* [PATCH 1/3] file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec [not found] <00000000000069c40405be6bdad4@google.com> @ 2021-04-02 12:35 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-13 4:12 ` [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) syzbot 1 sibling, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-04-02 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-fsdevel Cc: Al Viro, Linus Torvalds, Dmitry Vyukov, Christian Brauner, syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf, Christoph Hellwig, Giuseppe Scrivano, stable From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> syzbot reported a bug when putting the last reference to a tasks file descriptor table. Debugging this showed we didn't recalculate the current maximum fd number for CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE | CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC after we unshared the file descriptors table. So max_fd could exceed the current fdtable maximum causing us to set excessive bits. As a concrete example, let's say the user requested everything from fd 4 to ~0UL to be closed and their current fdtable size is 256 with their highest open fd being 4. With CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE the caller will end up with a new fdtable which has room for 64 file descriptors since that is the lowest fdtable size we accept. But now max_fd will still point to 255 and needs to be adjusted. Fix this by retrieving the correct maximum fd value in __range_cloexec(). Reported-by: syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 582f1fb6b721 ("fs, close_range: add flag CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC") Fixes: fec8a6a69103 ("close_range: unshare all fds for CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE | CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC") Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> --- fs/file.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c index f3a4bac2cbe9..f633348029a5 100644 --- a/fs/file.c +++ b/fs/file.c @@ -629,17 +629,30 @@ int close_fd(unsigned fd) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(close_fd); /* for ksys_close() */ +/** + * last_fd - return last valid index into fd table + * @cur_fds: files struct + * + * Context: Either rcu read lock or files_lock must be held. + * + * Returns: Last valid index into fdtable. + */ +static inline unsigned last_fd(struct fdtable *fdt) +{ + return fdt->max_fds - 1; +} + static inline void __range_cloexec(struct files_struct *cur_fds, unsigned int fd, unsigned int max_fd) { struct fdtable *fdt; - if (fd > max_fd) - return; - + /* make sure we're using the correct maximum value */ spin_lock(&cur_fds->file_lock); fdt = files_fdtable(cur_fds); - bitmap_set(fdt->close_on_exec, fd, max_fd - fd + 1); + max_fd = min(last_fd(fdt), max_fd); + if (fd <= max_fd) + bitmap_set(fdt->close_on_exec, fd, max_fd - fd + 1); spin_unlock(&cur_fds->file_lock); } -- 2.27.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) [not found] <00000000000069c40405be6bdad4@google.com> 2021-04-02 12:35 ` [PATCH 1/3] file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-13 4:12 ` syzbot 2021-07-13 18:49 ` Linus Torvalds ` (2 more replies) 1 sibling, 3 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: syzbot @ 2021-07-13 4:12 UTC (permalink / raw) To: brauner, christian.brauner, dvyukov, gregkh, gscrivan, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, torvalds, viro syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=178919b0300000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=20276914ec6ad813 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=120220f2300000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=115f37b4300000 IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic64_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:605 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_long_read include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:29 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888025a40a78 by task syz-executor493/8445 CPU: 1 PID: 8445 Comm: syz-executor493 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:105 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x6c/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:233 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:436 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] atomic64_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:605 [inline] atomic_long_read include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:29 [inline] filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 close_fd+0x5c/0x80 fs/file.c:628 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1331 [inline] __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1329 [inline] __x64_sys_close+0x2f/0xa0 fs/open.c:1329 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4021b3 Code: c7 c2 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb ba 0f 1f 00 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 45 c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 RSP: 002b:00007ffe62cc73e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00000000004021b3 RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe62cc73f8 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 00000000004aa000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe62cc7400 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000004ad018 R15: 0000000000400488 Allocated by task 8445: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:434 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x84/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:467 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:512 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2981 