[PATCH v2 00/14] stackleak: Support Clang stack depth tracking

[PATCH v2 00/14] stackleak: Support Clang stack depth tracking

[Kees Cook]

 v2:
  - rename stackleak to kstack_erase (mingo)
  - address __init vs inline with KCOV changes
 v1:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250507180852.work.231-kees@kernel.org/
 RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250502185834.work.560-kees@kernel.org/

Hi,

As part of looking at what GCC plugins could be replaced with Clang
implementations, this series uses the recently landed stack depth tracking
callback in Clang[1] to implement the stackleak feature. Since the Clang
feature is now landed, I'm moving this out of RFC to a v1.

Since this touches a lot of arch-specific Makefiles, I tried to trim
the CC list down to just mailing lists in those cases, otherwise the CC
was giant.

Thanks!

-Kees

[1] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/SanitizerCoverage.html#tracing-stack-depth

Kees Cook (14):
  stackleak: Rename STACKLEAK to KSTACK_ERASE
  stackleak: Rename stackleak_track_stack to __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth
  stackleak: Split KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS
  x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  arm: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  arm64: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  s390: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  powerpc: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  mips: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  loongarch: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
  init.h: Disable sanitizer coverage for __init and __head
  kstack_erase: Support Clang stack depth tracking
  configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
  configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON

 arch/Kconfig                                  |  4 +-
 arch/arm/Kconfig                              |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                            |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                            |  2 +-
 arch/s390/Kconfig                             |  2 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  2 +-
 security/Kconfig.hardening                    | 45 +++++++++-------
 Makefile                                      |  1 +
 arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile             |  2 +-
 arch/arm/vdso/Makefile                        |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile               |  3 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile              |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile                      |  3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                  |  3 +-
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile                   |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile         |  8 +--
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile                   |  2 +-
 kernel/Makefile                               | 10 ++--
 lib/Makefile                                  |  2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins                  | 16 +-----
 scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase                 | 21 ++++++++
 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c        | 52 +++++++++----------
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst   |  4 +-
 Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst          |  2 +-
 Documentation/security/self-protection.rst    |  2 +-
 .../zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst        |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/acpi.h                 |  2 +-
 arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h              |  2 +-
 arch/mips/include/asm/time.h                  |  2 +-
 arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs.h                       |  2 +-
 arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.h                  |  2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                      |  4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h                   |  4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/init.h                   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h               |  2 +-
 include/linux/acpi.h                          |  4 +-
 include/linux/bootconfig.h                    |  2 +-
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  2 +-
 include/linux/init.h                          |  4 +-
 include/linux/{stackleak.h => kstack_erase.h} | 20 +++----
 include/linux/memblock.h                      |  2 +-
 include/linux/mfd/dbx500-prcmu.h              |  2 +-
 include/linux/sched.h                         |  4 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S                |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S                     |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/entry.S                      |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/cache-feroceon-l2.c               |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/cache-tauros2.c                   |  2 +-
 arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c                  |  2 +-
 arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c                   |  4 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c         |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c      |  2 +-
 arch/s390/mm/init.c                           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                         |  2 +-
 drivers/clocksource/timer-orion.c             |  2 +-
 .../lkdtm/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c}     | 26 +++++-----
 drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c          |  4 +-
 drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c                       |  2 +-
 fs/proc/base.c                                |  6 +--
 kernel/fork.c                                 |  2 +-
 kernel/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c}        | 22 ++++----
 tools/objtool/check.c                         |  4 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config          |  2 +-
 MAINTAINERS                                   |  6 ++-
 kernel/configs/hardening.config               |  6 +++
 69 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 171 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
 rename include/linux/{stackleak.h => kstack_erase.h} (81%)
 rename drivers/misc/lkdtm/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} (89%)
 rename kernel/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} (87%)

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 01/14] stackleak: Rename STACKLEAK to KSTACK_ERASE

[Kees Cook]

In preparation for adding Clang sanitizer coverage stack depth tracking
that can support stack depth callbacks:

- Add the new top-level CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE option which will be
  implemented either with the stackleak GCC plugin, or with the Clang
  stack depth callback support.
- Rename CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK as needed to CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE,
  but keep it for anything specific to the GCC plugin itself.
- Rename all exposed "STACKLEAK" names and files to "KSTACK_ERASE" (named
  for what it does rather than what it protects against), but leave as
  many of the internals alone as possible to avoid even more churn.

While here, also split "prev_lowest_stack" into CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS,
since that's the only place it is referenced from.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: <kvmarm@lists.linux.dev>
Cc: <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
---
 arch/Kconfig                                  |  4 +--
 arch/arm/Kconfig                              |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                            |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                            |  2 +-
 arch/s390/Kconfig                             |  2 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  2 +-
 security/Kconfig.hardening                    | 36 ++++++++++---------
 arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile             |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile              |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile                   |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile         |  8 ++---
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile                   |  2 +-
 kernel/Makefile                               | 10 +++---
 lib/Makefile                                  |  2 +-
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins                  |  6 ++--
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst   |  4 +--
 Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst          |  2 +-
 Documentation/security/self-protection.rst    |  2 +-
 .../zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                      |  4 +--
 include/linux/{stackleak.h => kstack_erase.h} | 18 +++++-----
 include/linux/sched.h                         |  4 ++-
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S                |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S                     |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/entry.S                      |  2 +-
 .../lkdtm/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c}     | 26 +++++++-------
 fs/proc/base.c                                |  6 ++--
 kernel/fork.c                                 |  2 +-
 kernel/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c}        | 18 +++++-----
 tools/objtool/check.c                         |  2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config          |  2 +-
 MAINTAINERS                                   |  4 +--
 36 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
 rename include/linux/{stackleak.h => kstack_erase.h} (85%)
 rename drivers/misc/lkdtm/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} (89%)
 rename kernel/{stackleak.c => kstack_erase.c} (90%)

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index a3308a220f86..4d1908f6f084 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -630,11 +630,11 @@ config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
+config HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	bool
 	help
 	  An architecture should select this if it has the code which
-	  fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON
+	  fills the used part of the kernel stack with the KSTACK_ERASE_POISON
 	  value before returning from system calls.
 
 config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 3072731fe09c..cb0b2e2211ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER if AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT
-	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if ARM_LPAE
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 55fc331af337..e2a9e013b6a9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -187,12 +187,12 @@ config ARM64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN if EXPERT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index fbca724302ab..31792e0e0bf6 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -133,13 +133,13 @@ config RISCV
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if MMU && 64BIT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if MMU && 64BIT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE if MMU && 64BIT
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !XIP_KERNEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB_QXFER_PKT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if 64BIT && MMU
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 0c16dc443e2f..a8e74ed8e3cc 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -176,10 +176,10 @@ config S390
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMSAN
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
-	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 340e5468980e..bc3708cad46b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -204,13 +204,13 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KMSAN			if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
-	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index fd1238753cad..125b35e2ef0f 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -82,10 +82,10 @@ choice
 
 endchoice
 
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+config KSTACK_ERASE
 	bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
 	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
-	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	help
 	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
 	  returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
 	  are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
 	  deploying it.
 
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	def_bool KSTACK_ERASE
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	help
 	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
 	   * https://grsecurity.net/
 	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
@@ -117,37 +121,37 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE
 	  instrumented. This is useful for comparing coverage between
 	  builds.
 
-config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
-	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
+config KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
+	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by KSTACK_ERASE"
 	default 100
 	range 0 4096
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	depends on KSTACK_ERASE
 	help
-	  The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
+	  The KSTACK_ERASE option instruments the kernel code for tracking
 	  the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
 	  It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
 	  a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
 	  If unsure, leave the default value 100.
 
-config STACKLEAK_METRICS
-	bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+config KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
+	bool "Show KSTACK_ERASE metrics in the /proc file system"
+	depends on KSTACK_ERASE
 	depends on PROC_FS
 	help
-	  If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
-	  the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
+	  If this is set, KSTACK_ERASE metrics for every task are available
+	  in the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
 	  shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
 	  previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
-	  can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
-	  your workloads.
+	  can be useful for estimating the KSTACK_ERASE performance impact
+	  for your workloads.
 
