From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B45CA246797; Sat, 12 Jul 2025 23:26:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1752362791; cv=none; b=Vp5zaykUQsaFiwqZ92JMSY2wDFV1npdUcoluUoiT8d93AWGgUv2jUmTjIY9HPhE9EaFVjed6IWXmKS/E3HjLF7B7E1O+XoJDBXp3b0wxKsgK3mMja0nnt9nfjW/t/E4htWKDiOBGYGH9LnqfLllOU1Enf/zVesgSZeshQHN+Dfk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1752362791; c=relaxed/simple; bh=yMm/MFGISASr8eQF+DRkJnRm7ToRkQJ87GfJAV9pLPk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=bCRKfRY82MYFYmbw3P75gEzKhFUlZfmPu9o3iEx/oW/yypCDrvuFoMd7HAabpPPaWwPiHQbXv/4/yPPNESL+ns/x39bHBpexM1Z1t6ZmhB3F5ap9t2E648q45GGlpmLcoVDBmd8yorIXvZzCk49zBkyGwJuK3tO0rNBgg3ojDgI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=hxrat3AU; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="hxrat3AU" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 361B2C4CEEF; Sat, 12 Jul 2025 23:26:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1752362791; bh=yMm/MFGISASr8eQF+DRkJnRm7ToRkQJ87GfJAV9pLPk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hxrat3AU+uS8Fsd4qkVKddMNU8Tvc6x8NYEaAuXu8iD1taJ26o/23h0SEKxM2HTKf 2nI3g2MTjZGgaxKozBsz4uRO5d/vI9SGUFWCmBK1huSIe2uqH2AzBPXn2CMzMhnxBJ hxlZD6R7vbUYdNO1ilkGUBHg5WqFsIokkTqHUZF9XcKVtI/P3F8zoDfuP9xwd49NiO Q5mN5IcR++bmWT7or0aSekU3BR+hT8npj5SuOrN0osGgeCRMieMqkJ64lXgzpfhgC5 Clid2oofX3CNXKkXeL5ybQfy/veXWedNDrvyGhzQsOX4AunEdT7dDYAXT63Vj/3vCC tu0Wng+DxQbKQ== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Eric Biggers Subject: [PATCH 24/26] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2025 16:23:15 -0700 Message-ID: <20250712232329.818226-25-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.50.1 In-Reply-To: <20250712232329.818226-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20250712232329.818226-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Use the SHA-1 library functions instead of crypto_shash. This is simpler and faster. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 4 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 221 ++++------------------ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 1fb8aa0019953..7685457ffcb41 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -3,13 +3,11 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO select ASN1_ENCODER select OID_REGISTRY select ASN1 select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 89c9798d18007..d1a66a0287fa5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -5,89 +5,36 @@ * * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst */ #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include -#include -#include -#include #include #include #include -static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; -static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; static struct tpm_chip *chip; static struct tpm_digest *digests; -struct sdesc { - struct shash_desc shash; - char ctx[]; -}; - -static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; -static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; - -static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) -{ - struct sdesc *sdesc; - int size; - - size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); - sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sdesc) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; - return sdesc; -} - -static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, - unsigned char *digest) -{ - struct sdesc *sdesc; - int ret; - - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - - ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); - return ret; -} - static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, ...) { - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx; va_list argp; unsigned int dlen; unsigned char *data; - int ret; - - sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } + int ret = 0; - ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + hmac_sha1_init_usingrawkey(&hmac_ctx, key, keylen); va_start(argp, keylen); for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); if (dlen == 0) @@ -95,19 +42,15 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); if (data == NULL) { ret = -EINVAL; break; } - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + hmac_sha1_update(&hmac_ctx, data, dlen); } va_end(argp); if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); + hmac_sha1_final(&hmac_ctx, digest); return ret; } /* * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM @@ -115,53 +58,41 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...) { unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx; unsigned int dlen; unsigned char *data; unsigned char c; - int ret; + int ret = 0; va_list argp; if (!chip) return -ENODEV; - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - c = !!h3; - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_init(&sha_ctx); va_start(argp, h3); for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); if (dlen == 0) break; data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); if (!data) { ret = -EINVAL; break; } - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, data, dlen); } va_end(argp); if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest); if (!ret) ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac); /* @@ -180,11 +111,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *enonce; unsigned char *continueflag; unsigned char *authdata; unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx; unsigned int dlen; unsigned int dpos; va_list argp; int ret; @@ -201,53 +132,33 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, return -EINVAL; authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; continueflag = authdata - 1; enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, - sizeof result); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, - sizeof ordinal); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_init(&sha_ctx); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result)); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal)); va_start(argp, keylen); for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); if (dlen == 0) break; dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen); } va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest); ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) - goto out; + return ret; if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) - ret = -EINVAL; -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); - return ret; + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1); /* * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM @@ -271,11 +182,11 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *continueflag2; unsigned char *authdata2; unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx; unsigned int dlen; unsigned int dpos; va_list argp; int ret; @@ -294,62 +205,40 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1; continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1; enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, - sizeof result); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, - sizeof ordinal); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_init(&sha_ctx); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result)); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal)); va_start(argp, keylen2); for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); if (dlen == 0) break; dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen); } va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest); ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) - goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } + return ret; + if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) - goto out; + return ret; if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) - ret = -EINVAL; -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); - return ret; + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } /* * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. @@ -496,13 +385,11 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, dump_sess(&sess); /* calculate encrypted authorization value */ memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret < 0) goto out; @@ -987,44 +874,10 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) { return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len); } -static void trusted_shash_release(void) -{ - if (hashalg) - crypto_free_shash(hashalg); - if (hmacalg) - crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); -} - -static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) -{ - int ret; - - hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { - pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n", - hmac_alg); - return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); - } - - hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { - pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n", - hash_alg); - ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); - goto hashalg_fail; - } - - return 0; - -hashalg_fail: - crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); - return ret; -} - static int __init init_digests(void) { int i; digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests), @@ -1047,19 +900,14 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void) return -ENODEV; ret = init_digests(); if (ret < 0) goto err_put; - ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); if (ret < 0) - goto err_release; + goto err_free; return 0; -err_release: - trusted_shash_release(); err_free: kfree(digests); err_put: put_device(&chip->dev); return ret; @@ -1068,11 +916,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void) static void trusted_tpm_exit(void) { if (chip) { put_device(&chip->dev); kfree(digests); - trusted_shash_release(); unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); } } struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = { -- 2.50.1