public inbox for rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>
To: "Alistair Francis" <alistair23@gmail.com>,
	"Jonathan Cameron" <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: <bhelgaas@google.com>, <lukas@wunner.de>,
	<rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	<linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>,
	<benno.lossin@proton.me>, <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	<a.hindborg@kernel.org>, <gary@garyguo.net>,
	<bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>, <tmgross@umich.edu>,
	<ojeda@kernel.org>, <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com>,
	<aliceryhl@google.com>,
	"Alistair Francis" <alistair@alistair23.me>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 16/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_certificate
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 14:19:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <DHGZXDPKEDAU.1DX1Z6U87O8XS@garyguo.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKmqyKNrP6Ap-0Jy-uaYKM=7W3Fiz8WtdG=JWV4ACv=2weS5EQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue Mar 31, 2026 at 3:37 AM BST, Alistair Francis wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 4, 2026 at 12:51 AM Jonathan Cameron
> <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 11 Feb 2026 13:29:23 +1000
>> alistair23@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> > From: Alistair Francis <alistair@alistair23.me>
>> >
>> > Support the GET_CERTIFICATE SPDM command.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair@alistair23.me>
>>
>> Minor things inline. The endian handling in general needs
>> some care + possibly some tests.
>>
>> > diff --git a/lib/rspdm/state.rs b/lib/rspdm/state.rs
>> > index 2606b825c494..1e5656144611 100644
>> > --- a/lib/rspdm/state.rs
>> > +++ b/lib/rspdm/state.rs
>> > @@ -26,8 +26,9 @@
>> >      SPDM_REQ, SPDM_RSP_MIN_CAPS, SPDM_SLOTS, SPDM_VER_10, SPDM_VER_11, SPDM_VER_12,
>> >  };
>>
>> >  impl SpdmState {
>> >      pub(crate) fn new(
>> >          dev: *mut bindings::device,
>> > @@ -620,4 +629,118 @@ pub(crate) fn get_digests(&mut self) -> Result<(), Error> {
>> >
>> >          Ok(())
>> >      }
>> > +
>> > +    fn get_cert_exchange(
>> > +        &mut self,
>> > +        request_buf: &mut [u8],
>> > +        response_vec: &mut KVec<u8>,
>> > +        rsp_sz: usize,
>> > +    ) -> Result<&mut GetCertificateRsp, Error> {
>> > +        // SAFETY: `request` is repr(C) and packed, so we can convert it to a slice
>> > +        let response_buf = unsafe { from_raw_parts_mut(response_vec.as_mut_ptr(), rsp_sz) };
>> > +
>> > +        let rc = self.spdm_exchange(request_buf, response_buf)?;
>> > +
>> > +        if rc < (core::mem::size_of::<GetCertificateReq>() as i32) {
>> > +            pr_err!("Truncated certificate response\n");
>> > +            to_result(-(bindings::EIO as i32))?;
>> > +        }
>> > +
>> > +        // SAFETY: `rc` is the length of data read, which will be smaller
>> > +        // then the capacity of the vector
>> > +        unsafe { response_vec.inc_len(rc as usize) };
>> > +
>> > +        let response: &mut GetCertificateRsp = Untrusted::new_mut(response_vec).validate_mut()?;
>> > +
>> > +        if rc
>> > +            < (core::mem::size_of::<GetCertificateRsp>() + response.portion_length as usize) as i32
>>
>> As below, I'd keep the type matching the spec and have the little endian to cpu conversion out here.
>>
>>
>> > +        {
>> > +            pr_err!("Truncated certificate response\n");
>> > +            to_result(-(bindings::EIO as i32))?;
>> > +        }
>> > +
>> > +        Ok(response)
>> > +    }
>> > +
>> > +    pub(crate) fn get_certificate(&mut self, slot: u8) -> Result<(), Error> {
>> > +        let mut request = GetCertificateReq::default();
>> > +        request.version = self.version;
>> > +        request.param1 = slot;
>> > +
>> > +        let req_sz = core::mem::size_of::<GetCertificateReq>();
>> > +        let rsp_sz = ((core::mem::size_of::<GetCertificateRsp>() + 0xffff) as u32)
>>
>> Similar to earlier comment, do we have U16_MAX or similar available?
>>
>> > +            .min(self.transport_sz) as usize;
>> > +
>> > +        request.offset = 0;
>>
>> That's the default, so worth setting here?
>
> I like being explicit :)
>
>>
>> > +        request.length = (rsp_sz - core::mem::size_of::<GetCertificateRsp>()).to_le() as u16;
>>
>> Why store it in a u16 if it is le16?
>
> core::mem::size_of gives us a usize. So this ensures it's little
> endian then casts it to a u16.

