From: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH userspace] libsepol/cil: fix signed overflow caused by using (1 << 31) - 1
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 20:01:06 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201014180106.GA16337@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201003131908.1867282-1-nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
On Sat, Oct 03, 2020 at 03:19:08PM +0200, Nicolas Iooss wrote:
> When compiling SELinux userspace tools with -ftrapv (this option
> generates traps for signed overflow on addition, subtraction,
> multiplication operations, instead of silently wrapping around),
> semodule crashes when running the tests from
> scripts/ci/fedora-test-runner.sh in a Fedora 32 virtual machine:
>
> [root@localhost selinux-testsuite]# make test
> make -C policy load
> make[1]: Entering directory '/root/selinux-testsuite/policy'
> # Test for "expand-check = 0" in /etc/selinux/semanage.conf
> # General policy build
> make[2]: Entering directory '/root/selinux-testsuite/policy/test_policy'
> Compiling targeted test_policy module
> Creating targeted test_policy.pp policy package
> rm tmp/test_policy.mod.fc
> make[2]: Leaving directory '/root/selinux-testsuite/policy/test_policy'
> # General policy load
> domain_fd_use --> off
> /usr/sbin/semodule -i test_policy/test_policy.pp test_mlsconstrain.cil test_overlay_defaultrange.cil test_add_levels.cil test_glblub.cil
> make[1]: *** [Makefile:174: load] Aborted (core dumped)
>
> Using "coredumpctl gdb" leads to the following strack trace:
>
> (gdb) bt
> #0 0x00007f608fe4fa25 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
> #1 0x00007f608fe38895 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6
> #2 0x00007f6090028aca in __addvsi3.cold () from /lib64/libsepol.so.1
> #3 0x00007f6090096f59 in __avrule_xperm_setrangebits (low=30, high=30, xperms=0x8b9eea0)
> at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1551
> #4 0x00007f60900970dd in __cil_permx_bitmap_to_sepol_xperms_list (xperms=0xb650a30, xperms_list=0x7ffce2653b18)
> at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1596
> #5 0x00007f6090097286 in __cil_avrulex_ioctl_to_policydb (k=0xb8ec200 "@\023\214\022\006", datum=0xb650a30,
> args=0x239a640) at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1649
> #6 0x00007f609003f1e5 in hashtab_map (h=0x41f8710, apply=0x7f60900971da <__cil_avrulex_ioctl_to_policydb>,
> args=0x239a640) at hashtab.c:234
> #7 0x00007f609009ea19 in cil_binary_create_allocated_pdb (db=0x2394f10, policydb=0x239a640)
> at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:4969
> #8 0x00007f609009d19d in cil_binary_create (db=0x2394f10, policydb=0x7ffce2653d30) at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:4329
> #9 0x00007f609008ec23 in cil_build_policydb_create_pdb (db=0x2394f10, sepol_db=0x7ffce2653d30)
> at ../cil/src/cil.c:631
> #10 0x00007f608fff4bf3 in semanage_direct_commit () from /lib64/libsemanage.so.1
> #11 0x00007f608fff9fae in semanage_commit () from /lib64/libsemanage.so.1
> #12 0x0000000000403e2b in main (argc=7, argv=0x7ffce2655058) at semodule.c:753
>
> (gdb) f 3
> #3 0x00007f6090096f59 in __avrule_xperm_setrangebits (low=30, high=30, xperms=0x8b9eea0)
> at ../cil/src/cil_binary.c:1551
> 1551 xperms->perms[i] |= XPERM_SETBITS(h) - XPERM_SETBITS(low);
>
> A signed integer overflow therefore occurs in XPERM_SETBITS(h):
>
> #define XPERM_SETBITS(x) ((1 << (x & 0x1f)) - 1)
>
> This macro is expanded with h=31, so "(1 << 31) - 1" is computed:
>
> * (1 << 31) = -0x80000000 is the lowest signed 32-bit integer value
> * (1 << 31) - 1 overflows the capacity of a signed 32-bit integer and
> results in 0x7fffffff (which is unsigned)
>
> Using unsigned integers (with "1U") fixes the crash, as
> (1U << 31) = 0x80000000U has no overflowing issues.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Acked-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
> ---
> checkpolicy/policy_define.c | 2 +-
> libsepol/cil/src/cil_binary.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/checkpolicy/policy_define.c b/checkpolicy/policy_define.c
> index 395f62284e3c..bf6c3e68bef3 100644
> --- a/checkpolicy/policy_define.c
> +++ b/checkpolicy/policy_define.c
> @@ -2147,7 +2147,7 @@ out:
> /* index of the u32 containing the permission */
> #define XPERM_IDX(x) (x >> 5)
> /* set bits 0 through x-1 within the u32 */
> -#define XPERM_SETBITS(x) ((1 << (x & 0x1f)) - 1)
> +#define XPERM_SETBITS(x) ((1U << (x & 0x1f)) - 1)
> /* low value for this u32 */
> #define XPERM_LOW(x) (x << 5)
> /* high value for this u32 */
> diff --git a/libsepol/cil/src/cil_binary.c b/libsepol/cil/src/cil_binary.c
> index 36720eda4549..e417c5c28b8b 100644
> --- a/libsepol/cil/src/cil_binary.c
> +++ b/libsepol/cil/src/cil_binary.c
> @@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ int cil_avrule_to_policydb(policydb_t *pdb, const struct cil_db *db, struct cil_
> /* index of the u32 containing the permission */
> #define XPERM_IDX(x) (x >> 5)
> /* set bits 0 through x-1 within the u32 */
> -#define XPERM_SETBITS(x) ((1 << (x & 0x1f)) - 1)
> +#define XPERM_SETBITS(x) ((1U << (x & 0x1f)) - 1)
> /* low value for this u32 */
> #define XPERM_LOW(x) (x << 5)
> /* high value for this u32 */
> --
> 2.28.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-14 18:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-03 13:19 [PATCH userspace] libsepol/cil: fix signed overflow caused by using (1 << 31) - 1 Nicolas Iooss
2020-10-14 18:01 ` Petr Lautrbach [this message]
2020-10-15 17:27 ` Petr Lautrbach
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