From: "Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 1/9] policycoreutils: introduce unsetfiles
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 14:08:27 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240131130840.48155-2-cgzones@googlemail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240131130840.48155-1-cgzones@googlemail.com>
Introduce a helper to remove SELinux file security contexts.
Mainly for testing label operations, and only for SELinux disabled
systems, since removing file contexts is not supported by SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
---
v2:
move from libselinux/utils to policycoreutils and rename
---
policycoreutils/.gitignore | 1 +
policycoreutils/Makefile | 2 +-
policycoreutils/unsetfiles/Makefile | 26 ++++
policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.1 | 46 ++++++
policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 policycoreutils/unsetfiles/Makefile
create mode 100644 policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.1
create mode 100644 policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.c
diff --git a/policycoreutils/.gitignore b/policycoreutils/.gitignore
index 47c9cc52..33e7414c 100644
--- a/policycoreutils/.gitignore
+++ b/policycoreutils/.gitignore
@@ -9,4 +9,5 @@ setfiles/restorecon
setfiles/restorecon_xattr
setfiles/setfiles
setsebool/setsebool
+unsetfiles/unsetfiles
hll/pp/pp
diff --git a/policycoreutils/Makefile b/policycoreutils/Makefile
index b930b297..32ad0201 100644
--- a/policycoreutils/Makefile
+++ b/policycoreutils/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-SUBDIRS = setfiles load_policy newrole run_init secon sestatus semodule setsebool scripts po man hll
+SUBDIRS = setfiles load_policy newrole run_init secon sestatus semodule setsebool scripts po man hll unsetfiles
all install relabel clean indent:
@for subdir in $(SUBDIRS); do \
diff --git a/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/Makefile b/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9e5edc04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+PREFIX ?= /usr
+SBINDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/sbin
+MANDIR ?= $(PREFIX)/share/man
+
+override CFLAGS += -D_GNU_SOURCE
+override LDLIBS += -lselinux
+
+
+all: unsetfiles
+
+unsetfiles: unsetfiles.o
+
+install: all
+ test -d $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR) || install -m 755 -d $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)
+ test -d $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1 || install -m 755 -d $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1
+ install -m 755 unsetfiles $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)
+ install -m 644 unsetfiles.1 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man1/
+
+clean:
+ -rm -f unsetfiles *.o
+
+indent:
+ ../../scripts/Lindent $(wildcard *.[ch])
+
+relabel: install
+ /sbin/restorecon $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)/unsetfiles
diff --git a/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.1 b/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.1
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..49d0c821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.1
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+.TH UNSETFILES "1" "December 2023" "Security Enhanced Linux"
+.SH NAME
+unsetfiles \- Remove SELinux file security contexts.
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B unsetfiles
+.RB [ \-hnrvx ]
+.IR pathname \ ...
+
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.P
+This program removes the SELinux file security contexts of files. It can help
+cleaning extended file attributes after disabling SELinux.
+.P
+.B unsetfiles
+will only work on SELinux disabled systems, since removing file security
+contexts is not supported by SELinux.
+
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP
+.B \-h
+Show usage information and exit.
+.TP
+.B \-n
+Do not actually remove any SELinux file security contexts.
+.TP
+.B \-r
+Remove SELinux file security contexts recursive.
+.TP
+.B \-v
+Be verbose about performed actions.
+.TP
+.B \-x
+Do not cross filesystem boundaries.
+
+.SH ARGUMENTS
+.TP
+.IR pathname \ ...
+One or more path names to operate on.
