stable.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings" has been added to the 3.10-stable tree
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 08:58:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <145330913814483@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings

to the 3.10-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     keys-prevent-keys-from-being-removed-from-specified-keyrings.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.10 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From d3600bcf9d64d88dc1d189a754dcfab960ce751f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 08:34:46 -0500
Subject: KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

commit d3600bcf9d64d88dc1d189a754dcfab960ce751f upstream.

Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings
(eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire.

This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent
userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed
out a key on a keyring.  When this flag is set on the keyring, all
keys subsequently added are flagged.

In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be
cleared.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/key.h    |    1 
 security/keys/key.c    |    6 ++++-
 security/keys/keyctl.c |   56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE	5	/* set if key is negative */
 #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	6	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
 #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	7	/* set if key has been invalidated */
+#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP		12	/* set if key should not be removed */
 
 	/* the description string
 	 * - this is used to match a key against search criteria
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -434,8 +434,12 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(st
 				awaken = 1;
 
 			/* and link it into the destination keyring */
-			if (keyring)
+			if (keyring) {
+				if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
+					set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
+
 				__key_link(keyring, key, _prealloc);
+			}
 
 			/* disable the authorisation key */
 			if (authkey)
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -358,11 +358,14 @@ error:
  * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
  * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
  *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 is returned.
  */
 long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	struct key *key;
 	long ret;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
@@ -377,8 +380,13 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 		}
 	}
 
-	key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
-	ret = 0;
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+	else {
+		key_revoke(key);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error:
@@ -392,11 +400,14 @@ error:
  * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
  * immediately.
  *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 is returned.
  */
 long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	struct key *key;
 	long ret;
 
 	kenter("%d", id);
@@ -407,8 +418,13 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
-	ret = 0;
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else {
+		key_invalidate(key);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error:
@@ -420,12 +436,13 @@ error:
  * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
  * special keyring IDs is used.
  *
- * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work.  If
- * successful, 0 will be returned.
+ * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have
+ * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work.  If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
 long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 {
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref;
+	struct key *keyring;
 	long ret;
 
 	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
@@ -447,7 +464,11 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t r
 	}
 
 clear:
-	ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		ret = keyring_clear(keyring);
 error_put:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
 error:
@@ -498,11 +519,14 @@ error:
  * itself need not grant the caller anything.  If the last link to a key is
  * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
  *
+ * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
 long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 {
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
+	struct key *keyring, *key;
 	long ret;
 
 	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
@@ -517,7 +541,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t
 		goto error2;
 	}
 
-	ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags) &&
+	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		ret = key_unlink(keyring, key);
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error2:
@@ -1306,6 +1336,8 @@ error:
  * the current time.  The key and any links to the key will be automatically
  * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
  *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 is returned.
  */
 long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
@@ -1337,10 +1369,14 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id,
 
 okay:
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
-	key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else {
+		key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
 	key_put(key);
 
-	ret = 0;
 error:
 	return ret;
 }


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com are

queue-3.10/keys-refcount-bug-fix.patch
queue-3.10/keys-prevent-keys-from-being-removed-from-specified-keyrings.patch

             reply	other threads:[~2016-01-20 16:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-20 16:58 gregkh [this message]
2016-01-20 18:15 ` Patch "KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings" has been added to the 3.10-stable tree Mimi Zohar
2016-01-20 18:36   ` Greg KH
2016-01-20 19:23     ` Mimi Zohar

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=145330913814483@kroah.com \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).