-config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+config KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE
 	bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
-	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	depends on KSTACK_ERASE
 	help
 	  This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
 	  runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
-	  CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
+	  CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE.
 
 config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
 	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
index d61369b1eabe..f9075edfd773 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ OBJS		=
 
 HEAD	= head.o
 OBJS	+= misc.o decompress.o
-CFLAGS_decompress.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+CFLAGS_decompress.o += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE)
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_UNCOMPRESS),y)
 OBJS	+= debug.o
 AFLAGS_head.o += -DDEBUG
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
index 4d11a8c29181..f440bf57b1a5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Copyright 2022 Google LLC
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	:= $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -fpie \
-		   -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+		   -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) \
 		   $(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) \
 		   $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) \
 		   -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
index a76522d63c3e..0b0a68b663d4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ asflags-y := -D__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__ -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
 ccflags-y := -D__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__ -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -D__DISABLE_TRACE_MMIO__
 ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector	\
 	     -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING	\
-	     $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+	     $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE)
 
 hostprogs := gen-hyprel
 HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -I$(objtree)/include
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile
index 81d69d45c06c..7dd15be69c90 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # This file was copied from arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile.
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	:= $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -fpie \
-		   -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+		   -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) \
 		   $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) \
 		   -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \
 		   -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h \
diff --git a/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile
index fb9c917c9b45..240592e3f5c2 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ targets += purgatory.ro purgatory.chk
 
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=medany -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss
-PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector -g0
 
 # Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index ebdfd7b84feb..e0a607a14e7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ targets += purgatory.ro purgatory.chk
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=small -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -g0
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fpic -fvisibility=hidden
-PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector
 
 # Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 6a0152858a2a..cdba14dde7d5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86)		+= -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ -std=gnu11 \
 
 # arm64 uses the full KBUILD_CFLAGS so it's necessary to explicitly
 # disable the stackleak plugin
-cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64)		+= -fpie $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64)		+= -fpie $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE) \
 				   -fno-unwind-tables -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM)		+= -DEFI_HAVE_STRLEN -DEFI_HAVE_STRNLEN \
 				   -DEFI_HAVE_MEMCHR -DEFI_HAVE_STRRCHR \
 				   -DEFI_HAVE_STRCMP -fno-builtin -fpic \
 				   $(call cc-option,-mno-single-pic-base) \
-				   $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+				   $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE)
 cflags-$(CONFIG_RISCV)		+= -fpic -DNO_ALTERNATIVE -mno-relax \
-				   $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
-cflags-$(CONFIG_LOONGARCH)	+= -fpie $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+				   $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE)
+cflags-$(CONFIG_LOONGARCH)	+= -fpie $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE)
 
 cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT)	+= -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
 
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
index 39468bd27b85..03ebe33185f9 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= perms.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= refcount.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= rodata_objcopy.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= usercopy.o
-lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= stackleak.o
+lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= kstack_erase.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= cfi.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= fortify.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_PPC_64S_HASH_MMU)	+= powerpc.o
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 32e80dd626af..e4f01f1d4d0c 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -139,11 +139,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE) += watch_queue.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_RESOURCE_KUNIT_TEST) += resource_kunit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL_KUNIT_TEST) += sysctl-test.o
 
-CFLAGS_stackleak.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
-obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak.o
-KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
-KCSAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
-KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackleak.o := n
+CFLAGS_kstack_erase.o += $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE)
+obj-$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE) += kstack_erase.o
+KASAN_SANITIZE_kstack_erase.o := n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_kstack_erase.o := n
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kstack_erase.o := n
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SCF_TORTURE_TEST) += scftorture.o
 
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index c38582f187dd..632e69d25feb 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan.o
 UBSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
 KCSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
-CFLAGS_ubsan.o := -fno-stack-protector $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+CFLAGS_ubsan.o := -fno-stack-protector $(DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE)
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o
 
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index 435ab3f0ec44..28b8867c4e84 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= stackleak_plugin.so
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
 		+= -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
-		+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
+		+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
 		+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-arch=$(SRCARCH)
 gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE)	\
 		+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-verbose
 ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-    DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
+    DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
 endif
-export DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN
+export DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE
 
 # All the plugin CFLAGS are collected here in case a build target needs to
 # filter them out of the KBUILD_CFLAGS.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index dd49a89a62d3..19224eeac1c2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ stack_erasing
 =============
 
 This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end
-of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``.
+of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE``.
 
 That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs
 can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
@@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
 compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary.
 
 = ====================================================================
-0 Kernel stack erasing is disabled, STACKLEAK_METRICS are not updated.
+0 Kernel stack erasing is disabled, KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS are not updated.
 1 Kernel stack erasing is enabled (default), it is performed before
   returning to the userspace at the end of syscalls.
 = ====================================================================
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst
index f2db178b353f..a6cf05d51bd8 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst
@@ -176,5 +176,5 @@ Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
 range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is
 correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
 
-For both 4- and 5-level layouts, the STACKLEAK_POISON value in the last 2MB
+For both 4- and 5-level layouts, the KSTACK_ERASE_POISON value in the last 2MB
 hole: ffffffffffff4111
diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
index 910668e665cb..a32ca23c21b0 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ Memory poisoning
 
 When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents, to avoid reuse
 attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a
-syscall return (``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a
+syscall return (``CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE``), wipe heap memory on a
 free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content
 exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks.
 
diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst
index 3c8a68b1e1be..93de9cee5c1a 100644
--- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst
+++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/self-protection.rst
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ KALLSYSM，则会直接打印原始地址。
 --------
 
 在释放内存时，最好对内存内容进行清除处理，以防止攻击者重用内存中以前
-的内容。例如，在系统调用返回时清除堆栈（CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK）,
+的内容。例如，在系统调用返回时清除堆栈（CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE）,
 在释放堆内容是清除其内容。这有助于防止许多未初始化变量攻击、堆栈内容
 泄露、堆内容泄露以及使用后释放攻击（user-after-free）。
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index d83236b96f22..94519688b007 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 .endm
 
 .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
 	call stackleak_erase
 	POP_REGS
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
 .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	call stackleak_erase
 #endif
 .endm
diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/kstack_erase.h
similarity index 85%
rename from include/linux/stackleak.h
rename to include/linux/kstack_erase.h
index 3be2cb564710..4e432eefa4d0 100644
--- a/include/linux/stackleak.h
+++ b/include/linux/kstack_erase.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef _LINUX_STACKLEAK_H
-#define _LINUX_STACKLEAK_H
+#ifndef _LINUX_KSTACK_ERASE_H
+#define _LINUX_KSTACK_ERASE_H
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@
  * Check that the poison value points to the unused hole in the
  * virtual memory map for your platform.
  */
-#define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
-#define STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH 128
+#define KSTACK_ERASE_POISON -0xBEEF
+#define KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH 128
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ stackleak_task_high_bound(const struct task_struct *tsk)
 static __always_inline unsigned long
 stackleak_find_top_of_poison(const unsigned long low, const unsigned long high)
 {
-	const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
+	const unsigned int depth = KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
 	unsigned int poison_count = 0;
 	unsigned long poison_high = high;
 	unsigned long sp = high;
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ stackleak_find_top_of_poison(const unsigned long low, const unsigned long high)
 	while (sp > low && poison_count < depth) {
 		sp -= sizeof(unsigned long);
 
-		if (*(unsigned long *)sp == STACKLEAK_POISON) {
+		if (*(unsigned long *)sp == KSTACK_ERASE_POISON) {
 			poison_count++;
 		} else {
 			poison_count = 0;
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ stackleak_find_top_of_poison(const unsigned long low, const unsigned long high)
 static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	t->lowest_stack = stackleak_task_low_bound(t);
-# ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
+# ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
 	t->prev_lowest_stack = t->lowest_stack;
 # endif
 }
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(void);
 asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void);
 void __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void);
 
-#else /* !CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK */
+#else /* !CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE */
 static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 8c60a42f9d00..9051d9484393 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1606,8 +1606,10 @@ struct task_struct {
 	/* Used by BPF for per-TASK xdp storage */
 	struct bpf_net_context		*bpf_net_context;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	unsigned long			lowest_stack;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
 	unsigned long			prev_lowest_stack;
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index f379c852dcb7..88336a1292bb 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ no_work_pending:
 
 	ct_user_enter save = 0
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	bl	stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
 #endif
 	restore_user_regs fast = 0, offset = 0
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 5ae2a34b50bd..67331437b2aa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_to_kernel)
 SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(ret_to_user)
 	ldr	x19, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]	// re-check for single-step
 	enable_step_tsk x19, x2
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	bl	stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
 #endif
 	kernel_exit 0
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
index af514614404a..49e2344007c8 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(ret_from_exception)
 #endif
 	bnez s0, 1f
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	call	stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
index 0f00f4b06d51..75b0fbb236d0 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ _LPP_OFFSET	= __LC_LPP
 #endif
 
