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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ware@linux.intel.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	james.l.morris@oracle.com, xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com,
	zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons" has been added to the 3.10-stable tree
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2016 14:18:13 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1455488293224228@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons

to the 3.10-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     evm-use-crypto_memneq-for-digest-comparisons.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.10 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 15:58:44 -0800
Subject: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons

From: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>

commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream.

This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include "evm.h"
 
 int evm_initialized;
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_
 				   xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
 		if (rc)
 			break;
-		rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
+		rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
 			    sizeof(calc.digest));
 		if (rc)
 			rc = -EINVAL;


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ware@linux.intel.com are

queue-3.10/evm-use-crypto_memneq-for-digest-comparisons.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2016-02-14 22:18 UTC|newest]

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