From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: mertsas@cisco.com
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
omosnace@redhat.com,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH selinuxns 1/3] selinux: do not cache sblabel mount flag in superblock
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 10:46:45 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251118154647.14566-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> (raw)
Currently SELinux determines whether the superblock supports
security labeling at superblock creation time and caches it
as a SBLABEL_MNT flag in the superblock security blob. However,
with the introduciton of SELinux namespaces, this can change
within a child SELinux namespace due to a different value for
the cgroupseclabel policy capability in its policy. Stop
precomputing and caching this flag and instead check it on use.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 ++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7003a3f96ead..61171c45329f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -581,16 +581,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
- /*
- * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
- * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
- * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
- */
- if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
- sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
- else
- sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
-
/* Initialize the root inode. */
rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -1141,7 +1131,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
if (rc)
return rc;
}
- if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
+ if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) {
seq_putc(m, ',');
seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
}
@@ -1815,7 +1805,7 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
*_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
- } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
+ } else if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(dir->i_sb) &&
tsec->create_sid) {
*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
} else {
@@ -3023,7 +3013,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
if (!selinux_initialized(current_selinux_state) ||
- !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+ !selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(dir->i_sb))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (xattr) {
@@ -3454,7 +3444,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
- if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+ if (!selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(inode->i_sb))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
@@ -3730,7 +3720,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
- if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+ if (!selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(inode->i_sb))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!value || !size)
@@ -7105,7 +7095,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen
{
int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
ctx, ctxlen, 0);
- /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
+ /* Do not return error when suppressing label. */
return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index e3e0b1eb7575..c5df7a0b0069 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@
#define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02
#define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04
#define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08
-#define SBLABEL_MNT 0x10
/* Non-mount related flags */
#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100
#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200
--
2.51.1
next reply other threads:[~2025-11-18 15:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-18 15:46 Stephen Smalley [this message]
2025-11-18 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH selinuxns 2/3] selinux: do not cache genfs xattr flag in superblock security blob Stephen Smalley
2025-11-18 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH selinuxns 3/3] selinux: ignore invalid contexts in kernfs_init_security in child namespace Stephen Smalley
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