This is broken code then.

In BE architectures, `.to_le()` flips the bytes around, and you do the truncation
*after* the byteswap, which would give you 0.

You'd need ((...) as u16).to_le()

Best,
Gary

>
> We could cast it to a __le16. u16 is a standard Rust type (compared to
> __le16 which is a internal kernel type), so I prefer u16 as it matches
> other Rust implementations.
>
>>
>> > +
>> > +        // SAFETY: `request` is repr(C) and packed, so we can convert it to a slice
>> > +        let request_buf = unsafe { from_raw_parts_mut(&mut request as *mut _ as *mut u8, req_sz) };
>> > +
>> > +        let mut response_vec: KVec<u8> = KVec::with_capacity(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL)?;
>> > +
>> > +        let response = self.get_cert_exchange(request_buf, &mut response_vec, rsp_sz)?;
>> > +
>> > +        let total_cert_len =
>> > +            ((response.portion_length + response.remainder_length) & 0xFFFF) as usize;
>> > +
>> > +        let mut certs_buf: KVec<u8> = KVec::new();
>> > +
>> > +        certs_buf.extend_from_slice(
>> > +            &response_vec[8..(8 + response.portion_length as usize)],
>> > +            GFP_KERNEL,
>> > +        )?;
>> > +
>> > +        let mut offset: usize = response.portion_length as usize;
>> > +        let mut remainder_length = response.remainder_length as usize;
>> > +
>> > +        while remainder_length > 0 {
>> > +            request.offset = offset.to_le() as u16;
>>
>> Similar to other places, why not just make the type __le16
>> and avoid need to cast.
>
> Same as above
>
>>
>> > +            request.length = (remainder_length
>> > +                .min(rsp_sz - core::mem::size_of::<GetCertificateRsp>()))
>> > +            .to_le() as u16;
>>
>> Likewise.
>
> and above
>
>>
>> > +
>> > +            let request_buf =
>> > +                unsafe { from_raw_parts_mut(&mut request as *mut _ as *mut u8, req_sz) };
>> > +
>> > +            let response = self.get_cert_exchange(request_buf, &mut response_vec, rsp_sz)?;
>> > +
>> > +            if response.portion_length == 0
>> > +                || (response.param1 & 0xF) != slot
>> > +                || offset as u16 + response.portion_length + response.remainder_length
>> > +                    != total_cert_len as u16
>> > +            {
>> > +                pr_err!("Malformed certificate response\n");
>> > +                to_result(-(bindings::EPROTO as i32))?;
>> > +            }
>> > +
>> > +            certs_buf.extend_from_slice(
>> > +                &response_vec[8..(8 + response.portion_length as usize)],
>> > +                GFP_KERNEL,
>> > +            )?;
>> > +            offset += response.portion_length as usize;
>> > +            remainder_length = response.remainder_length as usize;
>> > +        }
>> > +
>> > +        let header_length = core::mem::size_of::<SpdmCertChain>() + self.hash_len;
>> > +
>> > +        let ptr = certs_buf.as_mut_ptr();
>> > +        // SAFETY: `SpdmCertChain` is repr(C) and packed, so we can convert it from a slice
