From: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@proton.me>
To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Alex Gaynor" <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>,
"Wedson Almeida Filho" <wedsonaf@gmail.com>,
"Boqun Feng" <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
"Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@samsung.com>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>,
"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@android.com>,
"Martijn Coenen" <maco@android.com>,
"Joel Fernandes" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
"Carlos Llamas" <cmllamas@google.com>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] rust: uaccess: add userspace pointers
Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2024 20:40:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d0558622-c287-4efd-8ed9-0b2cf15d7c1a@proton.me> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240404-alice-mm-v4-1-49a84242cf02@google.com>
On 04.04.24 14:31, Alice Ryhl wrote:
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs b/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..3f8ad4dc13c4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs
> @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +//! Slices to user space memory regions.
> +//!
> +//! C header: [`include/linux/uaccess.h`](srctree/include/linux/uaccess.h)
> +
> +use crate::{bindings, error::code::*, error::Result};
> +use alloc::vec::Vec;
> +use core::ffi::{c_ulong, c_void};
> +use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
> +
> +/// A pointer to an area in userspace memory, which can be either read-only or
> +/// read-write.
> +///
> +/// All methods on this struct are safe: attempting to read or write on bad
> +/// addresses (either out of the bound of the slice or unmapped addresses) will
> +/// return `EFAULT`. Concurrent access, *including data races to/from userspace
> +/// memory*, is permitted, because fundamentally another userspace
> +/// thread/process could always be modifying memory at the same time (in the
> +/// same way that userspace Rust's [`std::io`] permits data races with the
> +/// contents of files on disk). In the presence of a race, the exact byte values
> +/// read/written are unspecified but the operation is well-defined. Kernelspace
> +/// code should validate its copy of data after completing a read, and not
> +/// expect that multiple reads of the same address will return the same value.
> +///
> +/// These APIs are designed to make it difficult to accidentally write TOCTOU
> +/// (time-of-check to time-of-use) bugs. Every time a memory location is read,
> +/// the reader's position is advanced by the read length and the next read will
> +/// start from there. This helps prevent accidentally reading the same location
> +/// twice and causing a TOCTOU bug.
> +///
> +/// Creating a [`UserSliceReader`] and/or [`UserSliceWriter`] consumes the
> +/// `UserSlice`, helping ensure that there aren't multiple readers or writers to
> +/// the same location.
> +///
> +/// If double-fetching a memory location is necessary for some reason, then that
> +/// is done by creating multiple readers to the same memory location, e.g. using
> +/// [`clone_reader`].
I think we should have consistent 100 column formatting. And not
something less.
> +///
> +/// # Examples
[...]
> + /// Reads raw data from the user slice into a kernel buffer.
> + ///
> + /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the read happens on a bad address.
> + pub fn read_raw(&mut self, out: &mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) -> Result {
> + let len = out.len();
> + let out_ptr = out.as_mut_ptr().cast::<c_void>();
> + if len > self.length {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + }
> + let Ok(len_ulong) = c_ulong::try_from(len) else {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + };
> + // SAFETY: The caller promises that `out` is valid for writing `len` bytes.
This comment needs updating.
> + let res = unsafe { bindings::copy_from_user(out_ptr, self.ptr, len_ulong) };
> + if res != 0 {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + }
> + // Userspace pointers are not directly dereferencable by the kernel, so
> + // we cannot use `add`, which has C-style rules for defined behavior.
> + self.ptr = self.ptr.wrapping_byte_add(len);
> + self.length -= len;
> + Ok(())
> + }
> +
> + /// Reads raw data from the user slice into a kernel buffer.
> + ///
> + /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the read happens on a bad address.
> + pub fn read_slice(&mut self, out: &mut [u8]) -> Result {
> + // SAFETY: The types are compatible and `read_raw` doesn't write
> + // uninitialized bytes to `out`.
Can you add this as a guarantee to `read_raw`?
> + let out = unsafe { &mut *(out as *mut [u8] as *mut [MaybeUninit<u8>]) };
> + self.read_raw(out)
> + }
> +
> + /// Reads the entirety of the user slice, appending it to the end of the
> + /// provided buffer.
> + ///
> + /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the read happens on a bad address.
> + pub fn read_all(mut self, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Result {
> + let len = self.length;
> + buf.try_reserve(len)?;
> +
> + // The call to `try_reserve` was successful, so the spare capacity is at
> + // least `len` bytes long.
> + self.read_raw(&mut buf.spare_capacity_mut()[..len])?;
> +
> + // SAFETY: Since the call to `read_raw` was successful, so the next
> + // `len` bytes of the vector have been initialized.
> + unsafe { buf.set_len(buf.len() + len) };
> + Ok(())
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/// A writer for [`UserSlice`].
> +///
> +/// Used to incrementally write into the user slice.
> +pub struct UserSliceWriter {
> + ptr: *mut c_void,
> + length: usize,
> +}
> +
> +impl UserSliceWriter {
> + /// Returns the amount of space remaining in this buffer.
> + ///
> + /// Note that even writing less than this number of bytes may fail.
> + pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
> + self.length
> + }
> +
> + /// Returns `true` if no more data can be written to this buffer.
> + pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
> + self.length == 0
> + }
> +
> + /// Writes raw data to this user pointer from a kernel buffer.
> + ///
> + /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the write happens on a bad address.
> + pub fn write_slice(&mut self, data: &[u8]) -> Result {
> + let len = data.len();
> + let data_ptr = data.as_ptr().cast::<c_void>();
> + if len > self.length {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + }
> + let Ok(len_ulong) = c_ulong::try_from(len) else {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + };
> + let res = unsafe { bindings::copy_to_user(self.ptr, data_ptr, len_ulong) };
Missing SAFETY comment.
--
Cheers,
Benno
> + if res != 0 {
> + return Err(EFAULT);
> + }
> + // Userspace pointers are not directly dereferencable by the kernel, so
> + // we cannot use `add`, which has C-style rules for defined behavior.
> + self.ptr = self.ptr.wrapping_byte_add(len);
> + self.length -= len;
> + Ok(())
> + }
> +}
>
> --
> 2.44.0.478.gd926399ef9-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-04 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-04 12:31 [PATCH v4 0/4] Memory management patches needed by Rust Binder Alice Ryhl
2024-04-04 12:31 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] rust: uaccess: add userspace pointers Alice Ryhl
2024-04-04 20:40 ` Benno Lossin [this message]
2024-04-04 12:31 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] uaccess: always export _copy_[from|to]_user with CONFIG_RUST Alice Ryhl
2024-04-04 12:31 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] rust: uaccess: add typed accessors for userspace pointers Alice Ryhl
2024-04-04 12:31 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] rust: add abstraction for `struct page` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-04 22:33 ` Benno Lossin
2024-04-05 7:44 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-07 8:58 ` Benno Lossin
2024-04-08 7:54 ` Alice Ryhl
2024-04-08 9:18 ` Miguel Ojeda
2024-04-08 9:26 ` Alice Ryhl
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