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2989 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x216/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:2994 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline] __alloc_file+0x21/0x280 fs/file_table.c:101 alloc_empty_file+0x6d/0x170 fs/file_table.c:150 path_openat+0xde/0x27f0 fs/namei.c:3493 do_filp_open+0x1aa/0x400 fs/namei.c:3534 do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1204 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1220 [inline] __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1294 [inline] __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1288 [inline] __x64_sys_creat+0xc9/0x120 fs/open.c:1288 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Freed by task 8445: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:46 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:360 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:328 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:374 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:229 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1650 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xdf/0x240 mm/slub.c:1675 slab_free mm/slub.c:3235 [inline] kfree+0xeb/0x650 mm/slub.c:4295 put_fs_context+0x3fb/0x650 fs/fs_context.c:454 fscontext_release+0x4c/0x60 fs/fsopen.c:73 __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x27e/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302 do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xe5/0x110 mm/kasan/generic.c:348 __call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3029 [inline] call_rcu+0xb1/0x750 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3109 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x27e/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302 do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xe5/0x110 mm/kasan/generic.c:348 task_work_add+0x3a/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:38 fput_many.part.0+0xbb/0x170 fs/file_table.c:341 fput_many fs/file_table.c:336 [inline] fput+0x3b/0x50 fs/file_table.c:357 path_openat+0x19bd/0x27f0 fs/namei.c:3516 do_filp_open+0x1aa/0x400 fs/namei.c:3534 do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1204 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1220 [inline] __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1228 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1224 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x119/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1224 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888025a40a00 which belongs to the cache filp of size 464 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of 464-byte region [ffff888025a40a00, ffff888025a40bd0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0000969000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x25a40 head:ffffea0000969000 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 0000000b00000001 ffff8880109c4780 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 1, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4875, ts 15466439710, free_ts 15379402342 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2433 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f80 mm/page_alloc.c:4166 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5374 alloc_pages+0x18c/0x2a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2244 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1713 [inline] allocate_slab+0x32b/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:1853 new_slab mm/slub.c:1916 [inline] new_slab_objects mm/slub.c:2662 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0x4ba/0x820 mm/slub.c:2825 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0xa7/0xf0 mm/slub.c:2865 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2947 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2989 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x372/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:2994 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline] __alloc_file+0x21/0x280 fs/file_table.c:101 alloc_empty_file+0x6d/0x170 fs/file_table.c:150 path_openat+0xde/0x27f0 fs/namei.c:3493 do_filp_open+0x1aa/0x400 fs/namei.c:3534 do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1204 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1220 [inline] __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1228 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1224 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x119/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1224 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae page last free stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1343 [inline] free_pcp_prepare+0x2c5/0x780 mm/page_alloc.c:1394 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3329 [inline] free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3408 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:146 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x5a/0xc0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:165 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x180/0x200 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:272 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x8e/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:444 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:512 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2981 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2989 [inline] __kmalloc+0x1f4/0x330 mm/slub.c:4133 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:596 [inline] tomoyo_add_entry security/tomoyo/common.c:2031 [inline] tomoyo_supervisor+0xce8/0xf00 security/tomoyo/common.c:2103 