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From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>,
	Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Subject: [patch added to 3.12-stable] netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 14:14:21 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1461240870-2373-8-git-send-email-jslaby@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1461240870-2373-1-git-send-email-jslaby@suse.cz>

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

This patch has been added to the 3.12 stable tree. If you have any
objections, please let us know.

===============

commit bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617 upstream.

We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 17 ++++++++---------
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 17 ++++++++---------
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 17 ++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index c8abe31961ed..269759dd96f4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -465,14 +465,12 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
+static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -513,10 +511,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	t = arpt_get_target(e);
 	target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
 					t->u.user.revision);
@@ -561,6 +555,7 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -575,6 +570,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1232,7 +1231,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 651c10774d58..5ca478f13080 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -560,14 +560,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -657,10 +655,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -724,6 +718,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -738,6 +733,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1498,7 +1497,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index 89a4e4ddd8bb..597f539f3d33 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -570,14 +570,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -668,10 +666,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -735,6 +729,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -749,6 +744,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1510,7 +1509,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-- 
2.8.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-04-21 12:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-04-21 12:14 [patch added to 3.12-stable] cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] fs, seq_file: fallback to vmalloc instead of oom kill processes Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] fs, seqfile: always allow oom killer Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] mmc: Allow forward compatibility for eMMC Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] ALSA: timer: Sync timer deletion at closing the system timer Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] SUNRPC: Fix large reads on NFS/RDMA Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` Jiri Slaby [this message]
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper Jiri Slaby
2016-04-22 15:38   ` Michal Kubecek
2016-04-23 16:46     ` Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] fs/pipe.c: skip file_update_time on frozen fs Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] crypto: crypto_memneq - add equality testing of memory regions w/o timing leaks Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] KVM: x86: removing unused variable Jiri Slaby
2016-04-21 12:14 ` [patch added to 3.12-stable] KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state Jiri Slaby

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