From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: jglisse@redhat.com, alexander.deucher@amd.com,
christian.koenig@amd.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/amdgpu: forbid mapping of userptr bo through radeon" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree
Date: Sun, 01 May 2016 15:56:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <146214337419637@kroah.com> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 054892ed6a1645e265bc35641c2a96433a051453 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A9r=C3=B4me=20Glisse?= <jglisse@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2016 09:07:51 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] drm/amdgpu: forbid mapping of userptr bo through radeon
device file
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Allowing userptr bo which are basicly a list of page from some vma
(so either anonymous page or file backed page) would lead to serious
corruption of kernel structures and counters (because we overwrite
the page->mapping field when mapping buffer).
This will already block if the buffer was populated before anyone does
try to mmap it because then TTM_PAGE_FLAG_SG would be set in in the
ttm_tt flags. But that flag is check before ttm_tt_populate in the ttm
vm fault handler.
So to be safe just add a check to verify_access() callback.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c
index 6f3369de232f..11af4492b4be 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c
@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ static int amdgpu_verify_access(struct ttm_buffer_object *bo, struct file *filp)
{
struct amdgpu_bo *rbo = container_of(bo, struct amdgpu_bo, tbo);
+ if (amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_usermm(bo->ttm))
+ return -EPERM;
return drm_vma_node_verify_access(&rbo->gem_base.vma_node, filp);
}
reply other threads:[~2016-05-01 22:56 UTC|newest]
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