tomoyo_audit_path_log security/tomoyo/file.c:168 [inline] tomoyo_path_permission security/tomoyo/file.c:587 [inline] tomoyo_path_permission+0x270/0x3a0 security/tomoyo/file.c:573 tomoyo_path_perm+0x2f0/0x400 security/tomoyo/file.c:838 security_inode_getattr+0xcf/0x140 security/security.c:1332 vfs_getattr fs/stat.c:139 [inline] vfs_statx+0x164/0x390 fs/stat.c:207 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:225 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3386 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat+0x91/0x110 fs/stat.c:380 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888025a40900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888025a40980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff888025a40a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888025a40a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888025a40b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-13 4:12 ` [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) syzbot @ 2021-07-13 18:49 ` Linus Torvalds 2021-07-14 7:59 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 13:51 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 13:53 ` Christian Brauner 2 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Linus Torvalds @ 2021-07-13 18:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: syzbot Cc: brauner, Christian Brauner, Dmitry Vyukov, Greg Kroah-Hartman, gscrivan, Christoph Hellwig, linux-fsdevel, Linux Kernel Mailing List, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, Al Viro On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 9:12 PM syzbot <syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: > > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: Hmm. This issue is reported to have been already fixed: Fix commit: 9b5b8722 file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec and that fix is already in the reported HEAD commit: > HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. and the oops report clearly is from that: > CPU: 1 PID: 8445 Comm: syz-executor493 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 so the alleged fix is already there. So clearly commit 9b5b872215fe ("file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec") does *NOT* fix the issue. This was originally bisected to that 582f1fb6b721 ("fs, close_range: add flag CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC") in https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1bef50bdd9622a1969608d1090b2b4a588d0c6ac which is where the "fix" is from. It would probably be good if sysbot made this kind of "hey, it was reported fixed, but it's not" very clear. The KASAN report looks like a use-after-free, and that "use" is actually the sanity check that the file count is non-zero, so it's really a "struct file *" that has already been free'd. That bogus free is a regular close() system call > filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 > close_fd+0x5c/0x80 fs/file.c:628 > __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1331 [inline] > __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1329 [inline] And it was opened by a "creat()" system call: > Allocated by task 8445: > __alloc_file+0x21/0x280 fs/file_table.c:101 > alloc_empty_file+0x6d/0x170 fs/file_table.c:150 > path_openat+0xde/0x27f0 fs/namei.c:3493 > do_filp_open+0x1aa/0x400 fs/namei.c:3534 > do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1204 > do_sys_open fs/open.c:1220 [inline] > __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1294 [inline] > __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1288 [inline] > __x64_sys_creat+0xc9/0x120 fs/open.c:1288 > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae But it has apparently already been closed from a workqueue: > Freed by task 8445: > __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 > task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 So it's some kind of confusion and re-use of a struct file pointer. Which is certainly consistent with the "fix" in 9b5b872215fe ("file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec"), but it very much looks like that fix was incomplete and not the full story. Some fdtable got re-allocated? The fix that wasn't a fix ends up re-checking the maximum file number under the file_lock, but there's clearly something else going on too. Christian? Linus ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-13 18:49 ` Linus Torvalds @ 2021-07-14 7:59 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 9:14 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 11:45 ` Dmitry Vyukov 0 siblings, 2 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 7:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: syzbot, brauner, Dmitry Vyukov, Greg Kroah-Hartman, gscrivan, Christoph Hellwig, linux-fsdevel, Linux Kernel Mailing List, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, Al Viro On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 11:49:14AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 9:12 PM syzbot > <syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: > > > > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > Hmm. > > This issue is reported to have been already fixed: > > Fix commit: 9b5b8722 file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec > > and that fix is already in the reported HEAD commit: > > > HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. > > and the oops report clearly is from that: > > > CPU: 1 PID: 8445 Comm: syz-executor493 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 > > so the alleged fix is already there. > > So clearly commit 9b5b872215fe ("file: fix close_range() for > unshare+cloexec") does *NOT* fix the issue. > > This was originally bisected to that 582f1fb6b721 ("fs, close_range: > add flag CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC") in > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1bef50bdd9622a1969608d1090b2b4a588d0c6ac > > which is where the "fix" is from. > > It would probably be good if sysbot made this kind of "hey, it was > reported fixed, but it's not" very clear. > > The KASAN report looks like a use-after-free, and that "use" is > actually the sanity check that the file count is non-zero, so it's > really a "struct file *" that has already been free'd. > > That bogus free is a regular close() system call > > > filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 > > close_fd+0x5c/0x80 fs/file.c:628 > > __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1331 [inline] > > __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1329 [inline] > > And it was opened by a "creat()" system call: > > > Allocated by task 8445: > > __alloc_file+0x21/0x280 fs/file_table.c:101 > > alloc_empty_file+0x6d/0x170 fs/file_table.c:150 > > path_openat+0xde/0x27f0 fs/namei.c:3493 > > do_filp_open+0x1aa/0x400 fs/namei.c:3534 > > do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1204 > > do_sys_open fs/open.c:1220 [inline] > > __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1294 [inline] > > __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1288 [inline] > > __x64_sys_creat+0xc9/0x120 fs/open.c:1288 > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > > But it has apparently already been closed from a workqueue: > > > Freed by task 8445: > > __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 > > task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 > > So it's some kind of confusion and re-use of a struct file pointer. > > Which is certainly consistent with the "fix" in 9b5b872215fe ("file: > fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec"), but it very much looks like > that fix was incomplete and not the full story. > > Some fdtable got re-allocated? The fix that wasn't a fix ends up > re-checking the maximum file number under the file_lock, but there's > clearly something else going on too. > > Christian? Looking into this now. I have to say I'm very confused by the syzkaller report here. If I go to https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf which is the original link in the report it shows me android-54 KASAN: use-after-free Read in filp_close C 2 183d 183d 0/1 upstream: reported C repro on 2021/01/11 12:38 which seems to indicate that this happened on an Android specific 5.4 kernel? But ok, so I click on the link "upstream: reported C repro on 2021/01/11 12:38" which takes me to a google group https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-android-bugs/c/FQj0qcRSy_M/m/wrY70QFzBAAJ which again strongly indicates that this is an Android specific kernel? HEAD commit: c9951e5d Merge 5.4.88 into android12-5.4 git tree: android12-5.4 but then I can click on the dashboard link for that crash report and it takes me to: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=53897bcb31b82c7a08fe which seems to be the upstream report? So I'm a bit confused whether I'm even looking at the correct bug report but I'll just give the repro a try and see what's going on. Christian ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-14 7:59 ` Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 9:14 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 11:45 ` Dmitry Vyukov 1 sibling, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 9:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: syzbot, brauner, Dmitry Vyukov, Greg Kroah-Hartman, gscrivan, Christoph Hellwig, linux-fsdevel, Linux Kernel Mailing List, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, Al Viro On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 09:59:25AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 11:49:14AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 9:12 PM syzbot > > <syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > > > Hmm. > > > > This issue is reported to have been already fixed: > > > > Fix commit: 9b5b8722 file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec > > > > and that fix is already in the reported HEAD commit: > > > > > HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. > > > > and the oops report clearly is from that: > > > > > CPU: 1 PID: 8445 Comm: syz-executor493 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 > > > > so the alleged fix is already there. > > > > So clearly commit 9b5b872215fe ("file: fix close_range() for > > unshare+cloexec") does *NOT* fix the issue. > > > > This was originally bisected to that 582f1fb6b721 ("fs, close_range: > > add flag CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC") in > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1bef50bdd9622a1969608d1090b2b4a588d0c6ac > > > > which is where the "fix" is from. > > > > It would probably be good if sysbot made this kind of "hey, it was > > reported fixed, but it's not" very clear. > > > > The KASAN report looks like a use-after-free, and that "use" is > > actually the sanity check that the file count is non-zero, so it's > > really a "struct file *" that has already been free'd. > > > > That bogus free is a regular close() system call > > > > > filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 > > > close_fd+0x5c/0x80 fs/file.c:628 > > > __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1331 [inline] > > > __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1329 [inline] > > > > And it was opened by a "creat()" system call: > > > > > Allocated by task 8445: > > > __alloc_file+0x21/0x280 fs/file_table.c:101 > > > alloc_empty_file+0x6d/0x170 fs/file_table.c:150 > > > path_openat+0xde/0x27f0 fs/namei.c:3493 > > > do_filp_open+0x1aa/0x400 fs/namei.c:3534 > > > do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1204 > > > do_sys_open fs/open.c:1220 [inline] > > > __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1294 [inline] > > > __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1288 [inline] > > > __x64_sys_creat+0xc9/0x120 fs/open.c:1288 > > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > > > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > > > > But it has apparently already been closed from a workqueue: > > > > > Freed by task 8445: > > > __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 > > > task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 > > > > So it's some kind of confusion and re-use of a struct file pointer. > > > > Which is certainly consistent with the "fix" in 9b5b872215fe ("file: > > fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec"), but it very much looks like > > that fix was incomplete and not the full story. > > > > Some fdtable got re-allocated? The fix that wasn't a fix ends up > > re-checking the maximum file number under the file_lock, but there's > > clearly something else going on too. > > > > Christian? > > Looking into this now. > > I have to say I'm very confused by the syzkaller report here. > > If I go to > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf > > which is the original link in the report it shows me > > android-54 KASAN: use-after-free Read in filp_close C 2 183d 183d 0/1 upstream: reported C repro on 2021/01/11 12:38 > > which seems to indicate that this happened on an Android specific 5.4 > kernel? > > But ok, so I click on the link "upstream: reported C repro on 2021/01/11 12:38" > which takes me to a google group > > https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-android-bugs/c/FQj0qcRSy_M/m/wrY70QFzBAAJ > > which again strongly indicates that this is an Android specific kernel? > > HEAD commit: c9951e5d Merge 5.4.88 into android12-5.4 > git tree: android12-5.4 > > but then I can click on the dashboard link for that crash report and it > takes me to: > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=53897bcb31b82c7a08fe > > which seems to be the upstream report? > > So I'm a bit confused whether I'm even looking at the correct bug report > but I'll just give the repro a try and see what's going on. Ok, reproduced and I think I found the issue. It's not related to close_fd((), I think it's caused by a UAF when FSCONFIG_SET_FD is with the key "source" and a valid fd passed through "aux". Briefly, fs_parameter is a union: struct fs_parameter { const char *key; /* Parameter name */ enum fs_value_type type:8; /* The type of value here */ union { char *string; void *blob; struct filename *name; struct file *file; }; size_t size; int dirfd; }; and cgroup1_parse_param is copying out param->string when the param's key is "source" without verifying that param->type is actually fs_value_is_string. I'll explain in detail in the commit once I've confirmed and tested that my suspicion is correct. Christian ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-14 7:59 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 9:14 ` Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 11:45 ` Dmitry Vyukov 1 sibling, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Dmitry Vyukov @ 2021-07-14 11:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Christian Brauner Cc: Linus Torvalds, syzbot, brauner, Greg Kroah-Hartman, gscrivan, Christoph Hellwig, linux-fsdevel, Linux Kernel Mailing List, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, Al Viro On Wed, 14 Jul 2021 at 09:59, Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 11:49:14AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 9:12 PM syzbot > > <syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > > > Hmm. > > > > This issue is reported to have been already fixed: > > > > Fix commit: 9b5b8722 file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec > > > > and that fix is already in the reported HEAD commit: > > > > > HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. > > > > and the oops report clearly is from that: > > > > > CPU: 1 PID: 8445 Comm: syz-executor493 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 > > > > so the alleged fix is already there. > > > > So clearly commit 9b5b872215fe ("file: fix close_range() for > > unshare+cloexec") does *NOT* fix the issue. > > > > This was originally bisected to that 582f1fb6b721 ("fs, close_range: > > add flag CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC") in > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1bef50bdd9622a1969608d1090b2b4a588d0c6ac > > > > which is where the "fix" is from. > > > > It would probably be good if sysbot made this kind of "hey, it was > > reported fixed, but it's not" very clear. > > > > The KASAN report looks like a use-after-free, and that "use" is > > actually the sanity check that the file count is non-zero, so it's > > really a "struct file *" that has already been free'd. > > > > That bogus free is a regular close() system call > > > > > filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 > > > close_fd+0x5c/0x80 fs/file.c:628 > > > __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1331 [inline] > > > __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1329 [inline] > > > > And it was opened by a "creat()" system call: > > > > > Allocated by task 8445: > > > __alloc_file+0x21/0x280 fs/file_table.c:101 > > > alloc_empty_file+0x6d/0x170 fs/file_table.c:150 > > > path_openat+0xde/0x27f0 fs/namei.c:3493 > > > do_filp_open+0x1aa/0x400 fs/namei.c:3534 > > > do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1204 > > > do_sys_open fs/open.c:1220 [inline] > > > __do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1294 [inline] > > > __se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1288 [inline] > > > __x64_sys_creat+0xc9/0x120 fs/open.c:1288 > > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > > > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > > > > But it has apparently already been closed from a workqueue: > > > > > Freed by task 8445: > > > __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 > > > task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 > > > > So it's some kind of confusion and re-use of a struct file pointer. > > > > Which is certainly consistent with the "fix" in 9b5b872215fe ("file: > > fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec"), but it very much looks like > > that fix was incomplete and not the full story. > > > > Some fdtable got re-allocated? The fix that wasn't a fix ends up > > re-checking the maximum file number under the file_lock, but there's > > clearly something else going on too. > > > > Christian? > > Looking into this now. > > I have to say I'm very confused by the syzkaller report here. > > If I go to > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf > > which is the original link in the report it shows me > > android-54 KASAN: use-after-free Read in filp_close C 2 183d 183d 0/1 upstream: reported C repro on 2021/01/11 12:38 > > which seems to indicate that this happened on an Android specific 5.4 > kernel? Hi Christian, That's "similar bugs" section. In this section syzbot shows previous similar bugs and similar bugs on other kernels (lts, android). "KASAN: use-after-free Read in filp_close" also happened on Android tree, if you click on the link, you can see crashes and reproducers on the android tree: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=255edc9d4f00a881d3bf68b87d09a8b7843409e7 If you are interested only in upstream crashes/reproducers, then ignore the "similar bugs" section. > But ok, so I click on the link "upstream: reported C repro on 2021/01/11 12:38" > which takes me to a google group > > https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-android-bugs/c/FQj0qcRSy_M/m/wrY70QFzBAAJ > > which again strongly indicates that this is an Android specific kernel? > > HEAD commit: c9951e5d Merge 5.4.88 into android12-5.4 > git tree: android12-5.4 > > but then I can click on the dashboard link for that crash report and it > takes me to: > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=53897bcb31b82c7a08fe > > which seems to be the upstream report? > > So I'm a bit confused whether I'm even looking at the correct bug report > but I'll just give the repro a try and see what's going on. > > Christian > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "syzkaller-bugs" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to syzkaller-bugs+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/syzkaller-bugs/20210714075925.jtlfrhhuj4bzff3m%40wittgenstein. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-13 4:12 ` [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) syzbot 2021-07-13 18:49 ` Linus Torvalds @ 2021-07-14 13:51 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 13:54 ` syzbot 2021-07-14 13:57 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 13:53 ` Christian Brauner 2 siblings, 2 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw) To: syzbot Cc: brauner, dvyukov, gregkh, gscrivan, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, torvalds, viro On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 09:12:20PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. > git tree: upstream > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=178919b0300000 > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=20276914ec6ad813 > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=120220f2300000 > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=115f37b4300000 > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > Reported-by: syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > ================================================================== > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic64_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:605 [inline] > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_long_read include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:29 [inline] > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 > Read of size 8 at addr ffff888025a40a78 by task syz-executor493/8445 #syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux.git/ 595fac5cecba71935450ec431eb8dfa963cf45fe ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-14 13:51 ` Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 13:54 ` syzbot 2021-07-14 13:57 ` Christian Brauner 1 sibling, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: syzbot @ 2021-07-14 13:54 UTC (permalink / raw) To: brauner, christian.brauner, dvyukov, gregkh, gscrivan, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, torvalds, viro Hello, syzbot tried to test the proposed patch but the build/boot failed: failed to checkout kernel repo https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux.git/ on commit 595fac5cecba71935450ec431eb8dfa963cf45fe: failed to run ["git" "checkout" "595fac5cecba71935450ec431eb8dfa963cf45fe"]: exit status 128 fatal: reference is not a tree: 595fac5cecba71935450ec431eb8dfa963cf45fe Tested on: commit: [unknown git tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux.git/ 595fac5cecba71935450ec431eb8dfa963cf45fe dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf compiler: ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-14 13:51 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 13:54 ` syzbot @ 2021-07-14 13:57 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 14:16 ` syzbot 1 sibling, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 13:57 UTC (permalink / raw) To: syzbot Cc: brauner, dvyukov, gregkh, gscrivan, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, torvalds, viro On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 03:51:57PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 09:12:20PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > > > HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. > > git tree: upstream > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=178919b0300000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=20276914ec6ad813 > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf > > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=120220f2300000 > > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=115f37b4300000 > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > ================================================================== > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:71 [inline] > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic64_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:605 [inline] > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_long_read include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:29 [inline] > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in filp_close+0x22/0x170 fs/open.c:1306 > > Read of size 8 at addr ffff888025a40a78 by task syz-executor493/8445 > > #syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux.git/ 595fac5cecba71935450ec431eb8dfa963cf45fe Hm, git.kernel.org doesn't seem to have caught up. Let's try: #syz test: https://gitlab.com/brauner/linux.git 595fac5cecba71935450ec431eb8dfa963cf45fe ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-14 13:57 ` Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 14:16 ` syzbot 0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: syzbot @ 2021-07-14 14:16 UTC (permalink / raw) To: brauner, christian.brauner, dvyukov, gregkh, gscrivan, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, torvalds, viro Hello, syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue: Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested on: commit: 595fac5c cgroup: verify that source is a string git tree: https://gitlab.com/brauner/linux.git kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=20276914ec6ad813 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf compiler: Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-13 4:12 ` [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) syzbot 2021-07-13 18:49 ` Linus Torvalds 2021-07-14 13:51 ` Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 13:53 ` Christian Brauner 2021-07-14 13:53 ` syzbot 2 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 13:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: syzbot Cc: brauner, dvyukov, gregkh, gscrivan, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, torvalds, viro On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 09:12:20PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. > git tree: upstream > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=178919b0300000 > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=20276914ec6ad813 > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=120220f2300000 > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=115f37b4300000 > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > Reported-by: syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com #syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux.git/ syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) 2021-07-14 13:53 ` Christian Brauner @ 2021-07-14 13:53 ` syzbot 0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: syzbot @ 2021-07-14 13:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Christian Brauner Cc: brauner, christian.brauner, dvyukov, gregkh, gscrivan, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, stable-commits, stable, syzkaller-bugs, torvalds, viro > On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 09:12:20PM -0700, syzbot wrote: >> syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: >> >> HEAD commit: 7fef2edf sd: don't mess with SD_MINORS for CONFIG_DEBUG_BL.. >> git tree: upstream >> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=178919b0300000 >> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=20276914ec6ad813 >> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=283ce5a46486d6acdbaf >> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=120220f2300000 >> C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=115f37b4300000 >> >> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: >> Reported-by: syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > #syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux.git/ syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf "syzbot+283ce5a46486d6acdbaf" does not look like a valid git branch or commit. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-07-14 14:16 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
[not found] <00000000000069c40405be6bdad4@google.com>
2021-04-02 12:35 ` [PATCH 1/3] file: fix close_range() for unshare+cloexec Christian Brauner
2021-07-13 4:12 ` [syzbot] KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in filp_close (2) syzbot
2021-07-13 18:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-07-14 7:59 ` Christian Brauner
2021-07-14 9:14 ` Christian Brauner
2021-07-14 11:45 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-07-14 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
2021-07-14 13:54 ` syzbot
2021-07-14 13:57 ` Christian Brauner
2021-07-14 14:16 ` syzbot
2021-07-14 13:53 ` Christian Brauner
2021-07-14 13:53 ` syzbot
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox