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE : 0);
+
+	return copy_to_user(status, &bcfi_status, sizeof(bcfi_status)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
+}
+
+int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status)
+{
+	unsigned long size = 0, addr = 0;
+	bool enable_shstk = false;
+
+	if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack())
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Reject unknown flags */
+	if (status & ~PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* bcfi status is locked and further can't be modified by user */
+	if (is_shstk_locked(t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	enable_shstk = status & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE;
+	/* Request is to enable shadow stack and shadow stack is not enabled already */
+	if (enable_shstk && !is_shstk_enabled(t)) {
+		/* shadow stack was allocated and enable request again
+		 * no need to support such usecase and return EINVAL.
+		 */
+		if (is_shstk_allocated(t))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		size = calc_shstk_size(0);
+		addr = allocate_shadow_stack(0, size, 0, false);
+		if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_shstk_base(t, addr, size);
+		set_active_shstk(t, addr + size);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If a request to disable shadow stack happens, let's go ahead and release it
+	 * Although, if CLONE_VFORKed child did this, then in that case we will end up
+	 * not releasing the shadow stack (because it might be needed in parent). Although
+	 * we will disable it for VFORKed child. And if VFORKed child tries to enable again
+	 * then in that case, it'll get entirely new shadow stack because following condition
+	 * are true
+	 *  - shadow stack was not enabled for vforked child
+	 *  - shadow stack base was anyways pointing to 0
+	 * This shouldn't be a big issue because we want parent to have availability of shadow
+	 * stack whenever VFORKed child releases resources via exit or exec but at the same
+	 * time we want VFORKed child to break away and establish new shadow stack if it desires
+	 *
+	 */
+	if (!enable_shstk)
+		shstk_release(t);
+
+	set_shstk_status(t, enable_shstk);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *task,
+				  unsigned long arg)
+{
+	/* If shtstk not supported or not enabled on task, nothing to lock here */
+	if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack() ||
+	    !is_shstk_enabled(task) || arg != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	set_shstk_lock(task);
+
+	return 0;
+}

-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-07-11 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-11 19:46 [PATCH v18 00/27] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 01/27] mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 02/27] dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml) Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 03/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 04/27] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 05/27] riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 06/27] riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 07/27] riscv/mm: manufacture shadow stack pte Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 08/27] riscv/mm: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 09/27] riscv/mm: write protect and shadow stack Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 10/27] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 11/27] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` Deepak Gupta [this message]
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 13/27] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 14/27] riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 15/27] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception and uprobe handling Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 16/27] riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 17/27] riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 18/27] riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 19/27] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 20/27] riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 21/27] riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 22/27] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 23/27] arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad and shadow stack note Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 24/27] riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 25/27] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 26/27] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 19:46 ` [PATCH v18 27/27] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi Deepak Gupta
2025-07-11 20:25 ` [PATCH v18 00/27] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode Deepak Gupta

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