+
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.BR restorecon (8),
+.BR setfiles (8)
+
+.SH AUTHORS
+.nf
+Christian Göttsche (cgzones@googlemail.com)
diff --git a/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.c b/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6293d00f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policycoreutils/unsetfiles/unsetfiles.c
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+
+
+#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX "security.selinux"
+
+
+static void usage(const char *progname)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-nrvx] <path>\n\n"
+ "Options:\n"
+ "\t-n\tdon't remove any file labels\n"
+ "\t-r\tremove labels recursive\n"
+ "\t-v\tbe verbose\n"
+ "\t-x\tdo not cross filesystem boundaries\n",
+ progname);
+}
+
+static void unset(int atfd, const char *path, const char *fullpath,
+ bool dry_run, bool recursive, bool verbose,
+ dev_t root_dev)
+{
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int fd, rc;
+ DIR *dir;
+
+ ret = lgetxattr(fullpath, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ if (errno != ENODATA && errno != ENOTSUP)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get SELinux label of %s: %m\n", fullpath);
+ else if (verbose)
+ printf("Failed to get SELinux label of %s: %m\n", fullpath);
+ } else {
+ if (dry_run) {
+ printf("Would remove SELinux label of %s\n", fullpath);
+ } else {
+ if (verbose)
+ printf("Removing label of %s\n", fullpath);
+
+ rc = lremovexattr(fullpath, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove SELinux label of %s: %m\n", fullpath);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!recursive)
+ return;
+
+ fd = openat(atfd, path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != ENOTDIR)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s: %m\n", fullpath);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (root_dev != (dev_t)-1) {
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ rc = fstat(fd, &sb);
+ if (rc == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to stat directory %s: %m\n", fullpath);
+ close(fd);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (sb.st_dev != root_dev) {
+ if (verbose)
+ printf("Skipping directory %s due to filesystem boundary\n", fullpath);
+
+ close(fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dir = fdopendir(fd);
+ if (!dir) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open directory %s: %m\n", fullpath);
+ close(fd);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while (true) {
+ const struct dirent *entry;
+ char *nextfullpath;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ entry = readdir(dir);
+ if (!entry) {
+ if (errno)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to iterate directory %s: %m\n", fullpath);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (entry->d_name[0] == '.' && (entry->d_name[1] == '\0' || (entry->d_name[1] == '.' && entry->d_name[2] == '\0')))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = asprintf(&nextfullpath, "%s/%s", strcmp(fullpath, "/") == 0 ? "" : fullpath, entry->d_name);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory!\n");
+ closedir(dir);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ unset(dirfd(dir), entry->d_name, nextfullpath, dry_run, recursive, verbose, root_dev);
+
+ free(nextfullpath);
+ }
+
+ closedir(dir);
+}
+
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ bool dry_run = false, recursive = false, verbose = false, same_dev = false;
+ int c;
+
+ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "hnrvx")) != -1) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case 'h':
+ usage(argv[0]);
+ return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+ case 'n':
+ dry_run = true;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ recursive = true;
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ verbose = true;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ same_dev = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage(argv[0]);
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (optind >= argc) {
+ usage(argv[0]);
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (is_selinux_enabled()) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Removing SELinux attributes on a SELinux enabled system is not supported!\n");
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ for (int index = optind; index < argc; index++) {
+ dev_t root_dev = (dev_t)-1;
+
+ if (same_dev) {
+ struct stat sb;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = stat(argv[index], &sb);
+ if (rc == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to stat %s: %m\n", argv[index]);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ root_dev = sb.st_dev;
+ }
+ unset(AT_FDCWD, argv[index], argv[index], dry_run, recursive, verbose, root_dev);
+ }
+
+ return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-31 13:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-31 13:08 [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] libselinux: rework selabel_file(5) database Christian Göttsche
2024-01-31 13:08 ` Christian Göttsche [this message]
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/9] libselinux/utils: introduce selabel_compare Christian Göttsche
2024-03-07 19:50 ` James Carter
2024-03-11 17:20 ` Christian Göttsche
2024-03-11 20:49 ` James Carter
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/9] libselinux: use more appropriate types in sidtab Christian Göttsche
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/9] libselinux: add unique id to sidtab entries Christian Göttsche
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/9] libselinux: sidtab updates Christian Göttsche
2024-03-07 20:53 ` James Carter
2024-03-11 16:32 ` Christian Göttsche
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/9] libselinux: rework selabel_file(5) database Christian Göttsche
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 7/9] libselinux: remove unused hashtab code Christian Göttsche
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 8/9] libselinux: add selabel_file(5) fuzzer Christian Göttsche
2024-01-31 13:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 9/9] libselinux: support parallel selabel_lookup(3) Christian Göttsche
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