 	.macro STACKLEAK_ERASE
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE
 	brasl	%r14,stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
 #endif
 	.endm
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/kstack_erase.c
similarity index 89%
rename from drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c
rename to drivers/misc/lkdtm/kstack_erase.c
index f1d022160913..4fd9b0bfb874 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/kstack_erase.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /*
  * This code tests that the current task stack is properly erased (filled
- * with STACKLEAK_POISON).
+ * with KSTACK_ERASE_POISON).
  *
  * Authors:
  *   Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@
  */
 
 #include "lkdtm.h"
-#include <linux/stackleak.h>
+#include <linux/kstack_erase.h>
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)
+#if defined(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE)
 /*
  * Check that stackleak tracks the lowest stack pointer and erases the stack
  * below this as expected.
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void noinstr check_stackleak_irqoff(void)
 	while (poison_low > task_stack_low) {
 		poison_low -= sizeof(unsigned long);
 
-		if (*(unsigned long *)poison_low == STACKLEAK_POISON)
+		if (*(unsigned long *)poison_low == KSTACK_ERASE_POISON)
 			continue;
 
 		instrumentation_begin();
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void noinstr check_stackleak_irqoff(void)
 	}
 
 	instrumentation_begin();
-	pr_info("stackleak stack usage:\n"
+	pr_info("kstack erase stack usage:\n"
 		"  high offset: %lu bytes\n"
 		"  current:     %lu bytes\n"
 		"  lowest:      %lu bytes\n"
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static void noinstr check_stackleak_irqoff(void)
 	instrumentation_end();
 }
 
-static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void)
+static void lkdtm_KSTACK_ERASE(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -129,19 +129,19 @@ static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void)
 	check_stackleak_irqoff();
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
-#else /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */
-static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void)
+#else /* defined(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE) */
+static void lkdtm_KSTACK_ERASE(void)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK)) {
-		pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n)\n");
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE)) {
+		pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE=n)\n");
 	} else {
-		pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)\n");
+		pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE=n)\n");
 	}
 }
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE) */
 
 static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
-	CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ERASING),
+	CRASHTYPE(KSTACK_ERASE),
 };
 
 struct crashtype_category stackleak_crashtypes = {
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c667702dc69b..be34612af8b6 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -3291,7 +3291,7 @@ static int proc_pid_ksm_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KSM */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
 static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 				struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
 {
@@ -3304,7 +3304,7 @@ static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 							prev_depth, depth);
 	return 0;
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS */
 
 /*
  * Thread groups
@@ -3411,7 +3411,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
 	ONE("patch_state",  S_IRUSR, proc_pid_patch_state),
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
 	ONE("stack_depth", S_IRUGO, proc_stack_depth),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 1ee8eb11f38b..1ec66911f6f6 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
 #include <linux/kcov.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
-#include <linux/stackleak.h>
+#include <linux/kstack_erase.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/scs.h>
 #include <linux/io_uring.h>
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/kstack_erase.c
similarity index 90%
rename from kernel/stackleak.c
rename to kernel/kstack_erase.c
index bb65321761b4..201b846f8345 100644
--- a/kernel/stackleak.c
+++ b/kernel/kstack_erase.c
@@ -6,14 +6,14 @@
  *
  * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
  *
- * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
+ * KSTACK_ERASE reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
  * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
  */
 
-#include <linux/stackleak.h>
+#include <linux/kstack_erase.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/string_choices.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
 #define skip_erasing()	static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
 #else
 #define skip_erasing()	false
-#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
 
 #ifndef __stackleak_poison
 static __always_inline void __stackleak_poison(unsigned long erase_low,
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(bool on_task_stack)
 	erase_low = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low,
 						 current->lowest_stack);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
 	current->prev_lowest_stack = erase_low;
 #endif
 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(bool on_task_stack)
 	else
 		erase_high = task_stack_high;
 
-	__stackleak_poison(erase_low, erase_high, STACKLEAK_POISON);
+	__stackleak_poison(erase_low, erase_high, KSTACK_ERASE_POISON);
 
 	/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
 	current->lowest_stack = task_stack_high;
@@ -161,11 +161,11 @@ void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
 	unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
 
 	/*
-	 * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
-	 * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
+	 * Having CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
+	 * KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
 	 * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
 	 */
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > KSTACK_ERASE_SEARCH_DEPTH);
 
 	/* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */
 	sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long));
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index b21b12ec88d9..31088a138bc9 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
 	"__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1",
 	"__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds",
 	"__ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value",
-	/* STACKLEAK */
+	/* KSTACK_ERASE */
 	"stackleak_track_stack",
 	/* TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING */
 	"ftrace_likely_update",
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config
index 7afe05e8c4d7..bd09fdaf53e0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ CONFIG_LKDTM=y
 CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
 CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
 CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
-CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
+CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE=y
 CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
 CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y
 CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 79a8e2c73908..9f76b329fdb3 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -9971,8 +9971,6 @@ L:	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/hardening
 F:	Documentation/kbuild/gcc-plugins.rst
-F:	include/linux/stackleak.h
-F:	kernel/stackleak.c
 F:	scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
 F:	scripts/gcc-plugins/
 
@@ -13060,10 +13058,12 @@ T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/har
 F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
 F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
 F:	arch/*/configs/hardening.config
+F:	include/linux/kstack_erase.h
 F:	include/linux/overflow.h
 F:	include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
 F:	include/linux/ucopysize.h
 F:	kernel/configs/hardening.config
+F:	kernel/kstack_erase.c
 F:	lib/tests/randstruct_kunit.c
 F:	lib/tests/usercopy_kunit.c
 F:	mm/usercopy.c
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 02/14] stackleak: Rename stackleak_track_stack to __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth

[Kees Cook]

The Clang stack depth tracking implementation has a fixed name for
the stack depth tracking callback, "__sanitizer_cov_stack_depth", so
rename the GCC plugin function to match since the plugin has no external
dependencies on naming.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
 security/Kconfig.hardening             |  4 +-
 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c | 52 +++++++++++++-------------
 include/linux/kstack_erase.h           |  2 +-
 kernel/kstack_erase.c                  |  4 +-
 tools/objtool/check.c                  |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 125b35e2ef0f..f7aa2024ab25 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ config KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
 	help
 	  The KSTACK_ERASE option instruments the kernel code for tracking
 	  the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
-	  It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
-	  a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
+	  It inserts the __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call for the functions
+	  with a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
 	  If unsure, leave the default value 100.
 
 config KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
index d20c47d21ad8..e486488c867d 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  * any of the gcc libraries
  *
  * This gcc plugin is needed for tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack.
- * It instruments the kernel code inserting stackleak_track_stack() calls:
+ * It instruments the kernel code inserting __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() calls:
  *  - after alloca();
  *  - for the functions with a stack frame size greater than or equal
  *     to the "track-min-size" plugin parameter.
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
 
 static int track_frame_size = -1;
 static bool build_for_x86 = false;
-static const char track_function[] = "stackleak_track_stack";
+static const char track_function[] = "__sanitizer_cov_stack_depth";
 static bool disable = false;
 static bool verbose = false;
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static void add_stack_tracking_gcall(gimple_stmt_iterator *gsi, bool after)
 	cgraph_node_ptr node;
 	basic_block bb;
 
-	/* Insert calling stackleak_track_stack() */
+	/* Insert calling __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() */
 	stmt = gimple_build_call(track_function_decl, 0);
 	gimple_call = as_a_gcall(stmt);
 	if (after)
@@ -120,12 +120,12 @@ static void add_stack_tracking_gasm(gimple_stmt_iterator *gsi, bool after)
 	gcc_assert(build_for_x86);
 
 	/*
-	 * Insert calling stackleak_track_stack() in asm:
-	 *   asm volatile("call stackleak_track_stack"
+	 * Insert calling __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() in asm:
+	 *   asm volatile("call __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth"
 	 *		  :: "r" (current_stack_pointer))
 	 * Use ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT trick from arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h.
 	 * This constraint is taken into account during gcc shrink-wrapping
-	 * optimization. It is needed to be sure that stackleak_track_stack()
+	 * optimization. It is needed to be sure that __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth()
 	 * call is inserted after the prologue of the containing function,
 	 * when the stack frame is prepared.
 	 */
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void add_stack_tracking_gasm(gimple_stmt_iterator *gsi, bool after)
 	input = build_tree_list(NULL_TREE, build_const_char_string(2, "r"));
 	input = chainon(NULL_TREE, build_tree_list(input, sp_decl));
 	vec_safe_push(inputs, input);
-	asm_call = gimple_build_asm_vec("call stackleak_track_stack",
+	asm_call = gimple_build_asm_vec("call __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth",
 					inputs, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 	gimple_asm_set_volatile(asm_call, true);
 	if (after)
@@ -151,11 +151,11 @@ static void add_stack_tracking(gimple_stmt_iterator *gsi, bool after)
 {
 	/*
 	 * The 'no_caller_saved_registers' attribute is used for
-	 * stackleak_track_stack(). If the compiler supports this attribute for
-	 * the target arch, we can add calling stackleak_track_stack() in asm.
+	 * __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth(). If the compiler supports this attribute for
+	 * the target arch, we can add calling __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() in asm.
 	 * That improves performance: we avoid useless operations with the
 	 * caller-saved registers in the functions from which we will remove
-	 * stackleak_track_stack() call during the stackleak_cleanup pass.
+	 * __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call during the stackleak_cleanup pass.
 	 */
 	if (lookup_attribute_spec(get_identifier("no_caller_saved_registers")))
 		add_stack_tracking_gasm(gsi, after);
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static void add_stack_tracking(gimple_stmt_iterator *gsi, bool after)
 