>> > +        let ptr = ptr.cast::<SpdmCertChain>();
>> > +        // SAFETY: `ptr` came from a reference and the cast above is valid.
>> > +        let certs: &mut SpdmCertChain = unsafe { &mut *ptr };
>> > +
>> > +        if total_cert_len < header_length
>> > +            || total_cert_len != usize::from_le(certs.length as usize)
>>
>> That's a confusing bit of casting as you are interpretting an __le16 as a usize
>> before doing the endian conversion?  Seems unlikely to get what you want
>> on a big endian machine.
>
> Yeah, I think this is wrong
>
>>
>> > +            || total_cert_len != certs_buf.len()
>> > +        {
>> > +            pr_err!("Malformed certificate chain in slot {slot}\n");
>> > +            to_result(-(bindings::EPROTO as i32))?;
>> > +        }
>> > +
>> > +        self.certs[slot as usize].clear();
>> > +        self.certs[slot as usize].extend_from_slice(&certs_buf, GFP_KERNEL)?;
>> > +
>> > +        Ok(())
>> > +    }
>> >  }
>> > diff --git a/lib/rspdm/validator.rs b/lib/rspdm/validator.rs
>> > index 2150a23997db..a8bc3378676f 100644
>> > --- a/lib/rspdm/validator.rs
>> > +++ b/lib/rspdm/validator.rs
>> > @@ -17,8 +17,9 @@
>> >  };
>>
>> >  #[repr(C, packed)]
>> > @@ -364,3 +365,62 @@ fn validate(unvalidated: &mut Unvalidated<KVec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Err>
>> >          Ok(rsp)
>> >      }
>> >  }
>>
>> > +#[repr(C, packed)]
>> > +pub(crate) struct GetCertificateRsp {
>> > +    pub(crate) version: u8,
>> > +    pub(crate) code: u8,
>> > +    pub(crate) param1: u8,
>> > +    pub(crate) param2: u8,
>> > +
>> > +    pub(crate) portion_length: u16,
>> > +    pub(crate) remainder_length: u16,
>> > +
>> > +    pub(crate) cert_chain: __IncompleteArrayField<u8>,
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +impl Validate<&mut Unvalidated<KVec<u8>>> for &mut GetCertificateRsp {
>> > +    type Err = Error;
>> > +
>> > +    fn validate(unvalidated: &mut Unvalidated<KVec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
>> > +        let raw = unvalidated.raw_mut();
>> > +        if raw.len() < mem::size_of::<GetCertificateRsp>() {
>> > +            return Err(EINVAL);
>> > +        }
>> > +
>> > +        let ptr = raw.as_mut_ptr();
>> > +        // CAST: `GetCertificateRsp` only contains integers and has `repr(C)`.
>> > +        let ptr = ptr.cast::<GetCertificateRsp>();
>> > +        // SAFETY: `ptr` came from a reference and the cast above is valid.
>> > +        let rsp: &mut GetCertificateRsp = unsafe { &mut *ptr };
>> > +
>> > +        rsp.portion_length = rsp.portion_length.to_le();
>> > +        rsp.remainder_length = rsp.remainder_length.to_le();
>>
>> Why to_le()?  I can understand from_le() but then I'm a bit dubious about the
>> types. My gut feeling is that the validate code should leave these in little
>> endian and we should convert them only at time of use.
>
> Fixed
>
> Alistair
>
>>
>> > +
>> > +        Ok(rsp)
>> > +    }
>> > +}
>>


