Re: [PATCH v4] libsepol, checkpolicy: remove use of hardcoded security class values

[Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>]

Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> writes:

> On 1/26/20 5:57 AM, Petr Lautrbach wrote:
>>
>> Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> writes:
>>
>>> libsepol carried its own (outdated) copy of flask.h with the generated
>>> security class and initial SID values for use by the policy
>>> compiler and the forked copy of the security server code
>>> leveraged by tools such as audit2why.  Convert libsepol and
>>> checkpolicy entirely to looking up class values from the policy,
>>> remove the SECCLASS_* definitions from its flask.h header, and move
>>> the header with its remaining initial SID definitions private to
>>> libsepol.  While we are here, fix the sepol_compute_sid() logic to
>>> properly support features long since added to the policy and kernel,
>>> although there are no users of it other than checkpolicy -d (debug)
>>> and it is not exported to users of the shared library.  There
>>> are still some residual differences between the kernel logic and
>>> libsepol.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>>
>>
>> The only problem I found running tests on this is related to SETools
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/pull/200#issuecomment-577745225
>>
>> Acked-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
>
> Thanks.  I guess the question is whether we should wait to merge it until
> setools has a corresponding fix ready or go ahead.

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/setools/issues/39

Lets wait until there's a response from Christopher.

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