 /*
  * Work with the GIMPLE representation of the code. Insert the
- * stackleak_track_stack() call after alloca() and into the beginning
+ * __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call after alloca() and into the beginning
  * of the function if it is not instrumented.
  */
 static unsigned int stackleak_instrument_execute(void)
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static unsigned int stackleak_instrument_execute(void)
 					DECL_NAME_POINTER(current_function_decl));
 			}
 
-			/* Insert stackleak_track_stack() call after alloca() */
+			/* Insert __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call after alloca() */
 			add_stack_tracking(&gsi, true);
 			if (bb == entry_bb)
 				prologue_instrumented = true;
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static unsigned int stackleak_instrument_execute(void)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* Insert stackleak_track_stack() call at the function beginning */
+	/* Insert __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call at the function beginning */
 	bb = entry_bb;
 	if (!single_pred_p(bb)) {
 		/* gcc_assert(bb_loop_depth(bb) ||
@@ -270,15 +270,15 @@ static void remove_stack_tracking_gcall(void)
 	rtx_insn *insn, *next;
 
 	/*
-	 * Find stackleak_track_stack() calls. Loop through the chain of insns,
+	 * Find __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() calls. Loop through the chain of insns,
 	 * which is an RTL representation of the code for a function.
 	 *
 	 * The example of a matching insn:
-	 *  (call_insn 8 4 10 2 (call (mem (symbol_ref ("stackleak_track_stack")
-	 *  [flags 0x41] <function_decl 0x7f7cd3302a80 stackleak_track_stack>)
-	 *  [0 stackleak_track_stack S1 A8]) (0)) 675 {*call} (expr_list
-	 *  (symbol_ref ("stackleak_track_stack") [flags 0x41] <function_decl
-	 *  0x7f7cd3302a80 stackleak_track_stack>) (expr_list (0) (nil))) (nil))
+	 *  (call_insn 8 4 10 2 (call (mem (symbol_ref ("__sanitizer_cov_stack_depth")
+	 *  [flags 0x41] <function_decl 0x7f7cd3302a80 __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth>)
+	 *  [0 __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth S1 A8]) (0)) 675 {*call} (expr_list
+	 *  (symbol_ref ("__sanitizer_cov_stack_depth") [flags 0x41] <function_decl
+	 *  0x7f7cd3302a80 __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth>) (expr_list (0) (nil))) (nil))
 	 */
 	for (insn = get_insns(); insn; insn = next) {
 		rtx body;
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static void remove_stack_tracking_gcall(void)
 		if (SYMBOL_REF_DECL(body) != track_function_decl)
 			continue;
 
-		/* Delete the stackleak_track_stack() call */
+		/* Delete the __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call */
 		delete_insn_and_edges(insn);
 #if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION < 8000
 		if (GET_CODE(next) == NOTE &&
@@ -340,12 +340,12 @@ static bool remove_stack_tracking_gasm(void)
 	gcc_assert(build_for_x86);
 
 	/*
-	 * Find stackleak_track_stack() asm calls. Loop through the chain of
+	 * Find __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() asm calls. Loop through the chain of
 	 * insns, which is an RTL representation of the code for a function.
 	 *
 	 * The example of a matching insn:
 	 *  (insn 11 5 12 2 (parallel [ (asm_operands/v
-	 *  ("call stackleak_track_stack") ("") 0
+	 *  ("call __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth") ("") 0
 	 *  [ (reg/v:DI 7 sp [ current_stack_pointer ]) ]
 	 *  [ (asm_input:DI ("r")) ] [])
 	 *  (clobber (reg:CC 17 flags)) ]) -1 (nil))
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static bool remove_stack_tracking_gasm(void)
 			continue;
 
 		if (strcmp(ASM_OPERANDS_TEMPLATE(body),
-						"call stackleak_track_stack")) {
+						"call __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth")) {
 			continue;
 		}
 
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static bool remove_stack_tracking_gasm(void)
 
 /*
  * Work with the RTL representation of the code.
- * Remove the unneeded stackleak_track_stack() calls from the functions
+ * Remove the unneeded __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() calls from the functions
  * which don't call alloca() and don't have a large enough stack frame size.
  */
 static unsigned int stackleak_cleanup_execute(void)
@@ -474,13 +474,13 @@ static bool stackleak_gate(void)
 	return track_frame_size >= 0;
 }
 
-/* Build the function declaration for stackleak_track_stack() */
+/* Build the function declaration for __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() */
 static void stackleak_start_unit(void *gcc_data __unused,
 				 void *user_data __unused)
 {
 	tree fntype;
 
-	/* void stackleak_track_stack(void) */
+	/* void __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth(void) */
 	fntype = build_function_type_list(void_type_node, NULL_TREE);
 	track_function_decl = build_fn_decl(track_function, fntype);
 	DECL_ASSEMBLER_NAME(track_function_decl); /* for LTO */
diff --git a/include/linux/kstack_erase.h b/include/linux/kstack_erase.h
index 4e432eefa4d0..bf3bf1905557 100644
--- a/include/linux/kstack_erase.h
+++ b/include/linux/kstack_erase.h
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
 asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase(void);
 asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(void);
 asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void);
-void __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void);
+void __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth(void);
 
 #else /* !CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE */
 static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { }
diff --git a/kernel/kstack_erase.c b/kernel/kstack_erase.c
index 201b846f8345..e49bb88b4f0a 100644
--- a/kernel/kstack_erase.c
+++ b/kernel/kstack_erase.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void)
 	__stackleak_erase(false);
 }
 
-void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
+void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth(void)
 {
 	unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
 
@@ -174,4 +174,4 @@ void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
 		current->lowest_stack = sp;
 	}
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_stack_depth);
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 31088a138bc9..dad81194a81b 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
 	"__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds",
 	"__ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value",
 	/* KSTACK_ERASE */
-	"stackleak_track_stack",
+	"__sanitizer_cov_stack_depth",
 	/* TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING */
 	"ftrace_likely_update",
 	/* STACKPROTECTOR */
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 03/14] stackleak: Split KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS

[Kees Cook]

In preparation for Clang stack depth tracking for KSTACK_ERASE,
split the stackleak-specific cflags out of GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS into
KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
 Makefile                        |  1 +
 arch/arm/vdso/Makefile          |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile |  3 ++-
 arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile        |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile    |  3 ++-
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins    | 16 ++--------------
 scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase   | 15 +++++++++++++++
 MAINTAINERS                     |  2 ++
 8 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 4bfac7e00d2b..4c9e4b5ec36c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ include-$(CONFIG_KMSAN)		+= scripts/Makefile.kmsan
 include-$(CONFIG_UBSAN)		+= scripts/Makefile.ubsan
 include-$(CONFIG_KCOV)		+= scripts/Makefile.kcov
 include-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT)	+= scripts/Makefile.randstruct
+include-$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE)	+= scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
 include-$(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG)	+= scripts/Makefile.autofdo
 include-$(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG)	+= scripts/Makefile.propeller
 include-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS)	+= scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
diff --git a/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile
index cb044bfd145d..cf8cd39ab804 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds += -P -C -U$(ARCH)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso.o = -pg
 
 # Force -O2 to avoid libgcc dependencies
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = -pg -Os $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = -pg -Os $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
 ifeq ($(c-gettimeofday-y),)
 CFLAGS_vgettimeofday.o = -O2
 else
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
index 5e27e46aa496..7dec05dd33b7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ ccflags-y += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO
 # -Wmissing-prototypes and -Wmissing-declarations are removed from
 # the CFLAGS to make possible to build the kernel with CONFIG_WERROR enabled.
 CC_FLAGS_REMOVE_VDSO := $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -Os $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) \
-			$(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) \
+			$(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS) \
+			$(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) \
 			$(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(CC_FLAGS_CFI) \
 			-Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations
 
diff --git a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile
index fdc4a8f5a49c..683b2d408224 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=medlow -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64
 
 SPARC_REG_CFLAGS = -ffixed-g4 -ffixed-g5 $(call cc-option,-fcall-used-g5) $(call cc-option,-fcall-used-g7)
 
-$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
+$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
 
 #
 # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway.
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -m64,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mcmodel=medlow,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -fno-pic,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
+KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -m32 -msoft-float -fpic
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index 54d3e9774d62..f247f5f5cb44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
 endif
 endif
 
-$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(PADDING_CFLAGS) $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(CC_FLAGS_CFI) $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
+$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(PADDING_CFLAGS) $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(CC_FLAGS_CFI) $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL)
 $(vobjs): KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DBUILD_VDSO
 
 #
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mcmodel=kernel,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -fno-pic,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mfentry,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
+KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32))
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index 28b8867c4e84..b0e1423b09c2 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -8,20 +8,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
 endif
 export DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
 
-gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= stackleak_plugin.so
-gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
-		+= -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN
-gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
-		+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
-gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
-		+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-arch=$(SRCARCH)
-gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE)	\
-		+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-verbose
-ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-    DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
-endif
-export DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE
-
 # All the plugin CFLAGS are collected here in case a build target needs to
 # filter them out of the KBUILD_CFLAGS.
 GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y)) -DGCC_PLUGINS
@@ -34,6 +20,8 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
 # be included in GCC_PLUGIN so they can get built.
 gcc-plugin-external-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)		\
 	+= randomize_layout_plugin.so
+gcc-plugin-external-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)		\
+	+= stackleak_plugin.so
 
 # All enabled GCC plugins are collected here for building in
 # scripts/gcc-scripts/Makefile.
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase b/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5223d3a35817
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+kstack-erase-cflags-y += -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.so
+kstack-erase-cflags-y += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
+kstack-erase-cflags-y += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-arch=$(SRCARCH)
+kstack-erase-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE) += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-verbose
+DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE := -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
+endif
+
+KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS   := $(kstack-erase-cflags-y)
+
+export STACKLEAK_CFLAGS DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE
+
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS)
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 9f76b329fdb3..f4dcf3c0be8d 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -13067,6 +13067,8 @@ F:	kernel/kstack_erase.c
 F:	lib/tests/randstruct_kunit.c
 F:	lib/tests/usercopy_kunit.c
 F:	mm/usercopy.c
+F:	scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
+F:	scripts/Makefile.randstruct
 F:	security/Kconfig.hardening
 K:	\b(add|choose)_random_kstack_offset\b
 K:	\b__check_(object_size|heap_object)\b
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 04/14] x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless the
__no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
x86 this means forcing several functions to be inline with
__always_inline.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: "Ilpo Järvinen" <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Wilczynski <michal.wilczynski@intel.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Usama Arif <usama.arif@bytedance.com>
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <ibm-acpi-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc: <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h          | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h      | 2 +-
 include/linux/acpi.h                 | 4 ++--
 include/linux/bootconfig.h           | 2 +-
 include/linux/efi.h                  | 2 +-
 include/linux/memblock.h             | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                | 2 +-
 drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c | 4 ++--
 8 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
index 5ab1a4598d00..a03aa6f999d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -158,13 +158,13 @@ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void)
 }
 
 #define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER
-static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr)
+static __always_inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr)
 {
 	x86_init.acpi.set_root_pointer(addr);
 }
 
 #define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER
-static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void)
+static __always_inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void)
 {
 	return x86_init.acpi.get_root_pointer();
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
index f607081a022a..e406a1e92c63 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ extern unsigned char secondary_startup_64[];
 extern unsigned char secondary_startup_64_no_verify[];
 #endif
 
-static inline size_t real_mode_size_needed(void)
+static __always_inline size_t real_mode_size_needed(void)
 {
 	if (real_mode_header)
 		return 0;	/* already allocated. */
diff --git a/include/linux/acpi.h b/include/linux/acpi.h
index e72100c0684f..ae76c8915000 100644
--- a/include/linux/acpi.h
+++ b/include/linux/acpi.h
@@ -759,13 +759,13 @@ int acpi_arch_timer_mem_init(struct arch_timer_mem *timer_mem, int *timer_count)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER
-static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr)
+static __always_inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr)
 {
 }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER
-static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void)
+static __always_inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/bootconfig.h b/include/linux/bootconfig.h
index 3f4b4ac527ca..25df9260d206 100644
--- a/include/linux/bootconfig.h
+++ b/include/linux/bootconfig.h
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int __init xbc_get_info(int *node_size, size_t *data_size);
 /* XBC cleanup data structures */
 void __init _xbc_exit(bool early);
 
-static inline void xbc_exit(void)
+static __always_inline void xbc_exit(void)
 {
 	_xbc_exit(false);
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 7d63d1d75f22..e3776d9cad07 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ struct linux_efi_initrd {
 
 bool xen_efi_config_table_is_usable(const efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long table);
 
-static inline
+static __always_inline
 bool efi_config_table_is_usable(const efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long table)
 {
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_EFI))
diff --git a/include/linux/memblock.h b/include/linux/memblock.h
index bb19a2534224..b96746376e17 100644
--- a/include/linux/memblock.h
+++ b/include/linux/memblock.h
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static inline void *memblock_alloc_raw(phys_addr_t size,
 					  NUMA_NO_NODE);
 }
 
-static inline void *memblock_alloc_from(phys_addr_t size,
+static __always_inline void *memblock_alloc_from(phys_addr_t size,
 						phys_addr_t align,
 						phys_addr_t min_addr)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 921c1c783bc1..72f13d643fca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static u64 kvm_steal_clock(int cpu)
 	return steal;
 }
 
-static inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
+static __always_inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
 	early_set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) ptr, size);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
index e7350c9fa3aa..0518d5b1f4ec 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
@@ -559,12 +559,12 @@ static unsigned long __init tpacpi_check_quirks(
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline bool __pure __init tpacpi_is_lenovo(void)
+static __always_inline bool __pure tpacpi_is_lenovo(void)
 {
 	return thinkpad_id.vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO;
 }
 
-static inline bool __pure __init tpacpi_is_ibm(void)
+static __always_inline bool __pure tpacpi_is_ibm(void)
 {
 	return thinkpad_id.vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_IBM;
 }
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 05/14] arm: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
arm this exposed several places where __init annotations were missing
but ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix these cases and force
several functions to be inline with __always_inline.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <ssantosh@kernel.org>
Cc: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/mfd/dbx500-prcmu.h  | 2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/cache-feroceon-l2.c   | 2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/cache-tauros2.c       | 2 +-
 drivers/clocksource/timer-orion.c | 2 +-
 drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c           | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/mfd/dbx500-prcmu.h b/include/linux/mfd/dbx500-prcmu.h
index 98567623c9df..828362b7860c 100644
--- a/include/linux/mfd/dbx500-prcmu.h
+++ b/include/linux/mfd/dbx500-prcmu.h
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ struct prcmu_fw_version {
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_UX500_SOC_DB8500)
 
-static inline void prcmu_early_init(void)
+static inline void __init prcmu_early_init(void)
 {
 	db8500_prcmu_early_init();
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/cache-feroceon-l2.c b/arch/arm/mm/cache-feroceon-l2.c
index 25dbd84a1aaf..2bfefb252ffd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/cache-feroceon-l2.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/cache-feroceon-l2.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ static inline u32 read_extra_features(void)
 	return u;
 }
 
-static inline void write_extra_features(u32 u)
+static inline void __init write_extra_features(u32 u)
 {
 	__asm__("mcr p15, 1, %0, c15, c1, 0" : : "r" (u));
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/cache-tauros2.c b/arch/arm/mm/cache-tauros2.c
index b1e1aba602f7..bfe166ccace0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/cache-tauros2.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/cache-tauros2.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void __init write_actlr(u32 actlr)
 	__asm__("mcr p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1\n" : : "r" (actlr));
 }
 
-static void enable_extra_feature(unsigned int features)
+static void __init enable_extra_feature(unsigned int features)
 {
 	u32 u;
 
diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/timer-orion.c b/drivers/clocksource/timer-orion.c
index 49e86cb70a7a..61f1e27fc41e 100644
--- a/drivers/clocksource/timer-orion.c
+++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-orion.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static struct delay_timer orion_delay_timer = {
 	.read_current_timer = orion_read_timer,
 };
 