  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-31 13:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 110+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-11  3:29 [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 01/27] rust: add untrusted data abstraction alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 02/27] X.509: Make certificate parser public alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 03/27] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 04/27] X.509: Move certificate length retrieval into new helper alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 05/27] certs: Create blacklist keyring earlier alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 06/27] rust: add bindings for hash.h alistair23
2026-02-19 14:48   ` Gary Guo
2026-03-02 16:18   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 07/27] rust: error: impl From<FromBytesWithNulError> for Kernel Error alistair23
2026-02-19 14:49   ` Gary Guo
2026-03-13  2:20     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-13 10:35       ` Alice Ryhl
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 08/27] lib: rspdm: Initial commit of Rust SPDM alistair23
2026-03-02 17:09   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-13  3:44     ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 09/27] PCI/CMA: Authenticate devices on enumeration alistair23
2026-02-16  4:25   ` Aksh Garg
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 10/27] PCI/CMA: Validate Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 11/27] PCI/CMA: Reauthenticate devices on reset and resume alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 12/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_version alistair23
2026-02-11  4:00   ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-03 11:36   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-13  5:35     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-13  5:53       ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-13  5:55         ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-16 17:16       ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 13/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_capabilities alistair23
2026-02-11  4:08   ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-03 12:09   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-03 18:07     ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-20  4:32     ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 14/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM negotiate_algorithms alistair23
2026-03-03 13:46   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 15/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_digests alistair23
2026-03-03 14:29   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 16/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_certificate alistair23
2026-03-03 14:51   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-31  2:37     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-31 13:19       ` Gary Guo [this message]
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 17/27] crypto: asymmetric_keys - Load certificate parsing early in boot alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 18/27] KEYS: Load keyring and certificates " alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 19/27] PCI/CMA: Support built in X.509 certificates alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 20/27] crypto: sha: Load early in boot alistair23
2026-03-03 14:52   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 21/27] crypto: ecdsa: " alistair23
2026-03-03 14:54   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 22/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM certificate validation alistair23
2026-03-03 15:00   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-31  3:29     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-31 10:11       ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-04-01  1:48         ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-01 10:37           ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 23/27] rust: allow extracting the buffer from a CString alistair23
2026-02-19 14:50   ` Gary Guo
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 24/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM challenge alistair23
2026-03-03 16:54   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 25/27] PCI/CMA: Expose in sysfs whether devices are authenticated alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 26/27] rust: add bindings for hash_info alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 27/27] rspdm: Multicast received signatures via netlink alistair23
2026-02-19 10:19   ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-12  5:56 ` [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM dan.j.williams
2026-02-18  2:12   ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-09  3:39   ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-13  5:42     ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-17  2:35     ` Dan Williams
2026-04-17  4:34       ` Lukas Wunner
2026-04-17  5:20         ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-17 23:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-18  2:17   ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-18 23:40     ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19  0:56       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19  5:05         ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 12:41           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 14:15             ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 14:31               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 15:07                 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 17:39                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 20:07                     ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-20  8:30                     ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20 14:10                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-21 18:46                         ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-21 23:29                           ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-23 17:15                             ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-23 19:11                               ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-24 14:33                                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-05  4:17                                 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-05 12:48                                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-05 19:49                                     ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-09 11:39                                       ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 12:31                                         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 15:33                                           ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 15:59                                             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 18:00                                               ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 20:40                                                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 23:11                                                   ` DanX Williams
2026-02-24 14:16                           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-24 15:54                             ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-25 14:50                               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 14:40               ` Greg KH
2026-02-20  7:46                 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20  9:14                   ` Greg KH
2026-02-20 11:45                     ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20 11:57                       ` Greg KH
2026-02-19  9:34         ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 12:43           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 18:48           ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19  9:13       ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 18:42         ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 11:24   ` Jonathan Cameron

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=DHGZXDPKEDAU.1DX1Z6U87O8XS@garyguo.net \
    --to=gary@garyguo.net \
    --cc=a.hindborg@kernel.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alex.gaynor@gmail.com \
    --cc=aliceryhl@google.com \
    --cc=alistair23@gmail.com \
    --cc=alistair@alistair23.me \
    --cc=benno.lossin@proton.me \
    --cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
    --cc=bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com \
    --cc=boqun.feng@gmail.com \
    --cc=jonathan.cameron@huawei.com \
    --cc=linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lukas@wunner.de \
    --cc=ojeda@kernel.org \
    --cc=rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tmgross@umich.edu \
    --cc=wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox