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From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Security fixes for 2.6.32-stable
Date: Sun, 05 Jul 2015 22:19:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1436131161.7337.12.camel@decadent.org.uk> (raw)


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Willy, here are the security patches I've recently applied to Debian's
2.6.32 branch, aside from "pipe: iovec: Fix memory corruption when
retrying atomic copy as non-atomic" which I sent earlier.

All except the last one ("udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums") have
already been released without reported regressions. The mapping to CVE
IDs is:

  * TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path (CVE-2011-5321)
  * netlink: fix possible spoofing from non-root processes (CVE-2012-6689)
  * eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
    (CVE-2014-9683)
  * HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones (CVE-2014-3184)
  * udf: Verify i_size when loading inode (CVE-2014-9728, CVE-2014-9729)
  * udf: Verify symlink size before loading it (CVE-2014-9728)
  * udf: Treat symlink component of type 2 as / (dependency of following fix)
  * udf: Check path length when reading symlink (CVE-2014-9731)
  * udf: Check component length before reading it
    (CVE-2014-9728, CVE-2014-9730)
  * udf: Remove repeated loads blocksize (dependency of following fix)
  * udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors
    (CVE-2015-4167)
  * udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums (CVE-2015-5364)

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings
Every program is either trivial or else contains at least one bug


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             reply	other threads:[~2015-07-05 21:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-07-05 21:19 Ben Hutchings [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-11-16 19:47 Security fixes for 2.6.32-stable Ben Hutchings
2015-11-16 20:08 ` Willy Tarreau
2015-12-27 20:45 Ben Hutchings
2015-12-27 20:50 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-01-17 14:30 Ben Hutchings
2016-01-17 17:28 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-02-05 17:45 Ben Hutchings
2016-02-05 18:11 ` Willy Tarreau

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