-static void orion_delay_timer_init(unsigned long rate)
+static void __init orion_delay_timer_init(unsigned long rate)
 {
 	orion_delay_timer.freq = rate;
 	register_current_timer_delay(&orion_delay_timer);
diff --git a/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c b/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c
index dfdff186c805..dc52a2197d24 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int am33xx_do_sram_idle(u32 wfi_flags)
 	return pm_ops->cpu_suspend(am33xx_do_wfi_sram, wfi_flags);
 }
 
-static int __init am43xx_map_gic(void)
+static int am43xx_map_gic(void)
 {
 	gic_dist_base = ioremap(AM43XX_GIC_DIST_BASE, SZ_4K);
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 06/14] arm64: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we
have to handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get
resolved. For arm64 this requires forcing one function to be inline
with __always_inline.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: "Russell King (Oracle)" <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Oza Pawandeep <quic_poza@quicinc.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/acpi.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/acpi.h
index a407f9cd549e..c07a58b96329 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ acpi_set_mailbox_entry(int cpu, struct acpi_madt_generic_interrupt *processor)
 {}
 #endif
 
-static inline const char *acpi_get_enable_method(int cpu)
+static __always_inline const char *acpi_get_enable_method(int cpu)
 {
 	if (acpi_psci_present())
 		return "psci";
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 07/14] s390: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
s390 this exposed a place where the __init annotation was missing but
ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix this cases and force a couple
functions to be inline with __always_inline.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Cc: <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>
---
 arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs.h      | 2 +-
 arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.h | 2 +-
 arch/s390/mm/init.c          | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs.h b/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs.h
index 83ebf54cca6b..4dc2e068e0ff 100644
--- a/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs.h
+++ b/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ void hypfs_sprp_exit(void);
 
 int __hypfs_fs_init(void);
 
-static inline int hypfs_fs_init(void)
+static __always_inline int hypfs_fs_init(void)
 {
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_S390_HYPFS_FS))
 		return __hypfs_fs_init();
diff --git a/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.h b/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.h
index 7090eff27fef..b5218135b8fe 100644
--- a/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.h
+++ b/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ int diag204_store(void *buf, int pages);
 int __hypfs_diag_fs_init(void);
 void __hypfs_diag_fs_exit(void);
 
-static inline int hypfs_diag_fs_init(void)
+static __always_inline int hypfs_diag_fs_init(void)
 {
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_S390_HYPFS_FS))
 		return __hypfs_diag_fs_init();
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/init.c b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
index afa085e8186c..0f83c82af7a6 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 }
 
 /* protected virtualization */
-static void pv_init(void)
+static void __init pv_init(void)
 {
 	if (!is_prot_virt_guest())
 		return;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 08/14] powerpc: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
s390 this requires forcing a couple functions to be inline with
__always_inline.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c    | 2 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
index 5158aefe4873..93f1e1eb5ea6 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(linear_map_kf_hash_lock);
 
 static phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
 
-static inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
+static __always_inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
 {
 	if (!kfence_early_init_enabled())
 		goto err;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
index 9f764bc42b8c..3238e9ed46b5 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static int __meminit create_physical_mapping(unsigned long start,
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE
-static inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
+static __always_inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
 {
 	phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 09/14] mips: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
mips this requires forcing a function to be inline with __always_inline.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>
---
 arch/mips/include/asm/time.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h
index e855a3611d92..044cff0e0764 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static inline int mips_clockevent_init(void)
  */
 extern int init_r4k_clocksource(void);
 
-static inline int init_mips_clocksource(void)
+static __always_inline int init_mips_clocksource(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CSRC_R4K
 	return init_r4k_clocksource();
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 10/14] loongarch: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
__no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
loongarch this exposed several places where __init annotations were
missing but ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix these cases and
force one function to be inline with __always_inline.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
Cc: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Cc: <loongarch@lists.linux.dev>
---
 arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h | 2 +-
 arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c     | 2 +-
 arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c      | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
index ad0bd234a0f1..88e19d8a11f4 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
+++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int loongson_cpu_disable(void);
 void loongson_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu);
 #endif
 
-static inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
+static __always_inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
 {
 	loongson_smp_setup();
 }
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
index bc75a3a69fc8..367906b10f81 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static int constant_timer_next_event(unsigned long delta, struct clock_event_dev
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static unsigned long __init get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
+static unsigned long get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
 {
 	unsigned long lpj = (unsigned long)const_clock_freq;
 
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
index 70ca73019811..df949a3d0f34 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ void __init early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size)
 
 }
 
-void *early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
+void * __init early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
 {
 	return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
 }
 
-void *early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+void * __init early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
 		    unsigned long prot_val)
 {
 	return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 11/14] init.h: Disable sanitizer coverage for __init and __head

[Kees Cook]

While __noinstr already contained __no_sanitize_coverage, it needs to
be added to __init and __head section markings to support the Clang
implementation of CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE. This is to make sure the stack
depth tracking callback is not executed in unsupported contexts.

The other sanitizer coverage options (trace-pc and trace-cmp) aren't
needed in __head nor __init either ("We are interested in code coverage
as a function of a syscall inputs"[1]), so this is fine to disable for
them as well.

Link: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/kernel/kcov.c?h=v6.14#n179 [1]
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 2 +-
 include/linux/init.h        | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
index 8b1b1abcef15..6bfdaeddbae8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG) && CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION < 170000
 #define __head	__section(".head.text") __no_sanitize_undefined __no_stack_protector
 #else
-#define __head	__section(".head.text") __no_sanitize_undefined
+#define __head	__section(".head.text") __no_sanitize_undefined __no_sanitize_coverage
 #endif
 
 struct x86_mapping_info {
diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h
index ee1309473bc6..c65a050d52a7 100644
--- a/include/linux/init.h
+++ b/include/linux/init.h
@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@
 
 /* These are for everybody (although not all archs will actually
    discard it in modules) */
-#define __init		__section(".init.text") __cold  __latent_entropy __noinitretpoline
+#define __init		__section(".init.text") __cold __latent_entropy	\
+						__noinitretpoline	\
+						__no_sanitize_coverage
 #define __initdata	__section(".init.data")
 #define __initconst	__section(".init.rodata")
 #define __exitdata	__section(".exit.data")
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 12/14] kstack_erase: Support Clang stack depth tracking

[Kees Cook]

Wire up CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE to Clang 21's new stack depth tracking
callback[1] option.

Link: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/SanitizerCoverage.html#tracing-stack-depth [1]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas.schier@linux.dev>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
 security/Kconfig.hardening    | 5 ++++-
 scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index f7aa2024ab25..b9a5bc3430aa 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -82,10 +82,13 @@ choice
 
 endchoice
 
+config CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage-stack-depth-callback-min=1)
+
 config KSTACK_ERASE
 	bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
 	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE
-	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK
 	help
 	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
 	  returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase b/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
index 5223d3a35817..c7bc2379e113 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.kstack_erase
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ kstack-erase-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE) += -fplugin-arg-stack
 DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE := -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
 endif
 
+ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
+kstack-erase-cflags-y += -fsanitize-coverage=stack-depth
+kstack-erase-cflags-y += -fsanitize-coverage-stack-depth-callback-min=$(CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
+DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE  := -fno-sanitize-coverage=stack-depth
+endif
+
 KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS   := $(kstack-erase-cflags-y)
 
 export STACKLEAK_CFLAGS DISABLE_KSTACK_ERASE
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 13/14] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE

[Kees Cook]

Since we can wipe the stack with both Clang and GCC plugins, enable this
for the "hardening.config" for wider testing.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
 kernel/configs/hardening.config | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
index dd7c32fb5ac1..d24c2772d04d 100644
--- a/kernel/configs/hardening.config
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
 # Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
 CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
 
+# Wipe kernel stack after syscall completion to reduce stale data lifetime.
+CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE=y
+
 # Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see:
 # https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v2 14/14] configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON

[Kees Cook]

To reduce stale data lifetimes, enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON as
well. This matches the addition of CONFIG_STACKLEAK=y, which is doing
similar for stack memory.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
---
 kernel/configs/hardening.config | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
index d24c2772d04d..64caaf997fc0 100644
--- a/kernel/configs/hardening.config
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED=y
 # Initialize all heap variables to zero on allocation.
 CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
 
+# Initialize all heap variables to zero on free to reduce stale data lifetime.
+CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y
+
 # Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
 CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
 
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] powerpc: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Andrew Donnellan]

On Thu, 2025-05-22 at 21:39 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved.
> For
> s390 this requires forcing a couple functions to be inline with

I assume you mean powerpc here, though I'm sure my employer is happy
that you're at least confusing us with IBM's other architecture :)

-- 
Andrew Donnellan    OzLabs, ADL Canberra
ajd@linux.ibm.com   IBM Australia Limited

Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] s390: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Heiko Carstens]

On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 09:39:17PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> s390 this exposed a place where the __init annotation was missing but
> ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix this cases and force a couple
> functions to be inline with __always_inline.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> ---
> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
> Cc: <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs.h      | 2 +-
>  arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.h | 2 +-
>  arch/s390/mm/init.c          | 2 +-
>  3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>

Re: [PATCH v2 05/14] arm: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Nishanth Menon]

On 21:39-20250522, Kees Cook wrote:
> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> arm this exposed several places where __init annotations were missing
> but ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix these cases and force
> several functions to be inline with __always_inline.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> ---
[...]
> diff --git a/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c b/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c
> index dfdff186c805..dc52a2197d24 100644
> --- a/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c
> +++ b/drivers/soc/ti/pm33xx.c
> @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int am33xx_do_sram_idle(u32 wfi_flags)
>  	return pm_ops->cpu_suspend(am33xx_do_wfi_sram, wfi_flags);
>  }
>  
> -static int __init am43xx_map_gic(void)
> +static int am43xx_map_gic(void)
>  {
>  	gic_dist_base = ioremap(AM43XX_GIC_DIST_BASE, SZ_4K);
>  
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 
Acked-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
-- 
Regards,
Nishanth Menon
Key (0xDDB5849D1736249D) / Fingerprint: F8A2 8693 54EB 8232 17A3  1A34 DDB5 849D 1736 249D

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Sean Christopherson]

On Thu, May 22, 2025, Kees Cook wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> index 921c1c783bc1..72f13d643fca 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> @@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static u64 kvm_steal_clock(int cpu)
>  	return steal;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +static __always_inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)

I'd rather drop the "inline" and explicitly mark this "__init".  There's value
in documenting and enforcing that memory is marked decrypted/shared only during
boot.

>  {
>  	early_set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) ptr, size);
>  }

Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] powerpc: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

On May 22, 2025 10:24:30 PM PDT, Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>On Thu, 2025-05-22 at 21:39 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
>> the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
>> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
>> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved.
>> For
>> s390 this requires forcing a couple functions to be inline with
>
>I assume you mean powerpc here, though I'm sure my employer is happy
>that you're at least confusing us with IBM's other architecture :)

Whoops! Yes. Paste-o on my part. The rest of the sentence was updated correctly though. :)

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 07:35:03AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, May 22, 2025, Kees Cook wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> > index 921c1c783bc1..72f13d643fca 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> > @@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static u64 kvm_steal_clock(int cpu)
> >  	return steal;
> >  }
> >  
> > -static inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
> > +static __always_inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
> 
> I'd rather drop the "inline" and explicitly mark this "__init".  There's value
> in documenting and enforcing that memory is marked decrypted/shared only during
> boot.

Sure! I will swap this around. Thanks!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] powerpc: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Ritesh Harjani]

Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> writes:

> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> s390 this requires forcing a couple functions to be inline with
> __always_inline.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> ---
> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
> Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
> Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c    | 2 +-
>  arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> index 5158aefe4873..93f1e1eb5ea6 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(linear_map_kf_hash_lock);
>  
>  static phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
>  
> -static inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
> +static __always_inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
>  {
>  	if (!kfence_early_init_enabled())
>  		goto err;
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
> index 9f764bc42b8c..3238e9ed46b5 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
> @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static int __meminit create_physical_mapping(unsigned long start,
>  }
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE
> -static inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
> +static __always_inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
>  {
>  	phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
>  

I remember seeing a warning msg around .init.text section. Let me dig
that...

... Here it is: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202504190552.mnFGs5sj-lkp@intel.com/

I am not sure why it only complains for hash_debug_pagealloc_alloc_slots().
I believe there should me more functions to mark with __init here.
Anyways, here is the patch of what I had in mind.. I am not a compiler expert,
so please let me know your thoughts on this.

-ritesh


From 59d64dc0014ccb4ae13ed08ab596738628ee23b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <59d64dc0014ccb4ae13ed08ab596738628ee23b1.1748084756.git.ritesh.list@gmail.com>
From: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 May 2025 16:14:08 +0530
Subject: [RFC] powerpc/mm/book3s64: Move few kfence & debug_pagealloc
 related calls to __init section

Move few kfence and debug_pagealloc related functions in hash_utils.c
and radix_pgtable.c to __init sections since these are only invoked once
by an __init function during system initialization.

i.e.
- hash_debug_pagealloc_alloc_slots()
- hash_kfence_alloc_pool()
- hash_kfence_map_pool()
  The above 3 functions only gets called by __init htab_initialize().

- alloc_kfence_pool()
- map_kfence_pool()
  The above 2 functions only gets called by __init radix_init_pgtable()

This should also help fix warning msgs like:

>> WARNING: modpost: vmlinux: section mismatch in reference:
hash_debug_pagealloc_alloc_slots+0xb0 (section: .text) ->
memblock_alloc_try_nid (section: .init.text)

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202504190552.mnFGs5sj-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c    | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
index 5158aefe4873..4693c464fc5a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static inline bool hash_supports_debug_pagealloc(void)
 static u8 *linear_map_hash_slots;
 static unsigned long linear_map_hash_count;
 static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(linear_map_hash_lock);
-static void hash_debug_pagealloc_alloc_slots(void)
+static __init void hash_debug_pagealloc_alloc_slots(void)
 {
 	if (!hash_supports_debug_pagealloc())
 		return;
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(linear_map_kf_hash_lock);
 
 static phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
 
-static inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
+static __init void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
 {
 	if (!kfence_early_init_enabled())
 		goto err;
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
 	disable_kfence();
 }
 
-static inline void hash_kfence_map_pool(void)
+static __init void hash_kfence_map_pool(void)
 {
 	unsigned long kfence_pool_start, kfence_pool_end;
 	unsigned long prot = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
index 311e2112d782..ed226ee1569a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static int __meminit create_physical_mapping(unsigned long start,
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE
-static inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
+static __init phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
 {
 	phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
 
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void map_kfence_pool(phys_addr_t kfence_pool)
+static __init void map_kfence_pool(phys_addr_t kfence_pool)
 {
 	if (!kfence_pool)
 		return;
-- 
2.39.5

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Ilpo Järvinen]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2795 bytes --]

On Thu, 22 May 2025, Kees Cook wrote:

> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless the
> __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> x86 this means forcing several functions to be inline with
> __always_inline.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> ---
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Ilpo Järvinen" <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
> Cc: Michal Wilczynski <michal.wilczynski@intel.com>
> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Cc: Usama Arif <usama.arif@bytedance.com>
> Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
> Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
> Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: <ibm-acpi-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
> Cc: <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: <linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: <linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
> ---

> diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
> index e7350c9fa3aa..0518d5b1f4ec 100644
> --- a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
> +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
> @@ -559,12 +559,12 @@ static unsigned long __init tpacpi_check_quirks(
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline bool __pure __init tpacpi_is_lenovo(void)
> +static __always_inline bool __pure tpacpi_is_lenovo(void)
>  {
>  	return thinkpad_id.vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO;
>  }
>  
> -static inline bool __pure __init tpacpi_is_ibm(void)
> +static __always_inline bool __pure tpacpi_is_ibm(void)
>  {
>  	return thinkpad_id.vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_IBM;
>  }

Hi Kees,

What's your plan on upstreaming route/timeline for this? I'd prefer to 
retain full control over this file as we were planning on some 
reorganization of files into lenovo/ subdir.


-- 
 i.

Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, May 26, 2025 at 12:53:13AM +0300, Ilpo Järvinen wrote:
> On Thu, 22 May 2025, Kees Cook wrote:
> 
> > When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless the
> > __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> > __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> > handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> > x86 this means forcing several functions to be inline with
> > __always_inline.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> > Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
> > Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
> > Cc: "Ilpo Järvinen" <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
> > Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Michal Wilczynski <michal.wilczynski@intel.com>
> > Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> > Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
> > Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
> > Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> > Cc: Usama Arif <usama.arif@bytedance.com>
> > Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
> > Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
> > Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
> > Cc: <ibm-acpi-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
> > Cc: <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>
> > Cc: <linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org>
> > Cc: <linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
> > Cc: <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
> > Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
> > ---
> 
> > diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
> > index e7350c9fa3aa..0518d5b1f4ec 100644
> > --- a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
> > +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
> > @@ -559,12 +559,12 @@ static unsigned long __init tpacpi_check_quirks(
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> >  
> > -static inline bool __pure __init tpacpi_is_lenovo(void)
> > +static __always_inline bool __pure tpacpi_is_lenovo(void)
> >  {
> >  	return thinkpad_id.vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO;
> >  }
> >  
> > -static inline bool __pure __init tpacpi_is_ibm(void)
> > +static __always_inline bool __pure tpacpi_is_ibm(void)
> >  {
> >  	return thinkpad_id.vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_IBM;
> >  }
> 
> Hi Kees,
> 
> What's your plan on upstreaming route/timeline for this? I'd prefer to 
> retain full control over this file as we were planning on some 
> reorganization of files into lenovo/ subdir.

I'm not in a big rush. I'm hoping to have this all in place for v6.17,
but the Clang feature won't be in a released compiler version until
September. :) I can send this bit separately for your tree.

Thanks for taking a look!

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH v2 09/14] mips: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Huacai Chen]

Hi, Kees,

On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 12:41 PM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> mips this requires forcing a function to be inline with __always_inline.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> ---
> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
> Cc: <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/mips/include/asm/time.h | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h
> index e855a3611d92..044cff0e0764 100644
> --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h
> +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/time.h
> @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static inline int mips_clockevent_init(void)
>   */
>  extern int init_r4k_clocksource(void);
>
> -static inline int init_mips_clocksource(void)
> +static __always_inline int init_mips_clocksource(void)
Similar to x86 and arm, I prefer to mark it as __init rather than
__always_inline.

Huacai

>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_CSRC_R4K
>         return init_r4k_clocksource();
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>

Re: [PATCH v2 10/14] loongarch: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Huacai Chen]

Hi, Kees,

On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 12:39 PM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> loongarch this exposed several places where __init annotations were
> missing but ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix these cases and
> force one function to be inline with __always_inline.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> ---
> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
> Cc: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
> Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
> Cc: <loongarch@lists.linux.dev>
> ---
>  arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h | 2 +-
>  arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c     | 2 +-
>  arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c      | 4 ++--
>  3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
> index ad0bd234a0f1..88e19d8a11f4 100644
> --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
> +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
> @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int loongson_cpu_disable(void);
>  void loongson_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu);
>  #endif
>
> -static inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
> +static __always_inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
Similar to x86 and arm, I prefer to mark it as __init rather than
__always_inline.

Huacai

>  {
>         loongson_smp_setup();
>  }
> diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
> index bc75a3a69fc8..367906b10f81 100644
> --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
> +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
> @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static int constant_timer_next_event(unsigned long delta, struct clock_event_dev
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> -static unsigned long __init get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
> +static unsigned long get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
>  {
>         unsigned long lpj = (unsigned long)const_clock_freq;
>
> diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
> index 70ca73019811..df949a3d0f34 100644
> --- a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ void __init early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size)
>
>  }
>
> -void *early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +void * __init early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>  {
>         return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
>  }
>
> -void *early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> +void * __init early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>                     unsigned long prot_val)
>  {
>         return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
> --
> 2.34.1
>

Re: [PATCH v2 10/14] loongarch: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Huacai Chen]

Hi, Kees,

On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 4:55 PM Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Hi, Kees,
>
> On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 12:39 PM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> > the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> > __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> > handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> > loongarch this exposed several places where __init annotations were
> > missing but ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix these cases and
> > force one function to be inline with __always_inline.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
> > Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > Cc: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
> > Cc: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
> > Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
> > Cc: <loongarch@lists.linux.dev>
> > ---
> >  arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h | 2 +-
> >  arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c     | 2 +-
> >  arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c      | 4 ++--
> >  3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
> > index ad0bd234a0f1..88e19d8a11f4 100644
> > --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
> > +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
> > @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int loongson_cpu_disable(void);
> >  void loongson_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu);
> >  #endif
> >
> > -static inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
> > +static __always_inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
> Similar to x86 and arm, I prefer to mark it as __init rather than
> __always_inline.
If you have no objections, I will apply this patch with the above modification.


Huacai

>
> Huacai
>
> >  {
> >         loongson_smp_setup();
> >  }
> > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
> > index bc75a3a69fc8..367906b10f81 100644
> > --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
> > +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
> > @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static int constant_timer_next_event(unsigned long delta, struct clock_event_dev
> >         return 0;
> >  }
> >
> > -static unsigned long __init get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
> > +static unsigned long get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
> >  {
> >         unsigned long lpj = (unsigned long)const_clock_freq;
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
> > index 70ca73019811..df949a3d0f34 100644
> > --- a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
> > +++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
> > @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ void __init early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size)
> >
> >  }
> >
> > -void *early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> > +void * __init early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> >  {
> >         return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
> >  }
> >
> > -void *early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> > +void * __init early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> >                     unsigned long prot_val)
> >  {
> >         return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >

Re: [PATCH v2 10/14] loongarch: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

On June 24, 2025 5:31:12 AM PDT, Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> wrote:
>Hi, Kees,
>
>On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 4:55 PM Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, Kees,
>>
>> On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 12:39 PM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
>> > the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
>> > __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
>> > handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
>> > loongarch this exposed several places where __init annotations were
>> > missing but ended up being "accidentally correct". Fix these cases and
>> > force one function to be inline with __always_inline.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
>> > ---
>> > Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
>> > Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
>> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> > Cc: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
>> > Cc: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
>> > Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
>> > Cc: <loongarch@lists.linux.dev>
>> > ---
>> >  arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h | 2 +-
>> >  arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c     | 2 +-
>> >  arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c      | 4 ++--
>> >  3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
>> > index ad0bd234a0f1..88e19d8a11f4 100644
>> > --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
>> > +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/smp.h
>> > @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int loongson_cpu_disable(void);
>> >  void loongson_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu);
>> >  #endif
>> >
>> > -static inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
>> > +static __always_inline void plat_smp_setup(void)
>> Similar to x86 and arm, I prefer to mark it as __init rather than
>> __always_inline.
>If you have no objections, I will apply this patch with the above modification.

That's fine by me; thank you! I didn't have a chance yet to verify that it actually fixes the mismatches I saw, but if it looks good to you, yes please. :)

-Kees

>
>
>Huacai
>
>>
>> Huacai
>>
>> >  {
>> >         loongson_smp_setup();
>> >  }
>> > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
>> > index bc75a3a69fc8..367906b10f81 100644
>> > --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
>> > +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/time.c
>> > @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static int constant_timer_next_event(unsigned long delta, struct clock_event_dev
>> >         return 0;
>> >  }
>> >
>> > -static unsigned long __init get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
>> > +static unsigned long get_loops_per_jiffy(void)
>> >  {
>> >         unsigned long lpj = (unsigned long)const_clock_freq;
>> >
>> > diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
>> > index 70ca73019811..df949a3d0f34 100644
>> > --- a/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
>> > +++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/ioremap.c
>> > @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ void __init early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size)
>> >
>> >  }
>> >
>> > -void *early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>> > +void * __init early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>> >  {
>> >         return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
>> >  }
>> >
>> > -void *early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>> > +void * __init early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>> >                     unsigned long prot_val)
>> >  {
>> >         return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
>> > --
>> > 2.34.1
>> >

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH v2 08/14] powerpc: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches

[Kees Cook]

On Sat, May 24, 2025 at 04:13:02PM +0530, Ritesh Harjani wrote:
> Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> writes:
> 
> > When KCOV is enabled all functions get instrumented, unless
> > the __no_sanitize_coverage attribute is used. To prepare for
> > __no_sanitize_coverage being applied to __init functions, we have to
> > handle differences in how GCC's inline optimizations get resolved. For
> > s390 this requires forcing a couple functions to be inline with
> > __always_inline.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
> > Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
> > Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
> > Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
> > Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
> > Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> > Cc: <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
> > ---
> >  arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c    | 2 +-
> >  arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c | 2 +-
> >  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> > index 5158aefe4873..93f1e1eb5ea6 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> > @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(linear_map_kf_hash_lock);
> >  
> >  static phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
> >  
> > -static inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
> > +static __always_inline void hash_kfence_alloc_pool(void)
> >  {
> >  	if (!kfence_early_init_enabled())
> >  		goto err;
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
> > index 9f764bc42b8c..3238e9ed46b5 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_pgtable.c
> > @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static int __meminit create_physical_mapping(unsigned long start,
> >  }
> >  
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE
> > -static inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
> > +static __always_inline phys_addr_t alloc_kfence_pool(void)
> >  {
> >  	phys_addr_t kfence_pool;
> >  
> 
> I remember seeing a warning msg around .init.text section. Let me dig
> that...
> 
> ... Here it is: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202504190552.mnFGs5sj-lkp@intel.com/
> 
> I am not sure why it only complains for hash_debug_pagealloc_alloc_slots().
> I believe there should me more functions to mark with __init here.
> Anyways, here is the patch of what I had in mind.. I am not a compiler expert,
> so please let me know your thoughts on this.

Yeah, this looks good. I'll snag your patch and drop mine. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook