[PATCH v7] SELinux: Add support for BPF token access control

Eric Suen
2025-12-05T02:43:04Z

BPF token support was introduced to allow a privileged process to delegate
limited BPF functionality—such as map creation and program loading—to
an unprivileged process:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231130185229.2688956-1-andrii@kernel.org/

This patch adds SELinux support for controlling BPF token access. With
this change, SELinux policies can now enforce constraints on BPF token
usage based on both the delegating (privileged) process and the recipient
(unprivileged) process.

Supported operations currently include:
- map_create
- prog_load

High-level workflow:
1. An unprivileged process creates a VFS context via `fsopen()` and
obtains a file descriptor.
2. This descriptor is passed to a privileged process, which configures
BPF token delegation options and mounts a BPF filesystem.
3. SELinux records the `creator_sid` of the privileged process during
mount setup.
4. The unprivileged process then uses this BPF fs mount to create a
token and attach it to subsequent BPF syscalls.
5. During verification of `map_create` and `prog_load`, SELinux uses
`creator_sid` and the current SID to check policy permissions via:
avc_has_perm(creator_sid, current_sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL);

The implementation introduces two new permissions:
- map_create_as
- prog_load_as

At token creation time, SELinux verifies that the current process has the
appropriate `*_as` permission (depending on the `allowed_cmds` value in
the bpf_token) to act on behalf of the `creator_sid`.

Example SELinux policy:
allow test_bpf_t self:bpf {
map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run
map_create_as prog_load_as
};

Additionally, a new policy capability bpf_token_perms is added to ensure
backward compatibility. If disabled, previous behavior ((checks based on
current process SID)) is preserved.

Signed-off-by: Eric Suen <ericsu@linux.microsoft.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Fixed bug in selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(u32 fd) where it retrieved
creator_sid from wrong file descriptor
- Removed unnecessary checks for null, per review comments from
the first patch

Changes in v3:
- Removed check for 'sid == SECSID_NULL' in selinux_bpf_token_create and
allow it to fall through to the permission checks which will fail as
access denied to unlabeled_t

Changes in v4:
- Added initialization of creator_sid in selinux_sb_alloc_security
- Enabled handling of creator_sid in selinux_cmp_sb_context and
selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
- Minor updates based on review comments

Changes in v5:
- Moved to dev-staging branch instead of main
- Added implementation of selinux_bpf_token_capable which is originally
from Daniel's patch
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20250801154637.143931-1-danieldurning.work@gmail.com/

Changes in v6:
- Updated bpf_token_capable to use grantor_sid as object in permission
check

Changes in v7:
- Bug fix in selinux_bpf_token_capable where incorrect source sid
was used in avc_has_perm

security/selinux/hooks.c | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 3 +
security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 +
security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 +
security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ++
6 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c95a5874bf7d..ffae25a18bd9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -733,6 +733,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
goto out;
}

+ sbsec->creator_sid = current_sid();
+
if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;

@@ -902,6 +904,8 @@ static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
goto mismatch;
}
+ if (old->creator_sid != new->creator_sid)
+ goto mismatch;
return 0;
mismatch:
pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
@@ -961,6 +965,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
+ newsbsec->creator_sid = oldsbsec->creator_sid;

if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
@@ -2576,6 +2581,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sbsec->creator_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;

return 0;
}
@@ -7017,6 +7023,9 @@ static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;

+ if (selinux_policycap_bpf_token_perms())
+ return 0;
+
switch (cmd) {
case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
@@ -7098,10 +7107,29 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
}

+static u32 selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(u32 fd)
+{
+ struct path path;
+ struct super_block *sb;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+ CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
+
+ if (fd_empty(f))
+ return SECSID_NULL;
+
+ path = fd_file(f)->f_path;
+ sb = path.dentry->d_sb;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+
+ return sbsec->creator_sid;
+}
+
static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel)
{
struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+ u32 ssid;

bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bpfsec)
@@ -7110,7 +7138,12 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
map->security = bpfsec;

- return 0;
+ if (!token)
+ ssid = bpfsec->sid;
+ else
+ ssid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr->map_token_fd);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(ssid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL);
}

static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
@@ -7125,6 +7158,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel)
{
struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+ u32 ssid;

bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bpfsec)
@@ -7133,7 +7167,12 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
prog->aux->security = bpfsec;

- return 0;
+ if (!token)
+ ssid = bpfsec->sid;
+ else
+ ssid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr->prog_token_fd);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(ssid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, NULL);
}

static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
@@ -7144,18 +7183,47 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
kfree(bpfsec);
}

+#define bpf_token_cmd(T, C) \
+ ((T)->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << (C)))
+
static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
const struct path *path)
{
struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+ u32 sid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd);
+ int err;

bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bpfsec)
return -ENOMEM;

bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ bpfsec->grantor_sid = sid;
token->security = bpfsec;

+ bpfsec->perms = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * 'token->allowed_cmds' is a bit mask of allowed commands
+ * Convert the BPF command enum to a bitmask representing its position in the
+ * allowed_cmds bitmap.
+ */
+ if (bpf_token_cmd(token, BPF_MAP_CREATE)) {
+ err = avc_has_perm(bpfsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE_AS, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ bpfsec->perms |= BPF__MAP_CREATE;
+ }
+
+ if (bpf_token_cmd(token, BPF_PROG_LOAD)) {
+ err = avc_has_perm(bpfsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD_AS, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ bpfsec->perms |= BPF__PROG_LOAD;
+ }
+
return 0;
}

@@ -7166,6 +7234,49 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
token->security = NULL;
kfree(bpfsec);
}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = token->security;
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+ if (!(bpfsec->perms & BPF__MAP_CREATE))
+ return -EACCES;
+ break;
+ case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+ if (!(bpfsec->perms & BPF__PROG_LOAD))
+ return -EACCES;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+ u16 sclass;
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+ bool initns = (token->userns == &init_user_ns);
+ u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+
+ switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+ case 0:
+ sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), bpfsec->grantor_sid, sclass, av, NULL);
+}
#endif

struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
@@ -7599,6 +7710,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_create, selinux_bpf_map_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_load, selinux_bpf_prog_load),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_create, selinux_bpf_token_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_cmd, selinux_bpf_token_cmd),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_capable, selinux_bpf_token_capable),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 5665aa5e7853..a6ed864af64c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "infiniband_endport", { "manage_subnet", NULL } },
{ "bpf",
{ "map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run",
- NULL } },
+ "map_create_as", "prog_load_as", NULL } },
{ "xdp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "mctp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "perf_event",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 1d7ac59015a1..c1b223e012b4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */
u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */
u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
+ u32 creator_sid; /* SID of privileged process */
unsigned short behavior; /* labeling behavior */
unsigned short flags; /* which mount options were specified */
struct mutex lock;
@@ -164,6 +165,8 @@ struct pkey_security_struct {

struct bpf_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of bpf obj creator */
+ u32 perms; /* allowed AV permissions, e.g. BPF__MAP_CREATE, for requested bpf commands */
+ u32 grantor_sid; /* SID of privileged process used for permission check */
};

struct perf_event_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
index 7405154e6c42..cde6aaf442cd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {
POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM,
POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD,
POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD,
+ POLICYDB_CAP_BPF_TOKEN_PERMS,
__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
};
#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
index d8962fcf2ff9..cd5e73f992ea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
"netlink_xperm",
"netif_wildcard",
"genfs_seclabel_wildcard",
+ "bpf_token_perms",
};
/* clang-format on */

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 8201e6a3ac0f..d3832e4ad4fb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -209,6 +209,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netif_wildcard(void)
selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD]);
}

+static inline bool selinux_policycap_bpf_token_perms(void)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(
+ selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_BPF_TOKEN_PERMS]);
+}
+
struct selinux_policy_convert_data;

struct selinux_load_state {
--
2.50.1